ML19210A442

Tech Spec Change Request 61 Supporting Licensee Request to Change App a of License DPR-50 Re Incorporation of Surveillance Requirements on Throttle Valves Per NRC 770701 Request.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19210A442
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	09/07/1977
From:	Arnold R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19210A385	List: ML19210A384 ML19210A442
References
NUDOCS 7910290794
Download: ML19210A442 (5)

Text

L'ETROPOLITA'I EDISCU COMPANY JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY T.51EE MILE ISLAND UUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Technical Scecification Change Reauest No. 61 This Technical Specification Change Request is submitted in support of Licensee's request to change Appendix A to Operating License No. DPR-50 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1. As a part of this request, proposed replacement pages for Appendix A are also included.

E CPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY

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/ Vic'e President Sworn and subscribed to me this 7u day of M w h 66 , 1977.

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$7u ?! - w Notary Public RITA \1. POWERS No:a i Putt:c. *.'#!enterg T.v;:.. Eerms Ca.

Vy Ccmrmssion E9res Se;' amter 30,1978 1469 062 N91029c 9

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REOULATCRY COMMISSIO!T IN THE MATTER OF DOCKET NO. 50-289

, LICENSE NO. DPR-50 METROPOLITA'I EDISON COMPANY This is to certify that a copy of Technical Specification Change Request No. 61 to Appendix A of the Operating License for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1, has , on the date giver. beluw, been filed with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission and been served on the chief executives of Londonderry Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania and Dauphin County, Pennsylvania by deposit in the United States call, addressed as follows:

Vr. Weldon B. Arehart Mr. Harry B. Reese, Jr.

Board of Supervisors of Board of County Cemissioners Londonderry Township of Dauphin County R. D. #1, Geyers Church Road Dauphin County Court House Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Harzisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPA'IY s

By /V b Vice President Dated: Septe-ber 7 . 10~7 1469 0t'3

Three Mile Island Nuclear Statien, Unit 1 Operating Licence No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Technical Specification Chance Recuest No. 61 The licencee requests that the attached changed pages replace pages h bl, h-h2 of the Technical Specifications Appendix A.

Reasons for Chance Reauest The NRC, in their letter dated July 1, 1977, requested all nuclear stations which use EPI and/or LPI throttle valves to propose changes to the technical specifications to incorporate surveillance require =ents on the throttle valves.

Safety Analysis Justifying Chance This change request increases the surveillance requirements for the HPI and LPI systems to provide additional assurance that they will function as assumed in the ECCS analyses. The surveillance assures proper flow and flow distribution to all necessary injection points by periodically checking those elements of the HPI and LPI systems which could adversely affect mini =n:e flow and/or correct flow distribution.

Exceptions have been taken to the NRC suggested surveillances in two instances.

First, no verification of the position stop is specified for the decay heat throttle valves in that they are manually operated and m not have positive stops. The intent of the suggested surveillance vill be .ulfilled by verifying that the valves are locked in the correct throttled position by observation of the position indicators. Second, the correct position of the HPI throttle valves is verified by observation of the position indicator lights in lieu of direct observation in that:

(1) Direct observation of the HPI throttle valve position or position stop is not possible without partial disassembly of the valve operator.

(2 } Due to the valves' small size, only gross changes in the position stop setting could be detected by direct observation, thus meaningful information could not be obtained.

(3) These throttle valves are frequently stroked and are in a relatively high radiation area, consequently frequent direct observation vould result in a significant can-rem dose commitment.

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h.5.2 DIERGENCY CORE GOOLING SYSTEM Applicability Applies to periodic testing requirement for emergency core cooling systems.

Objective To verify that the emergney core cooling systems are operable.

Specifiestion h.5.2.1 Hiah Pressu-e In.iection

a. During each refueling interval and following maintenance or modification that affects system flow characteristics, system pumps and system high point vents shall be vented, and a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate that the system is operable.

After a satisfactory test of the E=ergency loading sequence (h.5.1),

the M. U. Pump and its required supporting auxiliaries vill be started manually by the operator and a test signal vill be applied to the High Pressure injection valves MU-V-16A, 3, C, D to de=onstrate l actuation of the high pressure injection system for emergency core cooling operaticn.

b. The test vill be considered satisfactory if the valves have completed their travel and the M. U. pumps are running as evidenced by the control board compcnent operating lights. Minimum acceptable flov must be greater than or equal to 200 gym per injection leg and greater than or equal to 500 gpm per EPI pump.

c. The correct li=it switch setting of MU-V-16A, B, C, D vill be verified within four hours of any maintenance on the valve or operator that affects the limit switch setting.

h.5 2.2 Lov Pressure Injection

a. During each refueling period and following maintenance or modification that affects system flow characteristics, system pumps and high point vents shall be vented, and a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate that the system is operable. The auxiliaries required for low pressure injection are all included in the emergency loading sequence specified in h.5.1.

b. The test vill be considered satisfactory if the decay heat pumps listed in h.5.1.lb have been successfully started and the decay beat injection valves and the decay heat supply valves have cc=pleted their travel as evidenced by the control board component operating lights. Mini =um acceptable flow must be greater than or equal to 2700 gym per injection leg /LPI pump.

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c. The correct position of DH-V-19A/3 shall be verified within four hours of each valve stroking operation or valve =aintenance, which affects the position indicator, when the Decay Heat System is required to be operable, h.5.2.3 Core Flooding

a. During each refueling pcriod, a system test shall be conducted to demonstrate proper operation of the system. During depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System, verification shall be made that the check and isolation valves in the core flooding tank discharge lines operate properly. _

b. The test vill be considered satisfactory if control board indication of core flood tank level verifies that all valves have opened.

h.5 2.h Comnonent Tests

a. At intervals not to exceed 3 months, the components required for emergency core cooling vill be tested.

b. The test vill be considered satisfactory if the pumps and fans have been successfully started and the valves have completed their travel as evidenced by the control board component operating lights, and either the station compater or pressure / flow indication.

Bases t

The e=ergency core cooling syste=s are the principal reactor safety features in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The removal of heat from the core provided by these syste=s is designed to limit core damage.

The low pressure injection pumps are tested singularly for operability by opening the borated water storage tank outlet valves and the bypass valves in the borated water storage tank fill line. This allows water to be pumped from the borated water storage tank through each of the injection lines and back to the tank.

The minimum acceptable HPI/LPI flov assures proper flow and flow split between injection legs. Post maintenance inspection of the HPI/LPI injection valves will assure their correct throttled position in the event of Engineered Safeguards actuation.

With the reactor shutdown, the valves in each core flooding line are checked for operability by reducing the reactor coolant system pressure until the indicated level in the core flood tanks verify that the check and isolation valves have opened.

Reference (1) FSAR, Section 6.

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