ML19209C399
| ML19209C399 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1979 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Clinton B ARKANSAS, STATE OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910150281 | |
| Download: ML19209C399 (3) | |
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SEP 2 41979 The Honorable Bill Clinton Office of the Governor State Capitol Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
Dear Governor Clinton:
I am pleased with the excellent report on the Three Mile Island Accident whicn was prepared by the Task Force of Arkansans you appointed in late April of this year. Most of the recomendations made by your Task Force parallel those that have been under active consideration by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Therefore we will have little difficulty in either directly implementing the recomendations of your Task Force or taking alternate actions which will reach the same objectives.
As you are aware, various groups are still engaged in study of the Threo Mile Accident. An interdisciplinary team within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu-lation recently completed a report entitled, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force:
Status Report and Short-Tenn Recomendations" (NUREG-0578). A copy of this report is encitsed.
I expect to take action in the near future to initiate implementation of most of these short-term recomendations. Some of these bear on the recomendations of your Task Force.
The Lessons Learned Task Force has turned its attention to longer term recommen-dations and expects to issue a second report in October.
Some of the topics under study are re'ated to recommendations by your Task Force. Others are under active study by various offices in the Comission. Provided below are comments on specific items in the Arkansas Report.
(1) At page 8 of the Arkansas Report it is stated, "It is the recommenda-tion of the Task Force that the NRC consider broadening its definition of events requiring early notification to include reactor trips and that a detailed analysis of the causes of such trips and the actions taken in consequence be made and reported by the operators."
The NRC is aware that there are deficiencies in reporting requirements.
While we do not believe that all reactor trips need to be reported promptly, it is expected that a requirement will be developed (among others) to report those instances wherein any significant deviation from expected systems behavior is observed. This would include instan-ces where significant human errors or equipment malfunctions were in-volved. Just as importantly, NRC will establish an internal system which will assure ' hat abnormal occurrences are reviewed systematically and assure feedback of such information to all parties involved.
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The Honorable Bill Clinton SEP 2 41979 You may note that NUREG-0570, Section 2.2.1.b, " Shift Technical Advisor", bears on the need for utilities to consider such infor-mation in a self-policing way.
(2) At pages 8 and 9 of their report, the Arkansas Task Force noted com-ments by the ACRS with respect to the need for expedited research regarding assurance of natural circulation. Planning for appropriate rs. search in this area is underway.
In addition a significant amount ci analysis work is underway to explore cooling requirements unoer degraded conditions (e.g., "small breaks") to assure that operations personnel are fully aware of systems behavior and the remedial actions that should be taken. You may note that some of the recommendations in NUREG-0578 bear on analyses, instrumentation requirements, and asso-ciated operator training. Various means for measuring " liquid level" in the reactor vessel are being explored.
As a result of coments by the ACRS, I have added three items to the recomendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force. These are require-ments to provide extended range pressure instrumentation, extended range water level instrumentation, and instrumentation for continuous monitoring of hydrogen concentration in containment buildings.
I have also added a requirement to make provision for high point venting of non-condensible gases in reactor coolant systems.
(3) At page 9 of the Arkansas Report it is stated, "In the opinion of the Task Force, the improvement or expansion of the ability to automati-cally and continuously monitor, record, and evaluate a multitude of plant parameters would be an invaluable aid..."
We fully agree, and the Lessons Learned Task Force is currently working on requirements for computerized monitoring of systems status. As an adjunct, attention is alsc being given to improved display of key infor-mation in the control room and to the possible application of computer-ized disturbance analysis systems as aids to the operators.
(4) At page 10 of the Arkansas Report it is stated that, "The Task Force further recomer.ds that the NRC examine the potential for improvement of supervision and regulatory enforcement of operating nuclear power pl an ts. "
Several sections of NUREG-0578 bear on this recommendation as it af-fects plant operating personnel, and the Lessons Learned Task Force is actively studying the role of utility management responsibilities to further improve plant supervision and oversight. Matters related to deciding the most effective role of NRC inspectors are under study by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
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SEP 2 41979 The Honorable Bill Clinton (5)
In " Item 4" of the Arkansas report, it is noted that there is need for identification of specific. individuals (utilities, local, state, and NRC) to obviate the confusion in transfer of information that pre-vailed at TMI-2.
You can be assured that this problem is being addressed in connection with upgrading of emergency preparedness planning as it affects NRC, other federal agencies, state and local governments and the utilities themselves. Other specific coments in " Item 4" are sound and are receiving expeditious attention by those within NRC who are engaged in emergency action plans.
(6) The comments under " Item 5" of the Arkaasas report bear principally on communications between AP&L and State agencies.
It is noted, how-ever, :. hat there is need for means to assure that public complaints received by NRC are comun1cated to AP&L and the State. Normally AP&L would be made aware of such complaints; perhaps some additional arrangement could be made to assure the State is infonned.
As a final coment, I would like to bring you up to date on the sources of high activity in the Auxiliary Building at Three Mile Island.
It was previously reported by NRC and others that the principal source was water pumped to the Auxiliary Building from the reactor building sump; this was also noted at page 5 of the Arkansas Report. While considerable water was pumped out of the reactor building, subsequent investigation has established that the sump pumps were turned off (at about 30 minutes) before the core became damaged.
It is now certain that the principal source of activity in the Auxiliary Building was leakage from systems which were in service subsequent to core damage, principally from the reactor coolant letdown system portions of which are in the Auxiliary Building.
I am pleased to have had the opportunity to review the Arkansas Task Force Report.
I will welcome any additional comments.
Sincerely, preal am :rg g L1.i;. 0 ctaa Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
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CLINTON,8 Arkansas, State of RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION W
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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,i SUBJECTS Forwards final rept oy Nuclear Energy Study Task Force ce.
I implications of TMI accident on facility.
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6 TITLE: Exec. Correspondence (No specifie Dkt. Trans, to Denton/
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!aly 19,1979
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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
On April 25, 1979 in response to the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, I appointed a task force comprised of Arkansans to examine that accident. The group also was to determine whether or not there could be any possible design relationship with Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One at Russellville, since both reactors were designed by Babcock and Wilcox.
I needed technical information upon which I could base judgments and from which I could make decisions relative to ANO-1.
ANO-1, as you will recall, was scheduled for routine refueling and maintenance, shortly after the TMI accident. I asked my task force to provide me with a report arior to the restart of ANO-1.
A copy of the report is enclosed. The tass force worked very hard in providing the report to me in less than one month's time, and for their dedication I am grateful. Moreover, I think it is a good report with very important points to be considered. However, upon receipt of the May 24th report I felt there were a few other questions for which I needed answers. I therefore asked for more information b'y letter of May 29th, copy attached. The task force again complied and I am enclosing a copy of the June 26th reply.
I urga that you review the enclosed material and implement the recommendations of my Nuclear Energy Study Task Force.
incerely,
4 BILL CLINTON Governor
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DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING Meenanical Engineenng Building Fayetteville. Arkansas 72701 (501) 575-3153 UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS College of Engineering 29 !!ay 1979
!iEliORA!10Utt TO:
The Ifonorable Bill Clinton MAY 301979 Governor of Arkansas TilROUGil:
fir. David Criner GOV 8m0r's Office Office of the Governor sn fiuclear Energy Study Task Force //,((
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SUBJECT:
Final Report Submission Enclosed please find the final report of the Task Force. This report has received the unanimous approval of all of the Task Force members.
I!e understand from Mr. Criner that you may have further questions relative to our efforts. tie will answer these by letter or by amendments to this final report.
1146 334 Tme ueeversity of Armansas 's an Eawai Cecor%edy Emcioyer
b FINAL REPORT TO THE HONORABLE BILL CLINTON GOVERNOR OF ARKANSAS by Nuclear Energy Study Task Force Cecil 0. Cogburn Glenn V. Dalrymple Linda B.
Dare Daniel M.
Mathews Milton E. McLain, Jr. - Chairman Joe F. Nix Charles B.
Richardson Jerry Webb Ira B. Whitney E. Frank Wilson May 24, 1979
!l46 335
J EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Since the accident at the Three Mile Island nucleee power plant in Pennsylvania in late March of this year, increased at-tention has been focused on f actors affecting the operational safety of pressurized water reactors and particularly those manufactured by the Babcock & Wilcox Company.
One such nuclear power plant is operated in Arkansas by the Arkansas Power & Light Company near Russellville.
The Nuclear Energy Study Task Force, appointed by Governor Clinton, has studied information available from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other sources relating to the Three Mile Island accident and has investigated the impli-cLt;ons for the Arkansas facility.
It should be understood that at the time of this writing, information concerning the Three Mile Island accident is still being gathered and evaluated by a number of federal, state, and local agencies.
Such future information as may be available should be incorporated into later valuations of this accident.
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One has been operated by the Arkansas Power & Light Company since December 1974.
During this period minor malfunctions have occurred and have been corrected.
Some improvements have been made in the reactor safety systems as called for in directives from the Nuclear i gulatory Commission e
or_from internal recommendations within Arkansas Power & Light Company.
Since the plant was s
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those related to the events leading to the Three Mile Island accident.
It appears to the Task Force that all the changes in the mechanical systems, control, systems and operating procedures a
as recommended or directed by the U.'S.
Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission since the accident are being made by Arkansas Power &
Light Company.
Operating personnel at the Arkansas plant have several years of experience in the operation of this facility and have recently received additional training in emergency pro-cedures based on the Three Mile Island accident sequence of events.
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit One was considered adequately safe and reliable prior to the recent shut down.
Its safety and reliability now seem improved against an accident such as occurred at Three Mile Island.
In spite of the apparent low risk of an accident of the Three Mile Island type or other serious incident occurring at the Arkansas nuclear plant, there appears to be a need for further study of the potential causes for such malfunctions in pressurized water reactors, and a need for additional emergency planning by the State.
Especially needed in emergency plans are clear lines of authority and communication, more detailed evacuation plans accompanied by public information programs and periodic drills.
Improved public understanding of nuclear energy and radiation hazards are also needed.
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