ML19209C005

Submits Results of Safe Shutdown Analysis & Conceptual Design for Alternate Shutdown Capability,Per Safety Evaluation Supporting Fire Protection Amend 35

ML19209C005
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	10/05/1979
From:	Andognini G BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
79-195, NUDOCS 7910110386
Download: ML19209C005 (7)

Text

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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY GENERAL OFFICES Guo GovkSTON STREET GasTON. M ASSACNusETTs c2199

0. CAAL ANDOGNINI

$ 6 P E RI NT E N D E N T NUCLE Am OPERATIONS OEPARTMENT october 5, 1979 BECo. Ltr. #79 195 Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Oper ating Reactors _

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regule. tion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 License No. DPR-35 Docket No. 50-293 Information on Alternate Shutdown Capability per Fite Protection Amendment No. 35

Dear Sir:

This letter, provides you with the results of a safe shutdown analysis and conceptual design for Alternate Shutdom capability, as required per Table 3.1 of the safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 35 to our operating license.

Th a four day delay in submitting our response is due to additional time that was required to verify the accuracy of a computer code which was recently developed by Boston Edison Company to search the cable and raceway schedules to compile a list of components necessary to achieve a safe shutdown.

Item 3.1.18 Alternate Shutdown Capability An alternate shutdown system will be provided, independeat of cabling and equipment in the cable spreading room.

Response

A. Analysis

}~'0 044 An analysis was conducted to determine the capability to accomplish a safe plant shutdown with total loss of function ,

of the cable spreading room (CSR) due to an assumed fire. '

The following assumptions were made:

1. No analyzed accident occurs concurrently with a fire in the CSR.

2. The most severe natural phenomena do not occur concur- t h

i rently with a fire in the CSR.

3. Safety related component failures do not occur concur- 6 rently by with a the fire. fire in the CSR, except as directly caused '[()g 79101103F6

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BCsTON EOMON COMPANY Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief October 5, 1979 Page 2

4. Abnormal r .erational trsnsients, as defined in the FSAR Appendix ' :an occur concurrently with a fire in the CSR.

5. One of the redundant safety divisions in the CSR is conservatively assumed to be functional during the initial period of twenty minutes from the time a fire is detected and the emergency shutdown procedure is -

initiated. This is based on 1) the defense-in-depth fire protection presently available in the CSR in the form of automatic smoke and heat detectors, automatic CO2 suppression system, fire barrier protection and spatial separation between safety division raceways,

2) proposed coating of all PVC insulated cables, all redundant rafety Division B exposed cables and the bottom part of all lower most cable trays with fire retardant material, and 3) encasing safety Division B power conduits in a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> enclosure to assure their functionability Isolation of all switches located in the local isolation panels will be accomplished during this time period.

6. Spurious operation of equipment and switchgear may occur due to a fire in the CSR if the control ettcuits pass through the CSR.

7. Three plant operators will be available to implement the e=ergency shutdown procedure.

The safety related equipment and switchgear required to be operable for safe shutdown have been identified (see Attached Table 1). The safety related equipment and suitchgear which are not required to be operable for safe plant shutdown, but whose spurious actuation could prevent the accomplishment of a safe shutdown have been identified as well (see Attached Table II).

Eaceway layouts and circuit schedules have been reviewed to determine the power, control, and instrumentation cables  ;

that are associated with safety-related safe shutdown equip- .

=ent listed on Tables I and II, which pass through the cable spreading room. The review has identified the equipment for which spurious activation can be prevented (or operability can be achieved) by deenergizing (or energizing) a switchgear breaker. In addition,a list of components, for which a design modification is required to assure their operability, was generated (see attached Table III).

7n JV n45 u

BOSTON E* DIS D N COMPANY Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief October 5, 1979 Page 3 B. Conceptual Design A design has been formulated to install L'olation switenes for safccy-related equipment that will provide tne capability for the plant operators to reach a safe shutdown condition indep-endent of the CSR and control room panels.

These switches will isolate their associated equipment from .

the CSR cables and thus transfer control from the control room to the local emergency shutdown stations outside the CSR. The local emergency shutdown panels and isolation switches will be seismically qualified and will be located as close as practical to the equipment or switchgear they serve.

Manual operator actions will be relied upon when feasible; otherwise operation will be by electrical means from the local emergency shutdown stations in the plant. Spurious actuation of equipment and usitchgear that are not required to coerate but c.'uld adversely affect plant safe shutdown will be prevented by deenergizing appropriate breakers and/or control circuits.

An emergency shutdown procedure, vhich is compatible with the design modifications and plant operator availability will be prepared to coordinate the opurator actions required to accomplish a safe plant shutdown.

All local emergency shutdown stations will be provided with key-locked doors or switches to insure that plant safety is not compromised during normal operation. In addition, an indicating light will be provided on the outside of each emergency shutdown panel which will be illuminated when all switches are in their

" Normal" plant operation positions. This status can be regularly monitored by plant operators. The control room position or status indicating lights for equipment and switchgear also serve to verify proper isolation switch position.

Two sketches showing the schematic diagram of a typical control circuit are attached:

1. Drawing E-lic shows existing schematic of RBCCW pump P202A.

2. DCN B2 to E-176 shows the same schematic with isolation switch located in one of the emergency shutdown panels.

Should you have any questions on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours,

/'

Attachments 1 and 2 il30 Tables I, II and III 0,16

TABLE I Safe Shutdown Equipment and Switchgear - Operation May be Required RHR Test Line Valve - MO 1001-34B RHR Test Line Valve - MO 1001-36B -

RHR Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Valve - MO 4060A RHR Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Valve - MO 4010A CS Injection Valve - MO 1400-25A CS Injection Valve - MO 1400-25B HPCI Turbine Seal Vacuum Pump - P223 HPCI Turbine Auxiliary 011 Pump - P229 HPC1 Steam Line Isolation Valve - MD 2301-3 HPCI Injection Valve - MD 2301-8 HPCI Pump Min. Flow Valve - MO 2301-14 RCIC Turbine Seal Vacuum Pumn - P222 RCIC Steam Supply Valve - Mc 101-61 RCIC Pump Inje tion Valve ..J 1301-49 RCIC Pu=p Min. Flow Valve - MO 1301-60 RCIC Pump Cooling Water Valve - MO 1301-62 Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-3A Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-3B Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-3C Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-3D RBCCW Pu=p - P202A RBCCW Pu=p - P202B RBCCW Pu=p - P202D RBCCW Pump - P202E Core Spray PP 215A Core Spray PP 2153 RHR Pu=p P203A RER Puup P203B RHR Pump P203C RHR Pump P203D SSW Pu=p - P208A SSW Pump - P208B SSW Pump - P208D SSW Pu=p - P208E RER Test Line Valve - MO 1001-34A RHR Test Line Valve - MO 1001-36A Diesel Generator A Diesel Generator B HPCI Turbine /Pu=p RCIC Turbine / Pump Diesel Oil Transfer Pu=p - P141A Diesel Oil Transfer Pump - P141B RHR/CS Room Unit Cooler - VAC 204A ,.

RER/CS Room Unit Cooler - VAC 204C -

RCIC Roem Unit Cooler - VAC 202A -

HPCI Room Unit Cooler - VAC 201A Breaker 152-505 to A5 from Auxiliary Transformer Breaker 152-504 to A5 from SU Transformer Breaker 152-509 to A5 from Diesel Generator .,

Breaker 152-605 to A6 from Auxiliary Transformer Breaker 152-604 to A6 from SU Transformer -

Breaker 152-609 to A6 from Diesel Generator Breaker 52-102 to B6 from 31 Breaker 52-202 to B6 from B2 j1}U? fig 8 V /

Breaker 52-105 to B29 from B1 Breaker 52-203 to B28 from B2

TABLE I (Continued)

Safe Shutdown Equipment and Switchgear - Operation May be Required ,

RHR Shutdown Cooling Iso. Valve M01001-47 RHR Pump Suction Valve M01001-7A RHR Pump Suction Valve M01001-7B RHR Pump Suction Valve M01001-7C RHR Pump Suction Valve M01001-7D RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Iso. Valve M01001-50 RHR Shutdown Cooling Block Valve M01001-43A RHR Shutdown Cooling Block Valve M01001-43B RHR Shatdown Cooling Block Valve M01001-43C ~

RRR Shutdown Cooling Block Valve M01001-43D RHR Inboard Valve M01001-28A RHR Inboard Valve M01001-28B -

RHR Balancing Valve M01001-19 RHR Balancing Valve 1001-53 HPCI Test Bypass Valve to Cond. Storage Tank M02301-10 RCIC Test Bypass Valve to Cond. Storage Tank M01301-53 1130 U48

TABLE II Safe Shutdown Eculpeent and Switcheear - Operation Not Required

' Norn. Plant Operation Description Status RHR H.X. Bypass Valve - MO 1001-16A Closed RHR H.X. Bypass Valve - MO 1001-16B Closed RHR Cont. Spray Valve - MO 1001-23A Closed RUR Cent. Spray Valve - MO 1001-23B Closed RHR Head Spray Valve - MO 1001-60 Closea CS Test Line Valve - MO 1400-4A Closed .

CS Test Line Valve - MO 1400-4B Closed CS Pp. Suction Valve - MO 1400-3A Open CS Pp. Suction Valve - MO 1400-3B Open CS Pp. Injection Valve - MO 1400-24A Open CS Pp. Injection Valve - MO 1400-24B Open EPCI Steam Line Iso. valve - MO 2301-4 Open HPCI Pp. Suction Valve - MO 2301-6 Open RFCl Steam Line Iso. Valve - MO 2301-5 Open HPCI Pp. Injection Valve - MO 2301-9 Open RCIC Steam Line Iso. Valve - MO 1301-16 Open RCIC Steam Line Iso. Valve - MO 1301-17 Open RCIC Pp. Suction Valve - MO 1301-22 Open RCIC Pp. Discharge Valve - MO 1301-48 Open RBCW H.X. Outlet Valve - MO 3800 Open RBCW H.X. Outlet Valve - MO 3806 Open Erkr. 152-508 for X21 (from AS) Closed Brkr. 152-608 for X22 (from A6) Closed Brkt.52-101 for B1 (from X21) Closed Erkr.52-201 for B2 (from X22) Closed Brkr.52-310 for B3 (from B1) Open Brkr.52-410 for B4 (from B2) Open Erkr.52-103 fer BIS (frem B1) Closed Brkr.52-104 for B17 (from Bl) Closed Brkr.52-204 for B14 (from B2) Closed Brkr.52-205 for B18 (frem D2) Closed RHR Min. Flow Bypass Valve MO 1001-18A Open RHR Min. Flow Bypass Valve MO 1001-18B Open Main St'eam Drain Iso. Valve MO 220-2 Closed Brkr's 72-166, 72-161, 72-29 (for D16) Closed Brkr's 72-176, 72-171, 72-30 (for D17) Closed Brkr 72-1021 (D9 to D10) Closed Brkr's 72-101.^, 72-31 (D10 to D3) Closed -;

Brkr 72-165 (D16 to D4) Closed  ;

Brkr 72-175 (D17 to DS) C1csed RHR Cutboard Valve MO 1001-29A Open RER Outboard Valva Mo 1001-29B - Open P00RORSINE 1130 049

TABLE III Components Re.;.jir31nD L esign Modification Syster Component Service Water SSW Pump P208A SSW Pump P208B SSW Pump P208D SSW Pump P208E RBCCW RBCCW Pu=p P202A RBCCW Pump P202B RBCCW Pump P202D RBCCW Pump P202E Heat Ex. Cooling Wtr. MO 4060A -

Hest Ex. Colling Wtr. MO 4010A Diesel & Standby AC Diesel Gen. Control Circuits RHR RHR PP. Suct. Vv. M0 1001-7A RHR PP. Suct. Vv. M0 1001-7B RHR Shutdown Cooling Vv. MO 1001-43A RHR Shutdown Cooling Vv. M0 1001-43B RHR Test Line Valve M0 1001-34A RHR Test Line Valve MO 1001-34B RHR Test Line Valve M0 1001-36A RHR Test Line Valve M0 1001-36B RER Chutdown Cocling Suction Iso. Valve MO 1001-50 RCIC Turb. Gland Seal Vacuum Pump P222 Steam Supply Valve MO 1301-61 PP Discharge Block Valve M0 1301-49 PP Min. Flow Bypass M0 1301-60 Turb. Cooling Shutoff MO 1301-62 Test Bypass to CST Vv 1301-53 RCIC Turbine / Pump HPCI PP Min. Recir'c. Block Valve M0 2301-14 Gland Seal Vacuum Pump P223 Turb. Aux. Oil Pump P229 Turb. Steam Supply M0 2301-3 PP Disch. Valve MO 2301-8 Test Bypass to CST Vv MO 2301-10 HPCI Turbine / Pump ADS Auto Blowdown Relief Valve SV203-3A Auto Blowdown Relief Valve SV203-3B Auto Blowdown Relief Valve SV203-3C .

Auto Blowdown Relief Valve SV203-3D Core Spray Block Valve A Loop MO 1400-25A Bleck Valve B Loop M0 1400-25B

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