ML19209A604

Forwards Addl Info Re Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability as Indicated in Safety Evaluation for Fire Protection Supporting Amend 44 to OL DPR-50

ML19209A604
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	09/11/1979
From:	Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Arnold R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 7910050053
Download: ML19209A604 (9)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y

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September 11, 1979 gj/gg

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50-Docket No. 289 Mr. R. C. Arnold Senior Vice President

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Metropolitan Edison Company

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260 Cherry Hill Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

Dear Mr. Arnold:

In the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for fire protection supporting Amendment No. 44 to Facility Operating License No. CPR-50 for the Three Mile Island, Unit No.1, Alternate Safe Shutdcwn Capability was identified as a modification for which additional infomation was required in Section 3.1.21.

To expedite the completion of our review of this item, we are enclosing our position entitled,

" Safe Shutdown Capability". Section 8 of this document specifies the infomation we require to complete cur review. Please provide this infomation within 90 days of'the date of this letter. If scme of the infomation is already available in a previous submittal, you need only reference that material.

Sincerely, l

Y.

Ro ert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:

Staff Position -

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Safe Shutdcwn Capability cc w/enclasure:

See next cage

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e Metropolitan Edison Company cc w/ enclosure (s):

G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Dauphin County Office Emergency Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Preparedness 1800 M Street, N.W.

Court House, Roan 7 Washington, D. C.

20036 Front & Market Streets Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 GPU Service Corporation Richard W. Heward, Project Manager Mr. E. G. Wallace Department of Environmental Resources Licensing Manager ATTN: Director, Office of Radiological 260 Cherry Hill Road Heal th Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Post Office Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105 Pennsylvania Electric Company Mr. R. W. Conre.d Director, Technical Assessment Vice President, Generation Division 1001 Broad Street Office of Radiation Programs Johnstown, Pennsylvania 15907 (AW-459)

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency "iss Mary V. Southard, Chair 1 nan Crystal Mall #2 Citizens for a Safe Environment Arlington, Virginia 20460 Post Office Box 405 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Babcock & Wilcox Government Publications Section Nuclear Power Generation Division State of Library of Pennsylvania Suite 420, 7735 Old Georgetown Road Box 1601 (Education Building)

Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126 Dr. Edward O. Swartz

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Board of Supervisors Londonderry Township Governor's Office of State Planning RFD#1 - Geyers Church Road and Development tiiddletown, Pennsylvania 17057 ATTN: Coordinator, Pennsylvania State Clearinghouse U. S. Environmental Protection Agency P. O. Box 1323 Region III Of fice Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 ATTN: EIS C0CRDINATOR Curtis Building (Sixth Floor) 6th and Walnut Streets Philadelphia, Pennsylyania 19106 Mr. J. G. Herbein, Vice President Metropolitan Edisen Company P. 0. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

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• STAFF POSITION SAT SHUTDCWN CAPA5ILITY Staff Concem D;rine the staff's evaluation of fire protection pr: grams at c:eraiing plants, one er mere specific plant areas may be identified in which the staff does not have adequate a.ssurance that t pestulated

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fire will not danace both redundant divisiens of shutdown syste=s.

This la:k of assurance in safe shu dewn ca: ability has esuited fr:m ene r both of te fcilewing situatiens:

Case A: The licensee has not adequately identified the systems and c :;enents required for safe shutdown and their 1ccatien in specific fire areas.

Case 5: The licensee..as nc dem nstrated that.he fire protection for specific plant areas wC1. prevent damage to both redundant divisiens f safe shutdown cc=cenents identified in these areas.

F:r Case A, ce staff has required cat an adecuata. safe shutd=wn a.alysis be perf0-med.

This evaluati:n includes the icen:1 fica:icn of the systers required f:r safe shutdown and the 1: cati n ef the system ::=:enents in the plant. Where it is de:E r-ined by th15 evalva-i:n.tha safe snu d:we :::enen;3 ef be:n r dundin: div1siens are iccated in the same fire area, the licensee is equired :: demonstrate

.ht: a ;cstulated fire will net damage bcth divisic.s er ; : vide alternate shu:dewn capability as in Case B.

For Case E, -he staff may have required that an alternate shutdtwn ca;atility be provided with is incependent of :he area of ::nprn cr :ne licensee may have prepcsed such a capabill y in lieu o.,ne certain additienal fire protection cdificati:ns an the area.

e specific mcdificatiens associated with the aret of concern along with other systems and equipment already independent of the area form the alternate shutdown capability.

For each plant, the medificatiens needed and

ne c:cbinatiens of systems which provide the shutdown fune:1ons may se unique for each critical area; hcwever, the shLtdcwn functions provided shculd maintain plant parameters within the beunds of de limiting safety consequences deemed ac:eptable fer.the design basis event.

stafe positien Safe snu desn :a: ability should be den:nstrated (;ase Al er l'.:e-a:e s.utd:sn :1:a:il':y : videc (Cast. E' '

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2. Limitine. Safe:v C:nsecuences and Recuired Shutdewn Functions 2.1 No fission product beundary integrity shall be affected:

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a.

No fuel clad damace; b.

No ruptu e of any primary c:01 ant bcundary; c.

No rupture of the containrent beundary.

2.2 The re.ac :r c:clant system pr: cess variables shall be within these predicted for a less of normal ac power.

2.3 The alternate s'hutd:wn capability shall be able := achieve and maintain subtritical c:nditions in -he 2act:r, maintain reac :r c:clart invent:ry, achieve and maintain h:

standby

• cend'itiens (het shutdewn' for a EWR) for an extended peried of time, achieve c=1d shutd:wn' ::nditiens within 72 hcurs and maintain c:1d shutdown conditi:ns thereafter.

As defined in the Standard Technical Specifica:icns.

3.

erformance Geais 3.1 The reactivity ::ntrol function shall be ca:a:1e :f a:hieving and maintaining ::1d shutdown reactivity conditiens.

3.2 The reacter c:elant makeup function shall be capable of

=aintaining the reacter ceplant level above the ::p cf the -

cbre f:r BWR's and in the pressuri:er f r FWR's.

3.3 The rea:ter heat remeval functicn shall be ca;able cf achieving and maintaining decay heat remcyal.

3.4 The process menit: ring function shall be capable of providi:g direct readings of the process variables necessary :: perfen: and ::ntr:1 the above functi ns.

-3.5 The su:perting. function.shall be. capable of providing th'e process cooling, lubricatien, et:. necessary to per=it the Operation of the equi; ment'used f:r safe shutdown by the systems identified in 3.1 - 3.4 3.6 The e:ui; ment and systers used :: achieve and mai.tain het stan:by c:ndi-i:ns (het snut::wn f:r a 5WR) sneul: be (1) #ree Of fire damage; (2) ca:able Of mai. ai ' ; s; b c:ndi-icns f:r an ex anced tire eri:: i nger :na-72 ".:urs d' :ne e:t i: en: eeui ec :: acnieve and mai. ai

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3.8 These systems need not be ' designed to (1) seismic categcry I criteria; (2) sinsle failure criteria; pc (3) cepe with

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other plant ac:idents such as pipe breaks er stu:k valves

( A;;endix A ETF g.5-1), except :acse perticas cf these syste=s which interface with cr i=;act existir.; safe y systers.

4. PVR Ecui: cent Generally Necessary Fer Het Standby _

(1) Reactivity Centrol.

Reacter trip capability (scram). Scratien ca;atili ty.e.c.,

charging pur:p, makeup pu== ce high pressure injectica pu=o taking suction fr:m concentrated berated water supplies.

and le:dewn system if required.

(2)

Reac::r C:clant Makeu:

neact:r c clan: =akeup capability, e.g., charging pe=;s P0we. cserated relief er the high pressure injection ;c=;s.

valves may be re;; ired :: reduce pressurt :: al':w use cf the high pressure injection pu=;s.

(3) Reac ce C:clant System Pressure Centrcl React:r pressure c:ntrb1 capability, e.g., charging pur=s er pressurizer heaters and use of the letdcwn systers if recuired.

(4)

Deca'v Heat Remeval Decay heat re=cval capability, e.g., power cperated relief valves.(steam generat:r) er safety relief valves fer heat

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removal with a water supply and emergency cr auxiliary Service feedwater pu=:s for :rakeup to the s.eam generator.

water er other pu=;s may be required to provide water for auxiliary feed pump suction if the cendensate st: rage tank capacity is

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m not adequa e f:r 72 hcurs.

(5)

Pr: cess M: nit:rine Instrumentatien Pr: cess nit:ri.; ca ability e.;., pressurizer ;ressure and level, steam gene at:r level.

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5. PWR E uierent Generally Hecessary For Cold Shutdewr.'

(1)

Reacter Ceclan: System Pressure Reduction to Residual Heat Rem va6 System ( RnR) Cacacist:v React:r coolen system pressure reducticn by c:cidewn using stet.= generat:r ;cwer cperated mlief vatves er ate: spheric duma valves.

(2)

Decav Feat Remeval Decay heat renoval capability e.g., rtsidual heat removal system, c =;cneh: c:eling water system and service water system to remeval heat and maintain cold shutd wn.

(3) _ Support capability e.g., ensite pewer s:urces ( AC Suceert er effs':s after 72 hcurs and the asscei:ted electrical distributien system : su:;1y the above ecui; ment.

maintain

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hot stancby.

6. BWR Ecui: ment Generally Necessary For Het Shutdewn (1) Reacti vity Centrol Reacter trip capability (scram).

(2)

Reacter C elan: Makeue Reactor coolant invent:ry makeup capability e.g., reacter core-isciaticn c: cling system (RCIC) er the high pressure coolant injection system (FPCI).

(3) Reacter Pnssure Cent-ci and Decaw Heat Remeval

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Depressuri:stien system valves cr safety relief valves for ~

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The rtsidual heat remeval system in steam condensing mcde, anc service water system may also be used for heat remeval : the ultimate heat sink.

(4; fur:ressi:n F:01 C: cline 0:1 c: ling Residual hea rem:va'. systa- (in su::ressi:n :

002) service =a:Er sys:Sm :: main:tir *: Snut::an.

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(f) Su:: ort Su;; ort capability e.g., ensite power seur:e (AC & DC) and their associated distribution systems :: pr: vide for the shu:dewn equipment.

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7. SWR E:ui: en: Gene rall y Necessary Fer C:1d Shutdewn' At this ;cint the equipment necessary for het shutdewn has reduced the primary system pressure and temperature to where the RHR

' system may be ;1 acte in service in RHR c oling mcde.

(1) Decav Fett Remeval Residual heat rereval system in the RHR c:: ling m:de, service water system.'

(2) Su: ert Onsite scurces ( AC & OC) er Offsite af ter 72 hcurs and :3eir ass:ciated distributi:n systems :: provide for shutdown equipment.

I;uipment provided in adcition :: that f:r achieving het shutd:wn.

8. In# rmatien %eceired For Staff Review Des:ri;;ien of the sys'tems' er pertions there:f used te (a) previde the shutdown capability and modifica:icns re:uired

. = achieve the alternate shutdown capability if recuired.

Sysfem design by drawings which show normal and alternate (b)

. shutdown centrol and power circuits, loca:icn of compenents, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which is eu:

cf the area that recuired the alternate system.

(c)

Demonstrate that changes to safety systems will not (e.g., new. isola:1cn sW.:hes degrade safety systems.and centrol swit:hes sheuld meet design criteria and ~ *

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standards in F5AR for electrical ecui; rent in the system tha: the switch is : be installed, cabinets tha: the the same swit:hes are to be =0unted in should aise met criteria (FSAR) as :her safety related :atine s and aveid i acvertent is01ation # rem :ne ::ntrol

anels; ::

reem, ne is:lati:n swit:nes sh ul: te key;::ke:, er alarme:

in ne ::ntr:1 re:m if in ne "iccal" er "is:ia:ed" ::si icn;

eri::i: : necks sneui: :e. ace : ve ri fy s i :h is in :ne

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si-icn f:r n:rma* ::erati:n; t.: a singie trans'er s

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Demonstrate that alternate shu:dewn p:wer sources, including (e) all breakers, have isciation devices en c:ntr:1 circuits that are routed thr: ugh the area to be avcided, even if the breaker is to be cperated manually.

Demenstrate that licensee procedure (s),have been develeped

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(f) which des: ribe the tasks to be per':r-ed to effect the shutdown

.e:hed.

A sumary =f these precedures sheuld be eviewed by the staff.

Demonstrate that spare fuses are available"fer cent o1

(.g) cir:uits where :.hese fuses,may be recuired in su;;:1ying cen:rel cir:uits used for the shutd:vn

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meted and =ay be blewn by the effects Of a :able sp-eading rocm fire. The spare fuses shculd be 1cca:2d convenient to the existing fuses. The shutdown prece ure shculd inferm the operater to check these fuses.

Dem:ns' rate tha: the manpcwer required to aer#c-= the (h) shutdown functi:ns using the pr:cedures =f (f) as weil as to previde fire brigade re..bers to fignt the fire is available as requi ed by the fire brigace techni:11 apecificatiens.

(i)

Demonstrate that adequate acceptance tests are perf:rmed.

These should verify that: equipment cperates fr:m the local c:nt el s:2:icn when the transfer er isolatien swit:h is placed in the "lecal" ;;csiticn and that the equipment cannet be operated from the con:rol rec =; and that equip-opera:es fr:m the centrol reem but :tnnet be operated ren:

at the local c:ntrol station when the transfer er isciati:n switch is in the "rerete" position.

Technical Specifications of the surveillance requirements (j) and limiting :enditions for Operatien fer that equipment r r exa=::le, ne: 41 ready covered'by existing Tech. Specs.

if new isolation and centrol swit:hes are added to a senice water sys:em, :ne existing Tech. Spec, surveillance require- -

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ments en the seWice water system-shculd add a, statement.,

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iri=ilar to the follcwing:

"Every thi.d pu=p tes should also verify that the pu=p sta-s fec= te alte-nate shutd wn station after =cving ce *ccal all se-vice water system is la:icn swit:nes

n r:1 pesi:icn."

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Demonstrate that repair precedures for cold shutdee sysit s are develeped and =aterial for repairs is e.a'ntained en siu.

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