ML19208D174
| ML19208D174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Hansen W, Knop R, Phillips H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208D170 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-79-14, NUDOCS 7909280081 | |
| Download: ML19208D174 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000341/1979014
Text
-
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Rsport No. 50-341/79-14
Docket No. 50-341
License No. CPPR-87
Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226
Facility Name: Enrico Fermi, Unit 2
Inspection At: Detroit / Troy, Michigan offices
Fermi Site, Monroe, Michigan
Inspection conoucted: Jun
19-22, 1979
.y
-
J ly s
k
Inspectors:
H. S. Philli s
7-/7-76
' M L c'h
n
W. A. Hansen,
7-/7-75
i'
$]Yw*t
%
M J. J. Harrison
7//?/~1/
f
a
'
g es' [*h
7//9h9
/
i
Accompanied By:
R. C. Knop
qc d -
Approved By:
R. C. Knop, Ch f
7-/b 7f
Projects Section 1
Inspection Summary
Inspection on June 19-22, 1979 (Report no. 50-341/79-14)
Areas Inspected: Follovup on Bulletins Calendar Years (CY) 1975-1979 and
Circulars CY 1976-1979. Followup on open items identified during previous
inspections. Followup on telephone allegation regarding anchors which
pulled out of concrete. Safety related structures structural steel and
support procedures / structural steel welding; Safety Related Components
(work); electrical cables and instrumentation. This inspection involved
a total of 124 inspector-hours on site by four bRC inspectors.
.
1051
295
79092800 n
.
,
Results: Seven areas were inspected. Three items of noncompliance were
,
identified in three of the seven areas inspected.
(Infractions - failure
to control purchased material, equipment and services; failure to identify,
correct and preclude materials and equipment from being shipped from the
vendor, being accepted by receiving inspection at site and failure to
preclude nonconforming material from being installed. Deficiency - failure
to properly identify safety related cable trays.)
.
.
.
-2-
105)
296
.
.
DETAILS
.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
- E. Hines, Assistant Vice President of Quality Assurance (QA)
- T. A. Alessi, Director Quality Assurance
- R. W. Barr, Project Quality Assurance Director
- H. A. Walker, Project Quality Assurance Director
- C. J. Miller, Quality Assurance Engineer
G. Carter, Quality Assurance Engineer
P. Cribbs, Quality Assurance Engineer
- J. R. Mullins, Quality Assurance Engineer
- W. Fahrner, Project Manager
- T. H. Dickson, Assistant Project Manager
- W. Everett, Project Superintendent
- C. R. Bacon, Field Project Engineer
M. A. Esau, Site Inspector (Purchasing)
Other Personnel
- J. G. Bolt, Project QA Manager, Daniel International Corporation (DIC)
C. V. King, Elect QA Engineer, DIC
- J. T. Blixt, QA Manager, DIC
- C. W. Kostbade, Assistant Project QC Manager, DIC
- K. Dempsey, Assistant Project Manager
- L. Hack, QC Manager, L. K. Comstock (LKC)
- C. Mitchell, Assistant Project Manager, LKC
- E. L. Young, Project Executive Manager, Wismer and Becker (W&B)
- C. Kellar, Project QC Manager, W&B
- T. J. Dykes, Project QC Supervisor, General Electric I&SE
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
and contractor employees, including members of the quality, technical,
and engineering staffs.
- Denotes those attending the first or second exit interview.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Open) Unresolved Matter (No Number Assigned): Region III received a
telephone call regarding " anchors" which had pulled out of the concrete.
The caller thought that the location was in the reactor building but was
not sure. A subsequent call was received on May 14, 1979, which stated
embeds had pulled out of the concrete in the turbine building N&P row.
The caller was assured that the item would be inspected during a routine
inspection.
-3-
k
.
.
The inspector observed the embeds in the turbine building at three locations.
.
William Terry, Daniel Field Engineer, stated that temporary lugs had been
attached by workmen and unknown loads had been hoisted. These embeds are
used to attach hangers N21-3109-G01, N21-3109-G10 and N21-3109-G13. The
N21-00 designation identifies the piping system to be supported as a
reactor feedwater supply system piping. The only components considered
to be safety related are the isolation valves which were not involved.
The licensee's engineering is investigating and will review and approve
necessary actions to correct these nonconformances. This matter is
similar to allegations investigated in NRC Report No. 50-341/79-04 and is
considered open pending a final review of DECO investigation report. The
licensee stated they would furnish Region III with a copy of this report
,
_
when completed as well as the basis of assuring that similar safety
related embeds are adequate to support design loads, that is, tests of
existing embeds.
(341/79-14-01)
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/78-09-06): Audits of Daniel QC procedures
were not comprehensive. This item was reviewed by the NRC inspector
during inspection No. 50-341/79-1? and should have been closed when open
item No. 341/79-09-05 was closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Matter (341/78-18-07): The in pector observed Dravo
boss welds that had excessive surface roughness which would preclude
meaningful NDE (PT) of these welds. Subsequent to this visit, Daniel
attempted to perform NDE on these welds and they found that meaningful
NDE could not be performed. Daniel also found additional examples where
the vendor had furnished similar boss welds. This matter is considered
closed because it is part of a noncompliance described in Paragraph 3 of
this report and will be followed under that item.
(Closed) Open Item (1/79-05-01):
Conflict between Fermi FSAR Sections
3 and 7 and QA level 1 instruments. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
change to the FSAR dated March 16, 1979, and reviset 7CN 1021, Rev. B,
dated May 4, 1979.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/79-05-02): General Electric supplied
instrument racks indicated that the documentation was complete. However,
the inspector could not determine if General Electric had audited the
supplier's qualification test / evaluated the test results. The inspector
reviewed the licensee's audit report dated March 21, 1979.
The audit
included seismic qualification and hydrostatic test results on three
instrument racks (H21-P001, H21-P011 and H21-P014).
The finding of the
licensee's audit was that the hydro records were in order and that the
seismic qualification records were acceptable with one minor clarifi-
cation.
This concerne1 seismic qualification of plastic covers versus
aluminum covers on 556 series type instruments.
.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/79-05-03): Numerous design changes to
Electrical Engineering Standard Specification No. 3071-128, Rev. 1, and
Pipe Erection Specification No. 3071-31, Rev. A, Addendum A.
The inspector
-4-
1051
29B
.
.
reviewed the revised specification No. 3071-128, Rev. P, dated May 29,
.
1979. Specification No. 3071-31 had been revised and was being routed
for final approval.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (341/78-11-05): Review of X-rays on Control Rod
Drive Vessel return nozzle cap and eight replacement safe ends.
Item was
inspected and is closed, for details see Section IV, Paragraph 1.b of
this report.
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/78-18-09): PT Developer not removed from
steam separator standpipe to shroud head welds. The inspector visually
examined the welds and found them to be acceptable.
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/79-09-01): Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
personnel not qualified to perform NDE per ASME Code, Section III/V. NDE
personnel did not have proper experience, training or eye test. During
this inspection, this inspector reviewed the action taken by General
Electric Company as follows:
(a) GE site personnel requalified; (b)
subcontractor personnel in question were removed from the site; (c)
examinations performed by these individuals have been/are being re-examined
on a sampling basis; and (d) GE IS&E offices have altered policy and
procedures to assure this problem does not recur. The actions taken are
satisfactory.
(Closed) Noncompliance (341/79-09-02): Materials Assurance Company did
not maintain records of an individual's actual examination. The inspector
reviewed the action taken by GE which is considered to be acceptable.
issued a form type letter to all NDE subcontractors to advise what records
would be required to meet contract and code requirements. These records
are and will be verified during audits.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins
Four NRC inspectors reviewed Bulletins No. 75-01 through 75-08; 76-01
through 76-06; 77-01 through 77-08; and 78-01 through 78-14 to determine
that the licensee had taken the following actions:
Written response made in time required.
.
Response included information required.
.
.
Corrective action in response.
Onsite management advised of response.
.
Followup on corrective action (CA) taken as described in the response.
.
Information Bulletins received, reviewed and corrective action
.
taken/ scheduled.
The actions were considered adequate; however, the followinf,, recommendations
were made relative to improving the system:
Develop a formal procedure instead of the present memo.
.
Clarify the present computer program system in the procedure to
.
simplify tracking status.
-5-
1051
299
.
.
Describe how bulletins, which do not now apply but may later apply,
.
,
are handled.
Include a requirement in the procedure to advise site management of
.
Bulletins / responses.
1.
The inspectors performed technical reviews and the specifics are as
-
follows:
IE Bulletins No. 79-01 through 79-12 were reviewed for licensee
actions outlined above. Actions were complete on 79-04, 79-09 and
79-11; however, the remainder of the Bulletins were in review.
2.
The inspector performed electrical technical reviews and the specifics
are as follows:
The inspector reviewed IE Bulletin Nos. 75-03, 77-05,77-05A, 77-07,
78-02 and 78-04.
Subsequent to the issue of these bulletins, IE
Circular No. 78-08 was issued, and contains the same information as
the bulletins. For tracking purposes, the bulletins are closed and
future inspection results covering these matters will be documented
under Circular No. 78-08.
The inspector reviewed the following IE Bulletins and assessment of
the licensee's review:
Westinghouse Type OT-2 Control Switches (IE Bulletin No. 75-06).
a.
Review of drawing No. 61721-2022-2, Rev. E, Typical Arrangement
of Equipment to verify that Fermi 2 does not use this type of
switch identified above.
b.
GE Type HFA, HGA, HKA and HMA relays (IE Bulletin No. 76-02).
Review of the RPS control logic drawing indicates that these
types of relays are not being used at Fermi 2.
Detroit Edison
notified the inspector that if any nylon coils are found during
preoperationa) and startup testing phase, they would be replaced
with Lexan type.
GE type STD relays (IE Bulletin No. 76-03). Review of drawings,
c.
Typical Arrangement of Equipment to verify that Fermi 2 does
not use this type of relays.
d.
Westinghouse Type BFD relays (IE Bulletin No. 76-05). Review
of control logic drawings and visual inspection of the main
control panels and relay panels indicates that Fermi 2 does not
use this type of relays.
ITE Imperial Pneumatic Time Delay Relay (IE Bullet'in No. 77-01):
e.
This bulletin was previously identified and was being carried
as an unresolved item No. 341/77-09-03.
_
_
\\
.
.
f.
Westinghouse AR relays (IE Bulletin No. 77-02). Review of
.
drawings and physically verified that Fermi 2 does not use this
type of relays.
g.
General Electric type AK-2 low voltage power circuit breakers
(IE Bulletin No. 79-09). Physically verified that Fermi 2 does
not have this type of circuit breaker.
'
h.
Cutler-Hammer Type H, DC Relays, Catalog No. D23MD (IE Bulletin
No. 78-06). The licensee had performed a systematic review of
the Ferni 2 design and equipment specification and confirmed
that this type of DC relays were not installed in Class IE
equipment.
3.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions and responses to IE
mechanical bulletins affecting Fermi 2 as follows:
79-03 - Open, awaiting action by licensee vendor (Dravo) to
a.
ascertain if material of the type in question was utilized on
safety related systems.
Investigative data was reviewed by tha
inspector for other sources as estracted by the licensee action
appears to be adequate except as previously noted.
b.
79-04 - Closed, bulletin subject was Velan check valves.
The
licensee has one purchase order with Velan, for 24" Gate Valves.
A review of the bill of materials and purchase orders was
conducted and confirmed this.
c.
78-10, 75-05 - Closed, subject Hydraulic Snubbers. Fermi 2
will be utilizing only mechanical snubbers in containment.
These bulletins do not currently affect this plant.
d.
78-12, A and B - Open, an extention was give by the NRC to
General Electric for Combustion Engineering manufactured reactor
vessels. The licensee will advise the NRC when a response is
obtained from General Electric.
76-04 - Was an informational bulletin and the licensee had
e.
acted accordingly.
Licensee Action on IE Circulars
The inspectors reviewed Circular Nos. 76-01 through 76-05; 77-01 through
77-16; 78-02 through 78-19, and 79-02.
These circulars had been received,
revised and corrective action was recommended.
The actions taken were
adequate; however, in several cases corrective action was n h completed
within the time requ' ed by the NRC or DECO. There were no letters in
file to show responses to that Circulars 76-04 and 76-05 had been sent to
the NRC within 90 days, however, the licensee telephoned after the inspec-
tion and stated the responses had been found.
Circulars 77-10, 77-14 and
-7-
1051
301
.
.
77-15 are examples where corrective was not completed by the time
required by Deco nor were there letters to show that extcusions were
granted.
The system appeared to be working well overall; however, the following
reconunendations if adopted may improve the system and eliminate these
administrative oversights.
Assign responsibility for tracking responses / corrective action dates.
.
Use the computer program to track circulars.
.
Require that overdue responses / corrective action be brought to
.
management's attention.
1.
The inspector reviewed the technical (electrical) aspects of IE
Circular No. 78-08.
The specifics are as follows:
The inspector noted that the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV)
a.
have Namco type SL3-CB2W and the feedwater isolation swing
check valve has a Namco D1200C--I type limit switches. The
inspector could not determine if these limit switches were
environmentally qualified for service inside the containment.
b.
The inspector reviewed Franklin Institute Research Laboratories
(FIRL) test report F-C3441 dated September 1972, titled
" Qualification Test of Limitorque Valve Operators in a Simulated
Reactor Containment Post-Accident Steam Environment." The
inspector could not determine if this test was for the various
types and sizes installed at Fermi 2 (i.e. SMB-2, SMB-4 and
SBD).
The inspector reviewed Joy Manufacturing Company test report
c.
X-604 dated April 6,1977, and titled " Qualification Testing of
Joy Axivane Fan and Reliance Electric Motor for Class 1 Service
for Nuclear Containment per IEEE 334-1974" for the drywell
cooler fans. The inspector could not determine if the radiation
test was performed in accordance with specification No. 3071-78.
During the review, the inspector noted that the test data
indicated that motor insulation resistance was zero at different
points during the test. The licensee indicated that they had
not evaluated what impact, if any, the zero insulation resistance
readings had on the test results.
These matters are unresolved.
(341/79-14-02)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
.
'
2.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions and responses to IE
circulars (mechanical) affecting Fermi 2 as follows:
1051
302
-8-
.
78-07 and 76-05 - Closed - Subject Hydraulic Snubbers. Fermi 2 will
.
be utilizing only mechanical snubbers in containment. These circulars
do not currently affect this plant.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected
Functional or program areas inspected are discussed in Sections I, II,
III and IV of this report.
.
9
-9-
1051
303
-
.
Section I
,
Prepared by H. S. Phillips
Reviewed by R. C. Knop, Chief
-
Projects Section 1
1.
Plant Tour
The inspector toured the entire Reactor building except for the
inside of the vessel. The control room and cable tray spreading
room in the Auxiliary building was toured.
Construction activities
and progress were assessed.
The licensee recently reported
construction to be eighty percent (80%) complete.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
2.
Structural Steel Welding Outside Containment
The inspectors found that safety related structures (structural
steel, supports and welding) outside containment has been completed
except for minor work.
Any such additional work should be covered
in conjunction with the welding of containment structural steel and
penetrations pipe; support / restraint systems.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Structural Steel Welding Inside Containment
Review of Walbridge Aldinger QA Procedures
a.
Walbridge Aldinger Company (WACo) assumed the duties of NSICo,
a site contractor, November 21, 1978. These duties included
performing safety related work, that is, installation of Inland
Ryerson furn.shed wall brackets supports for reactor pressure
vent, core spray, feedwater and recirculation lines.
The inspector briefly reviewed the WACo instruction manual and
found that their company was using Edison QA Manual.
Daniel
International Construction Corporation (DIC) was performing
first level inspection. WACo committed to weld per specification
D.1.1-72.
The engineer stated he was working to AWS D.I.1-75.
The inspector noted that the installation drawings conformed to
the AWS D.I.1-75 and 77 specification.
It was also noted that
this documentation inconsistency causes the engineer considerable
work to relate the old and the new specification.
In fact,
weld joint design BU2a on Drawing 65-721-3179, a new designation,
does not correspond to the old designation (AWS D.I.1-72).
- 10 -
1051
304
.
.
The inspector found that no evaluation of the WACo QA program /
.
work procedures was accomplished. DIC letter dated November 21,
1978, subject: Walbridge Aldinger Company / Bracket and Guard
Tube Work, essentially by passed Edison's and Daniel's QA
organization and the requirement to evaluate WACo. Si.ce WACo
had been previously responsible for nonsafety related work the
'
issuance of a field work order without assuring personnel were
trained and qualified did not conform to the requirements of
Edison QA Manual QAP No. 1, "The Quality Assurance Program,"
which stated in part in Paragraph 1.5.3, " Edison, or its agent,
has the responsibility for the review and concurrence with QA
programs of its vendors and contractors." Paragraph 1.8 requires
that Quality Assurance assure that indoctrination and training
of contractor personnel be accomplished. Edison QAF No. 19
also requires that vendor's or contractor's quality assurance
program be audited to determine acceptability.
In this case,
Edison QA should have been requested to audit Daniel's and
WACo's program prior to award.
The subject Daniel letter failed to address whether quality
assurance would be provided by Edison, Daniel, or Walbridge
Aldinger Company.
These findings (341/79-14-03) represent a noncompliance to
10 CFR 50, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment
and Services.
See Appendix A.
b.
Review of Walbridge Aldinger Company Welding
The inspector observed AWS DI.1-72 welding at various stages of
completion for weld identification, joint preparation, weld
procedures, repair procedures, weld material, welding variables,
welder qualification, QC inspection and testing. These areas
were found satisfactory except as follows:
(1) Field Erection Plate for Sacrificial Shield, Drawing
65-721-3179, Section CC; Welding A588 Material Grade A or
B, per Procedure P103 at 180 Azimuth, drywell area, 613.5
elevation.
The inspector observed welding by welders WA-20 and WA-22.
Field weld No. I was an overhead weld and No. 3 was a flat
weld in process.
No. 2 and 4 were completed welds. The
2" material A588 Grade B required filler material AWS
2.5.1 (1/8" 7018). The parameters were 110-150 amps /21-24
volts with a weld travel speed of 2-8 inches'per minete.
The weld process sheet did not show weld parameters. The
procedure was not available at the work s:.te and the
welders had not read the procedure. This lack of training /
indoctrination was discussed in Paragraph 3.a above and is
considered a part of the noncompliance in that paragraph.
- 11 -
1051
305
-
.
.
(2) Core Spray Restraint 3 racket, Exterior Bracket for Sacrificial
Shield, S&L Drawing B143, Rev. K; Welding material A588,
Procedure P108 in fabrication shop.
The inspector observed the repair of the vendor weld on a
bracket which was fabricated by Inland-Ryerson, an offsite
vendor.
-
The Inland-Ryerson paperwork indicated that the full
penetration welds had been ultrasonic tested and found
acceptable. The inspector observed a 12" defect after
removing most of the weld metal. The grinding personnel
stated that the defect extended the entire length of the
weld, approximately two feet.
In places the slag entrapment
was about one quarter (1/4) inch wide. The joint design
(bevel) appeared to be improper. The WACo engineer presented
DOR 2774 which documented this condition.
This defect was
identified on site by visual inspection.
Generic Inland-Ryerson welding problems were identified in
Daniel QC letters dated March 2, 1979, and April 16, 1979.
Although the generic problem was identified, action to
comprehensively identify and correct these nonconformances
was not apparent.
(3) RHR Heat Exchanger Platform, Drawing No. 6C 721-3510,
Rev. 10, Bill of Material B2782-785.
The inspector observed welding which was in progress on
the subject platform. The appearance of the finished
welds performed on site appeared to be satisfactory;
however, the welds made offsite by Inland-Ryerson per AWS
Dl.1-72 were inadequate. That is, visual inspection
revealed improper fitup, undercut, porosity and incomplete
fusion. The slag was not chipped from the surface of the
weld and paint was applied over the slag.
(4) Review of All Inland-Ryerson Furnished Sacrificial Shield
Wall Brackets
The inspector reviewed a listing of all brackets installed
to date and found that twenty-six of seventy-one brackets
(thirty-seven percent) were identified as nonconformances.
This percentage deficient is largely based on visual
inspection to AWS D1.1-72 welding requirement performed by
Daniel AC at the site.
Inspections performed (offsite by
Inland-Ryerson and licensee personnel should have prevented
shipment of such nonconforming brackets to the site.
- 12 -
.
.
.
(5) Previous examples of inadequate source inspection at
vendors as well as past noncompliances indicate that the
licensee's past corrective action has not precluded
repetition. The following examples have occurred in the
last sixteen (16) months:
Inadequate visual source inspection of electrical
-
.
supports at vendors resulted in hundreds of cable
trays hangers being installed even though it was
visually evident that the welds did not meet AWS
D.1.1-75.
NRC Report 50-341/78-05 (March 1978).
Inadequate visual source inspection of GE jet pumps
.
which resulted in the pumps being shipped and installed
in a nonconforming condition. NRC Report 50-341/78-18
(November 1978).
Inadequate visual source inspection of Dravo boss
.
welds on piping. Excessive surface roughness would
not allow meaningful NDE (penetrant inspection).
Subsequent review by the licensee indicated there
were other examples of such nonconforming items that
were installed. This item was classified as unresolved
in NRC Report No. 50-341/78-18 (November 1978).
Inadequate visual inspection of Schrieber Manufacturing
.
Company welding of beams A3101, A3104, A3113, A3116
and A3117. NRC Report 50-341/79-03 (Januar'/ 1979).
The findings in Paragraphs 3.a and 3.b represent a noncom-
pliance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective
Action.
(341/79-14-04) See Appendix A.
These findings indicate a system breakdown in the quality
assurance program, in that the following were not corrected:
Source inspection and/or audit of the vendor was
.
inadequa'te.
Inspection (visual) of vendor brackets
did not prevent the shipment of nonconforming brackets
from the vendor.
Receiving inspection did not prevent the acceptance
.
of nonconforming brackets.
Nonconforming brackets were installed even though
.
nonconformances documenting the problems were evident.
Quality assurance trend analysis of vendor noncon-
.
formances was not performed or was inadequately
performed.
1051
307
- 13 -
-
Site audits of WACo, the site contractor responsible
.
for installing the brackets, were not performed. QA
was excluded from the preaward cycle and no program
evaluation was performed briore award. An audit was
scheduled but was senceled because of loss of personnel.
Engineering dispositions appear to have overlooked
-
.
the generic problem of not meeting the AWS specification
imposed by the purchase order. The NRC inspector
stated that reviews performed by engineering should
consider generic implications in the future.
Communica-
tions between quality and engineering organizations
needs to be improved in this area.
.
The licensee's response should specifically describe the
following:
How the licensee will assure that all vendor furnished
.
material / components on site is adequate? When this
action will be complete?
How nonconforming materials / components, installed or
.
to be installed, will
corrected? What is the
target date for cor,plet.ah this action?
What action will 'oe taken to essure adequate vendor
.
surveillance? How many vendor- <ill unia include?
.
When will t!.is action be completed?
What action will be taken to assure that adequate
.
receivino 4Jenection at the site is accomplished?
When wlil thts action be completed?
What actiona will be taken to assure that quality
.
a ssuranr+: organizations perform comprehensive audits
and trend analysis?
.
.
- 14 -
.
.
Section II
Prepared 'y J. Hughes
o
Reviewed by D. W. Hayes, Chief
Engineering Support
Section 1
1.
Observation of Recent Electrical Work Activities
The inspector observed the in-progress and partially completed
a.
installation of the following Class 1E cables:
Cable No. 221184-2C
Cable No. 221349-2C
Cable No. 221654-2C
Cable No. 228794Y-2C
Cable No. 200023-2P
Cable No. 220080-2P
The cables were properly routed in accordance with pull cards.
The raceways and conduit were free of debris, sharp edges, etc.
and grounded. Separation criteria, identification, bend radii,
and specific cable pulling tensions were calculated in accordance
with procedures.
b.
During the cable pulling operation, the inspector observed
various vertical cable trays which had their identification
markers located inside of the tray and were not visible once
the cables were placed in the trays. Specification 128 states
in part, "They shall be located for easy identification by
plant personnel." This item is considered to be in noncompliance
with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII,
and applicable specifications and procedures, as described in
Appendix A of this report.
(341/79-14-05)
The inspector verified installation of the Motor Control Center
c.
(MCC) 72ED-2D switchgear located in the RHR building complex.
Relative to the above equipment, the following attributes were
considered to be acceptable:
Segregation of nonconforming
components; techniques of handling; methods of welding and
inspection; implementation of inspection procedures; equipment
location, missile protection and separation; and related record
keeping including maintenance and nonconformance r'eports.
No items of noncompliance were identified except as noted in
Paragraph 1.b.
105)
309
- 15 -
.
.
2.
Electrical Cables - Review of Quality Records
.
The inspector reviewed cable installation records which were
a.
being used for inspection of the above mentioned cables in
Paragraph 1 above. The inspector determined that the following
were signed off by the LKC QC inspector prior to cable pulls,
after pulls and/or during the cable pulls:
-
(1) Raceway and conduit completed, including cleanliness,
marking, etc.
(2) Cable identification correct for type, size and color,
including cable reel number.
(3) Cable number identification tags installed according to
procedures.
(4) Cable routing the same as the routing on the pull cable.
(5) Cables dressed and tied properly to the tray with tie-raps.
(6) Cable bend radii and pull tension were not exceeded.
(7) Tension meter number LTM 5 (LKC eqLipment 2192) cabriation
was current.
b.
The inspector reviewed cable installation records for electrical
cables identified and 200026A-2P; 200026B-2P; 200022A-2P; end
200022B-2P and determined:
(1) The installation to be in accordance with L. K. Comstock
Procedure, Cable Pulling Instructions WI-000-03-008.
(2) Cable pull cards, dates and revisions were current.
(3) The records include type, cable class code, and prefab
number.
(4) LKC cable pull inspection check, which was signed off by
the QC inspector prior to cable pulls included the following:
(a) Raceway and conduit must be completed, including
cleanliness, marking and QC signoff prior to pulling
cables.
(b) Temperature must be above 14 F in the arpa where a
cable pull is in process.
(c) Cable to be pulled must be correct type, size and
color with appropriate documentation and QC signoff
prior to cable pull.
- 16 -
\\05\\
5\\D
.
.
(d) Cable number identification tags must be installed at
.
each end of the installed cable.
(e) Cable routing must be the same as the routing on the
pull card.
(f) Cables must be dressed and tied properly to the tray
.
af ter pulling i.he cable.
(g) Cable bend radii must not be exceeded.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Instrumentation - Observation of Work Activities
The inspector verified installation of NSSS rack H21-P001 (Core
Spray Syrtem A) to ascertain whether the requirements of applicable
specifications and drawing (GE 145C3421TG) were accomplished in the
following areas:
Identification and location, proper tyle of instre-nt
component with proper range, rating, etc. and in there proper location,
including the generation of inspection records during inspection
activities by qualified inspection (QC) personnel and that identification,
segregation and documentation with respect to nonconforming components.
Racks were physical protected as specified and protected from adjacent
construction activities.
Note: General Electric has issued Field Disposition Instructions
(FDI) WHGP Rev. O and WHGM Rev. O at the request of Detroit Edison
Company to supply a testability option. These FDI's are to replace
level and/or pressure switches with transmitters on racks H21-P010,
P014, P019, P022, P036, P037, P038, P004 and P015. The RIII inrpector
will review installation and seismic documentation.
Load distribution
changes are due to the addition of transmitter versus pressure
switches which was originally installed and tested. This item is
unresolved.
(341/79-14-06)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Instrumentation - Quality Records
The inspector reviewed installation records for the following Class
IE instrumentation racks; H21-P001, P004A, P005A, P004B and P005B.
Wismer-Becker travelers included current drawings, location, weld
procedures, receipt inspection number, weld rod issue ticket, process
control sheets, QC verification.
The inspector found the above
records satisfactory.
,
No items of noncompliance were identified.
1051
311
- 17 -
.
.
5.
Eher Areas Inspected
During a tour of the plant, the inspector observed several cable
tray supports (hangers) being installed in the Nancy Area - located
in the auxiliary building.
Several support base plates located in
the RHR building contained laminations; this nonconformance had been
documented on a Deviation Disposition Request (DDR) and deficient
.
material has since been replaced. The inspector inquired as to
whether or not similar inspections had been conducted in the reactor
building, concerning support base plate quality. The licensee
indicated that the base plates in the reactor building had not been
inspected for similiar defects; however, such an inspection will be
conducted. This item is unresolved.
(341/79-14-07)
.
- 18 -
-
-
Section III
Prepared by W. A. Hansea
Reviewed by R. C. Knop, Chief
Projects Section 1
2.
Containment Piping Penetration Review of Completed Work and Records
The inspector selected three containment penetrations for piping
systems, X16H, X17 and X42. The following activities were verified:
The penetrations were inspected at receipt for damage.
a.
b.
The material data packages were verified by inspectors.
NDE was performed during installation in accordance with work
c.
specifications.
d.
The inspector performing the NDE was qualified to perform
visual and liquid penetrant inspections.
2.
Review of Work Activities Concerning the Flued Head Anchor Structure
No. 4 for Penetration X17
During a tour of work areas it was noted that two welds on the
anchor structure legs were not made. Pertinent documents including
Drawing 6M721-9163, Design Change requests P-0 711A through D, PO
1005A.
Deviation Disposition Request W2573 and Wismer and Becker
Nondestructive Examination reports were reviewed.
Two significant items were noted during this review.
During the revision of Drawing 6M721-9163 to incorporate DCR P-0711D
a note was added to the drawing specifying the welding requirements
but did not delete the welds as was done in the DCR. The weld
symbol for the anchor structure required t'2e anchor legs be welded
completely around; however, the drawing was not changed to indicate
clearly that welds were deleted.
Since this item concerns the
handling of DCds as did unresolved item 341/78-09-15 the item will
be resinpected when evidence has been submitted to indicate that
DCRs are being properly controlled. For records purposes this will
be identified as unresolved item 341/79-14-08.
,
The Nondestructive testing inspection report on file for the anchor
structure welds are inconsistent. Form EF140 for Flued Head Anchor
Structure 4 Field welds 5 and 6 indicated that the bottom weld face
1051
3I3
- 19 -
.
.
'
was inspected for each weld. The bottom weld lead was deleted by
DCR P-0711D. Another NDE report on file indicated that the welds
were satisfactory but did not list each weld area or surface.
This matter is considered an unresolved item pending verification of
the correct inspection of the structure welds.
(341/79-14-09)
,
.
9
.
es
105\\
5\\4
- 20 -
.
.
Section IV
,
Prepared by J. J. Harrison
Reviewed by D. H. Danielson, Chief
Engineering Support
.
Section 2
1.
Review of Quality Implementing Procedures and Quality Related
Records for Safety Related Components
The inspector reviewed the following quality records for receiving
inspection, material received, ship-out, receiving inspection,
issuance and manufacturers documentation for the components listed
in Table I.
This review included assurance that procedural requirements
were being met.
Also, radiographs were reviewed for reactor vessel
connections.
The following quality recordr. for valve V17-2020 were reviewed
a.
to assure that the requirements of Daniel International (Daniel)
procedures AP-VII-03, Material and Equipment Receiving, and
AP-VII-09, Quality Assurance Record filing were met:
Manufacturers documenation package, Daniel document control
.
number E41-50-F-002-QO-001. Originally source inspected
and accepted by Bechtel Corporation for Ralph M. Parsons
Company on March 29, 1974.
Receiving Inspection was performed on April 2, 1979, by
.
Parsons, report No. 906-6.
Valve was shipped-out to manufacturer on DECO order No.
.
402, dated July 21, 1977, for modification.
Daniel performed receiving inspection on the documentation
.
package on April 5,1978, recorded on report. 4-5-78-2E.
Wismer and Becker performed receiving inspection on April 27,
.
1979, and documented on report No. 1307.
Wismer and Becker field issued this item on August 16,
.
1978, requisition 19964.
A similar review was conducted for the other components listed
in Table I.
b.
The inspector reviewed the final radiographs for the replacement
safe ends and contiol rod drive nozzle cap. This review included
- 21 -
1051 MS
.
.
evaluation against the requirements of the ASME Code and General
,
Electric procedure NDE-RT-3000, Rev. 3, dated September 27,
1978, with results as follows:
Feedwater Nozzles
.
Weld Number
Status
.
N4A
Accept
N4B
Accept
N4C
Accept
N4D
Accept
N4E
Accept
N4F
Accept
Core Spray Nozzles
.
h5A
Accept
NSB
Accept
CRD Return Nozzle
.
N9
Accept.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the
review of the records denoted above.
2.
Observation of Work and Work Activities for Safety Related Components
The inspector observed the storage, handling and protection, installation
work in progress, protection after installation, esd action related
to nonconforming components listed in Table I.
The following nonconformance reports were reviewed, as a result of
inprocess related problems, to the requirements of Wismer and Becker
procedure WB-A-113, Reporting of Defects and Nonconformance:
Wismer and Becker DDR No. 580 (Hold Tag No. 801 dated March 26,
.
1979) dated March 26, 1979, Subject: Arc strikes on valve
V17-2021, awaiting disposition.
Wisiner and Becker DDR No. 380 (Hold Tag No. Q365 dated March 23,
.
1979) dated March 23, 1979, Subject:
(1) Valve welded in an
Conditional Release No. 153 violated, (2) Valve was issued
prior to receiving inspection by Wismer and Becker, and (3)
Valve identification tag identified as V8-2159, code data
report NPV-1 says V8-2016 - Awaiting Resolution.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the
observations above.
- 22 -
105)
316
.
.
Table I
.
Safety Related Components
Purchase Order /
c
Component
Mfg
Bill of Material
Description
.
A.
V17-2020
Wm. Powell
IE-86734/BM-P1-21M - 10" 900# M. O. Gate Valve,
(S/N 64067-1)
Class I, QA-1
B.
V17-2021
W'. Powell
IE-86734/BM-PI-21M - 10" 900# M. O. Gate Valve,
m
(S/N 71283-1)
Class I, QA-1
C.
V17-2022 Wm. Powell
IE-86734/BM-PI-24M - 10" 900# M. O. Gate Valve,
(S/N 65668-1)
Class II, QA-1
D.
V8-2195
Wm. Powell
IE-86734/BM-P1-24M - 14" 600# Lift Check Valve,
(S/N 64919-1)
Class I, QA-1
E.
V8-2193
Wm. Powell
IE-86734/BM-P1-24M - 14" 600# M. O. Gate Valve,
(S/N 64058-1)
Class I, QA-1
F.
V8-2165
Wm. Powell
IE-86734/BM-PI-21M - 24" 900# M. O. Gate Valve,
(S/N 64464-1)
Class I, QA-1
G.
V8-2161
- Wm. Powell
IE-86734/BM-P1-21M - 24" 900# M. O. Gate Valve,
(S/N 64051-1)
Class I, QA-1
H.
V8-2159
Wm. Powell
IE-86734/BM-PI-21M - 24" M. O. "Y" Glove Valve,
(S/N 64050-1)
Class II, QA-1
- Not issued, in warehouse.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascercain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance,
or deviations.
Unresolved i+ ems disclosed during the inspection are
discussed in Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings; Licensee
Action on IE Cir:ulars;Section II, Paragraphs 3 and 5.b; and Section III,
Paragraph 2.
Exit Interview
.
The inspectors met with site staff representatives (denoted in the Persons
Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 19-22,
1979. The inspectors summarized the scope and specific findings of the
051
317
- 23 -
~
.
inspection. This included the apparent items of noncompliance, identified
,
in Appendix A and the Results paragraph of this report, and Unresolved
Matters. The licensee acknowledged the findings.
The project inspector emphasized that the finding concerning inadequate
licensee vendor surveillance / inspection at Inland-Ryerson is considered a
programatic or QA system problem because the problem had been repetitive.
.
.
- 24 -