ML19208B143
| ML19208B143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Spangler W Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190113 | |
| Download: ML19208B143 (39) | |
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UNITED STAiCa OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
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of I
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William H. Spangler Manager of Plant Startup Services Si l
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l Trailer #203
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NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
June 20, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 1l
.J,31v g, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 114 15j (Tape Numoer(s))
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181 191 20' 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
22' James S. Creswell 23{
Owen C. Shackleton 24i'
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SHACKLETON: This is Owen Shackleton speaking.
The time is now 3:09 2r p.m. EDT, June 20, 1979.
This is an interview of Mr. William H. Spangler.
31 Mr. Spangler is the Manager of Plant St:rtup Services, Nuclear Power i
41 Generation Division, Babcock and Wilcox Company.
This interview is a.
being conducted in Trailer No. 203 which is parked just outside the 6i South Security Gate at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Generation 7l Plant operated by the Metropolitan Edison Company.
Present fr;m the U.
S'i S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this interview is Mr. James Cl S. Creswell.
Mr. Creswel' is a Reactor Inspector in Region III.
My
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name is Owen C. Shackleton.
I am an Investigator assigned to Region V.
11!
Just prior to beginning this interview on a tape recording I presented 12!
to Mr. Spangler a two page document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 13l Commission which explains the scope and purpose of this investigation 14' as well as the authority grantec to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 151 by Congress to conduct this type of an investigation.
This document 16 further explained to Mr. Spangler his rights to refuse to be inter-17!
viewed and to have anyone of his choice present during the conduct of 181 this interview.
In addition, it advired Mr. Spangler that he does not 19l have to furnish any type of a signed statement.
On the second page of 20{
this two page document are three questions.
Mr. Spangler answered all 21!
three questions to the affirmative and now for a matter of record I am 22f going to repeat these questions and Mr. Spangler will reply.
Mr.
23 Spangler, did you understand the two page document that I am referring 2 41 to.
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SPANGLER:
Yes.
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SHACKLETON: And do we, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have 41 your permission to tape this interview?
Si
,i 6i SPANGLER:
Yes.
7 8
SHACKLETON: And would you like a copy of the tape?
9I 101 SPANGLER:
Yes.
lif 12 SHACKLETON:
All right, sir, that will be provided at the close of the 1
13 interview.
And now Mr. Spangler to assist those persons who will be 14!
reading the transcript as well as listening to tn.
- ecording, 15:
would you please give us a brief resume of your experience in the 16i nuclear field.
17l 18l SPANGLER:
I have graduated from Penn State in 1953 with a degree in 19!
Fuel Technology.
I have been working in the nuclear field since 1967, 20l Feoruary 1967, and I started to work at NPG, S&W, Lynchburg.
Since 21!
starting to work with B&W, Lynchburg, my assignments have been as a 22!
Project Manager on the Oconee project, as an Engineering Manager in the 23l 2 41 25i
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li Mechanical Equipment Engineering Section and finally in my present 2!
i position which I have been in since March 1975 as Manager of Startup 3r Services.
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SHACXLETON: Thank you very much Mr. Spangler and now I'll turn the 6i interview over to Mr. Creswell.
1 7!
8 CRESWELL:
Jim Creswell speaking.
Bill, I wonder if you cou!d back to 9I the day of March 28, 1979 and relate to us when you first found out 10i about the event at TMI-2 and how you found out about it.
11l 1
12 SPANGLER:
I found out about it by way of telephone call from L2e 13 Rogers at very close to 7:45 a.m. March 28.
It was exactly the time I 14) arrived at the office that morning.
The phone was ringing, as a matter 15; of fact, when I hit the office.
That's when I learned about TMI.
16i 17l CRESWELL: What did Mr. Rogers relate to yot. about the event?
18t 191 SPANGLER:
Lee got_ me on the phone and I don't remember his exact words 20j but he said something to the effect that we've had, we had a serious 2b situation at Three Mile Island and he relayed to me the following 22!
information. He told us that the incident started at approximately 4: 00 1
231 a.m., it was on TMI-2, they had a loss of feedwater while operating at 24i 98%, the turbine tripped followed by reactor trip.
HPI, High Pressure
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Injection, was activated, the system possibly went solid.
They believed 2!
j the quench tank rupture disc broke.
They were registering or had 31 registered 800 R per hour in the dome at some point, I don't know when.
4i that's about it.
He did mention'that a fuel leak was a good possibility.
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CRESWELL:
Fuel leak or fuel damage.
a 71 i
SPANGLER:
Fuel leak.
10 CRESWELL:
Okay. What did you.then do with tnis information?
11!
12!
SPANGLER:
Well first of all, when the telephone came in, as soon as
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131 Lee mentioned it was a serious situation, I called two additional 141 people in my offici:.
One was Ken Wandoing, who is my assistant, basically.
15i 16i CRESWELL:
Excuse me Lee could you could spell his last name.
17!
18!
SPANGLER:
Wandoing.
191 20!
CRESWELL:
Wandoing, Ken Wandoing.
21.!
22l SPANGLER:
Ken Wando' g.
And the other gentleman was Don Hallman.
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CRESWELL:
Could you spell his last name.
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SPANGLER: Hallman.
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CRESWELL:
Okay.
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SPANGLER: ~Hallman is the Manager of Plant Performance Service.
Its a 8i
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service organization.
So these two gentlemen heard all this information.
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Lee was on the squawk box in my office.
i 101 11!
CRESWELL:
They heard the call also.
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131 SPANGLER: They heard the call also, that is correct.
As a matter of 14 fact, the notes I am using were notes taken by Ken Wandoing.
He was 4
designated by me as the official note taker of telephone calls that 15:
day.
So the question then was what did we 'do following the phone call.
17!
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CRESWELL:
Right.
19i 20{
SPANGLER:
Okay.
The phone lasted just a very few minutes, long enough 21; to relay this information and my next move was to, well first of all we 22l recorded the information that I gave you on the board in my office and 23 my next move was to call Don Roy.
Don Roy is Manager of Engineering 24l i
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and we relayed the information to Don Roy.
Don then made arrangements 2 '
to set up a task force and identified Bruce Karrasch as to lead such a 3t task force.
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j CRESWELL:
Could you spell Mr. Karrasch's name.
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I think it's Karrasch.
Bruce Karrasch.
81 9!
CRESWELL: All right.
Do you know what his title is.
101 11:'
SPANGLER:
I think he is Manager of
. (unintelligible) 12!
13!
CRESWELL:
Okay, so Mr. Karrasch was appointed by Mr. Roy to set up a 14l task force.
15:
16i SPANGLER:
Yes And we set up a meeting for 9:00, 0900, in Classroom 8 17,'!
to make this information that we had known.
18l 191 CRESWELL:
Bill, Classroom B is close to the simulator.
20:
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SPANGLER:
Classroom B is right down next to the simulator.
So at 0900 22!
we then had the meeting.
Do you want me to go on?
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l ll CRESWELL: Go ahead.
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i SPANGLER:
I answered your...do you want me to go on.
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CRESWELL:
Just step through the sequence.
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SPANGLER: All right.
0900 then, we had our meeting which was attended 8
by a number of people including Don Roy, Alan Womack, Bruce Karrasch, 9f Don Hallman, Ken Wandoing and many others.
I guess there were probably 10 20 people in that room.
And at that meeting we relayed the information i
11 Lee had given to us on the telephone to this group. At that meeting we 12!
also identified a specific list of information that we would like to i
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get from the site when they called back.
I have that list right here.
14i CRESWELL:
Could you identify what those items are?
16i 17!
SPANGLER:
Yea, the information specifically requested were... requested 18f the information was identified at this meeting to be useful to us in 19f Lynchburg was pressuri::er level, steam generator levels and was it 20!
controllable, the reactor coolant pump condition, did the Aux feecwater 21j actuate, secondary side temperature / pressure, RCS temperature / pressure, 22 core delta T (delta temperature), sump level in the Reactor Building, 23 24 25:,
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were the diesels running, borated water storage tank level / inventory, 2!
l primary / secondary radiochemistry, chronology sequence of events pump 31 l
trip, when, why.
HPI running, how many, what's the flow rate.
41 i
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CRESWELL:
Excuse me just a minute.
You stated in item 3 that you 6i would want to know about 7I
' reactor coolant pump conditions and the last item that you talked about was the pump trip.
Could you go back to 8{
that item that referred to the pump trip and read it again please.
9!,
101 SPANGLER:
Chronology of sequence of events, pump trip, when why.
11!
12!
CRESWELL: What pump?
131 14!
SPANGLER:
I would assume that means the reactor coolant pump.
13!
16i CRESWELL:
So you had knowledge that the RCPs had...any reactor coolant 17 pump had been tripped.
ISI 19i SPANGLER:
Yep. We got that in the initial phone call.
One of the 20!
items that was mentioned....... lost RCS flow indication, tripped 21:
reactor coolant pumo.
22f 23l CRESWELL:
Could you read off that first list again, Bill, I don't 24j believe I got that one down.
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SPANGLER: Well it wasn't in the first list.
The first list was basically 2 '
operating data.
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4i CRESWELL: Okay.
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6i SPANGLER:
There was additional information from the phone call in the 71' notes if you would like that I'll give them to you also.
8l 9l CRESWELL: We would like to have a copy of those notes.
10f 11';
SPANGLER:
Do you want me to read them.
12l 131 CRESWELL: Well, no let's not go into that right now but,...
14i 10' SPANGLER: Anyway we did get on the original phone call, we got infor-16i mation that the reactor coolant pumps had been tripped.
17f 181 CRESWELL:
So the reactor coolant pump conditions would have referred 19I to something else rather than their being tripped.
20t 21!
SPANGLER:
The reactor coolant pump conditions would refer to, would 22I refer to seal cavity pressures, seal temperatures, that kind of thing.
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CRESWELL:
I understand.
2l 31 SPANGLER:
Operability of the pump.
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l c-CRESWELL: Okay.
That clears that up. So the last item that we had 6i there that you were going-to ask about was the pump trip, when and why.
What's the next item after that?
8l 9!
SPANGLER:
HPI running-how many-flow rates, ycu know, how many pumps 10 were running and what was the flow rate.
11:
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CRESWELL: Okay.
14 SPANGLER: And we had also...there had also been in the initial phone 15' call indication of a primary to secondary leak.
This was mentioned in 16; the phone call and the other item of information we were looking for 17!
was the suspected path of the primary to secondary leak. You know, like 18!
where.
And that brings us up through the 9 o' clock meeting.
191 20f CRESWELL: Were there any decisions made in that 9:00 o' clock meeting, 21j Bill?
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2 DANGLER: No, only that we needed...Well, one -:ecision was made was to 2'
i dispatch three knowledgeable people to TMI-2 immediately to assist as
'~l required.
These people were dispatched.
You got Bob Weeks, Joe Kelly and Bob Tilley, Bob Tulley...were dispatched to the site, to the area, "9
to be available for whatever assistance they could offer.
t 6:
CRESWELL:
Bill, did you participa.te in the decision of who was to be 8
sent down.
91 10 SPANGLER:
No.
11!
12 CRESWELL: Who made that decision.
13l 14 SPANGLER:
Engineering Department's decision.
151 16!
CRESWELL:
Mr. Womack.
17; IS!
SPANGLER:
I wouldn't want to identify specific by name.
It was a 191 committee-decision.
20t 21l CRESWELL:
Was Mr. Deddens present at this 9 o' clock meeting?
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SPANGLER:
I don't know.
I suspect yes.
I don't have a list of it 2!
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handy.
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4i CRESWELL:
How long do you estimate the 9 o' clock meeting lasted?
Si Si SPANGLER:
I would guess, looking back, half hour, 45 minutes.
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81 CRESWELL: Was there any discussion of fuel damage during your 9 o' clock 9l meeting.
101 i
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SPANGLER:
No, none other than, you know, t'le correlations between the 1
12f activity levels reported in the building and there's an obvious pos-13f sibility based on that there is some fuel damage.
14!
15' CRESWELL:
There was a correlation of activity levels in containment.
16i 17 SPANGLER: Well I made that in my own mind, and I am assuming other ISI people did.
There was no specific lengthy discussion about that, fuel 19!'
damage.
Really, the conversation during that meeting was directed at 20l letting people know that the incident had occurred, getting a task 21i force of people thinking about the thing, identifying the kinds of 22l information that we would like to get. Now that's the last activities 231 specifically recorded here until 10:30. At 10:30, and I was, this was 24i 25i b
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~j reported to me and I wasn't involved directly in the conversation but 2'
j Phinney reported the following information which resulted from a telephone 31 call between Jim Floyd....You know Jim Floyd?
4!
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CRESWELL:
Yes. Who was the main, who had...
Si i
SPANGLER: Jim Phinney.
8!
9I CRESWELL:
How do you spell his last name.
101 l
11!
SPANGLER:
Phinney.
12!
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CRESWELL: What is his position?
141 15' SPANGLER: Jim, is Manager of Operating Plant Service for the plant.
16i And Jim Floyd, who was in Lynchburg on a training mission on the simulator II!
called somebody at TMI and about all that came out of that phone call i
18!
was confirmation of the data that Lee had given us.
19' 20!
CRESWELL:
Did Mr. Floyd indicate at that period of time anything about 21, the auxiliary feecwater actuation?
22!
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SPANGLER:
Polisher isolation valve caused valve to shut, and start 2l
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blocking feedwater.
Let me look through the notes here.
Talks a lot 3!
about radiation levels. What the notes here say is that the aux feedwater i
4r was inf atiated but there was no flow to the OTSG's until and this says
]"I approximately twelve minutes after the trip.
It adds that the OTSG's Si did not go dry.
71 i
CRESWELL: You stated that the once thru steam generators did not go dry?
10f SPANGLER: That's what we stated at the time, yes.
12:
13 CRESWELL: Did anyone question that particular statement, to your knowledge?
14:
-15' SPANGLER: This statement was not made at the meeting.
This was a 16 telephone conversation between... and tnis information was relayed from 171 Jim Floyd to Jim Phinney who relayed to Wandoing and myself later in 18i the morning.
19I 20!
CRESWELL: Did that seem reasonable to you that auxiliary feecwater had 21i been delayed for twelve minutes and the once thru steam generator did 2l not go dry?
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l li SPANGLER:
Didn't...at the time.
I don't recall thinking of it in 2'
j those terms at all.
If I could sit back now and reflect I'd probably 31 j
say "yes, its not unreasonable."
4f E*l SPANGLER: OK. Want me to go on?
Si CRESWEll.: Go ahead.
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9f CRESWELL:
Let me understand one thing. You had received no communications 101 from Lee or Greg Schaedel up until, or between the time of 7:45 until lif 10:30.
12!
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SPANGLER: That's right. That's the next recorded thing in these notes 141 is that at 11:45 we had a telecon with Schaedel who was apparently at 15i his residence.
16; 11l CRESWELL:
Greg called you?
18!
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SPANGLER:
Greg called me at my office and identified that he had just 20{
finished speaking to Lee at the site and had some additional information 21!
concerning the t.ansient and at the end of it it appears that the 22l reactor coolant pump had shut down. Trying to go solid and, actually I 23l don't know that means, whether the plant was trying to go solid or 24!
whether I assumed the plant was trying to go solid, I don't think they 25i 1
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l were trying deliberately to make it solid. Indicating that a steam 2l l
bubble in the RCS loop, a specific loop was identified.
Low level 31 l
radioactivity in atmosphere reported, Met Ed had made public announcement 41 to the news media.
Radiation ter'::: performing surveys on and off site, 5
and NRC teams sent to site to investigate.
Primary to secondary leak 6i on B steam generator confirmed by sample analysis.
B OTSG as a result 71 l
had been isolated. I have no idea what time.
And they were cooling 81 down on A steam generator, feeding the steam there using natural circu-9!
lation. At this point he does indicate that the HPI is taking suction 10f from the barated water storage tank. Some indication that the pressurizer 11f heaters had shorted out and they were using pressurizer electromatic i
12!
isolation valves to control pressure.
At this time the RCS conditions 13 were T cold, 300 degrees and the system nas 2100 psi and their plans 141 were to cool dcwn and depressurize.
Speculation of fuel leakage but no 13 further information on radiation levels.
Some level increase in reactor 16 building sump.
High moisture level in the reactor building.
Did 17!
mention that component cooling water seal injection had been maintained ISI on the reactor coolant pumps.
At that time I asked Greg to have Lee 19i Rogers call up at 1315 so we could establish a time so we could keep 20t the telephone open.
21l 22!
CRESWELL: That would've been 1:15 in the afternoon?
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17 li SPANGLER: Yeah. Apparently, Greg relayed to us, also, that Met Ed had 2!
requested radiochemistry expertise support, and Eric Yohaning (?) and 31 Dale (Unintelligible name) were dispatched to the site immediately.
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5 SPANGLER: I did not do that, I, exactly, do not know how that request 6i came about.
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8l CRESWELL: OK.
Does that terminate the...
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SPANGLER:
That terminates the 11:45 phone call.
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CRESWELL:
Is that 10:45 or 11:45?
131 141 SPANGLER: 11:45.
Did I say 10:45?
11:45.
151 16' CRESWELL: Do you recollect talking to Greg about the posture of 5&W 17!
employees in talking to the media?
18j 19!
SPANGLER: I don't think that even occurred to us at that time. At least 20!
to me. (Unintelligible words).
21l 22{
CRESWELL: Alright.
You had previously prepared a list of items that 23l you wanted to ask Lee about.
One of which was pressurizer level.
Did 24l you ask Greg to find out what pressurizer level was?
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SPANGLER: I don't remember and certainly indicated in the notes.
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CRESWELL: And also about auxiliary feedwater actuation. Was there any 4!
discussion there?
Si Si SPANGLER: No indication in the notes.
7 81 CRESWELL: In other words, I guess the question I'm asking was, was the 9!
list that you had prepared used for information purposes or information 101 requests:
111 SPANGLER: Apparently...I don't know. I don't know.
Even if I looked at i
'31 these notes and I don't remember and if certainly the notes can't 14i indicate that he specifically read down his list, great.
15; 16i CRESWELL: Do you recall any discussion about the incore thermocouples 17!
at this point in time?
18t 19i SPANGLER: No.
201 21l CRESWELL: You mention that it was relayed to you that they were cooling 22 down on the A steam generator and that they were using natural circulation.
23l Was it reported to you any temperatures in the hot leg?
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19 li SPANGLER: No.
If they were they were n<Jt made note of.
The only thing i
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I got recorded here is T cold.
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l CRESWELL: There was a note that there was steam bubble in trie reactor
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j cooling system loop.
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7l SPANGLER: There was a note that says.. in effect that they suspected...what 81, the note says here "trying to go solid.
Indication of steam bubble in 9!
RCS loop" 101 115 CRESWELL: Well, if they were cooling using natural circulation, then i
- 12f, more than likely tnere wasn't a blockage in the A loop.
13l
~4f SPANGLER: Well,. its questionable. We have a question mark here as to 15i whether this was the 3 loop or A loop.
And I don't know, I had no 16; idea, based on my memory and the telephone calls what led him to even 17 say that they were suspicious of the steam bubble in the loop.
They 181 did suspect at that time the possibility of a steam bubble in one of 19I the loop.
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CRESWELL: After you received this information, I imagine that you do 22{
circulate it on the design people, engineering people...
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SPANGLER: There were people who were assigned to this task force, 2
headed up by Karrasch.
Again, there must've been fifteen people in my 31 little bitty office during this phone call.
So they got this information 41 directly.
Later on in the day after these notes were written up, 5;
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j people had time to read the notes, =any people could've put their own 6!
notes in certain portions of the conversations.
At this point, at this point, you know it was still in the telephone conversation note-taking OI mode.
9i 10(
CRESWELL: OK.
lli 12 SPANGLER: There was no such thing as a letter written up after the 13t telephone call (unintelligible words).
14i 1
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CRESWELL: You mentioned that this telephone conversation was held in 16!
your office?
1T ISI SPANGLER: It was.
19i 20 CRESWELL: Was there a period of time during the day that you met in the 21:
Project Management Control Center?
22!
r 23t SPANGLER: I'm getting to that now.
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CRESWELL:
Ok. So that's not ia at ;his point in time.
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SPANGLER: No. Not at this point in time. We were still in my office.
4, CRESWELL:
Ok. And this.[ gain is abodt twelve o'cicck.
et 71
~2PANGLER:
_ Yes, we're ubcut twelve o'c. lock noon at this time.
8!
9!
CRESWELL: Do you recollect what the' suggestions were of the task force
O'y about the information that they had been given by Greg?
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SPANGLER: Well, yes, I remember essentially zero...(unintelligible) I I
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had so many conversations that dayn Every thing I' recollect had to be f
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from notes.
And'following the conversation, the biscussion, of course, 1N I
continued in my office and, according to these notes Karrasch was 1NI assignec a task force to determine a recommended course of action for 1!
cases with and without reactor coolant pumps. In other words, what 18f would we taking (unintelligible) about asking witn those situations.
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And Bobby Kennedy was asked to determine the prerequisites to starting
,.a 20l a reactor coolant pump.
21:
2d CRESWELL: Who is Bobby Kennedy?
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SPANGLER: Bobby Kennedy is the Mahager of the Engineering Organization 2:
responsible for research (unintelligible words).
31 41 CRESWELL: Were there any other assignments given...like to the ECCS g.
group?
6i 7!
l SPANGLER: Not recorded in the notes, no.
But, I'm sure that Karrasch 8I and Womack were busy off doing their things with their people. OK?
91 101 CRESWELL: That's good.
11:
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SPANGLER: We were then expecting a telephone cail frca Lee Rogers at 13i 1315 and prior to that time in preparation for that phone call we 14 established ourselves in the Project Control Center.
At this time the 15i task force had totally outgrown my office and that was when the Project 16 Control Center, Command Center, Comnunications Center, was established, 17' somewhere around one o' clock, one fifteen.
One thirty, 13:30, then we 18I had another telephone call from Schaedel.
And the information being 19!
reported to us was that the reactor coolant system was at 495 psi and, 20f of course, floating on their core flood tank.
T hot was 700 F and this 21, was apparently by valt meter.
Pressurizer was full, and they were 22{
controlling pressure with the electromatic relief valve isolation 231 valves.
The HPI was taking suction from borated water storage tanks 24i 2$i i
\\
l e,
t
23 l
li and, according to him, at that time they were in the process of switching 2!
l to the reactor coolant bleed hold up tanks.
Reconfirmed that the 8 3
f steam generator was isolated, the level was at 50% on the operating 4l level.
Si CRESWELL: Was there any discussion that the plant staff was trying to go down on shutdown cooling?
8!
l 9!
SPANGLER: Pardon.
10j 11!
CRESWELL: Was there any discussion that the plant was trying to go down 12 on shutdown cooling?
131 14I SPANGLER: Let me just go through the notes here.
He indicated, and I 15:
don't know that that means his comment that the minimum cooldown from 16i A0TSG, that was A steam generator, we were still, they thought were 17l cooling down on those pumps, (unintelligible words).
They were dumping 18i steam to the atmosphere through the atmospheric dump valves because 191 they had lost gland seal steam on the turbine (that's your backup 20:
ude).
So they were dumping to the atmosphere at this time. Emergency 2b feedwater to A steam generator through the main feedwater nozzles. No 22!
further information on radiation levels. Airborne activity in the aux 231 building and the controlled area. I don't understand exactly what that 24i meant. He did indicate at that time that the reactor building sump was 25i 35g qul o
s
f 24 I
1!
being pumped to the aux building sump, had been pumped to the aux 2'
l building sump prior, before it was discovered and isolated.
So this 31 was the first time that we had information that that had occurred.
4j i,
CRESWELL:
That was to the aux building sump?..... From the reactor building sump to the aux building sump.
7l l
OI SPANGLER: The aux building sump.
Yeah.
He also told us that they had tried to start the reactor coolant pumps, one in each loop, but they 101 drew only 100 amps so they obviously weren't loaded. We asked a lot of 11f questions. We asked, for example, why their reactor coolant pump 12{
originally stopped.
Didn't...we didn't get a very clear answer.
13l 14I CRESWELL: Did you recollect what the explanation was?
15; 16:
SPANGLER: Pardon.
17f 18i CRESWELL: Can you recollect what the explanation was that you were 191 getting?
20; 21!
SPANGLER:
Yeah.
The explanation, and I don:t know when we got this.
22 I don't know if it was during this phone call, or later or earlier, but 2 31 the explanation that we got was they had had a loss of...an indicated 24l loss of reactor coolant flow, indicated the pump losing suction in 25; f
fJ
l l
4 25 i
1,'
their minds, so they turned them off. Well, we advised Schaedel that 2!
weeks, Kelly and Tully were on their way.
Schaedel advised us that 3r John Flint was also on site then by then, and wer were advised that 4:j they planned to go on decay heat removal system as soon as possible.
c:
~l The plan, apparently, was to come on down and get on decay heat. And, 6i we recommended the following to Schaedel from Rogers: obtain cooldown 7!
data, insure accurate RCS temperature before going on to decay heat 8i removal system operation.
Confirm core outleti temperature by pressurizer 91' temperature since this is now the flow path.
Sorated water storage 1
10I level last know thirty seven feet, and that's just an isolated note ou9 they're going to...(unintelligible words).
12!
13I CRES'WELL: Bill, what was your interest in obtaining the cooldown data?
14:
1 15; SpANGLER: What do you-mean, what was my interest in obtaining cooldown 16i data?
17l 18i CRES'WELL: For what purpose were you going to use the cooldown data?
19!
20{
SpANGLER: I don't know...I don't understand the question.
Since we 21l were obviously after all the data we could get.. (unintelligible 22l words) plant in the cool down mode so we could begin to assess what was 23!
going on, we could add whatever assistance we can when we got the 24!
cpportunity.
25i OOu i
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26 i
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CRESWELL: I'm asking basically for stress calculations on certains of 2!
piping, or...
3!
4l l
SPANGLER:
No. At this point in time we weren't thinking about stress Si
~
calculations, we were thinking about cooldown (Unintelligible words).
Si 7
CRESWELL:
Do you recall who asked for the cooldown data?
81 9I SPANGLER: No.
101 11{
CRESWELL: At this point, we're getting at the end of the tape and I'll 12{
turn it back over to Owen.
13l 14 SHACXLETON:
We'll change the tape and now the time is 3:52 p.m.,
131 Eastern Daylight Time, June 20, 1979. This is a continuation of the 16i interview of Mr. William H. Spangla'.
Time is now 3:54 p.m. Eastern 17!
Daylight Time, June 20, 1979.
Mr. Creswell will continue with the 18f questioning.
191 20 CRESWELL: Bill, one of the items that you mentioned that was recommended 21!
to Greg was to assure accurate RCS temperature before going into decay 22l heat removal system operation.
Could give me an idea of why you wanted 23{
that accurate RCS temperature information?
2 41 25i E09 20'i
l I
i 27 i
1!
SPANGLER: I don' t know specifically why..you'd better recognize now.
2}
I'm not the guy asking all these questions. We've got an office full 31 of people.
i 4l i
- 'i CREEWELL: Do you recollect who asked this particular question?
Si I
7!'
SPANGLER: I sure don't.
I dcn't have any idea.
8 91 CRESWELL: So you don' t have any knowledge of why...
10!
17; SPANGLER: Specifically why that one specific piece of information 12l'
..other than, again, obviously what you want to know, before you make 1
any move to change things, what the conditions were.
141 15!
CRESWELL.
And the third item was confirm core outlet temperatures by 16i pressurizer temperatures since this is how flow path...
17!
18!
SPANGLER:
Look real close eyed.
In other words you're saying a valve 19I is open and the fluid discharges through the valve and therefore that's 20 a flowpath through the surge line and that will give you some idea what 2II the flow detail is, what the temperature is.
22!
23l i
24j 25f i
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i 28 l
1!
CRESWELL: That is, as I would interpret it, saying use the pressurizer 2l l
temperature, the liquid level temperature as opposed to the hot leg 3!
temperature to determine what the core discharge..
4!
l
]c-SPANGLER: No.
I interpret that more to mean..the..you might want to 6i take a look at this as a confirming type of information.
7t I
CRESWELL: OK.
Please continue.
91 10{
SPANGLER: OK.
1400 to 1600. We're in the Control Center then and i
11!
it's some time in this time frame that Jim Oeddens had apparently 12 requested Met Ed/GPU to establish a communication link between B&W and 13!
TMI-2 site.
You see we still hadn't established any communications, 14!
directly between us and the Control Room and Jim, had apparently, had 15' passed along the message through Klingaman(?), I guess I don't exactly 16:
remember...the executive level to see if they couldn't be some way to 17!
establish this communication.
And it war. at this time that Womack 18!
recommended that 500 GPM or, at least 400 borated water be at the HPI 19t be established immediate and this message was transmitted via Jim Floyd 201 who teleconed TMI-l control room to pass to TMI-2.
So Jim Floyd apparently 21; did call TMI-l control room at that time and pass this information on.
22l Also transmitted to it TMI-2 via Don Lloyd (?), Met Ed.
23 24j 25i
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l 29 i
if'.
CRESWELL: How was that done?
2' i
i
" ANGLER:
I don't know.
4l
- ~i CRESWELL:
Do you recollect that during this time period Mr. Davis contacted Mr. Arndt (?) of the GPU staff.
7l l
OI SDANGLER:
Not in my presence, no.
Again we are in the control center 9!
and there are other offices in the area.
In fact Jim Oeddens' office 101 is right next to the control center and everything that went on certainly 11!
didn't get included in these notes. (Unintelligible words) Then Floyd 12!
apparently as a result of this conversation provided additional infor-13 mation based on his telecon and that the electromatic relief valve had 141 stuck resulting in quench tank rupture disc blowing.
There was a delay 15' in feeding emergency Aux feedwater because of incorrect indications; 161 pumps running, valves indicated open but were not.
So I guess this was 17!
about the first time...we began to get that story.
Reactor coolant 181 pumps had stopped because of indication of cavitation and they made a 19!
decision based on the potential (unintelligible word). Condenser offgas 20f alarm first indicated leak (Unintelligible word) we had asked that 21!
question, how did they know the steam generator was steaming?
22l 23l CRESWELL : Was Mr. Floyd in the area? We're not saying in the area, 24!
that was the project management control center at this point in time.
25i 7 Cj 4 c U.S
{
30 l
1!
SPANGLER:
No.
I remember Jim Floyd in and out of there a number of 2!
l times, how long and how many times he'd been there I really have no 31 idea.
It was 60,000 R per hour, that was the number we got at the 4{
Reactor Building dome activity levels, and there was some concern that c
that might be a bad reading because of the building moisture. (unintel-61
]
ligible words) 100 R per hour, best estimate of Reactor Building radiation 7'
l level based upon 100 mr per hour at the personnel hatch.
Somebody 81 apparently made that Judgement. Reactor Building pressure went to two i
9I and a half psi initially and then 4 psi about 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the start 10 of the transient.
Now again, we are starting again to build up a 11!
little bit of information about what was going on up there from these 12!
telephone calls. We're contacting Jim and Jim was contacting us.
13 14 CRE5WELL:
This was still from Floyd.
15i 16; SPANGLER:
This was still from this information from Floyd. Kennedy-Dempsey 17!
reported calling.
Kennedy and Dempsey again are two pump guys, pump 18' ex;.
ts.
They were concerned, and these were their comments relative 19!
to the reactor coolant pumps.
They wee concerned about moisture being 20j a problem and start getting coolant pump motors. (unintelligible words) 21!
We checked the component cooling water leak alarm moisture detector and 22!
that's its the motors (unintelligible words)can allow up to 30 ml l
23{
vibrations temporarily to operate the reactor coolant pump.
Gray line 2 41 luce reactor coolant pumps, if possible.
I don't know what tnat means.
25i c09 i
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31 1!
But obviously at this point in time we're talking about, we're beginning 2
to talk about starting the reactor coolant pump (unintellibible word).
3!
What do we have to do?
4l What's the situation? There is a possiblity the reactor coolant pumps are not truly connected.
In other words, the c-damage 'heared, broke the coupling, and maybe that's why they didn't pick up a load and make that start.
That kind of discussion was taking place, okay?
Okay, then 1600 we had another telephone call from Schaedel 0
to the task force.
And again Schaedel had been talking with Rogers 9
(unintelligible words). We had been questioning Schaedel (unintel-10 ligible words).
We really need to talk directly to the Control Room, 11!
can we establish that communication? Why do we have to go (unintel-12 ligible words) and, of course, he responded, it was difficult to establish 13 direct communication with the site.
At that time he indicated that 14 they had to collapse the bubble, had to collapse a bubble in the A leg 15 Good indication from temperatures and pressures, in other words, a 16 that had assumed, based nn what they saw in there (unintelligible 17) words perhaps stutter) the bubble had existed and they had now managed 18{
to collapse the bubble.
Normal letdown plus pressurizer plus isolation 19i valve pressure control trying to collapse the bubble in B loop, cause 20:
they still thought they had a bubble in the 3 loop at this time 21!
(Unintelligible words).
Pressurizer 190 inches, 460 Fahrenheit, 560 221 psi.
Planned to get on decay heat removal system via suction from i
23}
boiling water, borated water storage tank.
We tested from B&W what our 24 considerations for running coolant pumps, so they apparently then had 25j i
h 1D n
Q t
i
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l 32 l
1:
requested through Schaedel for us to begin considering what it would 2!
l take to start the pumps, at least one in the 8 loop.
That's to keep 31 the heat (unintelligible words).
4!
ce
]
CRESWELL:
The decay heat (unintelligible words).
Si 7l SPANGLER:
Yea, the decay heat (unintelligible words).
Okay they say 8I there is still floating on the core flooding tank and ZA reactor cooling pumps approximately 400 to 500 psi, Srp (unintelligible word).
Two
- 01 1
reactor coolant pumps had indication of leakage, but unsure, cooldown lli data available from reactimeter tapes.
That would be (unintelligible 12!
words).
I guess that was the first indication we had that the reactimeter 13f had been running.
A steam generator 80% operating level, B at 50 14' percent operating level, 400 to 500 gpm, HPI flow recommended to Schaedel U
to pass to site.
He was directed (unintelligible words).
This was 16!
based on 100 full power days plus 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of shutdown.
It was conservative.
17!
Max, the minimum recommended for reactor coolant pump start, 30 mills ISI vibrations limited to HPI, saturated conditions for loop; HPI on, 191 saturated condition for loop.
Good amperage reading, in other words, 20!
make sure it picks up a load.
Component cooling water on, pre... normal 21!
condition for startup, (unintelligible words) seals, that kind of 22!
thing.
1640, reactor coolant system conditions reported from TMI-2 23 control room, T hot 550, 450 psi, (unintelligible word) conditions.
I 24}
don't remember exactly how that communication came in.
It doesn't say 25i
l i
i 33 1!
and I don't know.
1745, another telecon from Schaedel task force 2:
giving us the latest information at the site and they were beginning to j
3!
draw a vacuum now in the condenser vacuum.100 gpm HPI reactor coolant 4
system 566, 70 psi on your (unintelligible word) Aux flood tank.
Obviously uncontrolled.
We got a bubble in the pressurizer, they still S
f have a suspected bubble in the A loop, T cold 520, T hot 530, that's 7
saturation from 800 to 900 psi.
A steam generator 80 percent operating 8
range level, that's 180 psi secondary sidei (Unintelligible word) 9l' level and HPI still grounding (?) from' borated water storage tank.
We 101 recommended to Schaedel that HPI be immediately increased to stop 11 letdown and go to subcooling conditions on reactor coolant pump.(?)
12!
Okay,1810, Met Ed/GPU incident (unintelligible words) informed me that 13i at 1625, HPI had been at 400 gpm and maintaining.
I would not call 14 that a telephone call.
I don't know who the telephone call came from.
15!
Now we are at 1835 to 2000 okay, we are talking about an hour and a 16i half telephone call and this is when we finally got Rogers on the 17l phone.
And this is the first that we actually established, that I can t
18{
recall, direct communications with the control room.
He advised they 19l were cooling via the A steam generstor, dumping the condenser from the 20f A loop, T cold 300, T hot 540- 550, going solid and I asked again what 21!
that means, and of course saturation is 540.
Pressurizer level stable 22!
at approximately 500 degrees, pressurizer heaters limited because of
(
231 shorts, bubble indication in the 8 loop; T cold 200, T het offscale, 24!
hign, apparently S loop.
25j
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34 I
1:
CRESWELL:
That's better than 650?
2l 31 SPANGLER:
Yep.
Reactor coo' it system pressure 1800 psi, increasing.
4j HPI at 400 gpm, (unintelligible words).
A steam generator, 50 psi, ci
]
consistently at 300 degrees.
I am not sure what that number is.
T 6i cold, A side, pressurizer pressure.
Incore thermocouple decreasing 7!'
with time. T hot, A side, consistent.
Reading:
2 at 500 degrees, 8
others are reading a question mark.
When they go offscale they read Cl question mark. (unintelligible word) They were offscale.
That's the 10l first that I guess we had any notrs on (unintelligible words).
11!
1 12!
CRESWELL: Do you recollect having any physicists or fuels people in i
13!
the conversations that day up to that time.
14i 15!
ErdLER:
I don't recollect...I don't even recollect whether there 16i 1,.ere any in our 9 o' clock meeting but I would be very surprised if 11!
there were not.
I just couldn't identify them by name and I am sure by 18:
this time in this control center there were lots of them.
The incore 19!
thermocouples were reading question mark.
Seal (?) injection had been 20!
maintai:'ed at least 0700 and since before the transient.
They really, 21i wnat they're saying is that, I guess they feel they maintained seal 22!
injection to most, not all of (unintelligible words).
Reactor coolant 23l pumps have good baaring temperatures and soal pressures.
No indication 24f that (unintelligible word) isolated seal inje. tion to reactor coolant 25!
u9 c
P I
35 1.'
pumps.
100 R per hour in Aux Building, RB sump automatically pumps to 2:
the Aux Building.
Sump secured later.
Again that's (unintelligible 3;
l words).
100 mr per hour in plant (unintelligible words).
700 mr per 4;
hour outside f.he gate.
Si Si CRESWELL:
Excuse me, I believe that's 70.
71 l
SPANGLER:
70, excuse me, right.
Greater than 1 mr p?r hour on State 9!
ground near site. Moisture and high radiation levels limiting use of 10!
some equipment.
Indications of primary to secondary leak from 20TSG by 11l sample.
No known magnitude of leak. We didn't have any idea.
B steam 12 generator had been isolated before 0700.
Buses lost for oil lift pump 13i (unintelligible words) reactor coolant pump start.
Again we are still 14!
in the same phone call, 1910, (unintelligible words).
DCLF pump now
~ 15l running and Dempsey provided the following requirements for startup of I6 reactor coolant pumps (unintelligible words) in this condition.
If you 17!
want me to read them I will.
18t 19'
.CRESWELL: Would you please.
20!
i 21!
SPANGLER:
Seal injection maintained at 12 gpm, seal return flow 1.9 22l gpm, max. (Unintelligible words) the component service water on the 23!
cooling pump.
Sealing leakage 1.9 gpm max., moisture detector, no l
24!
25!
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l l
(
36 1
alarm, (unintelligible word) startup current should be approximately 2 '
j 600 amps to give you some idea what they were picking up.
Vibration 31 (unintelligible word) 30 mils (unintelligible words) clear motor (unin-4i telligible words) start of interlock.
Seal infection temperature 150, Si seal return temperature less than 185 (?).
2A and 28 reactor coolant 6i pumps, or pumps used earli'er today attempt to restart.
A steam generator, 7\\
50 psi, 80% level steaming down 8 (unintelligible words).
Recommended i
81 to Rogers that the 1A reactor coolt. ;t pump be given a bump for five 91 seconds, start dead stop and let RCS parameters stabilize.
At 1930 the 10l' 1A pump was given a ten second bump, start /stop by Met Ed operator 11;I personnel. OTSG's at 200 psi; A steam generator steaming rate increased.
12!
RTGs all indicate consistant with conditions.
13l II CRE5WELL:
If I remember correctly at this point in time you are still 15:
in constant communication with Lee Rogers.
16i 17l SpANGLER:
Oh yes, we are all on the phone in there.
18f 191 CRESWELL:
That call lasted...
201 21j SpANGLER:
That call lasted over an hour and a half.
1940.
A loop: T 22!
hot: 520, T cold: 320.
OTSG 60 psi, 325 Degrees F.
S loop: T hot, 2M 620: T cold: 225, (unintelligible words): 160 psi, 390 out.
RCS pressure 24l 1850 psi, and it says here it dipped to approximately 1400 psi, I don't "4 :
g\\\\
c,
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37 1:
i know what that means.
(Unintelligible words) flow went to 40 percent.
2!
(Unintelligible words).
Reactor coolant pump starting current 1200 31 amps.
Task force evaluated conditions for a second bump of reactor 4!
{
coolant pump or for a start with continued running of the reactor Si coolant pump.
Recommendation given to start and run the 1A reactor 6i coolant pump, however the station superintendent had already ordered 7
this to be done.
So the 1A reactor coolant pump started and was running 8l at 1950 on the 28th and plant data then after the pump running goes t
9l like this, lA reactor coolant pump vibration: 18 mils; both loops, T 101 hot 520, T cold 340.
Steam generators 100 psi, approximately 310 F; 11
plant stable. RCS pressure 1800 psi, reactor coolant pumps current 620 to 580 amps, right on where we expected to be.
Reactor coolant system 13 flow 40%.
Pressurizer temperature, 500 F; incore thermocouple approxi-14' mately 400 F.
Plans are to stay on one reactor coolant pump and cool E
down and get in on the decay heat removal system operation which is 16!
expected within a few hours, and then we're anticipating right on 17 downhill on decay heat.
Rogers to call Spangler when decay heat 1St removal system is in operation and if there any other problems or 19i assistance needed.
Rogers stated no further assistance needed at this 20t time.
Task force was adjourned.
This was...
21:
22!
CRESWELL:
This was about 8:00 to 9 o' clock?
I 23l 24i 25i
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9\\L e9
.o s
6
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38 I,
1!
SPANGLER::
8:00 to 9 o' clock.
2 '
3t j
CRESWELL: Mr. Spangler, did you record any conversations that you had 4!
with the people, Schaedel cLr Rogers?
51 l
Si SPANGLER:
I believe...I'l'1 tell you when...once the command center was 7
initiated, at some time during that period there were telephone calls 81 recorded and I can't honestly say which ones or if they all were or 91 not.
Again there was a lot of decision making going on during the 10I process of this (unintelligible words) and there were some telephone 11!
conversations recorded but wnether they started that day or (unintelligible 12 words) I don't know.
u!
14 CRESWELL:
Okay you have given us quite a bit of information Mr. Rogers
-15:
and we appreciate it very much.
I would like to have some time to 16; study this information and we may want to get back in touch with you 17 later, after we study that.
At this time I will turn it back over to lSt Owen and close the interview out.
19i 20' SHACXLETON:
Thank you Mr. Spangler, the time is now 4:18 p.m. EDT, 21.'
June 20, 1979 and we will bring this interview to a close.
i 22!
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