ML19208B091
| ML19208B091 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | Bryan K, Hunter D Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190045 | |
| Download: ML19208B091 (25) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
),
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
f I
In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW of Mr. Kenneth P. Bryan Shift Supervisor 4'
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Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site i
TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 101 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
July ll, 1979 121 (Date of Interview) i 131 July 26, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14; 329 15!
(Tape Numcer(s))
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NRC PERSONNEL:
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Mr. Dorwin R. Hunter Mr. Thcmas T. Martin 23!
Mr. Peter Sicilia, Jr.
Mr. Owen C. Shackleton 24l rd ! I C, R !
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SHACXLETON:
The time is now 10:02 a.m. Eastern Daylignt Time, July 2j 11, 1979. This is an interview i Mr. Kenneth P. Bryan.
Mr. Bryan is 3
a Shift Supervisor for the station nuclear, assigned to the Three Mile sland Nuclear Power Station operated by ne Metropoman Edson 4
Sj Company.
Present to car. duct this interview, from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Mr. Dorwin R. Hunter, Mr. Hunter is an Inspection i
Specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch, Inspection and Enforcement
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Reactor Construction Inspection.
Also present is Mr. Thomas T. Martin.
81 Mr. Martin is also an Inspection Specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch, Inspection and Enforcement, Reactor Construction Inspection.
In addition present is Mr. Peter Sicilia, Jr.
Mr. Sicilia is an 11!
Inspector Auditor from the Office of Inspector and Audits.
My name is 12t Owen C. Shackleton, I am an Investigator from Region V.
This interview 131 is taking place in Trailer #203 which is located just outside the 14' south security gate at the Three Mile Island facility. Just prior to 15.
going on tape I presented to Mr. Bryan a two page document frcm the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which he is familiar with as he had 17!
read it and had signed a similar document before, and this document, 181 Mr. Brjan do you understand still remains in effect?
191 20!
BRYAN:
Yes, I do.
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22l SHACKLETON:
And do we have your permission to tape this interview?
23 24l 25i C U,7 0
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gj BRYAN:
ies.
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3j SCHACXLETON: And would you like a copy of the tape?
4i i
BRYAN: Yes.
I 6i SHACKLETON: Alright sir, we will provide that to you at the conclusion of the interview and at this time I will turn the interview over to 81 Mr. Martin.
91 10l MARTIN:
Ken, early in the morning I believe you arrived in Unit 2 approximately 4:08?
13!
BRYAN:
That's true.
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15:
MARTIN _: From the time that you arrived until approximately six something you remained in Unit 2 control room, is that correct?
1T.
18t BRYAN:
That's true.
191 20t l
MARTIN:
During that period time, did you know anyone attempting to 21i repair or replace the alarm typer?
22!
23l BRYAN:
No, I didn't.
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. MARTIN:
Do you re. member who was working in the area of the alarm 2,
typer gathering information off of it?
I 31 BRYAN:
No, I don't remember who was there at the time at the alarm 4
typer.
The typewriter right next to it is the utility typer.
There 5
i was Scott Wilkerson, the Unit 2 Engineer, I believe.
He~was in the
..ei 7{
area.
Other than that I don't remember who was right there at the typerwriter.
81, 9i MARTIN: Alright, Ken. New area of question.
4:02 in the morning we had our first automatic ES actuation which started the two diesels.
11!
When you arrived in the control room, were the diesels running?
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BRYAN:
I don't remember, I didn't look at that.
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15:
MARTIN: Were you aware of the diesels running at any time during the 16i morni,'g?
171 18!
BRYAN:
I can't say that they were running whil6 I was there.
I know 19i that the diesels had started, when they got shut down, I don't know.
20:
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MARTIN:
Ken, who would be responsible for sending an operator out to 22l l
secure the diesels to prevent them from running unloaded for long 231 j
eriods of time?
241 25i n
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BRYAN: The shift forman or the shift supervisor.
2l MARTIN:
3 Exploring a little history, have we had problems with the starting of make-up pumps in the past prior to this event?
Si BRYAN:
On ES actuation?
01 71 MARTIN:
Either on ES actuation or even manual starts.
81 9!
BRYAN:
No, no real problems.
I 11!
MARTIN: When you say no real problems, would you expand on that if you could?
13l 14' BRYAN:
It was a little bit before my time on Unit 2, I can't really 15i expand, I think there was a problem with the wiring at one time, but it would always start on ES, it was in with the switch and the oil 171 pressure switch, but I really don't know that much about it, because 181 it was before I got down there and started my training in Unit 2.
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20i MARTIN:
Alright, that's all I have.
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22!
HUNTER:
Ken, we've touched base on core flood tank valves before with 23 you and I'd like to touch base with you a moment again.
When you came 24l across to Unit 2 from Unit 1, the reactor pressure after the ES was 25i
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decreasing. One of the AO's has indicated that he was at Core Flood 2
Tank Valve breakers, and he, in fact, recalls vividly because he didn't have his keys with him so, in order to close those electrical 3
4l breakers on the core flood tank valves, he actually broke the locks y
off physically because the're break away locks and he, then closed the
. l.
core flood tank valves breakers, lA and 18 valves, I believe they're Si the numbers. Can you recall any instructions given to in A0 to go to the area and close the breakers on the Core Flood Tank valves?
8t 91 i
BRYAN:
I can't remember exactly that we told an A0 to go do it, but 10!
in general, in that time of the morning we had intentions of cl1 sing the core flood valves and somebody must've sent the A0 out to do it, he didn't go out to do it on his own.
13) 14:
HUNTER:
Can you elaborate some on the philosophy for closing the core 15:
flood tank va'"es that morning and who you discussed that with?
16i 1T BRYAN:
The philosophy behind it was that we felt we had a solid 18!
system and we didn't need the cere flood tanks to discharge into the 191 reactor vessel that morning even though the pressure was decreasing 20!
with the indication that we thought we had in the pressurizer tnat it 21l was full.
That was the reason that we didn' t... we didn' t want them 22
to automatically discharge.
23[
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HUNTER: Who were you discussing, or who was in that discussion, Ken, 2j d y u recall?
l 31 BRYAN:
Probably myself and Bill Zewe and Fred Scheimann.
4!
Si H
Okay.
Loadng at de locadon of the fellows as they went 6
through the event trying to refresh your memory a bit... it's been a while, Bill Zewe was in the control room from the time of the event g
until about twenty minutes, fifteeen - twenty minutes after the hour, you had come across from Unit 1, the conditions were somewhat stable, i
I guess wer the words Bill was using.
Bill then proceded down to the 11',
condensate polisher hotwell area to work on the reject line the bypass 12',
I around the polishers and that left you in the control room with Fred 131 Scheimann and Ed Frederick. Bill apparently got back tc the control room somewhere right after five o' clock so he was gone about forty-15i five minutes apparently.
In the discussion of the core flood tank 16i valves as an example, would that have been with Bill Zewe say before 17!
ne left or aftar he came ba:k?
18I 19i BRYAN:
It was definitely after he e ra back.
20j 21!
HUNTER:
So, it wouid be somewhere after five o' clock, does that time 22!
seem realistic?
23 2 41 25!
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7 BRYAN:
Seems awful'long to me.
Seaas,. lhe thinking back on it now I g
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don' t think hs. wad gone maybe more than fifteen - tventy minutes.
2.
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HUNTER: We have him positioned up on the duct work opening tr.e twelve
< valve at fifty-nine minyt.es, that puts him there and we wen't argue
- l about how time passed, probably did pass faster th3n yote realited.
Gi But then when he came back, would you have Mscussed it at that time?
7 8:
BRYAN:
It was definitely after he came back.
I don't knov/ that we 91' got into it as soon as h'n came back, it might have been a -littio
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10!
farther along.
I think it was.
11' 12!
HUNTER:
Okay. The philocephy was discussed at that time because 131 pressure actually ended up drrpping down latar on in the morning.
It 14I was ch about a thousand poun!s right before takirig.the A pump off..,
15i the B pumps off and then the A pumps off and +. hen the pressure decreased 16!
to about to 950 and then the A panps were taken off, then the pressure
~~
17' c.)ntinued i.o decay and it reached about 700 600 pounds at the E er B
Were they end of that.
Do yua recall th9 discussioiis at that time?
19 based on tre continuing pressure decrease,.th core flood tanks would 201 inject at some pressure less than -700. pour.ds or in that ringe?
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BRYAN: We were always told we could recpen the valve if we wanted the 23l water, it didn't make any difference what the pressure was.
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HUNTER:
Do you recall, you've indicated that the valves were, in 2f fact, closed, do you recall who closed the valves or when they were closed? Was that like after five or six o' clock?
3 4l BRYAN:
I closed the valves.
I don't remember what time it was.
5 t
6j HUNTER:
Do you recall wh*n the valves were reopened?
Si 8RYAN:
No, I don't.
10:
HUNTER: And the closure of the valves was based on not needing any more water as the pressure continued to decay and the fact that you could manually reopen the valves if you needed the core flood system?
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BRYAN:
Yes, electrically from the control room - just push the button 15i and the fact that the pressurizer was indicating full.
16i 17!
HUNTER:
Okay Ken.
Going back again, and you were discussing this 18!
particular problem, Fred Schiemann was on the make-up panel and reading 19i pressurf:er pressure and pressuri:er level and we have him at that 20i position most of the day, so, and then Ed Frederick was actually on 21:
the make-ur, panel itself and operatini some equipment there, reactor 22!
coolant pumps, moving back and forth, again, did you discuss that with 231 Fred Schiemann and Ed Frederick? Were you three involved in that 24l discussion?
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1 BRYAN:
No I, I know Bill was involved in it and I'm not sure about Ed, and Fred was involved in it. We were standing right there at the 2
panel.
4; gj HUNTER: Okay, when you left the control room at about six thirty, f
when Brian (Leder?) came in and then you went back to Unit 1, you indicate that the valves were still closed at that time?
I 8l BRYAN: To the best of my recollection they were, yes.
10i l
HUNTER: You're not aware that they were open, if they were open, 11.
reopened?
12!
13l BRYAN:
Right.
14 15:
HUNTER:
Go to another subject. Wher you came over, one of the first 16i things that you saw when you came into Unit 2 was directly or indirectly 17:
the emergency... that the steam generators were not getting feed water 18i because of the low level and that, your indications were, not getting 191 feed and you then...Craig Faust was on the emergency feed panel at 20I that time...do you recall your actions, specifically, at that time as 21:
far as physically did you go over to behind Craig Faust or into the 22j area of the emergency feed water control sections when you came across?
23I 24i 25i DD C (2.q
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10 BRYAN: When I first walked into the cont $ol room, I walked to the 7;
2 right hand side of the Tave indicator which is where the feed water is 3j controlled from and I looked at Tave and I looked at steam generator levels and I said, "Oc you know we don't have any feedwater?" Craig d,!
was standing almost in front of me or to my right a little bit but he gj was right in front of the emergency feed water valve and he looked down and said that the twe'lve valve was snut, within about a few 1
Sl seconds of when I said you don't have any feed water I didn't actually' i
look down and see it myself because by the time I saw what he was g
doing, he already had his hands on the switch to open them.
11:
l HUNTER: Okay, So the twelve valves came open.
The indication was 121 then at that time the operators were aware that feed water was being injected in the steam generators due to noise, water hammer, off of 14!
the speaker system.
This speaker system is at the microphone that is 1*
mounted in the main steam room or, also, was it off of the pump noise 1Si
...the noise monitoring system?
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181 BRYAN:
Loose parts monitoring system.
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20i HUNTER:
Apparently the A generator was selected on that...if we have 21:
the testimony... that appears...
22l 231 l
BRYAN:
I did not look to see what was selected but the noise...
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HUNTER: That's where it came frem at the speaker on the vertical cam.
I 2:
BRYAN:
Right.
3 41 HUNTER:
5 The next thing that happens after the emergency feed water is in fact initiated, and the noise is apparent water...the~ thumping, the 7
water hammer, the cracking, and in my review of the transient Ken, the A and the 8 generators, the feed water was applied at zero four zero 8!
eight OK, it was within thirty seconds the sequence of events picked it up and the reactimiter picked it up.
Then in the A generator the 11;:
level, actually, did not start to increase and c me up to recover as twenty-four inches or above eighteen inches as Tech Specs up to thirty inches until zero four twenty, so it was twelve minutes.
The B generator 131 came up at four twenty five, 0425 and talking with the operators in 141 that area we're not able to understand why it took from 4:08 to twenty and twenty-five respectively to obtain steam generator levels with 16i three emergency feed pumps running and our understanding was that the 171 eleven valves were closed and then they were opened, that's excuse me 18l the twelve valves were closed and then they were opened.
During this time frame the eleven valves would've been in automatic and stroked 201 full cpen and Craig indicated, Craig Faust indicated they were open at 21!
that time.
We have two ways to look at it, one would be that there 22l was a problem with feeding and the second would be that the feed water 231 was throttled during this time frame, and I'd like to get your input 2 41 I
on that and if you are aware if the eleven valves or the system was 25!
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12 i
throttled during that time frame, or modified. or one of the levels
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didn't recover during that time?
3!
BRYAN: Are you worried about the five minutes difference between the 5
two-or are you worried about the length of time...?
Gi HUNTER:
7l No, I'm concerned about the fact that the system was put on, the steam generators pressures increased but in fact did not go up as l
8!
they should.
Secondly, and that was on both, and then this would indicate that right out in the twenty minute frame, twenty five minute 1 01 frame, that the actual levels were recovered, then the steam generators 11!
appear to reach a stable condition.
Two parameters that I'm looking 12!
at besides this, okay, I've looked at reactor system pressure.
I You 131 can tell me what, you can elaborate on that if you would, and also I 14I looked at T,y, and you were looking at T,y,, but can you give me a feel for what was going on at, during that time, since you were standing 16; in that area?
17l 18t BRYAN:
Okay, we were certainly looking at T,y, and reactor systems pressure and I'm almost positive that we did throttle down on the feed 20!
water.
First of all, we had a hot steam generator that was dry and I 21l don't know how long it would really take until you're going to see 22t some level because the first, the first water going in there is 23l going to flash to steam anyway.
And how long it takes to get to the 24I' point where you can actually start filling the steam generator from lw' c '
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i gl empty, I don't have a time frama for that. But the consideration was 2
that we didn't want to just sock it to it and drop T and drop the ave 3
pressure down any further. We were trying to feed it slowly.
41 g
HUNTER:
Xen, the consideration, I can indicate to you that looking at a plot of, of emergency feed water discharge pressure and reactor ei system, Tay, and pressure' decrease they look almost identical as far "9 *
- "'" 9""
9*
8 it does in fact track the, as if you were watching T,y, and reactor pressure while you were bringing this system up. Then, would my under-101 standing be correct that the reason the levels were in fact slow 11!
recovering was based on throttling of the EF-il valves at manual, and 12!
then obtaining the level at the time that i and the reactor system 13; ave pressure had in fact leveled out? At a point they went down around 11 14!
hundred pounds and then T went to, to.:h like five...
ave 16i BRYAN:
I don' t rememoer the number... that was 35...
17!
18!
HUNTER:
That was 35 or so when it actually stablized. Ken, looking at 19!
this particular situation, is this a practice at this plant to watch 20!
T and reactor coolant system pressure while maintaining steam ave generator levels either emergency feed water flow, or normal feed 22!
water flow? Because it is that it effects the generators severely, or 23l is it something that I need to understand better about controlling 2 41 feedwater at these plants, at this plant?
25i
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14 BRYAN: Well, on normal startup for control' ling feedwater in manual, 7
2 y u do watch T, you do watch your reactor coolant system, temperature.
Well, as soon as temperature starts going down, your pressure is going 3
to go down, so by trying to maintain a constant temperature in the 4
l reactor coolant system, you'd maintain pressure more or less constant.
_:l And it's not a common practice with the emergency feedwater. We've et never been in a situation where we start off from a dry steam generator 7l for a few minutes and then try to fill it back up again, but on a 8!
normal start up as long as we have, well normally Unit 1 there is 30 inches in the steam generator, you never go below that.
i 11!
HUNTER:
Okay Ken, have you, recalling the merning of the 28th and the 12 feed water was being throttled, were the EF-11 valves being used for 131 that path, for that...for slaving the steam generators? Emergency 14' feedwate flow?
15i 16i BRYAN:
I believe so.
17!
1SI HUNTER:
Alright they were, we've established I think this through 19t other interviews that they were in manual. Were you actually throttling 20!
or was Craig throttling them? Or was somebody else throttling them, 21l actually manipulating the valves?
22' 23 BRYAN:
I might have touched them once or twice, but basically it was 24l Craig.
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HUNTER: So, between you and Craig they were in fact being throttled?
Oue to the high temperature and by steam generator condition? Do you 2
i feel like you've recovered the generator levels as soon as you, ah, 3
could have er safely could have recovered levels?
5!
BRYAN: Yes. Without decrease the reactor coolant system pressure any 6$
further.
7!
l 8!
HUNTER: Okay, again, give me a, try to give us a feel for besides the dry steam generators, that's one thing, is putting cold water, the other, the... you apparently were concerned about T and reactor ave t
coolant system pressure, decreasing reactor coolant system pressure 12'.
f specifically. When you fed the steam generators and the pressure came 13l down, did the system react as if you thought it would?
14!
15; BRYAN:
Um.
16i li; HUNTER:
Or, as you thought it should?
18r 19!
BRYAN:
I can't remember, it may not have done that, it was, we were 201 kind of fighting it, getting the feed water back on and trying to 21l j
watch the reactor coolant system pressure.
I was not concerned about 22!
the T dropping okay? But by T indicating it's gonna drop, I'm ave ave 23!
expecting pressure to drop.
We were having some problems in that area 24 and I can't specifically rememoer what it was, but, it may not have 25!
a c R' 'l
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16 y
looked like a normal startup or a normal ed water, manual manipula-tion of feedwater, but it was fairly close, I think.
We were able to 2
get some water in the steam generator without dropping the reactor e lant system pressure down... too low.
I think the thing that 4
maybe didn't work out quite as, well, we expected, was the pressurizer level.
I think that's what it was.
ei 7l l
HUNTER: Alright, pressurizer level then, in fact, did not, if I'm 8!
understanding what you're saying, did not decrease as, as T,y, came down as you might have expected it to.
i 101 11:
BRYAN:
Right.
12!
13!
SHACXLETON: G4ntlemen, we're getting close to the end of this tape, it so we'll take a minute to change the tape.
The time is now 10:28 a.m.
15:
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Xenneth P. Bryan and 16i the questioning will be continued by Mr. Hunter.
IT 181 HUNTER:
Ken, during the first, frem time 8 minutes to 20 minutes 19t while the level in the steam generator is being recovered to normal, 20:
do you recall any problems with the EF-ll, the 11 A and 3 valves, the 6
7.1:
emergency feed water flow control valves, of... recall any problems 22.
with those valves responding to the way that you had felt like they 23l should respond?
2 41 25!
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BRYAN:
No, I didn't.
1!
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j HUNTER: Did it seem that they responded, you fellows do not have 3,
4[
steam generator emergency feed water flow indications so you are actually watching steam generator levels as far as response, but to M
l your knowledge do you recall any problems with them at all?
Si 7!
BRYAN:
No, I don't.
8!
9!
r HUNTER: Okay, I'd like to go one more, one more area before, Ken you 101 have another question. Ah, one of the issues that you... the fellows 11j on the shift... became involved in was securing the reactor coolant 12!
pumps and going on natural circulation, do you recall being involved 131 in discussions concerning that particular issue?
14' 15 BRYAN:
I remember the discussions, yes.
How involved I was, I don't.
16i I don't really remember, by the time we did that I believe, we had 3 171' or 4 other pecple also there. We had two pumps off and one loop.
And 18; the last two pumps went off, it must have been around 5:30 to 6:15, 19f somewhere around there. We were getting... flow was still decreasing, 20!'
we discussed that, and the vibrations were high.
And I don't think 2~' '
there was, as far as a discussion, everybody is saying this is what 22!
}
we ought to do, I think, it was just a matter of just somebody did it.
23 241 251 i
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18 HUNTER:
Ken, during this particular discussion, do you recall seeing 2
a procedure for natural circulation being out, or being used or did y u review a pr cedure?
3 41 BRYAN:
I had reviewed the turbine trip and reactor trip earlier, and 5!
l before wi actually turned the last two pumps off, the procedure was Si not out.
I think it came out at about that time.
Somebody was getting I
it.
81 91 HUNTER: Okay, Ken, if you had the procedure and looking back now and 101 it says that in order to initiate natural circulation, it requires 11!
that your pressure be equivalent to, you take T add 30 degrees and ave then take the saturation pressure off, that would be equivalent to 13) that and would ensure that there would be no flashing in the steam 14i generators, the hot T or the candy canes.
Looking back at that and g
being at 900 - 850 pounds vs. a required 1100 or 1200, 1150 pounds based on 528 degree T3y, at that moment.
Would that have affected i
17l your the, decision, or your involvement in that particular issue?
ISi 19l BRYAN:
I would like to think so, yes.
20; 21l; HUNTER:
Or would it just happen and then it come around?
22l l
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BRYAN:
The night, the time that the decision was made to do that it 24!
would, we just did it.
Now if I would have sat down and went through 25i the procedure first it probably wouid have been a different story.
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i HUNTER: Well, it, saying that you needed pressure and this is again, I don't want lead you but, saying that you needed pressure, in order 2
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n na ra chedations, aM your pgs were Mng, and ney I
were in fact dying, very quickly at that time, the indications are Si that manual SI or SI flow was increased, between the A and the B pumps, the B pumps being off and the A pumps cutting off, and when 6i manual SI was initiated the reactor coolant system pressure just started to nose dive. That may have been then, then the reactor 81 coolant pump flow dropped.
It like dropped from 35 million to 25 mil"lon, just as the pressure dropped and the flows were decreasing, 10:
as the pumps were dying, they were going one way or another.
If in fact you, you did not have the pressure, would that have keyed you, to I
any specific actions such as another alternative other than securing 131 the reactor coolant pumps?
14i 15.
BRYAN:
Looking back on it, yes.
That night I can't say that it was.
16; 17!
HUNTER: Okay, Ken you recently attained a license in Unit 1-2 cross 18t license for a shift supervisor position, can you describe your experience 19i with manual circulation as far as training or actual tests that you've 20;
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been involved with at Unit 1 or 2? In the natural circulation mode?
21!
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BRfAN:
It has been mainly limited to classroom training, no actual 23i experience with natural circulation cooling.
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HUNTER:
g At the simulator, had you seen natural circulation set up as a 2j simulated operaticnal transient?
31 i
BRYAN:
If I have, it's not been like once or twice and it's been a Si while ag.
I haven't seen it in probably the last two years.
i 6i i
HUNTER:
During those type simulation events, transients, do you 7!
l recall if you ever, if their natural circulation were ever commenced 81 and then the simulator was allowed to run and then go through all the 91 parameters that you expected in natural circulation, such as 25 degree i
WT or whatever the parameters that you would look at?
11.,
12l l
BRYAN:
No, I can't say that.
I have seen natural circulation since 13) the accident, just to clear that up.
We were down there just the 14!
other week.
But before that, I'm speaking of before the accident.
15i 16i HUNTER:
Right, before the accident, as far as training, simulation, 17!
or you indicated any, that you may have seen it in simulation but 131 quite a while back, and if you had it before the accident, recently, 191 it would have been in classroom discussions.
Scme of the operators 20; i
indicated to us Ken that we didn't feel we had natural circulation 21!
established and then the next question is well what did you expect?
22!
And they have a general idea of simulator training or specific natural 23 circulation tests on Unit 2, it did not appear that anyone had those, 241 that type of training.
The closest I came in the discussions were 25i b
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that the natural circulation conditions were set up at the simulator, but as soon as the pumps were off and they were conditioned, then they shut the simulator down and went to another transient.
They didn't let it run out so the guys didn't have the actual experience of natural circulation. With the appropriate training, it may have altered their
,j decision, they may have put high pressure injection on earlier, that et is to say, we've got to do something else, nttural circulation is li starting to fail, with the parameters that you had.
It became obvious 81 it was going to faii; but not that morning, maybe you didn't know it 91 was going to fail.
101 11:
SHACKLETON:
Ken, just for the record, when you said you were down and 12 i
actually saw this type of mode, was it at Lynchburg, with the Babcock 131 and Wilcox Company?
14' 15.
BRYAN:
Yes, it was.
16i 17:
HUNTER:
One, one area I want to clarify concerning the utility typer, 18!
you in fact looked at the EMOV temperature a couple of times during 19t the morning.
One time it indicated a few cegrees, quite a few degrees 20!
higher than the power operated relief, the code safety valve discharge 21!
temperatures.
I don't recall the numbers, differences like 283 vs.
219 or 211.
Then later on you looked at it again and the differential 231 i
temperature then wasn't quite as high as that, it was something less.
2 41 You indicated in your previous tapes that you didn't see the need to 25i l
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y close the power operated relief block valve, the EMOV block valve at 2j that time based on the fact that the power operated relief valve had lifted after the trip and then later on that the temperatures were g
i close together. The one time that it was looked at the temperature
- Y 9'
"9" "
5i event.
Looking at the computer at this time, and not "ealizing that.
St I
When... that morning that you looked at it, wert: you aware that it 71 j
was 25 minutes after the event, or did you relate to any time, or did el you relate to the fact that the valve opens or can you elaborate on that a little bit?
101 11l BRYAN:
I'm surprised you said it was twenty five minutes and I didn't, 12!
no, I didn't realize it was that late.
Um, I didn't rel :' it to 13) anything, I just when I got time to look at it, and I don't, I wasn't 14'.
watcning the time.
I expected to see a higher temperature on the electromatic, because I expected it lifted, well I knew it lifted.
16; And, maybe if I had thought about it, you know how long ago it was, I 17!
might have thought differently.
181 19i HUNTER:
Ken, you said you expected a higher temperature, what would 20i' you really have expected if it had, if had just lifted or after a 21l t
normal transient.
22!
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BRYAN:
I don't have a real, a number for you.
I expected it to be 24f higher than the code safety valves, significantly higher, and eighty 25i 1
cal d<
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y degrees is, I thought I'd see 2 or 3 hundred, it wouldn't have bothered me either.
3l HUNTER:
If it was that shortly after the opening?
Si BRYAN: After of the opening of the valve, yeah.
Si i
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HUNTER:
Skay, Tim.
9!
MARTIN:
Ken, one final question.
During the period that Bill Zewe 10i was out of the control room and down by the polishers and the hot 11!
well, who was in charge of the control rocm?
12l 131 BRYAN:
I was the senior person in the control room at the time.
14!
15i MARTIN: Did you perceive that you were in charge at that time?
16i 17!
BRYAN: Well, Bill and I were working together. We still, we have a 18f paging system at the plant and he'd called about hotwell level being igi high, and we discussed about opening up the, about taking the circ-20 water pumps off so that the atmospheric relief valves would open and I
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instead of putting water back into the hotwell, blow it out through 22!
the atmospheric's and I discussed that.
I, we discussed it on the 23 l
page and when he came back in.
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MARTIN: Would you expect during this period for Fred Scheimann to g
clear with you any actions that he planned to take?
3l BRYAN: You have to be more specific. Some things he could very well 4!
do on his own.
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,j MARTIN: Again, I am trying to determine who was in charge in the l'
I control room during this period of Mr. Zewe's absence and really I'm 8!
looking for youi perception, were you in charge?
10i BRYAN: Yes you could say that.
11!
12l l
MARTIN:
That's all the questions I have.
131 14I SHACXLETON:
Mr. Bryan, do you have anything further you'd like to say 15i before we bring the interview to a close?
ISi 17' BRYAN:
No, I don't.
18t 19i SHACKLETON:
On behalf of the Commission, we thank you again for 20I giving us your time and assistance here in answering our inquiry.
2
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We'll close this interview at this time.
The time is now 10:46 a.m.
22}i and this is the conclusion of this interview.
23l 241 25i g ([i 1
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