ML19207B290
| ML19207B290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1979 |
| From: | Hinckley D, Jenkins H, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19207B288 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-79-21, 50-325-79-21, NUDOCS 7908240336 | |
| Download: ML19207B290 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1979021
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA sT., N.W., sulTE 3100
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AT L ANT A. GEORGI A 30303
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Report Nos.
50-324/79-21 and 50-325/79-21
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
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Raleigh, North Carolina
27602
Facility Name:
Brunswick Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-324 and 50-325
License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62
Inspection at Brunswick Site near Southport, North Carolina
Inspectors:
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Approved by:
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Date Signed
SUMMARY
Inspection on May 23-25, 2979
Arers Inspected
This special announced inspection involved 80 inspector-hours on site in the areas
of licensee actions taken in response to Bulletin 79-08.
Results
Of the areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
A. C. Tollison, Plant Manager
- D. N. Allen, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. M. Brown, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
E. Enzor, Administrative Supervisor
- G. R. Peeler, Operations Engineer
R. Poulk, NRC Coordinator
J. Thompson, Project Engineer
- W. L. Triplett, Supervisor Engineering
W. Tucker, Administrative and Technical Supervisor
- C. V. Wagoner, Maintenance Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included 8 operators, 2 mechanic, and
2 office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on 5/25/79 with those
persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Review of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletin 79-08
In the verification of licensee's response to the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-08, interviews and inspections were conducted in the following areas:
Interviews With Licensed Operators
The following subjects were discussed and reviewed with two operators from
each of the three active shif ts:
Specific details available of the TMI-2 incident and training on any
a.
procedure changes initiated as a result of this incident.
b.
Instructions on the specific measures which provide assurance that
engineered safety features would be available if required, particularly
measures for returning such systems to operable status following testing
and maintenance,
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c.
Instructions on the specific and detailed measures to assure that
automatic actuation of emergency safety features are not overridden.
d.
Review of plant automatic actions initiated by reset of engineered
safety features, that could effect the control of radioactive liquids
and gases.
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Instructions in the provisions and 'irectives for early NRC notification
e.
of serious events.
f.
The requirements and equipment necessary for continuous communication
with NRC immediately following a serious event. The requirement to
assign a qualified individual to communicate meaningful information to
NRC, until relieved by an NRC inspector was emphasized to the licensee.
The adequacy of operator training was not verified during this inspection,
but was intentionally deferred until the I&E inspection to be conducted
in the area of training the period of June 6-8, 1979.
Inspection Of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
The inspectors conducted an independent examination of records, drawings,
procedure, procedure results and equipment status for ESF systems to insure
that operations were in accordance with Technical Specifications requirements
and that the licensee's procedures and administrative controls provide
adequate assurance of continued operability.
The following systems were
examined:
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Standby Liquid Control System
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Containment Atmospheric Control System
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Diesel Generators and Emergency Buses
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Automatic Depressurization System
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Residual Heat Removal System
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Core Spray System
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High Pressure Coolant Injection System
Reactor. Core Isolation Cooling System
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The above systems were inspected and records and documents reviewed to
verify the follcwing:
a.
Valve, breaker and switch alignment procedures agreed with current
P61Ds.
b.
Accessible valve, breaker and switch alignments agreed with procedures.
c.
Administrative controls exist
to insure proper return to service of
ESF components following testing and maintenance.
d.
Reviewed periodic test and maintenance procedures to verify return to
operable condition following testing and maintenance.
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Reviewed test results for 35 of the most current periodic tsst procedures.
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f.
Review of administrative controls to assure ESF systems are returned
to operability at the conclusion of extended outages. This is accom-
plished in steps of the general plant operating procedures during
. startup.
g.
Dete rmine if independent verification of valve, breaker and switch
alignment is utilized following extended outages and testing and
maintenance (Result: In general the licensee does not utilize indepen-
dent verification for alignment of these components.)
h.
Valves in the auxiliary feed system identified by the licensee as
requiring locking or similar positive position control are actually
locked or controlled.
Assessment of Operating Procedures and Control Panel Visibility
Selected operating procedures were reviewed, discussions held with the
licensee and panels inspected to verify the following:
a.
If the licensee requires the actuation of RCIC or HPCI to assist in
level control of the reactor during routine op ration events induced
reactor level transients (Results:
The licensee's procedures do not
depend on the actuation of these systems to assist in level control of
the reactor during routine operation event induced transients).
b.
That tagging practices on control panels provided potential for obscuring
status indicators.
(Results: Accessible panels were inspected and no
indicators were observed to be obscured or the potential existing at
the time for obscuring the indicators. Standard tags size ( 3x5) are
used, and under a different tagout situation, the potential for indicator
obscurity might exist.)
Review of Licensee's Response to I&E Bulletin 79-08
In the licensee's response to I&E Bulletin 79-08 of April 23, 1979, he
indicated that the reviews conducted thus far were necessarily preliminary,
and committed to have detailed reviews and procedure changes, if required,
completed by July 31, 1979. Particularly the licensee's response to I&E
Bulletin 79-0E items 1, 5, 8, 9 and 10 are not fully completed.
As a result of the review of the licensee's procedures, bulletin responses,
drawings, inspection of systems and interviews with personnel no items of
noncompliance or deviations were identified. During this review and inspection,
the following items of concern were identified and brought to the attention
of the licensee.
In the review of administrative procedures no-where could requirements
a.
for the return of components / systems to service be found. Section 7
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.iduinistrative procedures addresses periodic testing but does
no .
wss this specific requirement.
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b.
GP-1 - General plant operating procedure guidelines states that "any
maintenance initiated has been completed and required post maintenance
check completed". No signoff is required on checklist.
c.
PT 7.1.9 - Manual blocked valves E21-F015 A(B) are locked closed
during test and are not specifically called out as to being returned
- to " locked open" status upon completion of test. (Valve lineup left
to discretion of shif t loreman, Step KKK.)
d.
PT-9.3, Step H (Paragraph III) is in error and partially redundant to
Step 5.
During walk thru of Unit i standby gas treatment systen valve, 2K-BFV-RB,
e.
purge exhaust Fan 2B Suction valve was found out of position.
This
valve operates automatically when the fan starts or stops and does not
have indication in control room. Local indication showed valve to be
open; normal shutdown position should be shut. This was brought to
the attention of operating personnel and they indicated that a trouble
ticket would be initiated.
f.
Several periodic test procedures had no requirement to return systems
to pretest conditions. This particularly applies to valves and switches
positioned in PT-15.1,15.2.1 and 15.2.2
squib valve continuity check by
g.
PT 6.1- Part B, which requires a
verifying that the annunciator light is out, is not a positive contin-
uity check since the bulbs may be burned out
h.
OP-39, Page 14 of 51 addresses the positions of equalizing valves
around the . pressure
relief valves (PRVs). The procedure erroneously
refers to PRV 1665 and PRV 1664 on page 14 of 51; the inspector verified
by P&lD and local tag that the valves should be RRV-1691 and 1689,
respectively.
i.
PT-12.1.1, Step 6.4.16 page 21 of 39 part
"G"
referred to jumper
installed in points 6.4.9 and 6.4.10.
These references were wrong and
the procedure was corrected to reflect steps 5.4.9 and 5.4.10.
j.
The following general housekeeping and maintenance observations were
made:
(1) Excessive water was found on the floors of pump rooms; i.e. RHR,
RCIC and A0G,
(2) Poor house keeping in pump rooms and diese. generator rooms; i.e.
1anse gear around, trash on floor and in pipe recesses and oil on
bedplate of diesel engine.
(3) N bottles near CRD hydraulic units for Unit 2.
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(4) Position indicators on valves generally not accurate.
Position
of valves must be determined locally by other means; i.e. position
of handwbeel.
(5) Numerous indicating lights not indicating, i.e. diesel generator
boards, SBLC system squib valves ccatinuity, etc. The operators
indicated that the problem was due to low voltage, and that the
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problem bad been brought to the attention of management.
(6)
In SBLC system, valve (F001) packing leak, valve handle missing
on isolation valve to transmitter, and metal protection on heat
traced lines missing.
(7) Valve identification tags not attached to valves.
(8) Yellow poly bags not restricted to packaging of contaminated
material.
(9) The system status at the time trouble is identified on a system
is not identified with the trouble ticket.
(10) A significant air leak existed on the outlet side of No. 2 diesel
generator air start compressor.
(11) Unit 1 RHR torus suction valve operator motor burned out (plant
shutdown, valve in proper position).
The licensee acknowledged the above items, agreed to consider applicable
items in his further response to I&E Bulletin 79-08, and include maintenance
and housekeeping items in future maintenance and housekeeping programs.
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