ML19123A191
| ML19123A191 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/2019 |
| From: | Curran D C-10 Research & Education Foundation, Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| 50-443-LA-2, ASLBP 17-953-02-LA-BD01, RAS 54960 | |
| Download: ML19123A191 (11) | |
Text
May 3, 2019 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC ) Docket No. 50-443 (Seabrook Station, Unit 1) )
_____________________________________)
C-10 RESEARCH AND EDUCATION FOUNDATIONS OPPOSITION TO NEXTERAS MOTION IN LIMINE I. INTRODUCTION C-10 Research and Education Foundation (C-10) hereby responds in opposition to NextEras Motion In Limine to Exclude Testimony and Exhibits Regarding Structure Deformation Monitoring (Apr. 23, 2019) (Motion). NextEra seeks to exclude from the record all testimony and portions of exhibits offered for the purpose of challenging the Structure Deformation Monitoring portion of NextEras License Amendment Request No. 16-03 (LAR). Motion at 1. NextEra also seeks to exclude testimony and exhibits regarding the finite element analysis (also referred to as finite element model) employed by NextEra in its evaluation of Alkali Silica Reaction (ASR). Id. at 10.
NextEra has failed to show a compelling need to pre-emptively exclude any testimony relating to the Structural Monitoring Program or finite element analysis at this early point in the proceeding -- before any testimony has been filed, let alone a hearing conducted. Calvert Cliffs 3 Nuclear Project, L.L.C. and UniStar Nuclear Operating Services, L.L.C. (Combined License Application for Calvert Cliffs Unit 3), Order (Granting in Part and Denying in Part NRC Staffs Motion in Limine) at 3 (Jan. 17, 2012) (Unpublished, ADAMS Accession No. ML12017A200)
(Calvert Cliffs). In any event, NextEras Motion should be denied because it is based on an
oversimplification and mischaracterization of C-10s contentions and NextEras LAR, and therefore granting it could improperly exclude relevant evidence.
II. BACKGROUND This proceeding concerns C-10s admitted contentions regarding NextEras proposed measures for monitoring ASR at the Seabrook nuclear power plant. Those monitoring measures are part of the methodology conceived by NextEra to assess the relatively recently-discovered phenomenon of ASR. Because of its novelty, ASR is not addressed by applicable industry codes for assessing the safety of concrete reactor structures.
A. LAR and NextEra Methodology for Assessing and Monitoring ASR As explained by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) in LBP-17-7:
At Seabrook, safety-related structures other than the containment were designed and constructed to comply with the 1971 edition of American Concrete Institute (ACI)
Standard 318, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (ACI 318-71). The containment structure was designed and constructed to comply with the 1975 edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 2, Subsection CC. Neither code contains methods to address the effects of ASR on the structural properties used in the design of concrete structures, and publicly available test data related to ASR effects on structures focus primarily on the science of ASR rather than the structural implications. NextEra therefore devised its own methodology.
NextEra Energy Seabrook, L.L.C. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-17-7, 86 N.R.C. 59, 124 (2017), affd, CLI-18-4, 87 N.R.C. 59 (2018) (LBP-17-7) (footnotes omitted).
In creating its methodology, NextEra decided that load testing of the as-built structures was impossible, and therefore it would conduct a strength evaluation by analysis to demonstrate that, despite the effects of ASR, Seabrook structures will have strength close to or in excess of that envisaged in the original design or as required by the code. LBP-17-7, 86 N.R.C. at 70 (quoting LAR at 15 of 73). This methodology is based in part on large-scale test programs conducted by NextEras consultant, MPR Associates (MPR), at the Ferguson Structural 2
Engineering Laboratory (FSEL) at the University of Texas in Austin; and in part on a review of existing literature. LBP-17-7, 86 N.R.C. at 70. As summarized by the ASLB:
FSEL completed tests reflecting various levels of ASR cracking to assess the impact on selected limit states, where limit state is a condition of a structure beyond which it no longer fulfills the relevant design criteria. These include all relevant limit states except compression (i.e., flexure and reinforcement anchorage, shear, and anchor bolts and structural attachments to concrete). The results of the test program demonstrated that none of the assessed limit states are reduced by ASR when ASR expansion levels in plant structures are below those evaluated in the large-scale test programs.
86 N.R.C. at 70 (footnotes omitted). The effect of ASR on compressive strength was not assessed in the large-scale test program, but instead was evaluated using existing data from public literature sources. Id. (footnotes omitted).
NextEras LAR seeks NRC approval of its methodology for assessing and monitoring ASR at Seabrook, as part of its Structural Management Program (SRP). The SRP is, in turn, incorporated into NextEras Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Attachment 1 to the LAR.
B. C-10s Admitted Contentions In LBP-17-7, the ASLB admitted five of C-10s contentions, and reformulated them as a single contention which asserts:
The large-scale test program, undertaken for NextEra at the FSEL, has yielded data that are not representative of the progression of ASR at Seabrook. As a result, the proposed monitoring, acceptance criteria, and inspection intervals are not adequate.
LBP-17-7, 86 N.R.C. at 90.1 As summarized by the ASLB, the key issue is Contention 1
The five contentions subsumed into this overarching contention state as follows:
As admitted, Contention A states that crack width indexing and extensometer deployment are not sufficient tools for determining the presence and extent of ASR at Seabrook. 86 N.R.C. at 93-102.
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Ds challenge to the representativeness of the large-scale test program, and Contentions A, B, C, and Hs alleged consequences from its alleged lack of representativeness.
Contention A, as admitted by the ASLB, asserts that crack width indexing and extensometer deployment are not sufficient tools for determining the presence and extent of ASR at Seabrook. 86 N.R.C. at 93-102. In admitting Contention A, the ASLB explained the relationship between ASR monitoring, the FSEL large-scale testing program, and establishment of acceptance criteria to satisfy NRC and industry safety standards:
Contention A alleges that the monitoring methods proposed in the LAR, without appropriate in-situ testing of the concrete, are inadequate to measure ASR advancement in safety-related structures at Seabrook. Accurate measurement of ASR advancement is necessary to determine whether it remains within the expansion limits in LAR Table 4 and proposed UFSAR Table 3.8-18, and thus that the large-scale test program results for As admitted, Contention B states that: [t]he LAR misconstrues expansion occurring within a reinforced concrete structure due to [ASR] because any mitigation of lost structural capacity, due to reinforcement, is temporary and unpredictable. 86 N.R.C. at 107.
As admitted, Contention C states that:
Thorough petrographic analysis, including core sample testing of Seabrooks in situ concrete, must be integral to NextEras assessment of the advance of ASR. Because of the extreme danger imposed by the radioactive substances contained within their walls, petrographic analysis of concrete from the Containment structures and the Spent Fuel Pool should be required by NRC. NextEras choice not to continue core sample testing --
especially for safety-related structures -- is based on spurious assumptions, leaves inspectors and the surrounding communities with an unnecessarily incomplete picture of the actual state of concrete degradation, and could endanger the public health and safety.
86 N.R.C. at 107-08, 111.
As admitted, Contention D asserts:
The Large-Scale Test Program, undertaken for NextEra at the Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory (FSEL), has yielded data that are not representative of the progression of ASR at Seabrook Station, and therefore cannot be substituted for the required comprehensive petrographic analysis of in-situ concrete at the Seabrook reactor
-- now many years overdue.
86 N.R.C. at 112, 121.
As admitted, Contention H asserts that [t]he proposed inspection intervals laid out in LAR 16-03 are too long to effectively measure the ongoing effects of ASR to structures at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant in a timely manner. 86 N.R.C. at 121, 125.
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Seabrook safety-related structures remain valid. The LAR itself acknowledges that, because there is no testing data for . . . more advanced levels of ASR, periodic monitoring of ASR at Seabrook is necessary to ensure that the conclusions of the large-scale test program remain valid and that the level of ASR does not exceed that considered under the test program[s]. Thus, [o]ne of the objectives of the test program was to identify effective methods for monitoring ASR. If the Staff is not assured that the proposed monitoring program will accurately monitor ASR advancement, the Staff could not plausibly conclude that the monitoring program will provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, or that the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the . . .
health and safety of the public.
86 N.R.C. at 98-99 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the scope of C-10s admitted contention includes whether and how NextEras use of the FSEL large-scale test program results in establishing its assessment and monitoring methodology affected the adequacy of that methodology, including the acceptance criteria devised by NextEra for compliance with NRC and industry safety standards.
III. ARGUMENT A. Exclusion of Evidence is Unnecessary and Premature at This State of the Proceeding.
As the ASLB noted in Calvert Cliffs, motions in limine are ordinarily used to prevent a jury from becoming aware of potentially prejudicial evidence that may ultimately be ruled inadmissible; and thus, there is no compelling need for such a motion in an administrative case. Id. at 3. Because NextEras motion is not necessary to assist the decision-makers in this proceeding, it should not be entertained.
NextEras motion is also premature. As demonstrated in detail in section III.B below, structure deformation monitoring and finite element analysis are intertwined with the FSEL test results, and thus are not clearly irrelevant or immaterial to this case under the broad standard established by NRC regulations. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant, material, and reliable.
10 C.F.R. §§2.337(a). As the ASLB noted in Calvert Cliffs:
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Evidence is material if it concerns a fact that is of consequence to the outcome of the proceeding. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any material fact more or less likely. Thus, evidence need not be conclusive in order to be relevant. It is sufficient that it has some tendency, even a slight one, to make a fact or consequence more or less likely.
Id. at 2. Given the complexity of the issues raised by C-10s contentions and NextEras methodology for assessing ASR, it is not possible for the ASLB to determine that evidence related to the Structure Deformation Monitoring Program or finite element analysis would have no tendency, even a slight one, to make a fact or consequence asserted by C-10 more or less likely. The ASLB should await the filing of C-10s testimony before evaluating whether any of it should be stricken as irrelevant or immaterial.
B. NextEra Fails to Justify the Exclusion of Evidence on the Structural Deformation Monitoring Program or Finite Element Analysis.
NextEras Motion is based on a mischaracterization and oversimplification of C-10s contentions and NextEras LAR. First, NextEra incorrectly asserts that the scope of C-10s admitted contentions includes only the ASR expansion monitoring program in Section 3.5.1. But C-10s contentions generally express concern about the lack of representativeness of FSEL test results for purposes of establishing monitoring, inspection criteria, and inspection intervals; and do not distinguish between their applications to any particular monitoring methodology. Thus, NextEras argument has no merit.
Second, NextEras depiction of the Structure Deformation Monitoring Program as completely unrelated to the FSEL large-scale testing program (Motion at 6-11) is contradicted by NextEras own documents. These documents show that NextEra has relied on the FSEL large-scale test results for ASR expansion monitoring methodologies, and structural deformation monitoring. They also show that the finite element analysis - which NextEra claims solely relates to deformation evaluations performed under the Structure Deformation Monitoring 6
portion of the LAR (id. at 10-11) - relies explicitly on FSEL test results to establish thresholds for structure deformation monitoring. FSEL test results are relied on to assume that monitoring is not necessary until these thresholds are exceeded.
The UFSAR attached to the LAR, for example, demonstrates that monitoring of the crack indices established by the FSEL tests sets a threshold for structural monitoring and analysis:
A Combined Cracking Index (CCI) is established at thresholds at which structural evaluation is necessary (see table below). The Cracking Index (CI) is the summation of the crack widths on the horizontal or vertical sides of 20-inch by 30-inch grid on the ASR-affected concrete surface. The horizontal and vertical Cracking Indices are averaged to obtain a Combined Cracking Index (CCI) for each area of interest. A CCI of less than the 1.0 mm/m can be deemed acceptable with deficiencies (Tier 2). Deficiencies determined to be acceptable with further review are trended for evidence of further degradation. The change from qualitative monitoring to quantitative monitoring occurs when the Cracking Index (CI) of the pattern cracking equals or is greater than 0.5 mm/m in the vertical and horizontal directions. Concrete crack widths less than 0.05 mm cannot be accurately measured and reliably repeated with standard, visual inspection equipment.
A CCI of 1.0 mm/m or greater requires structural evaluation (Tier 3). All locations meeting Tier 3 criteria will be monitored via CCI on a Yi year (6-month) inspection frequency and added to the through-thickness expansion monitoring via extensometers.
All locations meeting the Tier 2 structures monitoring criteria will be monitored on a 2.5 year (30-month) frequency. CCI correlates well with strain in the in-plane directions and the ability to visually detect cracking in exposed surfaces making it an effective initial detection parameter.
UFSAR at 148 (64 of 73). Tiers 1, 2, and 3 are the thresholds for structure deformation analysis and monitoring described in Section 3.5.2 of the LAR, which are also established through finite element analysis. See also Section 3.3.2 (describing tiers in more detail and application of finite element analysis).
The USFSAR further links ASR expansion monitoring and structural evaluations as follows:
The Alkali-Silica Reaction Monitoring Program was initially based on published studies describing screening methods to determine when structural evaluations of ASR affected concrete are appropriate. Large scale destructive testing of concrete beams with accelerated ASR [i.e., the FSEL testing program] has confirmed that parameters being 7
monitored are appropriate to manage the effects of ASR and that acceptance criterion of I mm/m a used provides sufficient margin.
UFSAR at 149 (65 of 73) (emphasis added). And SGH concludes:
Although the observed strains due to ASR are of very small magnitude and adequately monitored by CCI and extensometers, over large distances and with the right building geometry, they can result in discernable dimension changes in a structure. Additional monitoring of this relative displacement potential and its impact to plant systems and components is included in the ASR Monitoring Program. Specifically, monitoring includes identifying signs of relative displacement or building deformation (e.g., fire seal displacement, seismic gap width changes, pipe/conduit misalignments at penetrations or between adjacent structures, bent or displaced pipe/conduit and supports, doorway misalignments). Critical building geometry locations where the potential for deformation is likely will be monitored for displacement via location-specific techniques.
Id. Thus, monitoring and analysis of ASR expansion and structural deformation are strongly coupled, and one cannot consider one without the other.
In addition, a report by Simpson Gumpertz & Heger, Inc. (SGH): "Evaluation and Design Confirmation of As-Deformed CEB, 150252CA-02," Rev. 0 (Seabrook FP#100985)
(July 2016) (ML16279A049) (SGH Report), shows that the results of the FSEL test program are incorporated into the finite element analysis (and therefore the Structure Deformation Monitoring Program) as assumptions.2 In Assumption JA03, SGH relied on the FSEL test results to assume that [u]nreduced design material stiffness properties can adequately represent ASRimpacted reinforced concrete sections of the CEB structure. Id. at 22 (23 of 527). The Justification for this assumption is described as follows:
Justification: A physical test program by MPR Associates and the Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory (FSEL) concludes that structural evaluations of ASR-affected structures at Seabrook Station with through-thickness expansion within certain limits should use the material properties specified in the original design specifications [17]. These limits bound the current conditions. Additionally, a parametric study (described in Appendix J) demonstrates that larger demands are 2
The SGH Report, prepared for the purpose of making a structural evaluation and design confirmation of the as-deformed Unit 1 Containment Enclosure Building (CEB), is attached as to NextEras supplemental LAR of September 30, 2016 (ML16279A048).
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computed from the as-deformed condition if an unreduced elastic modulus is used.
Therefore, an unreduced elastic modulus based on the design concrete compression strength (f c) is used in the Standard and Standard-Plus Analysis Cases in this calculation.
Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Assumption JA11, SGH assumed that ASR expansion impacts the total demand on reinforced concrete elements, but does not reduce the resistance (capacity) of reinforced concrete elements so long as the strain does not exceed the limits defined in [the FSEL test results]. Id. at 25. The Justification for this assumption is described as follows:
Justification: A physical testing program performed by MPR Associates and the University of Texas at Austin Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory (FSEL) [16]
has shown that ASR does not reduce the design properties and capacities for the levels of ASR currently identified in the CEB.
Id. (emphasis added).3 Thus, the FSEL test results provide input to and assumptions for the finite element analysis relied on by NextEra for its methodology for ASR assessment and monitoring, including structural deformation. Accordingly, NextEra is incorrect in arguing that the Structure Deformation Monitoring Program and finite element analysis have no relevance to C-10s contentions. The ASLB therefore should deny the Motion as unsupported.
3 See also id. at 19 (emphasis added):
Acceptance criteria for evaluation and design of reinforced concrete components are defined by ACI 318-71 [11]. No reductions in capacity are made to account for material degradation due to ASR (Justified Assumption JA11, Section 5.1). Physical testing performed by others [FSEL, Ref. 16] has indicated that ASR expansion does not reduce structural capacities if the total out-of-plane expansion is less than the limits defined in Ref. 16.
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IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, NextEra has failed to demonstrate a compelling, or even rational, basis to grant its Motion In Limine. Therefore the Motion should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
__/signed electronically by/___
Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240-393-9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com May 3, 2019 10
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC ) Docket No. 50-443 (Seabrook Station, Unit 1) )
_____________________________________)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on May 3, 2019, I posted C-10 RESEARCH AND EDUCATION FOUNDATIONS OPPOSITION TO NEXTERAS MOTION IN LIMINE on the NRCs electronic hearing docket.
__/signed electronically by/___
Diane Curran 11