ML19031C861

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LIC-206, Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making for Licensing Reviews
ML19031C861
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/06/2019
From: Brian Mcdermott
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
S. Lee, NRR/DORL/LPL1, 301-415-3168
References
YT020190044 LIC-206
Download: ML19031C861 (32)
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION LIC-206 Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making for Licensing Reviews Volume 200 Licensing Support Approved By: Brian McDermott Date Approved: June 6, 2019 Effective Date: June 10, 2019 Certification Date: June 10, 2024 Responsible Organization: Division of Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL)

Primary

Contact:

Samson S. Lee 301-415-3168 Samson.Lee@nrc.gov Summary: This is the initial issuance of LIC-206. This office instruction provides guidance on a graded approach for using risk insights in licensing and to better integrate complementary insights from traditional engineering and risk assessment approaches to foster a broadened understanding of the benefits that risk-informed decision-making can bring to the overall regulatory approach. This office instruction is effective on June 10, 2019 and applies to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office of New Reactors (NRO). After NRR and NRO merge on October 13, 2019, this office instruction will remain in effect.

Recognizing the pending merger, the remainder of this document refers to NRR only.

Training: General training on risk-informed decision-making:

iLearn Course ID_280148, Risk-Informed Thinking Workshop Training for LIC-206: To be determined Training for Appendix B to LIC-206:

iLearn Course ID_427162, Integrating Risk into Regulatory Reviews Web-based)

ADAMS Accession Number: ML19031C861 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. POLICY ................................................................................................................................. 2
2. OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................ 2
3. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 2
4. BASIC REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................................... 3
5. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... 4
6. PERFORMANCE MEASURES ............................................................................................. 6
7. PRIMARY CONTACT ...........................................................................................................6
8. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION ........................................................................................ 6
9. EFFECTIVE DATE ................................................................................................................ 6
10. CERTIFICATION DATE ........................................................................................................ 6
11. REFERENCES...................................................................................................................... 6

ML19031C861 *by e-mail OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL1/LA NRR/DORL/DD* NRR/DRA/DD*

NAME SLee LRonewicz KBrock RFelts DATE 05/06/2019 05/06/2019 02/13/2019 02/14/2019 NRR/DE/DD*

OFFICE NRR/DSS/DD* NRO/DSRA/DD* NRR/DMPS/D (w/comments)

NAME BSmith JMarshall KCoyne ARoberts DATE 02/15/2019 02/15/2019 02/19/2019 02/19/2019 OFFICE NRR/DD NAME BMcDermott DATE 06/06/2019 NRR Office Instruction LIC-206 Page 2 of 6

1. POLICY It is the policy of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to advance the nuclear reactor safety program towards becoming a more effective and risk-informed regulator. It is NRR managements expectation to promote timely and effective decision-making that appropriately prioritizes resources that are commensurate with the respective safety significance of the activity. It is also NRR managements continued expectation that all regulatory activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) Principles of Good Regulation (i.e., independence, openness, efficiency, clarity, and reliability) and Organizational Values (i.e., integrity, service, openness, commitment, cooperation, excellence, and respect).

This office instruction (OI) provides guidance applicable to considering risk-informed decision-making (RIDM) in licensing and other licensing-related activities to enhance process efficiency and effectiveness. Integrating risk insights with traditional engineering approaches provides better-reasoned regulatory decisions to appropriately disposition issues that arise in all regulatory matters, including licensing activities. Staff in NRR are expected to use RIDM, when appropriate, to complement and enhance deterministic approaches to ensure a sound risk-informed regulatory decision is made. Additionally, a risk-informed approach enables us to focus our resources on the more significant issues and prevents us from diverting agency and licensee attention on low safety-significant issues. Furthermore, all NRR staff are expected to use risk insights to improve communication on the significance of issues both within their organizations and with external stakeholders.

2. OBJECTIVES This OI, along with the guidance in the attachments, provides staff who support NRR with a basic framework for considering risk insights in licensing and other licensing-related activities.

This OI will also support and enhance NRR efficiency and effectiveness by:

  • providing staff and management with an improved framework to consider risk insights in licensing activities
  • promoting consistency in considering and applying risk insights
  • improving internal and external communications involving risk considerations
  • increasing technical consistency on applying RIDM for similar licensing activities
  • applying a holistic and integrated view of safety that considers defense in depth, margin, engineering judgment, probabilistic risk assessment, and other technical information An outcome of this OI is to continue efforts to support inclusion of risk considerations in staff and management mindset and cultural changes at different levels of the organization.

NRR Office Instruction LIC-206 Page 3 of 6

3. BACKGROUND On May 11, 2017, the Commission was briefed on risk-informed regulatory activities by nuclear industry representatives and the NRC staff. The briefing included a status of the NRCs and industrys risk-informed initiatives and an overview of successes and areas of focus for advancing risk-informed regulation. On June 26, 2017, the Commission issued Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)-M170511, Briefing on Risk-Informed Regulation (ADAMS Accession No. ML17177A397), and directed the staff to provide the Commission with an information paper discussing its plans for increasing staff capabilities to use risk information in decision-making activities.

On November 13, 2017, the staff responded to SRM-M170511 by SECY-17-0112, Plans for Increasing Staff Capabilities to Use Risk Information in Decision-Making Activities (ADAMS Accession No. ML17270A192). SECY-17-0112 provides the staffs proposal for increasing its capability to use risk information in decision-making and describes challenges toward further progress in RIDM and measures that the staff is taking to overcome these challenges.

The staff developed the RIDM Action Plan, Action Plan, Risk-Informed Decision-Making Operating Reactor Business Line, dated November 27, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18317A117), implementing the staffs proposal contained in SECY-17-0112 and continuing the development and inclusion of risk considerations in licensing reviews. NRR staff was assigned specific tasks from the RIDM Action Plan and also conducted a pilot program with a sample of licensing actions during a trial period in the fall of 2018.

Phases 1 and 2 of the RIDM Action Plan reports, dated June 26, 2018, and January 30, 2019, respectively, are available in ADAMS (Accession No. ML18169A205 and Package Accession No. ML19007A339, respectively).

This OI documents the guidance resulting from the RIDM Action Plan efforts. The staff plans to update the guidance in this OI as more experience is gained in considering risk insights in licensing and other licensing-related activities. The staff continues to develop more applications as a result of the RIDM Action Plan, which may be inserted as additional appendices to this OI or revisions to procedures as they are finalized. The licensing-related topics identified in Phase 2 of the RIDM Action Plan are power uprate, backfits, Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) travelers, task interface agreements, and RIDM guidance to technical reviewers. There may be additional topics, as appropriate, such as relief requests.

4. BASIC REQUIREMENTS The NRC has a longstanding commitment to increase the consideration of risk insights. It is managements vision to enhance the integration of risk information into the organizations decision-making practices and processes to improve the technical basis for regulatory activities, increase efficiency, and improve effectiveness. This OI provides guidance on a graded approach for using risk insights in licensing and to better integrate complementary insights from traditional engineering and risk assessment approaches to foster a broadened understanding of the benefits that RIDM can bring to the overall regulatory approach.

NRR Office Instruction LIC-206 Page 4 of 6 Appendices on various aspects of RIDM in licensing are expected to be inserted into this OI as they become available. Currently, this OI contains one appendix on the Integrated Review Team (IRT), Appendix B. Future appendices to this OI will include additional guidance on applying risk insights in specific licensing activities; defining RIDM terminology; staff training; and other guidance, as appropriate.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES All staff who support the nuclear safety and security program are responsible for understanding and applying the guidance in this OI and current and future appendices. The staff is also responsible for identifying potential improvements to the guidance and submitting suggestions for such improvements to the primary contact for this OI.

The staff and management are responsible for focusing efforts on safety-significant issues and dispositioning low-risk issues efficiently.

In addition, the following describes the NRC staff and management roles and responsibilities associated with the consideration of risk insights in licensing and other licensing-related activities.

A. Office Directors and Deputy Directors Office management is responsible for:

  • leading the offices implementation of the policy in this procedure
  • initiating behavior changes throughout the organization toward RIDM B. Division Management Division management is responsible for:
  • providing overall management and oversight of licensing activities to incorporate RIDM
  • ensuring appropriate resources are made available to consider risk insights in licensing activities
  • promoting consistency in considering and applying risk insights
  • facilitating strategies to address challenges incorporating risk considerations in decision-making C. Branch Chiefs Branch chiefs are responsible for:
  • being familiar with pertinent elements of risk-informed and performance-based regulation
  • effectively managing use of risk information and technology, as appropriate, to enhance decision-making
  • encouraging staff participation in risk-informed processes, as appropriate

NRR Office Instruction LIC-206 Page 5 of 6

  • assigning appropriate resources, including risk analysts, to consider risk insights in licensing activities
  • ensuring staff attends RIDM training
  • promoting consistency in considering and applying risk insights D. Project Managers Project managers (PMs) are responsible for:
  • being familiar with pertinent elements of risk-informed and performance-based regulation
  • reflecting the use of risk insights and a risk-informed and performance-based philosophy into work products, as appropriate
  • coordinating consideration of risk insights in licensing activities
  • appropriately engaging a risk analyst early for risk insights in licensing activities E. Technical Reviewers Technical reviewers (TRs) are responsible for:
  • being familiar with pertinent elements of risk-informed and performance-based regulation
  • using risk information and risk insights to enhance decision-making without undue delay, as appropriate
  • reflecting the use of risk insights and a risk-informed and performance-based philosophy in work products, as appropriate
  • considering risk insights in licensing activities
  • working collaboratively with risk analysts in both traditionally deterministic and risk-informed licensing activities
  • working collaboratively with the responsible PM F. Risk Analysts In addition to TR responsibilities, risk analysts are responsible for:
  • providing risk insights on licensing activities as requested, including traditionally deterministic regulatory activities
  • familiarizing the staff with available risk tools and information in communicating risk insights
  • ensuring documentation properly characterizes the consideration of risk information in the staffs decision
  • working collaboratively with TRs in both traditionally deterministic and risk-informed licensing activities

NRR Office Instruction LIC-206 Page 6 of 6

6. PERFORMANCE MEASURES To be developed.
7. PRIMARY CONTACT Samson S. Lee 301-415-3168 Samson.Lee@nrc.gov
8. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION DORL
9. EFFECTIVE DATE June 10, 2019
10. CERTIFICATION DATE June 10, 2024
11. REFERENCES None

Enclosures:

1. Appendix A: Change History
2. Appendix B: Guide for Integrated Review Team

Appendix A - Change History Office Instruction LIC-206 Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making for Licensing Reviews LIC-206 Change History - Page 1 of 1 Date Description of Changes Method Used to Training Announce &

Distribute 06/06/19 This is the initial issuance of E-mail to NRR General training on LIC-206. This office instruction Leadership Team risk-informed provides guidance on a graded and Technical decision-making:

approach for using risk insights in Assistants iLearn Course licensing and to better integrate ID_280148, complementary insights from Risk-Informed traditional engineering and risk Thinking Workshop assessment approaches to foster a broadened understanding of the Training for benefits that risk-informed LIC-206: TBD decision-making can bring to the overall regulatory approach. Training for Appendix B to LIC-206:

iLearn Course ID_427162, Integrating Risk into Regulatory Reviews (Web-based)

Enclosure

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Appendix B Guide for Integrated Review Team Enclosure 2

1.0 INTEGRATED REVIEW TEAM PROCESS1 1.1 Integrated Review Team Process Flow Chart The Integrated Review Team (IRT) process was discussed in the June 26, 2018, Risk-Informed Decision-Making (RIDM) Phase 1 report (ADAMS Accession No. ML18169A205). Team A, Phase 2, revised the IRT process flow chart and made minor changes to the IRT process to incorporate lessons learned from the trial period implementing the IRT (ADAMS Accession No. ML18360A499, non-public). The revised IRT is also documented in Enclosure 3 of the January 30, 2019, RIDM Phase 2 report (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML19007A339).

Box 1: Upon receipt of a licensee submittal, the project manager (PM) will review the request to identify the level of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-related information in the submittal. The checklists discussed in Sections 5 through 8 provide guidance to facilitate the implementation of the IRT process.

1 Staff performing licensing and review activities in the new reactor business line are encouraged to apply this guidance to the extent possible and appropriate, because certain requirements are different from those of the operating reactor business line, such as timelines and milestones.

Box 2: Based on the level of PRA information, the PM will use the PM Checklist (see Section 5.0) to categorize the submittal as being Type 1, 2, or 3.

Box 3: There is little or no risk information and no quantitative risk (e.g., core damage frequency (CDF)) discussed in the licensee submittal. The technical reviewers (TRs) and PM determine if an IRT is needed through the use of the IRT Checklist (see Section 6.0). A broad understanding of the concepts of the Division of Risk Assessment (DRA) Checklist may help in the determination (see Section 7.0).

Box 3a: The action in this box depends on the input and also how the IRT decides to use the input. This is described as TR-led since licensees have not provided information in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis; therefore, this will result in a deterministic regulatory decision, albeit possibly with some supporting risk-insight information.

Box 4: The submittal is risk-informed in accordance with RG 1.174. DRA leads the review.

Boxes 5 through 8 Overview In order to integrate the reviews of submittals that have varying levels of risk information, safety evaluation (SE) template language is discussed below in association with Boxes 5 through 8 of the IRT Process Flow Chart.

The staff should use consistent and commonly understood language when integrating risk information into regulatory decision-making, as defined in NUREG-2122, Glossary of Risk-Related Terms in Support of Risk-Informed Decision-Making.

Primary consideration for properly describing the use of risk information in regulatory decision-making should be given to ensure that the term probabilistic risk assessment or PRA is only used when there is a PRA calculation used as part of the basis or to support the decision.

Secondly, PRA can only be part of the basis for a decision when the PRA is acceptable for the application; that is, the PRA acceptability is addressed in accordance with RG 1.200, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities. If PRA acceptability is not addressed in accordance with RG 1.200, then the PRA results or risk insights could assist by supporting safety conclusions and enhancing confidence in the technical evaluations. Lastly, if a PRA or risk analysis was not used, even if there is quantitative information or calculations, the term probabilistic risk assessment or PRA should not be used in the NRC staffs SE.

Box 5: This is a traditional engineering decision. The staff may consider risk information in the licensee submittal to determine the necessary scope and depth of the deterministic review, and to confirm that it does not challenge the traditional engineering conclusion. In this case, the SE needs to clearly state that the licensee methodology used to derive the risk insights was not

reviewed, and that the risk information was not used as the basis for the licensing decision. An example SE for a license amendment request (LAR) (ADAMS Accession No. ML18204A252) states:

The licensee stated that the proposed extension offered the lowest risk among the four options available. No numerical support for the conclusion was submitted. Because the LAR is not a risk-informed application, the staff did not review the method used by the licensee to derive risk insights. The evaluation performed was not used to support a risk-informed decision by the staff.

However, the staff considered the insights provided, judged that they were reasonable, and determined that they did not challenge the conclusion that the proposed change maintains defense in depth.

Box 6: Qualitative insights of risk significance or supporting information can be used to support regulatory decisions. Examples include probabilities of failures of equipment, the frequency of initiating events, or other pertinent information. This also includes consideration of supporting PRA information such as CDF or large early release frequency (LERF) submitted not in accordance with RG 1.174. Care is needed to avoid calling this supporting information PRA.

This information does not have to be used within a risk analysis to help support a deterministic evaluation. Perhaps a better name would be risk inputs or the factors that could be used in a risk analysis.

The language that would be used for this supporting information could be called likelihood information, probabilistic analyses, or other quasi-qualitative terms. However, this information should not be called PRA results or input. Care should be taken to ensure that users of this probabilistic information do not mistakenly assume probabilistic information is PRA results or insights just because such information has the potential to be used in PRA or risk evaluation that is PRA.

DRA risk analysts should assist the staff in crafting an SE that uses probabilistic information, in addition to the typical deterministic information to support a regulatory decision. When discussing probabilistic information or risk inputs, technical staff have significant flexibility within the templates provided in Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) office instructions (OIs) such as LIC-101, License Amendment Review Procedures, to describe the technical basis for their regulatory decision. The limitation is that when describing probabilistic or risk input, the term PRA or use of quantitative CDF or LERF should not be used. Use of these terms would indicate PRA as a basis of the decision or as used to support the decision; therefore, it would be in Box 8.

Box 7: PRA insights or results that can help support or verify regulatory decisions made using traditional engineering evaluations is a primary outcome of the graded approach in RIDM. The output of PRAs often includes numbers such as CDF or LERF. PRAs are also used to gain insights about a facilitys response to initiating events and accident progression, including the expected interactions among facility systems, structures, and components (SSCs), and between the facility and its operating staff. A risk assessment is a systematic method for addressing these questions as they relate to understanding issues such as important hazards and initiators; important accident sequences and their associated SSCs failures and human errors; system interactions; vulnerable plant areas; likely outcomes; sensitivities; and areas of uncertainty.

Risk insights can be obtained by both quantitative and qualitative investigations. Quantitative risk results from PRA calculations are typically the most useful and complete characterization of risk, but they are generally supplemented by qualitative risk insights and traditional engineering analysis. Qualitative risk insights include generic results (i.e., results that have been learned from numerous PRAs performed in the past and from operational experience, and that are applicable to a group of similar plants). These qualitative or quantitative risk insights also need not be necessarily developed by PRA models that meet the guidance of RG 1.200, but may be developed using standardized plant analysis risk (SPAR) models or other PRA tools.

DRA risk analysts should assist in the crafting of the SE and should be specifically included in the initial IRT assignment. The language used in SEs would describe the information from a PRA but would be clear that the information was not used as the basis in the NRCs RIDM framework. For example, verification might be described as, PRA information was determined to be consistent with this conclusion or Nothing in the PRA was inconsistent with this deterministic evaluation.

Using PRA tools such as SPAR models, human reliability analysis worksheets, or Plant Risk Information e-Book handbooks that do not generally meet the acceptability needed for RG 1.174 applications can also be described as PRA insights or information used to verify a regulatory decision, as described above.

When describing the use of PRA to support regulatory decisions, language such as the following can be used as a template in the following manner:

In the subject application, the licensee stated that the basis for the proposed []

is based upon []. The licensee submitted a risk evaluation that was not consistent with risk-informed decision-making.

Because this is not a risk-informed application, the PRA models used to derive risk insights in [] were not reviewed by the staff to determine their technical acceptability as a basis to support this application. As a result, the staff did not rely on the numerical results provided by the licensee. However, the staff considered the licensee-provided risk insights to aid in the deterministic review of the proposed change. The staff also performed an independent assessment using [] to evaluate the risk contribution. The licensee-provided risk insights and the risk insights developed by staff both supported the engineering conclusions []. The currently available risk insights and results did not challenge the engineering conclusions that the proposed change maintains defense in depth.

Box 8: Using the results of a PRA as part of the basis of a regulatory decision involves using the five principles of the RIDM framework from RG 1.174. These features are: (1) the change meets the regulations, (2) is consistent with defense-in-depth, (3) maintains safety margins, (4) results in small increase in risk using PRA information, and (5) is monitored. For PRA information to be used in this RIDM framework, the PRA should be acceptable to support the application as described in RG 1.174.

DRA risk analysts typically lead review activities for these licensing actions, including primary development of the SE. The language used to describe PRA results as elements of a regulatory decision are documented in RG 1.174 and other RIDM regulatory guidance. The language should focus on PRA. Language such as risk insights or PRA insights may be used, consistent with the guidance in RG 1.174 or RG 1.200. Therefore, existing precedents and guidance from RG 1.174 apply.

1.2 Integrated Review Team Process for Licensing Actions The following are general licensing actions:

  • routine plant-specific licensing actions that are requested by Type 1, 2, or 3 submittals
  • emergent licensing actions (i.e., emergency and exigent amendments and verbal relief requests)

The IRT process does not constitute a review methodology for integrating risk and traditional insights to complete a technical evaluation; rather, it describes a framework for forming the teams that will need to integrate the review products from TRs and risk analysts. The use of the terms technical branches (TBs), technical reviewers (TRs), or traditional engineering, refers to staff that are not qualified risk analysts or reliability experts. Use of the terms risk analyst or PRA analysts refers to qualified PRA analysts or reliability experts who would typically be assigned to PRA branches in DRA of NRR.

Integrated review team (IRT) typically refers to a review team consisting of at least one PM, a TR, and a risk analyst, whereby the team members are responsible for developing requests for additional information (RAIs), audit plans, and SEs. However, an IRT does not have to include a risk analyst if the team finds the IRT concept is beneficial to enhance the review integration of various technical disciplines and the consolidation of SE and RAI input. The IRT concept encourages reviewers from many technical disciplines, including a risk analyst, if any, to work together as a team. The communication within a team and developing joint consolidated products enhance the efficiency of the licensing process. If a branch has a concurrence-only role, the inclusion of this branch in the IRT may not be necessary. An IRT can be created to review Type 1, 2, or 3 submittals. Ultimately, the IRT generates a single SE with a primary TR branch responsible for the body of the draft SE and other TRs providing written additions to the draft SE (see Section 8.0).

Although the IRT process described below consists of specific team meetings, the IRT has the flexibility in determining whether certain meetings are needed on a case-by-case basis.

2.0 INTEGRATED REVIEW TEAM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES The following describes roles, responsibilities, knowledge, skills, and abilities of the IRT. As a reminder, the staffs performance plans have been revised to incorporate RIDM, and the IRT process provides guidance in implementing RIDM. The staff should charge time to the specific CAC/EPID corresponding to the licensee submittal when participating in an IRT for that review.

2.1 Project Manager The PM will:

  • Facilitate team formation, meetings, written products, and meeting milestones.
  • Have a leadership role in consolidating products (e.g., RAIs and SEs) by ensuring that the products are consistent with OIs and training courses involving the fundamentals of reactor licensing.
  • Ensure that the consolidated SE conforms to the guidance in LIC-101, Appendix B, Attachment 2, or LIC-102, Relief Request Reviews.
  • Ascertain the teams abilities with using available information technology (IT) tools, such as ADAMS, SharePoint, Office 365, Skype, and Go-To-Meetings, to determine which platform would best suit the team for consolidated products and accommodating remote workers.
  • Be familiar with various IT tools, such as ADAMS, SharePoint, Office 365, Skype, and Go-To-Meetings.
  • Be familiar with using risk insights in licensing reviews, various risk-informed licensing initiatives (e.g., Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) travelers and 10 CFR 50.69 LARs), and RGs for risk-informed reviews (e.g., RG 1.174, RG 1.200, etc.) to better inform team formation and review needs. The PMs will facilitate issue resolution and escalation to management.
  • Be familiar with the Type 1, 2, and 3 definitions.
  • Consider risk insights to inform the scope and depth of reviews to reach a reasonable assurance determination
  • Ensure maintenance of information current for responsible licensing actions in the Replacement Reactor Program System (RRPS).

2.2 Technical Reviewers Technical reviewers (TRs) will:

  • Be familiar with the Type 1, 2, and 3 definitions.
  • Be familiar with the application of risk in licensing reviews to assist PMs with team formation, integrate risk and traditional engineering reviews, and enable early identification of the need to involve risk analysts with the reviews.
  • Serve a technical coordination role in the integration of risk and traditional engineering insights.
  • Be familiar with various IT tools, such as ADAMS, SharePoint, Office 365, Skype, and Go-To-Meetings.
  • Consider risk insights to inform the scope and depth of reviews to reach a reasonable assurance determination
  • Maintain information current for responsible licensing actions in RRPS.

2.3 Risk Analysts Risk analysts will:

  • Be familiar with the Type 1, 2, and 3 definitions.
  • Assist PMs with team formation and the TRs with integrating the risk and traditional engineering reviews.
  • Understand the various SE formats and guidance in LIC-101 and LIC-102 to assist with the consolidated SE format.
  • Serve a technical coordination role in the integration of PRA and traditional engineering insights.
  • Be familiar with various IT tools, such as ADAMS, SharePoint, Office 365, Skype, and Go-to-Meetings.
  • Be able to identify, with the PMs assistance, which technical branch or discipline will be needed to review RG 1.174 applications.
  • Consider risk insights to inform the scope and depth of reviews to reach a reasonable assurance determination
  • Maintain information current for responsible licensing actions in RRPS.

2.4 Management Division management will:

  • Maintain awareness of industry initiatives that will result in a large volume of similar risk-informed applications and allot the resources needed to efficiently address those applications.
  • Ensure that the PMs, TRs, and risk analysts are aware of such situations and will communicate with management peers through workload management meetings.
  • Ensure the staff is sufficiently trained in the integrated review approach.
  • Assist, as needed, in resolving differing views that may arise during the integration of risk and traditional engineering insights.

Branch chiefs will:

  • Review and concur on their staffs input to the consolidated SEs and RAIs to ensure the adequacy of the review methodology, approach, and result documentation.
  • Review and concur on the final consolidated SEs and RAIs as requested by the PMs.
  • Ensure staff considers risk insights to inform the scope and depth of reviews to reach a reasonable assurance determination
  • Adjust resources or redirect their staff to support projects, as needed, to meet office level goals and priorities.

3.0 ROUTINE PLANT-SPECIFIC LICENSING ACTIONS The following process description is for establishing IRTs for routine plant-specific licensing actions submitted as Type 1, 2, or 3 applications from licensees. The process description covers submittal type designation, staffing assignments, determination of whether to use an

IRT, and consolidated RAI and SE development. The processes described in established and applicable NRR OIs apply unless they are specifically addressed by the following description.

The term routine means that the application is not an emergency or exigent (i.e., emergent) request or a verbal relief request.

3.1 Submittal Type Determination The following process for submittal type determination applies when the PM creates the project in RRPS and makes initial branch assignments.

A. Within the typical timeliness for adding a project to RRPS when an application is received, the PM will review the application to determine whether it is a Type 1, 2, or 3 application based on the level of quantitative PRA information in the application (e.g.,

CDFs, LERFs, initiating event frequencies, references to PRAs, etc.). For large applications, doing a find for PRA terms or asking the licensee during routine discussions can be helpful. If the PM is uncertain how to determine the type of application, the PM can consult with DRA. For Type 3 applications, the PM should consult with DRA, as needed, to determine which branches have reviewed similar applications in the past. For the purpose of implementing this step, Type 1, 2, and 3 applications are defined as follows:

Type 1: Applications contain little or no risk/PRA information.

Type 2: Applications contain PRA information, but are not submitted as risk-informed applications in accordance with RG 1.174.

Type 3: Applications submitted as risk-informed applications in accordance with RG 1.174.

B. The PM will assign branches in RRPS as follows:

  • Routine Type 1: Assign technical branches but not DRA branches. The need for risk analysts will be determined after meeting with the TR(s) or after the PM determines that he or she needs assistance with the no significant hazards consideration determination regarding frequency of accidents. The PM may assign DRA at this stage if it is already known that the technical staff will want a consideration of risk insights (e.g., if this was discussed after a pre-submittal meeting).
  • Routine Type 2 or emergent: Assign both DRA and technical branches.
  • Routine Type 3: Assign DRA and technical branches. If technical branch assistance is not needed, the reviewer can be removed from the project at a later time.

Assigning the technical branches at the start of the project will provide them an early opportunity to raise concerns with risk-informed applications.

3.2 Integrated Review Team Determination The following process for team formation and project scoping is applicable from the time the initial set of reviewers is assigned in RRPS to when the acceptance review is issued. It includes explicit instructions to hold team meetings prior to issuance of the acceptance review to verify team composition, scopes of review, and any issues regardless of the hours estimate, and the possibility that more than 25 days may be needed to do an acceptance review for an IRT approach. If more than 25 days are required for an acceptance review, request division management approval for a longer review period as discussed in LIC-109.

A. The PM will hold an initial staffing meeting with the assigned reviewers, regardless of the estimated hours, within 10 working days of the application being added to ADAMS to determine if additional branches should be added to or consulted about the review. The PM and assigned reviewers should consult the checklists in Sections 5.0 through 8.0 of this document. Assigned reviewers should use RRPS to identify other branches needed and start recommending scopes of review. However, the PM will confirm with the reviewers by a meeting to understand the bases for his or her recommendations. For Type 1 applications, the staffing meeting will be used to determine if risk analysts or any other technical branches should be assigned to the review, using the checklists in Sections 6.0 and 7.0. If risk analysts will not be used (i.e., the review team agrees that it does not need risk insights from DRA), then staff should follow the acceptance review processes established by applicable NRR OIs. For Type 2 applications, the staffing meeting will be used to confirm that assigned branches will remain on the review and whether to assign other branches using the checklists for assistance. For Type 3 applications, the staffing meeting will be used to confirm whether the technical branches will remain on the review and whether to assign other branches. If technical staff will not be assigned to Type 3 reviews, then staff should follow the acceptance review processes in LIC-109.

B. After the staffing meeting, the PM will use RRPS to assign other branches to the review, as needed. It is not expected at this stage that the extent of each reviewers scope is known; therefore, it is possible at a later time that some reviewers may still be added, denoted as having a concurrence-only scope or no longer needed. However, the meeting provides assurance that the reviewers have read the application and have considered whether risk insights will be used.

C. After the review team is staffed and assigned in RRPS, the PM will hold a scoping meeting, regardless of the estimated hours, within 15 working days of the application being added to ADAMS. The following will occur during the scoping meeting:

  • The PM will discuss the application, including all of the proposed changes that need evaluation, plant-specific issues, or background information (e.g., licensing and design basis, stakeholder interests, time-charging expectations, or generic RAI and SE expectations). The PM will also identify if there are other ongoing reviews for applications that may overlap with the current application (e.g., multiple risk-informed applications from the same plant that use the same PRA information).
  • Team members will discuss their expertise as it pertains to the review.
  • The PM will introduce any scoping recommendations with input from the TRs and risk analysts. The PM should also identify whether he or she will need the teams help with the no significant hazards consideration determination (e.g., whether the change could affect the frequency of accidents).
  • For Type 1 and 2 applications, the team will use the checklists in Sections 6.0 and 7.0 to decide if DRA should be on the review. The DRA division must be on the review if the staff intends to document risk insights in the SE. DRA has the responsibility to determine if risk insights are appropriate or beneficial to the SE.

Consideration for cost/benefit from a staff resource, as well as licensee fee billing, will be the general responsibility of the PM (maintaining cost tracking for hours and contract expenses through the fee validation process, as well as informing the licensee of the added risk review).

  • For each change identified in the submittal, the review team will confirm each change proposed by the licensee, which team member is reviewing each of the change(s),

and the scope of each team members review. The PM will ensure that the entire application (i.e., every proposed change) has an assigned reviewer. The team members will identify what information, evaluations, and conclusions the reviewers will need from each other to help inform the hours estimate. This action may take more than one meeting because it requires the staff to understand how risk and traditional engineering insights can be integrated.

  • With assistance from the review team, the PM will document the proposed changes and reviewer assignments and note the scoping assignments in an RRPS comment.

At this time, the PM will denote in RRPS whether an IRT approach will be used. If it is determined that both risk analysts and TRs are providing input to the review, or if the risk analysts are assisting with documenting qualitative risk insights, then an IRT approach will be used. If either the risk analysts or TRs are on concurrence only, then an IRT approach is not necessary; however, the staff can and should consult with each other throughout the review to ensure any issues are identified and resolved early in the process.

D. Within 20 working days2 after the application is added to ADAMS, the PM will hold an acceptance review meeting. This meeting will cover the following topics:

  • Hours estimate and the need for a metric exclusion memorandum. With the IRT approach, the average hours per review may increase; therefore, the hours estimate per reviewer in the expectations memorandum (ADAMS Accession No. ML16202A029) may no longer be accurate, and the total hours estimate for the review may no longer be a sufficient gauge to determine whether the review may be complex.

2 The technical staffs acceptance review is due to the PM within 20 days based on guidance in LIC-109. The PM may hold the meeting prior to this date if efficiencies can be gained (e.g., if previous meetings or discussions can be held sooner).

  • The IT tools (e.g., e-mail, ADAMS, SharePoint, or Office 365) to be used to collectively develop the consolidated RAIs and SE. The team will also determine the need for Skype or Go-To-Meetings for teleworking staff.

E. Prior to issuing the acceptance review results to the licensee, the PM may hold additional team meetings or discussions to finalize any acceptance review issues, and to confirm hours estimate, review scopes, and milestone dates. Reviews with an IRT might exceed the 25-day metric for acceptance reviews because the review team will need to understand how it plans to use risk insights or how technical staff will contribute to Type 3 reviews. In these instances, the staff should follow the guidance in LIC-109 to request division management approval.

4.0 EMERGENT LICENSING ACTIONS The efficiency of IRT can be beneficial for emergent or emergency licensing actions, although the prescribed process here may be adjusted for the situation by the PM. The PM should consider early inclusion of DRA staff, especially if risk insights are being discussed by TRs. The IRT should leverage existing completed PRA work and other risk insights to expedite the review.

The NRR staff will maintain the current processes and practices for emergent actions but apply the IRT approach to the extent practicable. For an emergent licensing action, the PM should involve the technical and risk branches; branch chiefs; and management, as appropriate, in an initial (and subsequent) staffing and scoping meetings as soon as practical, to understand the methodology for the review and who will be reviewing which aspects of the proposed changes.

The review team should decide whether there is sufficient time to develop a consolidated SE at the start of the review and if individual branch SE inputs are needed or preferred. The PM or a technical coordinator will need to consolidate the SE inputs into LIC-101, Appendix B, or LIC-102 SE format. Therefore, the PM, with assistance from the review team, will begin developing the consolidated SE outline at the start of the review.

5.0 PROJECT MANAGER CHECKLIST The following are several checklists to facilitate implementation of the IRT process:

  • Project Manager Checklist (Section 5.0)
  • Integrated Review Team Checklist (Section 6.0)
  • DRA Checklist (Section 7.0)
  • Project Checklist for Consolidated SEs and RAIs (Section 8.0)

The PM uses the following checklist to determine whether a licensee application is Type 1, 2, or 3.

PM Checklist Licensee Application Type Information in Licensee Request Type 1 Applications contain little or no risk/PRA information Type 2 Applications contain PRA information, but are not submitted as risk-informed applications in accordance with RG 1.174 Type 3 Applications submitted as risk-informed applications in accordance with RG 1.174 6.0 INTEGRATED REVIEW TEAM CHECKLIST The PM will determine which branches to initially assign to the review based on the level of PRA information in a submittal. The team then meets to determine if additional reviewers are needed and if an IRT should be used. The IRT Checklist will assist the teams with determining whether to apply an IRT. This checklist (i.e., Table 1 below) can be used for Type 1, 2, and 3 submittals, including license amendments, relief requests (or proposed alternatives), and exemption requests. The checklist corresponds to the decision on whether to form an IRT based on considerations of the review or licensee submittals.

Table 1 lists decisions (i.e., integration recommended, integration considered, and integration not necessary) and descriptions under description of review or submittal topic. If any of the descriptions in Table 1 apply, then the corresponding decision can be selected.

Table 1: Integrated Review Team Checklist Decision Description of Review or Submittal Topic Integrated 1. Risk-informed reviews in accordance with RG 1.174 Review Team Recommended 2. Requests to adopt risk-informed TSTF travelers (e.g.,

consolidated line item improvement process), unless risk considerations were taken into account during the TSTF approval process

3. Submittals that include risk information, but not in accordance with RG 1.174
4. Submittals that are complex and involve many technical disciplines, even though they do not benefit from including a risk analyst, should be reviewed by an IRT without a risk analyst to enhance review integration

Table 1: Integrated Review Team Checklist Decision Description of Review or Submittal Topic Integrated 1. Reviews that technical divisions have historically found to be Review Team challenging, specifically where PRA insights may help in Considered completing the review more effectively

2. Reviews where it is not feasible to complete a portion of the deterministic justification in an appropriate timeframe
3. Changes to technical specifications where single failure and other conservatisms in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15, are no longer considered as part of the assumption
4. Reviews that involve multiple system integration
5. Reviews that are related to SSCs that are important to safety, but risk information is not provided
6. Submittals that involve many technical disciplines, even though they do not benefit from including a risk analyst, should be considered for an IRT without a risk analyst to enhance review integration Integrated 1. Administrative changes Review Team Not Necessary 2. Reactor risk neutral activities, such as offsite sirens, domestic water, etc.
3. Other reviews where integrating the review with risk analysts will have no significant use, such as those where risk methods are not available, or reviews where including risk information is not needed to ensure an efficient and effective review
4. Submittals that involve a single technical discipline and do not benefit from including a risk analyst NOTE: If NRC SEs will include some discussion of risk insights, then DRA should be involved.

6.1 Integrated Review Team Recommended 6.1.1 Risk-Informed Reviews in Accordance with RG 1.174 These reviews, which are Type 3 reviews, require the use of risk analysts from DRA. These reviews should be integrated as soon as practicable to ensure that the TRs and risk analysts understand the scope of their respective portions of the review, the justification for the bases for

acceptance in each of the technical and risk areas, and technique for formatting an integrated technical evaluation.

TRs should become familiar with risk-informed reviews in accordance with RG 1.174 with focus on the principles of RIDM. Also, see available references in Module 1 of iLearn Course 322150, Inspector Training on Risk-Informed Completion Times. The Technical Specifications Branch Specific Training Module, Section B, contains a primer about risk (ADAMS Accession No. ML17086A415, non-public). TRs may also reach out to risk analysts for information about the RIDM process or precedents involving risk reviews.

Risk analysts that are new to the topic area may find technical information in the Technical Training Center series training or reach out to the technical branches for references.

6.1.2 Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process The consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to make the review of technical specification changes more efficient. Reviews that use the CLIIP are called CLIIPs.

Even though CLIIPs are highly streamlined, CLIIPs that rely on risk information typically involve the review by a risk analyst from DRA.

Revision 5 of LIC-101 states, in part, Only the NRR Division of Safety Systems (DSS)

Technical Specifications Branch and the PM in DORL typically need to review a CLIIP LAR, unless it is a risk-informed CLIIP LAR, which would also need to be reviewed by DRA/APLA. In some cases, risk considerations are taken into account during the initial CLIIP review process.

In these cases, the risk review of plant-specific applications of the CLIIP may be unnecessary.

6.1.3 Submittals that Include Risk Information but Not in Accordance with RG 1.174 For these reviews, the licensee is presenting what it believes is risk information that supports its safety case. This information is not sufficient to form the basis of a potential NRC acceptance of the submittal because it does not meet RG 1.174. However, the proposed change may lend itself to risk evaluations, and DRA may be able to provide some technical rather than quantitative insights to the review. Risk insights should be considered to inform the scope and depth of the staff review to reach a reasonable assurance determination. DRA risk analysts should be engaged early in these reviews to ensure that the provided risk information is used appropriately and within the correct context.

6.1.4 Submittals that are Complex and Involve Many Technical Disciplines For these submittals, many technical disciplines are involved in the review. Even though the reviewers and PM decide that the risk analyst would not benefit from the review, an IRT can still be formed without a risk analyst, as discussed in Section 1.2.

The IRT concept encourages reviewers from many technical disciplines to work together as a team. The communication within a team and developing joint consolidated products enhance the efficiency of the licensing process. The IRT enhances the integration of staff review and preparation of consolidated SEs and RAIs from the many technical disciplines.

6.2 Integrated Review Team Considered For these reviews, there may be usefulness in engaging DRA risk analysts to provide supporting information or other insights to the staff reviews. In general, these are listed below in the order of the most likely to involve a risk analyst to the least likely.

6.2.1 Reviews that Technical Divisions Have Historically Found Challenging and Where Probabilistic Risk Assessment Insights May Help Complete the Review More Effectively For complex reviews that are technically challenging but without a clear challenge to plant safety, the staff should consider integrating risk insights. Without a fully risk-informed submittal, risk insights may not be used as the basis for acceptance of a request; however, the risk insights would be expected to assist the TRs by supporting their safety conclusions and enhancing the TRs confidence in their technical evaluations.

6.2.2 Emergency and Exigent Reviews Emergency and exigent reviews typically involve a request to quickly change a deterministic requirement. It is prudent to involve DRA risk analysts in these reviews early. The role of the use of risk insights would be to assist the TRs in supporting their safety conclusions and enhancing the TRs confidence in their technical evaluations.

6.2.3 Changes to Technical Specifications Where Single Failure and Other Conservatisms in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15, are No Longer Considered as Part of the Assumptions Safety-related SSCs and analyses often have numerous layers of protection, such as assuming a single failure or worst-case scenarios. Where these numerous layers of protection are in place, there may not be any use in applying risk insights developed by risk tools because the risk tools do not make the same assumptions (for example, regarding single failure). In cases where a safety-related analysis no longer relies on these prescriptive assumptions, it is both useful and prudent to look to risk analyses for insights. This is often the case when a licensee is already in a technical specification completion time because single failure does not apply in that case, or for a submittal where the licensee is requesting not to consider single failure for a period of time (for example, when maintenance is planned).

6.2.4 Reviews that Involve Multiple System Integration Reviews of submittals that involve multiple system integration that may not have an obvious risk connection should be considered to be discussed with risk analysts.

6.2.5 Reviews that are Related to Structures, Systems, and Components that are Important to Safety, but Risk Information is Not Provided SSCs that are important to safety are typically modeled in the PRA. For SSCs that are important to safety, there are typically more tools (e.g., SPAR, notebooks, etc.) available to the risk analysts to provide insights to TRs regarding the risk insights related to an SSC that are important to safety. Discussion with risk analysts may be prudent to ensure all the roles of that

equipment are considered in the deterministic review. In this case, the risk analyst may not provide risk insights but may provide connections to other review organizations that are not obviously related to the review topic.

6.2.6 Submittals that Involve Many Technical Disciplines For these submittals, even though they may not benefit from including a risk analyst in the staff review, an IRT without a risk analyst should be considered to enhance the integration of the staffs interactive review and preparation of consolidated SEs and RAIs as discussed in Section 1.2.

The IRT concept encourages reviewers from many technical disciplines to work together as a team versus the traditional silo reviews that each reviewer works independently and transmits the responsible section to the SE to the PM at the end for integration. The communication within a team and developing joint consolidated products enhance the efficiency of the licensing process. The IRT enhances the integration of staff review and preparation of consolidated SEs and RAIs from the many technical disciplines.

6.3 Integrated Review Team Not Necessary For these reviews, there is currently not an identified need to engage with DRA risk analysts.

Either there is not a risk aspect to be considered, or the technical review process is mature enough such that adding risk resources would not improve the efficiency or effectiveness or safety decision of the review.

6.3.1 Administrative Changes If administrative changes do not impact the operation or maintenance of the plant, there is no need to engage with DRA risk analysts for reviewing these changes. Requests for NRC review of operational, testing, or maintenance procedure-related changes could potentially impact plant risk and should not be excluded from possible integration by categorizing these types of changes as administrative changes.

6.3.2 Reactor Risk Neutral Activities This includes reviews of topics that are not related to components that could have an impact on the safety of the reactor, such as the use of offsite sirens or domestic water. If the TRs for such changes are new to the reviews, discussions with risk analysts may be prudent.

6.3.3 Other Reviews Where Integrating the Review with Risk Analysts Will Have No Significant Benefit, as Agreed on by DRA (for Example, Reviews Where Risk Methods are Not Available or Reviews Where Including Risk Information is Not Needed to Ensure an Efficient and Effective Review)

For a large number of reviews, there currently is no integrated review, and it may continue to be the most efficient and effective way to manage these reviews. For example, where single failure is required to be considered, there is little value in layering in a risk review that uses different

criteria. There may be no need for risk analyst involvement unless a new or unique situation dictates that risk may play a larger factor.

6.3.4 Submittals that Involve a Single Technical Discipline For submittals that do not benefit from including a risk analyst in the staff review, an IRT is not necessary because the SE and RAI input is from a single technical branch.

7.0 DRA CHECKLIST During the scoping meetings, the PMs and reviewers will need to determine whether to use risk insights, and therefore, use an IRT approach. The DRA Checklist below identifies risk tools to provide insights for reviews of applications that were not submitted in accordance with RG 1.174. These risk insights may be developed based on quantitative information but will be characterized as qualitative risk insights when included in SEs. The staff may use risk tools such as SPAR models, the risk triplet, or event frequencies to develop these qualitative risk insights. RG 1.174 quantitative risk thresholds are not expected to be used as the basis for approving changes that were not submitted in accordance with RG 1.174.

The questions in the checklist below provide a framework for developing risk insights that may provide additional confidence in conclusions reached by TRs using traditional defense-in-depth and deterministic evaluations. The DRA staff will be responsible for facilitating the use of this checklist with the review team when considering whether PRA risk insights should be included in licensing action decision-making. Quantitative or qualitative PRA risk insights are considered in this checklist. The DRA staff should assist the IRT in differentiating probabilistic information from PRA risk insights. The staff will use this checklist to determine whether and in what form PRA risk insights should be included as part of an SE. DRA risk analysts should be considered as the risk insight specialists and will be responsible for reviewing risk-related information contained in SEs. The DRA staff will use NRC SPAR models or publicly-available information provided by a licensee as part of risk-informed reviews to develop these risk insights, when possible.

If there is significant risk discussion or quantitative risk information (e.g., CDF), but the licensee submittal is not in accordance with RG 1.174 principles, a risk analyst should be included.

Significant risk discussion is not a casual mention of a submittal being low risk but is a substantive discussion of risk insights. If risk discussion is substantive or quantitative risk is mentioned, a risk analyst should be included.

The review team, with DRAs lead, should compile answers for all questions in the checklist when considering whether the review may use PRA risk insights. If the risk analysts response to Questions A E is no (N), the proposed change is not considered to be risk-significant. If the answer to any of those questions is yes (Y) or not available (NA), the risk analyst may perform additional analysis in response to Question F or develop risk insights using SPAR models or other tools.

The checklist helps focus discussion between DRA and TRs.

Description of the Proposed Change:

Y N NA A. PREVENTION: Does the proposed change increase the likelihood of events that challenge normal plant operations and require successful mitigation?

1. Does the proposed change increase the likelihood of events from internal plant causes (e.g., hardware faults, internal floods, or internal fires) that challenge normal plant operation and require successful mitigation?
2. Does the proposed change introduce new events from internal plant causes (e.g., hardware faults, internal floods, or internal fires) that challenge normal plant operation and require successful mitigation?
3. Does the proposed change increase the intensity or occurrence of external plant causes (e.g., earthquakes or high winds)?
4. Does the proposed change introduce external plant causes (e.g.,

earthquakes or high winds) not previously evaluated?

Y N N/A B. PROTECTION: Does the proposed change adversely affect common cause failures by increasing the likelihood of such failures (e.g., an operable SSC may be subject to the same failure mode as an inoperable SSC)?

1. Does the proposed change increase the likelihood of a cause or event that could cause simultaneous multiple component failures?
2. What is the risk significance of common cause failures? Is an SSC that is the subject of the proposed change impacted by the increased likelihood of common cause failures? Is an SSC that is necessary for successful mitigation from events caused by internal and external plant causes impacted by the increased likelihood of common cause failures?

Y N N/A C. MITIGATION: Does the proposed change affect the likelihood of successful mitigation (i.e., plant response) of challenges to normal plant operation (events that would cause the plant to implement abnormal operating procedures and emergency operating procedures)?

1. Is the likelihood of the affected SSCs to successfully perform their required function(s) (during a specified period) affected by the proposed change?
2. What is the likelihood of the affected SSCs not being capable of supporting their functions due to being unavailable for test or maintenance? Is this unavailability of an SSC due to test and maintenance affected by the proposed change?
3. Does the proposed change affect the likelihood of restoring a function due to failure of affected SSCs?
i. Does the affected function rely on diverse/redundant SSCs? What is the recovery likelihood of the affected SSCs or affected function?

ii. Do the proposed compensatory measures manage risk-significant configurations?

Y N N/A D. DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH CONSIDERATIONS

1. Does the proposed change significantly increase the likelihood of an event or introduce a new event that could simultaneously challenge multiple barriers (e.g., interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accident and steam generator tube rupture)?
2. Does the balance among the layers of defense remain appropriate?
3. Does the proposed change significantly impact the containment function or SSCs supporting that function? Does the proposed change significantly reduce the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness program?
4. Does the proposed change include an overreliance on programmatic activities as compensatory measures? (Reliance on a programmatic activity as a compensatory measure might be considered excessive when a program is substituted for an engineered means of performing a safety function or when the failure of the programmatic activity could prevent an engineered safety feature from performing its intended function.)
5. Does the proposed change result in a decrease in redundancy, independence, or diversity of system functions impacted by the change?

Does the proposed change decrease the redundancy, independency, or diversity of system functions not impacted by the change?

Y N N/A E. HUMAN ACTIONS: Does the proposed change increase failures or unavailability of SSCs (or function) caused by human inaction or inappropriate actions or result in new human failure event?

1. Does the proposed change create new human actions?
2. What is the likelihood of errors associated with new or affected human actions?
3. Are new human actions important to preserving layers of defense?
4. What are the absolute or relative contributions of new or affected human actions to overall risk?

F. RISK INFORMATION:

1. If risk information is known, what are some readily available risk insights applicable to the proposed change?
a. What is the overall risk of the plant (i.e., baseline risk)?
b. What are the drivers of risk (or change in risk) (e.g., at the initiating events, accident sequences, and cut sets levels)?
c. Has the NRC reviewed applications that proposed similar changes? What conclusions were made in those reviews by the NRC?
2. What are the absolute and relative contributions of the affected SSCs, collectively and individually, to overall risk?
a. What is the increase in risk if the affected SSC (or a collection of SSCs) was assumed to be failed or unavailable?
b. What is the relative contribution of the affected SSC (or a collection of SSCs) to the calculated risk?
c. What is the sensitivity of risk to the performance of the affected SSC?

Overall

Conclusions:

8.0 CONSOLIDATED SAFETY EVALUATION AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INPUT There is efficiency when members of an IRT work together to produce consolidated SEs and RAIs. This process should be considered when the staff review involves multiple technical disciplines, with or without a risk analyst. The following process steps are for the development of the consolidated SEs and RAIs. The discussion below about a risk analyst does not apply if there is no risk analyst involved in the review.

Figure 1 shows the timeliness for a traditional review and an IRT review from the time a licensee submittal is entered into ADAMS to when the SE is issued. The Project Checklist for Consolidated SEs and RAIs provides details of the IRT process. Existing staff guidance continues to apply, such as branch chief review of staff input to RAIs and the SE, PM maintenance of RAIs and SE, and PM preparation of the licensing package. However, the IRT approach requires a preparation of a consolidated SE outline early and more internal meetings for communication and coordination than the traditional approach. It is important to have an agreed-upon consolidated SE outline so each member of the IRT knows where his or her input fits in the SE, and the PM can confirm that there is no gap in the SE.

Figure 1: Review Timelines for Traditional and Integrated Review Teams Review Timelines 12 Months with 9 Months as Stretched Goal PMs SE consolidation &

AR Issued in DORL, OGC Traditional 25 working Branch-Specific Draft SEs Branch-Specific Concurrences &

days and RAIs to DORL RAI Responses SEs to DORL Issuance Review Kick-Off Team Meeting Timeline AR Issued in 25 working OGC, DORL BC Integrated days Concurrences &

Draft SE Tech, DORL LA Review Outline Draft SE & RAIs developed RAI Responses SE Concurrences Issuance Team Staffing, Timeline Scoping, &

AR Meetings ADAMS Add T0 1m 2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 7m 8m 9-12m Project Checklist for Consolidated Safety Evaluations and Requests for Additional Information The following steps are in addition to those in other applicable office instructions.

Who? Task Adding Project to RRPS PM Add project to RRPS and assign Type 1, 2, or 3 o Type 1 (no PRA) o Type 2 (PRA info but not RG 1.174) o Type 3 (formally risk-informed; RG 1.174)

Key search words: risk, probabilistic, CDF, LERF, frequency PM Assign branches (or DRA Front Office DRAFO for risk analyst) based on type number o Type 1 - technical branches (TBs) only o Type 2 and 3 - technical branches and DRAFO Staffing Meeting PM Schedule staffing meeting within 10 working days Team For Type 1 and 2, determine if other reviewers and DRA need to be added or remain.

For Type 3, determine if technical branches should remain or need other branches.

PM Assign any new branches.

Technical Remove branches not needed.

Scoping Meeting PM Schedule scoping meeting within 15 working days.

Team Identify all changes and who is reviewing each change.

Team Decide if IRT will be used.

Acceptance Review Meeting PM Schedule acceptance review meeting within 20 working days.

Team Discuss hours estimate, complex review determination.

Team Identify any acceptance review issues.

Team Discuss IT format for consolidated SE (e-mail, ADAMS, SharePoint, etc.).

Team Identify challenges to meeting 25-day metric - refer to LIC-109, Section 3, page 6.

Consolidated SE Preparation PM Schedule consolidated SE meeting within approximately 6 weeks from acceptance review

- schedule laptop/projector if needed

- establish SharePoint site location or ADAMS accession number, if needed PM Develop licensing package with draft SE outline.

PM Start filling out Introduction section of the SE.

TB/DRA Technical reviewers and DRA nominate a technical coordinator.

TB/DRA Begin Regulatory Evaluation and outline Technical Evaluation sections of the SE.

TB/DRA Send PM draft SE outline within 4 weeks of acceptance review.

PM Combine TB/DRA SE outline with PMs outline; send to team within 5 weeks.

Consolidated SE Meeting (may need multiple meetings)

PM Discuss version control of SE (e.g., have TB/DRA only check out document when updating; not while developing).

Team Discuss and agree on a consolidated SE outline.

Team Agree on who is responsible to complete which section or subsection of the SE.

PM Ensure someone is assigned responsibility to complete every section and subsection of the SE.

Team Ensure Regulatory Evaluation section of the SE is accurate.

Team Agree on review methodology.

PM Get branch chiefs informal approval on draft SE outline (after meeting).

SE and RAI Development Team Work on section or subsection of the SE as agreed.

Team Finish draft SE with any holes prior to sending RAIs.

TB/DRA Review his or her staffs RAI input to the PM.

Branch Chiefs Team Develop and consolidate RAIs into one document.

PM Get branch chiefs concurrences on consolidated RAIs.

Team Fill in holes in draft SE after RAI responses are received.

TB/DRA Review his or her staffs SE input to the PM.

Branch Chiefs Team Develop and consolidate SE into one document.

PM Get branch chiefs concurrences on consolidated SE.

The process, as described above, contains specific timeframes. When necessary, and except for timelines associated with metrics, the staff has flexibility to manage their review with the PM and propose timelines that suit the workload. In addition, it may not be necessary to have formal meetings as described because the IRT has flexibility to decide when it is appropriate to hold meetings.

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