ML18324A316

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2018-10-Post Exam Comments
ML18324A316
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 11/07/2018
From: Vincent Gaddy
Operations Branch IV
To:
South Texas
References
Download: ML18324A316 (10)


Text

LOT 22 NRC EXAM ANALYSIS - 11/7/2018 Bank #

RO#

SRO#

ANSWER A

B C

D Total Missed 2799 1

D 2

2 2794 2

A 3

3 1387 3

C 1

1 1945 4

C 0

2096 5

A 0

2733 6

C 0

2739 7

C 1

1 2

2740 8

D 0

2750 9

C 1

1 2

2753 10 B

1 1

390 11 B

1 1

551 12 C

0 171 13 A

2 1

3 909 14 B

1 1

2 1117 15 A

0 1303 16 A

0 1384 17 C

0 1742 18 A

0 1744 19 A

0 1820 20 A

0 2796 21 B

8 8

1973 22 A

0 2022 23 A

0 2088 24 D

1 1

2797 25 B

0 2793 26 D

0 2791 27 B

4 4

2614 28 C

0 2628 29 D

1 1

2630 30 D

0 2677 31 C

1 4

5 2789 32 D

6 6

2735 33 B

1 1

2748 34 A

0 2749 35 B

4 5

9 2754 36 B

5 1

1 7

2767 37 C

0 2776 38 C

0 736 39 A

0 2781 40 C

1 1

2780 41 B

0 2779 42 C

1 1

LOT 22 NRC EXAM ANALYSIS - 11/7/2018 Bank #

RO#

SRO#

ANSWER A

B C

D Total Missed 2775 43 A

0 2766 44 A

1 1

2762 45 B

2 2

2761 46 B

2 1

2 5

2760 47 D

0 2759 48 C

0 2757 49 A

1 1

2800 50 C

4 1

5 2752 51 D

1 1

2751 52 D

1 1

2747 53 A

1 1

2746 54 B

5 1

6 2742 55 A

1 2

3 2741 56 B

2 2

4 2738 57 A

0 2737 58 B

0 2736 59 D

1 2568 60 A

2 2

2524 61 A

1 1

2 2798 62 A

0 2107 63 B

0 28 64 B

0 2758 65 D

0 2763 66 A

1 3

4 2755 67 D

0 2764 68 C

0 2765 69 B

0 2778 70 C

0 2734 71 D

0 2586 72 C

0 2507 73 B

0 2415 74 A

0 2380 75 D

0 2792 76 A

2 2

790 77 D

0 2180 78 B

0 2743 79 B

1 1

2744 80 D

2 2

2803 81 C

3 3

2175 82 C

4 4

2464 83 D

0 2730 84 B

0 2769 86 C

2 2

2732 85 B

5 5

LOT 22 NRC EXAM ANALYSIS - 11/7/2018 Bank #

RO#

SRO#

ANSWER A

B C

D Total Missed 2771 87 C

4 4

2804 88 D

0 2773 89 A

0 2774 90 A

2 2

2783 91 D

1 1

2784 92 B

7 7

2785 93 A

2 2

2787 94 D

1 1

2788 95 B

6 6

2745 96 D

1 1

2768 97 C

0 2770 98 B

3 3

2782 99 D

0 2786 100 C

1 1

RO #21 - 8 candidates chose distracter A; (correct answer is B).

This question is based upon knowledge of containment water level instrumentation and containment radiation monitoring. The distracter chosen by those who missed the question indicated a lack of knowledge of the Containment Water Level instrumentation as shown on QDPS. This instrumentation is a set of discrete level sensors mounted on a wall inside containment. The lowest sensor is 10 off the bottom floor of containment. A leak that was limited to 500 gallons would not cause a rise in containment water level to an elevation of

10. Training on the containment water level instrumentation is included in lesson plan LOT201.10 and is also referred to in LOT 504.41.

No changes to the exam are warranted.

RO #32 - 6 candidates chose distracter C; (correct answer is D).

This question is based upon plant response to a trip of RCP 1A at 45% reactor power. The knowledge required was steam generator level response and the feedwater source after the trip of RCP 1A. The keyed answer stated that steam generator level would lower and auxiliary feedwater would be the feedwater source. The simulator response shows that all 4 Steam Generators lower after the reactor trip. Additionally the following timeline was observed.

RCP 1A trip t = 0 Reactor trip t = 10 seconds Feedwater isolation t = 27 seconds AFW actuation t = 19 minutes 43 seconds Since MFW is available for a short time after the RCP 1A trip, this could be considered a correct response. Since AFW actuates approximately 20 minutes after the RCP 1A trip, this was considered the correct response. Additionally, the crew would progress through 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 0POP05-EO-ES01, Reactor Trip

LOT 22 NRC EXAM ANALYSIS - 11/7/2018 Response and at Step 3 the crew has a choice of re-establishing MFW or AFW.

STP will enhance this question to ensure only one correct answer can be chosen.

RO #35 - 4 candidates chose distracter A; 5 candidate chose distracter C (correct answer is B).

This question is based upon knowledge of the containment response to various design basis accidents. Specifically, the student was required to know which accident would cause the greatest pressure rise in containment. The distracters required students to choose between a Large Break LOCA and a Main Steam Line Break and also between 1 train and all 3 trains of ECCS injecting. The distracters chosen indicated a lack of knowledge of design basis accident containment response. This material is covered in LOT 505.08, Containment.

No changes to the exam are warranted.

RO #36 - 5 candidates chose distracter A; 1 candidate chose distracter C; 1 candidate chose distracter D (correct answer is B).

This question is based upon knowledge of the interlocks for charging pump suction valves and accumulator outlet isolation valves upon a safety injection signal. The charging pump suction swaps immediately to the RWST upon an SI signal. The accumulator outlet isolation valves are deenergized and open at 100% power. An SI signal is supplied to the valves to open, but with the valves deenergized in the open position the signal has no effect. There was no discussion on the first part of the question which required knowledge of the effect of an SI on charging pump suction. The discussion from the students centered around the use of the word receive. The distracter for the second part stated that the accumulator outlet isolation valves do NOT receive an open signal because they are already open. It can be argued about the receipt of the open signal in a deenergized condition, but the cause (they are already open) is clearly wrong. Valve position has nothing to do, in and of itself, with receipt of a signal from SI. The correct answer for the second part of the question stated that the accumulator outlet isolation valves receive an open signal. At 100% power, the valve is deenergized due to a motor-operated power lockout device being operated. This device removes power to the valve from the bus and also deenergizes the control power circuit. However, the contact from the SI circuit is powered from SSPS and would change state even if it has no effect on the circuit. Essentially, any challenges to this question centered on how the student would interpret the word receive. No student raised a question during the exam over the meaning of the word receive. This material is covered in LOT 201.10, ECCS.

No changes to the exam are warranted.

LOT 22 NRC EXAM ANALYSIS - 11/7/2018 RO #54 - 5 candidates chose distracter A; 1 candidate chose distracter D; (correct answer is B).

This question is based upon knowledge of 0POP05-EO-EC11, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Step 5. This step was provided to the students as a reference. RWST level, containment pressure was provided in the body of the question, and students were told a Large Break LOCA had occurred and that cold leg recirculation was unsuccessful. Appendix E of NUREG 1021 informs students that if given information in the stem they can conclude actions have been taken to support that condition. In this case, students can assume that all actions that are required up to 0POP05-EO-EC11, Step 5 have been completed. This includes stopping one Containment Spray pump in the course of performing 0POP05-EO-EO00. With this information, and using the table provided with Step 5, NO Containment Spray pumps should be running in order to conserve inventory. The students should have selected stopping two Containment Spray pumps NOW. The distracters chosen indicated the students did not consider that one pump had previously been stopped in 0POP05-EO-EO00. This material is covered in LOT 504.27, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

No changes to the exam are warranted.

SRO #92 - 7 candidates chose distracter A; (correct answer is B).

This question is based on knowledge of 0POP04-RS-0001, Control Rod Malfunction. With a rod mispositioned by 10 steps, the user is directed to Addendum 2, Recovery of a Misaligned Rod, to recover the misaligned rod. In the course of this Addendum to most accurately reposition the rod, a empirically determined DRPI Transition Point is used by procedure. Although a flux map can be used to determined rod position, it is not used in this procedure. The students chose a distracter that required a flux map and did not have sufficient knowledge of the methodology in the procedure to ensure the rod is accurately positioned. This material is covered in LOT505.01, Off Normal Operating Procedures.

No changes to the exam are warranted.

SRO #85 - 5 candidates chose distracter C; (correct answer is B).

This question presented readings for the 4 Pressurizer level channels at 100% power:

LT465: 55.5%, LT466: 55.4%, LT467: 51.1%, LT468: 50.0%

and asked the student for actions required by Technical Specifications. Normal pressurizer level at 100% power is between 55 and 56%. With these readings, when doing a channel check per 0PSP03-ZQ-0028, the max difference between operable channels is 5%. This question was written for 100% power conditions. In the absence of any additional information, the student is to assume that normal conditions exist except where noted in the stem of the question. LT465 or LT467 are controlling channels for pressurizer level. Per 0POP03-ZG-0008, either of these channels can be selected for control based on which pressurizer pressure channel is selected.

Since no other conditions or failures were introduced into the stem, it can be assumed that LT465 is working correctly. IF LT465 is accurate, then LT466 must be reading accurately also since it is nearly the same value.With this information and using 0PSP03-ZQ-0028, the student should apply the note that operable channels can have a max difference of 5% for the associated channel check for pressurizer level. Since LT468 is the only channel greater than 5% different from the other channels, it should be declared inoperable.

No changes to the exam are warranted.

No changes to the exam are warranted.

This question is based on knowledge of Technical Specificaton 3.6.3 as applied to the Instrument Air system. In MODE 4 (required mode for this TS), Instrument Air OCIV FV-8565 is declared inoperable. The students were required to know if the inside containment check valve IA-0541 may be used as an isolation barrier and how long the crew has until FV-8565 must be returned to an operable status. Per TS 3.6.3, IA-0541 may be used as an isolation barrier because only one isolation valve is inoperable and this is not a penetration that is a closed system with a single isolation valve (TS page 3/4 6-17). The students were also required to know how long they have until FV-8565 must be restored to an operable status. Per TS 3.6.3, absent other options presented, the valve must be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The students knew the time requirement, but did not recognize the check valve as an isolation barrier.

SRO #95 - 6 candidates chose distracter D; (correct answer is B).

LOT 22 NRC EXAM ANALYSIS - 11/7/2018