ML18310A324

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Part 02 - Final Safety Analysis Report (Rev. 2) - Part 02 - Tier 02 - Chapter 03 - Design of Structures, Systems, Components and Equipment - Appendices 3A - 3C
ML18310A324
Person / Time
Site: NuScale
Issue date: 10/30/2018
From: Bergman T
NuScale
To:
Office of New Reactors
Cranston G
References
NUSCALESMRDC, NUSCALESMRDC.SUBMISSION.6, NUSCALEPART02.NP, NUSCALEPART02.NP.2
Download: ML18310A324 (221)


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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Dynamic Structural Analysis of the NuScale Power Module Appendix 3A Dynamic Structural Analysis of the NuScale Power Module 3A.1 Seismic Analysis The dynamic analysis of the NuScale Power Module (NPM) uses a complete system model to represent the dynamic coupling of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), containment vessel (CNV), reactor internals and core support, reactor core, surrounding pool water, and structures, systems, and components (SSC) supported by the NPM. The dynamic analysis of the complete NPM system is performed using time history dynamic analysis methods and a three dimensional (3-D) ANSYS (Section 3.9.1.2) finite element model. The NPM system model includes acoustic elements to represent the effects of fluid-structure interaction (FSI) due to pool water found between the CNV and pool floor and walls.

To account for possible dynamic coupling of the NPMs and the reactor building (RXB) system, a model of each of the NPMs is included in the RXB system model as described in Section 3.7.2.

The Reactor Building (RXB) system model, with representation of the NPMs, is analyzed for soil-structure interaction (SSI) in the frequency domain using computer code SASSI2010 (Section 3.7.5.3). Results from the RXB seismic system analysis include in-structure time histories at each NPM support location and the pool walls and floor surrounding the NPM.

In-structure response spectra (ISRS) are also calculated. Results are shown in Section 3.7.2.

The detailed dynamic analysis of the NPM subsystem is performed using a 3D NPM system model using ANSYS. The NPM dynamic analysis provides in-structure time histories and in-structure response spectra for qualification of equipment supported on the NPM and time histories at core support locations for seismic qualification of fuel assemblies.

The seismic analysis of the NPM is provided in technical report TR-0916-51502, "NuScale Power Module Seismic Analysis."

3A.2 Blowdown Analysis The blowdown analysis addresses events caused by the failure or actuation of piping and valves, including high-energy line breaks inside the CNV. These short term transient events result in system internal pressure waves and asymmetric cavity pressurization waves external to the pipe break or valve outlet.

Short term transient events require special treatment due to their rapidly changing thermal hydraulic conditions and resulting dynamic mechanical loads. In addition to the rapid nature of these transients, fluid-structure interactions are influential and are therefore also considered.

The blowdown analysis of the NPM is provided in technical report TR-1016-51669, "NuScale Power Module Short-Term Transient Analysis."

Tier 2 3A-1 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Appendix 3B Design Reports and Critical Section Details This appendix summarizes the structural design and analysis of the Reactor Building (RXB) and Control Building (CRB). Section 3.8.4 and Section 3.8.5 describe these structures, their foundations, and the primary loads and load combinations. This appendix describes how those loads are combined and how the design is checked for adequacy. In addition, a selection of structural elements are described in detail. These elements are critical sections in that they represent parts of the structure that: (1) perform a safety-critical function, (2) are subjected to large stress demands, (3) are considered difficult to design or construct, or (4) are considered to be representative of the structural design. Within the safety related structures, the only true critical sections are those associated with the bays that contain the NuScale Power Modules (NPMs). The walls and slab at the NPM bays satisfy the first three criteria. To present a representative overview of the buildings, an additional 10 sections in the RXB and 7 in the CRB are provided as critical sections.

Section 3B.1 discusses the design methodology used for both buildings. Section 3B.2 provides the design report and critical section details for the RXB, and Section 3B.3 provides that information for the CRB.

The following critical sections are presented for the RXB:

Walls

  • Wall at grid line 1 - West outer perimeter wall at foundation level
  • Wall at grid line 3 - Interior weir wall and upper stiffener
  • Wall at grid line 4 - Interior wall of RXB with two different thicknesses
  • Wall at grid line 6 - Pool wall and upper stiffener wall
  • Wall at grid line E - South exterior wall extending upward from foundation level Slabs
  • Slab at EL. 100'-0" - Slab at grade
  • Slab at EL. 181'-0" - Slab at roof Pilasters
  • Pilasters at grid line A Beams
  • Beam at EL. 75'-0" Buttresses
  • Buttress at EL. 126'-0" NPM Bay
  • West wing wall
  • Pool wall Tier 2 3B-1 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details

  • NPM support skirt
  • NPM lug restraint The following critical sections are presented for the CRB:

Walls

  • Wall at grid line 3 - Interior structural wall
  • Wall at grid line 4 - East exterior structural wall
  • Wall at grid line A - North exterior structural wall Slabs
  • Basemat foundation
  • Slab at EL. 100'-0" - Slab at grade Pilasters
  • Pilasters at grid line 1 T- Beams
  • T-Beam at EL. 120'-0" Table 3B-55 and Table 3B-56 outline the critical sections and details for the RXB and CRB.

Section 1.2 contains architectural drawings of the RXB and CRB. Figure 1.2-10 through Figure 1.2-20 are for the RXB and Figure 1.2-21 through Figure 1.2-27 are for the CRB.

The concrete design process is organized by defining each wall, slab, pilaster, buttress and T-beam into several small zones on the structure and assigning identification names to these regions. The zone definitions are labeled according to the naming conventions below:

Wall Zone Definition Name: "A";"B";"C-D";"E-F" where, "A" = Building name "B" = Grid line ID designation "C-D" = Wall zone grid line ID range in the horizontal direction "E-F" = Wall zone elevation range For example a zone labeled as "RXB;1;E-D;100-120" is a RXB wall zone on grid line 1, between grid lines E and D, and located between elevations 100' and 120'.

Tier 2 3B-2 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Slab Zone Definition Name: "A";"B";"C-D";"E-F" where, "A" = Building name "B" = TOC elevation designation "C-D" = Slab zone grid line ID range in the E-W direction "E-F" = Slab zone grid line ID range in the N-S direction For example, a zone labeled as "RXB;100;1-2;A-B" is an RXB slab zone at the 100' elevation between grid lines 1 and 2, and between grid lines A and B.

Pilaster Zone Definition Name: "A";"B";"CD";"E-F" where, "A" = Building name "B" = Pilaster abbreviation "C" = the wall grid line ID where the pilaster is located "D" = the grid line that represents the centerline of where the pilaster is located "E-F" = Elevation IDs that represent where the pilaster is between in the vertical direction For example, a zone labeled as "RXB;PI;A2;75 - 100" is a RXB pilaster on wall grid line A, on grid centerline 2, between elevations 75' 100'.

T-Beam Zone Definition Name: "A";"B";"C";"D-E";"F-G" where, "A" = Building name "B" = T-beam abbreviation "C" = Elevation designation "D-E" = Slab zone grid line range in the E-W direction "F-G" = Slab zone grid line range in the N-S direction For example, a zone labeled as "RXB;TB;100;1-2;A-B" is a RXB T-beam at Elevation 100', between grid lines 1 and 2, and between grid lines A and B. If multiple zones lie between two grid lines, the numbering of (1), (2), or (3) is added to the end of the definition name.

Tier 2 3B-3 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Buttress Zone Definition Name: "A";"B";"C";"D";"E-F" where, "A" = Building name "B" = Buttress abbreviation "C" = the wall grid line ID where the buttress is located "D" = Elevation designation "E-F" = Grid line IDs that represent the buttress range in the horizontal direction For example, a zone labeled as "RXB;B;A;145.5;1-2" is a RXB buttress on wall grid line A, at elevation 145-6, between grid lines 1 and 2.

In addition to the zone names, figures are included in Section 3B.2 and Section 3B.3 that visually place the section within the building.

3B.1 Methodology SAP2000 (Reference 3B-1) and SASSI2010 (Reference 3B-2) are used to develop the static and dynamic loads as described in Section 3.7 and 3.8. The methodology and equations from ACI-349 (Reference 3B-3) are used to develop the forces and moments used for the design of the RXB and CRB, unless otherwise noted. The predominant governing load combination is Combination 10 from Table 3.8.4-1 (ACI 349 Load Equation 9-6). The demand forces and moments have been increased by 5 percent to account for the effect of accidental torsion as described in Section 3.7.2.11. The strength reduction factors used for the reinforced concrete design are provided in Table 3B-54.

3B.1.1 Wall and Slab Design Methodology The standard global and local axis orientation is shown below.

  • Global X- Axis - east-west direction
  • Global Y- Axis - north-south direction
  • Global Z- Axis - vertical direction
  • Local "x" axis - always horizontal
  • Local "y" axis - parallel to global y for slab or parallel to global z for wall
  • Local "z" axis - perpendicular to the x and y axes by the right-hand rule The total area of the longitudinal reinforcing steel provided in an element is the sum of the steel required for (i) membrane tension, (ii) in-plane shear, and (iii) out-of-plane moment. The maximum compression in an element is a combination of flexural compression (out-of-plane moment) and membrane compression. A simplified approach is used for addressing combined effects of flexural and membrane compression. For the simplified method, the sectional area, defined by (b =12")*(a),

Tier 2 3B-4 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details provides for flexural compression. The net sectional area, defined by (b=12")*(h-a), is available for carrying membrane compression. The maximum membrane compressive stress is calculated to be (Sxx or Syy)/[12(h-a)]. The Whitney stress block defines parameters "a" and "h" as shown in Figure 3B-1. The maximum membrane compressive stress is less than the allowable compressive strength for membrane compression.

3B.1.1.1 Averaging Demand Forces and Moments The finite element models often show highly localized forces and moments that are not representative of the average demand forces and moments over the wall and slab sections. Therefore, the design zones with demand/capacity (D/C) ratio exceedances over a single finite element are averaged with adjacent elements to show a more realistic value. When necessary for averaging purposes of finite element analysis generated element forces and moments, the length of the failure plane considered is taken approximately 4 times the thickness of the element.

For the in-plane shear stress check used to demonstrate acceptable wall and slab thickness, average demand shear stresses over the full available section length of wall or slab cross-sections are used. The cross-sectional areas used for the stress check also include the presence of pilasters and T-beams.

3B.1.1.2 Wall and Slab Design Forces and Moments For each element in the analysis models, static forces and moments are obtained from SAP2000 analysis for non-seismic loads. The direction of the loads result in either compression (negative) or tension (positive) membrane forces due to the static forces and moments being monotonic. The forces and moments for SAP2000 analysis are listed below and are shown in Figure 3B-2 and Figure 3B-3.

  • F11, F22 Membrane forces
  • F12 In-plane shear
  • M11, M22 Out-of-plane moment
  • M12 Torsional moment
  • V13, V23 Out-of-plane shear Similarly, for each element in the analysis models, dynamic forces and moments are obtained from SASSI2010 soil-structure interaction analysis for seismic loads. The dynamic forces and moments are reversible (not monotonic) and therefore consider the direction that is most adverse in a load combination. The SASSI2010 x- and y-components of membrane tension or compression, out-of-plane moment, and out-of-plane shear are enveloped in order to ensure compliance with the local axes of SAP2000. The forces and moments from SASSI2010 are listed below and shown in Figure 3B-4.
  • Sxx, Syy Membrane forces
  • Sxy In-plane shear
  • Mxx, Myy Out-of-plane moment Tier 2 3B-5 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details

  • Mxy Torsional moment
  • Vxz, Vyz Out-of-plane shear 3B.1.1.3 Wall and Slab Design Approach The design check approach uses load combinations that involve both static and dynamic load cases from SAP2000 and SASSI2010 to get combined element forces and moments. The shell element forces and moments from the two analyses are shown in Table 3B-1. Additional terms used in this analysis combined are shown below:
  • Sxx Membrane tension/compression in local x direction
  • Syy Membrane tension/compression in local y direction
  • Sxy In-plane shear acting along both faces
  • (Mxx + Mxy) Out-of-plane moment about local y-axis
  • (Myy + Mxy) Out-of-plane moment about local x-axis
  • Vxz Out-of-plane shear in local z direction on local x face
  • Vyz Out-of-plane shear in local z direction on local y face The terms in-plane and out-of plane are abbreviated as IP and OOP in tables and figures. The following paragraphs describe the design check approach for a structural wall. The approach is equally applicable for slabs.

The design forces and moments that produce tensile, shear and flexural stress are resisted by the reinforcing steel and stirrups in the following manner:

1) The main reinforcing steel is provided at the face of the wall (such as 1 layer #9

@ 12 centers = 2.00 in2) and considered for the resistance of membrane tension forces (Sxx or Syy), out-of-plane moments( (Mxx + Mxy) or (Myy + Mxy)),

and in- plane shear(Sxy).

2) The out-of-plane shear forces on the section are resisted by the strength of concrete and, if required, the addition of stirrups (such as 1 leg #6 stirrups @ 12 centers).
3) The design forces and moments that produce compressive stress, namely membrane compression and flexural compression, are resisted by the strength of concrete.

Design for Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

The area of horizontal reinforcing steel due to membrane tension, in-plane shear and out-of-plane moment are calculated as follows. In the calculation of the required in-plane shear steel required, Vconc is the in-plane shear resisted by concrete and is calculated using a shear wall coefficient of 2.

Tier 2 3B-6 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Area of steel required due to membrane tension:

S xx A s1x = ------------ Eq. 3B-1 m fy Area of steel required due to in-plane shear:

S xy - V conc A s2x = ----------------------------- Eq. 3B-2 v fy Area of steel required due to out-of-plane moment:

M xx + M xy A s3x = ---------------------------- Eq. 3B-3 m jdf y where, Vconc is the factored capacity of concrete, jd is the lever arm, the distance between the resultant compressive force and the resultant tensile force (in), and j is a dimensionless ratio used to define the lever arm, jd. It varies depending on the moment acting on the wall section.

The sum of membrane tension, in-plane shear, and out-of-plane moment steel areas must be less than that provided by the chosen horizontal reinforcement.

Area of total horizontal reinforcing steel:

A S Horiz = A s1x + A s2x + A s3x Eq. 3B-4 D/C ratio:

A S Horiz D C HorizReinf = -------------------------------- Eq. 3B-5 A S Provided H Total horizontal reinforcing steel provided (AS Provided H) is divided equally on each face.

Horizontal membrane compressive stress:

S xx f xx = ---------------------- Eq. 3B-6 b(h - a)

Tier 2 3B-7 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Membrane compression strength:

0.8 c [ 0.85f' c ( A g - A s ) + f y A s ]

all = --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eq. 3B-7 Ag The horizontal membrane compressive stress must be less than the membrane compressive strength.

Membrane compression D/C ratio:

f xx D C Horiz Comp = -------- - Eq. 3B-8 all Design for Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

The area of vertical reinforcing steel due to membrane tension, in-plane shear, and out-of-plane moment are calculated as follows. In the calculation of in-plane shear steel required, Vconc is the in-plane shear resisted by concrete and is calculated using a shear wall coefficient of 2.

Area of steel required due to membrane tension:

S yy A s1y = ------------- Eq. 3B-9 m fy Area of steel required due to in-plane shear:

S xy - V conc A s2y = ----------------------------- Eq. 3B-10 v fy Area of steel required due to out-of-plane moment:

M yy + M xy A s3y = ---------------------------- Eq. 3B-11 m jdf y where, Vconc is the factored capacity of concrete, jd is the lever arm, the distance between the resultant compressive force and the resultant tensile force (in), and j is a dimensionless ratio used to define the lever arm, jd. It varies depending on the moment acting on the wall section.

Tier 2 3B-8 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details The sum of membrane tension, in-plane shear, and out-of-plane moment steel areas must be less than that provided by the chosen vertical reinforcement shown below:

Total vertical reinforcing steel:

A S Vert = A s1y + A s2y + A s3y Eq. 3B-12 D/C ratio:

A S Vert D C Vert Reinf = -------------------------------- Eq. 3B-13 A S Provided V Total vertical reinforcing steel provided (AS Provided V) is divided equally on each face.

Vertical membrane compressive stress:

S yy f yy = ---------------------- Eq. 3B-14 b(h - a)

Membrane compression strength:

0.8 c [ 0.85f' c ( A g - A s ) + f y A s ]

all = --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eq. 3B-15 Ag Membrane compression D/C ratio:

f yy D C Vert Comp = -------- - Eq. 3B-16 all Shear Friction in the X Plane The design check for shear friction is based on a coefficient of friction of =1. The XZ plane shear friction area of steel is the sum of the in-plane shear and out-of-plane moment. The in-plane shear Sxy must be less than the nominal shear friction capacity.

XZ plane shear friction:

A vfx = A S Provided V + A s1x Eq. 3B-17 Nominal shear friction capacity:

V nx = v A vfx f y Eq. 3B-18 Tier 2 3B-9 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Shear friction check:

S xy < v V nx Eq. 3B-19 Shear Friction in the Y Plane The design check for shear friction is based on a coefficient of friction of =1. The YZ plane shear friction area of steel is the sum of the in-plane shear and out-of-plane moment. The in-plane shear Sxy must be less than the nominal shear friction capacity.

YZ plane shear friction:

A vfy = A S Provided H + A s1y Eq. 3B-20 Nominal shear friction capacity:

V ny = v A vfy f y Eq. 3B-21 Shear friction check:

S xy < v V ny Eq. 3B-22 In-Plane Shear Check The area of reinforcing steel required for the in-plane shear stress (Sxy) is always added to the total steel area for the horizontal and vertical reinforcement. The added in-plane shear areas are AS2x and AS2y.

However, another design check for the in-plane shear forces, which is independent of the amount of the reinforcing steel but dependent upon having sufficient thickness of the concrete section, can be performed. The maximum in-plane shear capacity is the maximum allowable shear on a given section based on the dimensional properties and concrete compressive strength. For the nominal in-plane shear strength, the coefficient defining the relative contribution to nominal wall shear strength is a conservative value of 2 when calculating the nominal in-plane shear strength.

Maximum in-plane shear capacity:

v V n = v 8A cv f' c Eq. 3B-23 Nominal in-plane shear strength:

v V n = v A cv ( c f' c + t f y ) Eq. 3B-24 Tier 2 3B-10 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details In-plane shear check:

S xy < v V n Eq. 3B-25 The averaging for in-plane shear can be done on the entire span of the wall.

Out-of-Plane Shear in XZ Plane Out-of-plane shear capacity is based on a shear strength reduction factor of v = 0.75. The shear capacity is adjusted when the section is subjected to membrane compression or tension.

See Figure 3B-2 through Figure 3B-5 for SAP2000/SASSI2010 sign convention of positive forces and moments.

Capacity of concrete for elements subjected to axial compression (Sxx is positive):

S xx V C,XZ = 2 v 1 + -------------------- f' c b w d Eq. 3B-26 2000A g Capacity of concrete for elements subjected to axial tension (Sxx is negative):

S xx V C,XZ = 2 v 1 + ----------------- f' c b w d Eq. 3B-27 500A g Out-of-plane shear D/C ratio:

V XZ D C XZ = ----------------------------------

- Eq. 3B-28 V C,XZ + V S Out-of-Plane Shear in YZ Plane Out-of-plane shear capacity is based on a shear strength reduction factor of v = 0.75. The shear capacity is adjusted when the section is subjected to membrane compression or tension.

Capacity of concrete for elements subjected to axial compression (Syy is positive):

S yy V C,YZ = 2 1 + -------------------- f' c b w d Eq. 3B-29 2000A g Tier 2 3B-11 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Capacity of concrete for elements subjected to axial tension (Syy is negative):

S yy V C,YZ = 2 1 + ----------------- f' c b w d Eq. 3B-30 500A g Out-of-plane shear D/C ratio:

V YZ D C YZ = ----------------------------------

- Eq. 3B-31 V C,YZ + V S 3B.1.1.4 Basemat Foundation Design Force and Moments The design check considers bounding demand forces and moments for the basemat.

The demand forces and moments of the design check consist of:

  • Out-of-plane moment, in kip-ft per unit length in feet: maximum out-of-plane moment in either of the two perpendicular directions in-plane
  • Out-of-plane shear force, in kips per unit length in feet: maximum out-of-plane shear force from either of the planes XZ or YZ
  • In-plane shear force, in kips per unit length in feet: maximum in-plane shear force
  • Axial force along x- or y-direction in kips per unit length in feet: maximum axial tension along the x- or y-axis The SASSI2010 program calculates the dynamic stresses due to a seismic excitation at the centroid of a solid element. These stresses are post-processed to obtain the forces and bending moments in the basemat foundation. The dynamic forces and moments in a solid element are combined with the corresponding static forces and moments calculated with SAP2000. For a solid element, the SAP2000 program calculates only the nodal forces at all eight nodes of the solid element. Therefore, these nodal forces also require post-processing to convert to forces and moments.

3B.1.2 T-Beam, Buttress and Pilaster Methodology These frame elements increase the stiffness of the walls or slabs which helps to mitigate the effects of out-of-plane seismic loads. The design check determines the D/C ratios for strong axis bending, strong axis shear, axial compression, and axial tension by using the combined forces and moments due to seismic and non-seismic loads.

3B.1.2.1 T-Beam, Buttress and Pilaster Design Forces and Moments The SAP2000 analysis for non-seismic loads provides the static forces and moments for the frame elements in the analysis models. The direction of the loads are Tier 2 3B-12 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details specific resulting in either compression (negative) or tension (positive) forces due to the static forces being monotonic. Figure 3B-5 defines the frame element forces and moments for SAP2000 shown below.

  • P Axial force
  • V2 Shear force in the 1-2 plane
  • V3 Shear force in the 1-3 plane
  • T Axial torque (about the 1-axis)
  • M2 Bending moment in the 1-3 plane (about the 2-axis)
  • M3 Bending moment in the 1-2 plane (about the 3-axis)

The SASSI2010 soil-structure interaction analysis for seismic loads provides the dynamic forces and moments for frame elements in the analysis models. The dynamic forces and moments consider the direction that is most adverse in a load combination due to the fact that they are reversible (not monotonic). Figure 3B-6 defines the forces and moments extracted from SASSI2010 listed below.

  • P1 Axial force
  • P2 Shear force in the 1-2 plane
  • P3 Shear force in the 1-3 plane
  • M1 Axial torque (about the 1-axis)
  • M2 Bending moment in the 1-3 plane (about the 2-axis)
  • M3 Bending moment in the 1-2 plane (about the 3-axis)

The combined resultant force or moment obtained from the combination of these loads uses the SAP2000 naming convention.

3B.1.2.2 T-Beam, Buttress and Pilaster Design Approach The frame design check approach uses load combinations of both static and dynamic load cases to get combined element forces and moments. The frame element forces and moments are shown in Table 3B-1. The SAP2000 terminology is used.

The design of reinforced concrete T-beam and pilaster sections uses the following methodology for frame elements.

Design for Strong Axis Bending The strong axis bending of the frame element governs the design. Iterations of the moment determine the required amount of strong axis bending rebar. The design of the frame element uses the equation for the nominal moment capacity shown below. The total combined static and dynamic moment must be less than the factored nominal moment capacity.

Tier 2 3B-13 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Nominal moment capacity:

M n3 = m A s f y d A2 - ---

a Eq. 3B-32 2

Strong axis bending D/C ratio:

M3 D C 3 = -------------- Eq. 3B-33 M n3 Design for Strong Axis Shear The strong axis shear capacity uses a shear strength reduction factor of v=0.75.

The shear capacity is adjusted when the section is subjected to membrane compression or tension.

Capacity of concrete for elements subjected to axial compression (P is positive):

V C,2 = 2 v 1 + -------------------- f' c b w d P

Eq. 3B-34 2000A g Capacity of concrete for elements subjected to axial tension (P is negative):

V C,2 = 2 v 1 + ----------------- f' c b w d P

Eq. 3B-35 500A g The strong axis shear demand must be less than the combined capacity of concrete and stirrups.

Out-of-plane shear D/C ratio:

V2 D C 2 = -------------------------------- Eq. 3B-36 V C,2 + V S Design for Compression or Tension (Axial Force)

With the exception for the dynamic axial force, the design SAP2000 axial force is known to be in tension or compression. The dynamic axial load is both added and subtracted from the static axial load to create a minimum and maximum value.

Compression is not checked if both the minimum and maximum values are positive and tension is not checked if both values are negative.

Axial compression capacity:

Tier 2 3B-14 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details P C = c 0.8f' c A g Eq. 3B-37 Compression D/C ratio:

P D C C = ---------- Eq. 3B-38 P C Axial tension capacity:

P T = m f y A s Eq. 3B-39 Tension D/C ratio:

P D C T = --------- Eq. 3B-40 P T 3B.2 Reactor Building 3B.2.1 Design Report Structural Description and Geometry The RXB is a Seismic Category I concrete structure. For a detailed description of the RXB, see Section 3.8.4.1.1. The RXB geometry and floor layout are shown in Figure 1.2-11 through Figure 1.2-20.

Structural Material Requirements The RXB design is based on the following material properties:

  • Concrete Compressive Strength - 5 ksi (7 ksi for exterior walls of the RXB above grade)

Modulus of Elasticity - 4, 031 ksi Shear Modulus - 1,722 ksi Poisson's Ratio - 0.17

  • Reinforcement Yield Stress - 60 ksi (ASTM A615 Grade 60 or ASTM A706 Grade 60)

Tensile Strength - 90 ksi (A615 Grade 60), 80 ksi (A706 Grade 60)

Elongation - See ASTMs A615 and A706

  • Structural Steel Grade - ASTM A992 (W shapes), ASTM A500 Grade B (Tube Steel), ASTM A36 (plates)

Ultimate Tensile Strength - 65 ksi A992, 58 ksi A500 Grade B and A36 Tier 2 3B-15 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Yield Stress - 50 ksi A992, 46 ksi A500 Grade B, 36 ksi A36

  • Foundation Media For a description of the soils considered in the design of the RXB, see Section 3.7.1.3.1.

Structural Loads The structural loads for the RXB are discussed in detail in Sections 3.7.1 and 3.8.4 for seismic and non-seismic loads, respectively.

Structural Analysis and Design

  • Design Computations of Critical Elements The design methodology of RXB related Critical Elements is discussed in Section 3B.1. Specific RXB Critical Elements analyzed are discussed in Section 3B.2.
  • Stability Calculations Stability of the RXB is addressed in Section 3.8.5.4.1, Section 3.8.5.5, and Section 3.8.5.6.1.

Summary of Results See Section 3B.2.2 through Section 3B.2.7.

Conclusions The D/C ratios presented are all less than 1.0. Therefore, the Critical Elements satisfy the design criteria for the investigated loading.

3B.2.2 Design Approach -Walls The combined SAP2000 and SASSI2010 design forces and moments are used in the element-based design check. The design check determines the D/C ratios for the horizontal and vertical wall reinforcement including the various shear failure modes based on the combined demand forces and moments.

An iterative design check approach is used to determine the appropriate uniform reinforcement pattern for a given structural wall section based on the maximum combined design forces and moments. A representative wall shell element within the design check zone is selected to demonstrate the element-based design check that is repeated for all shell elements within the wall.

This design approach is used for each structural wall. A summary of the D/C ratios for each wall is presented using specified uniform reinforcement. If all elements pass, then the wall section is considered acceptable. The general design goal is to achieve D/C ratios below 0.8. Demand/Capacity ratios higher than 0.8 but less than 1.0 are also acceptable, however case by case justifications are provided.

Tier 2 3B-16 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details When individual elements exceed design requirements, the region is evaluated. Often, more accurate design moments and forces are obtained by averaging the results of several elements. If this approach is inappropriate for the location (or does not produce acceptable results) additional reinforcing is added to increase section capacity.

The summary tables of D/C ratios at each gridline shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. If necessary, a separate check of averaging for walls that contain elements exceeding the in-plane shear limit, or contain elements that exceed shear friction limits is performed to ensure the D/C ratios are acceptable.

In-plane shear for the adequacy of concrete wall thickness is checked for all elements in the RXB. Several individual elements in the wall at grid line 3 encountered In-plane shear exceedances. Where individual elements in the wall exceed in-plane shear limits, the elements are averaged as shown in Table 3B-51. The cross-section was checked based on calculating the average in plane shear over the entire wall section, and is acceptable. Note that the example in Table 3B-51 is a different element than shown in Table 3B-4 through Table 3B-6.

Shear friction is also checked for all elements in the RXB. Some individual elements in the wall at grid line 3 encountered shear friction exceedances. An example of averaging over additional elements is shown in Table 3B-52. The example in Table 3B-52 is a different element than shown in Table 3B-4 through Table 3B-6.

3B.2.2.1 Wall at Grid Line 1 The wall at grid line 1 is an exterior structural wall on the west side of the RXB. This wall is 5 feet thick. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-7, along with the shell element labels.

This wall uses 5000 psi concrete below grade and 7000 psi concrete above grade.

Reinforcement drawings and section details are presented in Figure 3B-8 and Figure 3B-9.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line 1 is presented in Table 3B-2. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. All design check zones have no D/C exceedances.

Based on the above results and evaluations, the wall is acceptable.

3B.2.2.2 Wall at Grid Line 3 The wall at grid line 3 consists of a 5 foot thick weir wall for the pool and a 4 foot thick upper stiffener located near the roof level. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-10, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and section details are presented in Figure 3B-11 through Figure 3B-13.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line 3 is presented in Table 3B-3. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios Tier 2 3B-17 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details within each design check zone and highlights those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8. Table 3B-4, Table 3B-5, and Table 3B-6 show the element averaging for the horizontal reinforcement, the horizontal membrane compression stress, and the vertical reinforcement, respectively. Table 3B-7 provides a summary of D/C ratios after averaging the affected elements. The method of averaging of the demand membrane forces, in-plane shear and out-of-plane moments (used for determination of D/C ratios in terms of reinforcing steel), and out-of-plane shears (used for determination of D/C ratios for shear) over a length of nominally 4 times the thickness of the wall is described in Section 3B.1.1.1. As shown in Table 3B-7, with this further distribution of demand, all D/C ratios are acceptable.

3B.2.2.3 Wall at Grid Line 4 The wall at grid line 4 is an interior wall of the RXB with two different thicknesses.

The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-14, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and section details are presented in Figure 3B-15 through Figure 3B-17.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line 4 is presented in Table 3B-8. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone and highlights those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8. Table 3B-9 shows the element averaging for the horizontal reinforcement exceedance indicated in Table 3B-8. Table 3B-10 provides a summary of D/C ratios after averaging. As shown in Table 3B-10, with this further distribution of demand, all D/C ratios are acceptable.

3B.2.2.4 Wall at Grid Line 6 The walls at grid line 6 consist of several wall thicknesses. The upper stiffener wall located near the roof is 4 feet thick. The pool wall section has two section thicknesses, 7.5 feet and 5 feet. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-18, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and section details are presented in Figure 3B-19 through Figure 3B-21.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line 6 is presented in Table 3B-11. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. The highlighted entries indicate those D/C ratios that exceed 1.0. Table 3B-12 shows the element averaging for the horizontal reinforcement exceedance in Table 3B-11. Table 3B-13 provides a summary of D/C ratios after averaging. As shown in Table 3B-13, with this further distribution of demand, all D/C ratios are acceptable.

Tier 2 3B-18 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details 3B.2.2.5 Wall at Grid Line E The wall at grid line E is an exterior structural wall on the south side of the RXB that is 5 feet thick. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-22, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings, details, and sketches are presented in Figure 3B-23 and Figure 3B-24.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line E is presented in Table 3B-14. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. All design check zones have no D/C exceedances.

Based on the above results and evaluations, the wall is acceptable.

3B.2.3 Design Approach - Slabs The slabs are designed using the same methodology as was used for the walls in Section 3B.1.1. The design check determines the D/C ratios for the north-south and east-west slab reinforcement including the various shear failure modes based on the combined demand forces and moments.

An iterative design check approach is used to determine the appropriate uniform reinforcement pattern for a given slab section based on the maximum combined design forces and moments. A representative slab shell element within the design check zone selected to demonstrate the element-based design check that is repeated for all shell elements within this slab. The demand forces and moments for the shell element in the design check zone combines the non-seismic (SAP2000) and seismic (SASSI2010) design value for performing the element-based design check.

The summary table of D/C ratios at each slab elevation shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. A separate check of averaging for slabs that contain elements exceeding the in-plane shear limit, or that contain elements exceeding shear friction limits is performed to ensure the D/C ratios are acceptable.

3B.2.3.1 Slab at EL. 100'-0" The slab at EL. 100'-0" is at grade level and is 3 feet thick. The outer and inner perimeter of the slab is reinforced with shear reinforcement. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-25, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and section details is presented in Figure 3B-26 and Figure 3B-27.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the slab at EL 100'-0" is presented in Table 3B-15. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone and highlights the XZ plane shear exceedance. Table 3B-16 shows the element averaging for that exceedance.

Table 3B-17 provides a summary of D/C ratios after averaging. Based upon the results shown in Table 3B-17, the slab at EL. 100'-0" is acceptable.

Tier 2 3B-19 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details 3B.2.3.2 Slab at EL. 181'-0" The roof slab is a 4 foot thick slab that begins at EL. 163'-0", slopes inward for 29.5 feet, and is flat at EL. 181'-0". The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-28, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and section details are presented in Figure 3B-29 and Figure 3B-30.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the roof slab is presented in Table 3B-18. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. All design check zones have no D/C exceedances.

Based on the above results and evaluations, the roof slab is acceptable.

3B.2.3.3 Pilasters Pilasters are used around the perimeter of the RXB exterior walls and at two locations inside the pool walls from elevation 50'-0" to elevation 100'-0" at grid line

3. The RXB pilasters strengthen the RXB exterior walls by resisting the following types of loading:
1) axial tension and compression
2) lateral shear loading in both the north-south and east-west directions
3) flexural bending about the north-south and east-west axes of the pilasters In the finite element model, the pilasters are modeled with frame elements with transverse flexural stiffness properties that represent the combined action of the walls (modeled with shell elements) and the pilasters. The forces in the artificially stiffened frame elements could be distributed to the pilaster and wall elements but for a conservative evaluation of the pilaster, the moments and the out of plane shear forces corresponding to the strong axis are compared to the capacity of the pilaster alone. Bending about the weak axis does not need to be evaluated because the pilaster is an integral part of the wall and bending in that direction is not local behavior. It is part of the in-plane behavior of the wall and the shell elements in this area have adequate reinforcing. The pilaster stem shear in the weak axis direction, parallel to the wall, does not need to be evaluated because the in-plane capacity of the wall is capable of accommodating the minor in-plane shear loading increase from the pilaster stems.

If the 5 feet by 10 feet pilaster can resist the resulting loads without consideration of the adjacent concrete walls, the pilaster is considered qualified.

The qualification of the pilasters compares the capacities of selected members with the demands and determines the demand to capacity ratios. In the structural model, the frame elements used to represent the pilasters are located at the center of the walls.

Tier 2 3B-20 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details The capacity of the pilaster is based on the reinforcing steel in the 5 feet by 10 feet zone. While the pilaster does interact with the wall, the additional capacity gained by considering the strength of the adjoining walls has been conservatively neglected.

A detailed explanation of the methodology for the design evaluation of the walls and slabs, also applicable to the pilasters in the RXB is presented in Section 3B.1.2.

The SAP2000 and SASSI2010 combined design forces and moments are used for the design check. The design check determines the D/C ratios for the various failure modes based on the combined demand forces and moments.

The pilasters in the RXB are designed for strong axis bending, strong axis shear, axial compression, and axial tension only. This is due to the very long span in the weak axis direction (along the plane of the walls) that prevents the pilasters from failing. Similarly, the pilasters cannot realistically fail in torsion due to the fact that they are embedded into the 5 foot thick RXB walls. Therefore, torsion is also not considered.

3B.2.4 Pilasters at Grid Line A The pilasters on the wall at grid line A consist of five types of pilaster. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-31, along with the pilaster frame element labels.

Reinforcement details are presented in Figure 3B-32 through Figure 3B-36 for the five pilaster types.

A summary table of the design check results for the pilasters on the wall at grid line A is presented in Table 3B-19. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. All design check zones have no D/C exceedances and the results acceptable.

3B.2.5 Beams A detailed explanation of the methodology for the design evaluation of the concrete walls and slabs, also applicable to the beams in the RXB is presented in Section 3B.1.2.

The SAP2000 and SASSI2010 combined design forces and moments are used in the design check. The design check determines the D/C ratios for the various failure modes based on the combined demand forces and moments.

An iterative design check approach is used to determine the appropriate uniform reinforcement pattern on each beam type based on the maximum combined design forces and moments. A representative beam frame element within the design check zone is selected to demonstrate the frame element design check that is repeated for all beam frame elements within this group.

The beams in the RXB are designed for strong axis bending and strong axis shear only.

This is due to the very long span in the weak axis direction (along the plane of the slabs) that prevents the beams from failing. Similarly, the beams cannot realistically fail in Tier 2 3B-21 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details torsion due to the fact that they are embedded into the 3 foot thick RXB slabs.

Therefore, torsion is also not considered.

The summary table of D/C ratios at each slab elevation shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone.

3B.2.5.1 Beam at EL. 75'-0" The slab at EL. 75-0 contains six beam sections running east-west and 22 beam sections running north-south. The SAP2000 analysis model plan view is shown in Figure 3B-37, along with the frame element labels.

The reinforcement details are shown in Figure 3B-38 and Figure 3B-39.

A summary table of the design check results for the beams at EL. 75-0" is presented in Table 3B-20. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. The D/C ratios are less than 1.0 and therefore the beams are acceptable.

3B.2.6 Buttresses A detailed explanation of the methodology for the design evaluation of the walls and slabs, also applicable to the buttresses in the RXB is presented in Section 3B.1.2. The SAP2000 analysis model is used to determine the maximum non-seismic demand results for each buttress frame element. Similarly, the SASSI2010 analysis model is used to determine the seismic demand results, which are then combined with the SAP2000 results for each buttress frame element. The SAP2000 and SASSI2010 combined design forces and moments are used in the design check. The design check determines the D/C ratios for the various failure modes based on the combined demand forces and moments.

An iterative design check approach is used to determine the appropriate uniform reinforcement pattern on each buttress type based on the maximum combined design forces and moments. A representative element within the design check zone is selected to demonstrate the frame element design check that is repeated for all elements within this group.

The buttresses in the RXB are designed for strong axis bending and strong axis shear only. This is due to the very long span in the weak axis direction (along the plane of the slabs) that prevents the buttresses from failing. Similarly, the buttresses cannot realistically fail in torsion due to the fact that they are embedded into the 5 foot thick RXB slabs. Therefore, torsion is also not considered.

3B.2.6.1 Buttress at EL. 126'-0" The wall at grid line 1 has two buttresses. These are at elevations 126'-0" and 145'-6". The buttress at EL. 126'-0" is evaluated. The SAP2000 analysis model plan view is shown in Figure 3B-40, along with the frame element labels.

The reinforcement details are shown in Figure 3B-41.

Tier 2 3B-22 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details A summary table of the design check results for the beams at elevation 126-0" is presented in Table 3B-21. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. The D/C ratios are less than 1.0 and therefore the buttress is acceptable.

3B.2.7 NuScale Power Module Bay The NPM bays are 3-walled compartments located in the reactor pool and are designed to house the NPMs during operation. Each bay is 20'-6" wide in the north-south direction and 19'-7" deep in the east-west direction, and extends from the pool floor at EL. 25'-0" up to EL. 125'-0". The bottom of the bay is the RXB foundation slab. The walls which make up the bay are 5 feet thick reinforced concrete. The top of the bay is capped with the Bioshield during operation. The bay provides restraints to prevent the NPM from moving laterally. Restraint is provided via a NPM skirt restraint located at EL.

25-0" and lug restraints located on the three bay walls at EL. 71'-7".

3B.2.7.1 West Wing Wall The west wing wall is one of the walls at grid line 4. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-42, along with the shell element labels. The west wing walls have the refueling pool on one side and an NPM located on the other. (See Figure 3B-52). Because of this location, it experiences the highest forces of the NPM bay wing walls.

Reinforcement drawings and section details are presented in Figure 3B-43 and Figure 3B-44.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at Grid Line 4 is presented in Table 3B-22. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. All design check zones have no D/C exceedances.

Based on the above results and evaluations, the west wing wall is acceptable.

3B.2.7.2 Pool Wall The portion of the pool wall that supports the NPMs is part of the wall at grid line B.

This is an interior wall of the RXB that is 5 feet thick. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-45, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and section details are presented in Figure 3B-46 and Figure 3B-47.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line B is presented in Table 3B-23. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone and highlights the YZ plane shear exceedance.

Table 3B-24 shows the element averaging for that exceedance. Table 3B-25 provides a summary of D/C ratios after averaging.

Tier 2 3B-23 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details 3B.2.7.3 NuScale Power Module Passive Support Ring Assembly The base of the NPM is located at the bottom of the RXB pool at EL. 25-0. There are up to 12 NPMs located in the RXB pool in their respective bays. The pool floor liner in the NPM bay is made of half-inch thick stainless steel whereas the wall liner is made of quarter-inch stainless steel.

The NPM is vertically supported for the dead load and seismic loads acting downwards at the base, but free to move up vertically for any uplifting forces (such as seismic load acting upwards and buoyant forces due to the water in the reactor pool). The NPM is also laterally restrained against seismic forces at the base.

The details of the NPM base support are shown in Figure 3B-48 through Figure 3B-50. The NPM base support includes the following:

  • The skirt of the NPM is supported on a 14.5 ft square, 4 in. thick bearing plate embedded in the basemat. This plate is made of austenitic stainless steel that is anchored to the concrete base mat through 36 concrete anchors welded to the bottom of the plate. The liner plate is discontinuous in the area around the NPM. A leaktight boundary is ensured by a seal weld between the liner plate and the embedded plate. Figure 3B-50 shows the details of the 4 in. thick bearing plate. The NPM is free to move upward vertically, and the vertical NPM load is transferred to the concrete basemat in bearing.
  • The NPM is laterally restrained by an 8-in.-thick passive support ring made of stainless steel bolted to the underlying bearing plate. At the inside periphery of the passive ring, a beveled edge at the top is provided in order to guide the NPM at initial placement and during its removal and replacement for refueling operation. If the NPM impacts the passive support ring, the resulting upward vertical load will be resisted by the concrete anchors. Figure 3B-48 and Figure 3B-49 show the details of the passive support ring.

NuScale Power Module Model:

A SASSI building model with a detailed NPM beam model, described in Section 3.7.2, is used to perform dynamic analyses on the RXB and extract results at the NPM to RXB interface locations. The RXB analysis produces local acceleration time histories that are used as input to the NPM seismic analysis discussed in Appendix 3A.

A separate ANSYS model is used to perform a non-linear dynamic analysis of the NPM. This model only includes the pool water and one NPM (1 or 6). The analysis results are based on the envelope of the six runs shown in Table 3B-53. The static reaction force, including the dead weight and the static buoyancy, is 1,090.4 kips in the vertical direction. The maximum uplift displacement, due to seismic, of the module from the floor is less than 0.125 inch. The enveloping reaction forces between the ANSYS and SASSI models are provided in Table 3B-28 and used for the design basis in the following subsections.

Tier 2 3B-24 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Envelope Loads:

  • Vertical downward load, P = 3,859 kips. This load includes dead load, fluid pressure load, and seismic load. Dead load is the static buoyancy load described above and is equal to 1,090.4 kips. The fluid pressure load is determined by the product of the baseplate area (14.5' x 14.5'), the fluid density (62.4 pcf), and the normal operating reactor pool depth (69') and is equal to 905.3 kips. The enveloping downward seismic load is 1,863 kips.
  • The vertical displacement is less than 0.125 inch. The passive support ring is 4.5 inches thick below the bevel, therefore, there will always be lateral support from the passive support ring.
  • Lateral load:

East-West seismic load = 1,144 kips North-South seismic load = 1,103 kips Square Root Sum of Squares horizontal seismic load =

2 2

( 1,144 + 1,103 ) = 1,589 kips It is possible for the support ring and anchors to experience an upward vertical force if the NPM were to strike the support ring during a seismic event. Because this force is of extremely short duration and the contact surface small, only a limited amount of force is transferred to the support ring. A coefficient of friction value between wet steel and steel of 0.2 is multiplied by the square root sum of squares of east-west and north-south seismic loads to determine this force.

V uplift = 0.2 x 1,589 kips = 318 kips Materials and Material Strength:

  • Stainless Steel: The stainless steel used for the liner plate conforms to ASTM A-167 or ASTM A-240 Type 304L and has a 0.2 percent offset yield strength of 25 ksi, and ultimate tensile strength 70 ksi.
  • Austenitic Stainless: The steel used for the 4-in.-thick bearing plate that supports the NPMs vertically is ASTM A965 Grade F304 with a yield strength of 22.4 ksi and ultimate tensile strength of 61.8 ksi at a design temperature of 300 degrees Fahrenheit.
  • Concrete for Basemat: The concrete strength, f'c is 5000 psi A total of 36, 3/4 in. diameter, ASTM F1554, Grade 55 concrete anchors are used to anchor the passive support ring and embedded plate assembly. These anchors have a yield strength of 55 ksi and designations of S1 (weldable) and S4 (Charpy test).

A total of 30, 1.5 in. thread diameter, ASTM A479, Type UNS S21800 bolts fasten the passive support ring to the embedded plate.

Tier 2 3B-25 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Load Path:

  • The vertical load is resisted by the 14.5 ft square, 4 in. thick bearing ring plate.
  • The lateral load is resisted by bolts that connect the passive support ring to the embedded bearing plate. The bolts transfer the lateral load to the bearing plate, which, in turn, transfers the load, via bearing, to the concrete basemat.

Evaluation:

Vertical Load Bearing Capacity

  • Area of concrete in bearing, Abrg, is 4310 in2, therefore the bearing pressure (PV/ Abrg) is 0.90 ksi
  • Allowable bearing pressure = ()(0.85f'c) = 2.76 ksi [ = 0.65]
  • Vertical bearing D/C Ratio: = 0.33
  • The maximum D/C ratio of the anchor bolts is due to concrete breakout in tension and is equal to 0.74.

Lateral Load Resistance

  • SRSS Lateral Load is 1,589 kips
  • The D/C ratio of the bolts in shear and tension is 0.92.
  • The maximum D/C ratio for concrete bearing due to lateral load transferred from the bearing plate is 0.83.

3B.2.7.4 Nuscale Power Module Lug Restraint The NPM lug restraint design consists of a stainless steel bumper comprised of 2 thick plates with 2 thick stiffener plates. The bumpers are welded to 2 thick stainless steel liner plates. On the inside of the liner plate there are 3 thick, 5 wide (48 depth) steel shear lugs to transfer the lateral shear loads into the wall. Finally, the two bumpers on either side of the lug on the pool walls are bolted together with through-bolts to withstand tensile loads due to moments from the eccentric lateral shear loads. The design layout for the support system for the NPM lug restraints is shown in Figure 3B-51.

The bumpers are Stainless Steel Type 630 - H1150, with a yield strength of 100.8 ksi, and an ultimate strength of 135 ksi. The shear lugs are carbon steel ASTM A572 GR 50, with a yield strength of 50 ksi, and an ultimate strength of 65 ksi. The through-bolts are ASTM A193 GR B7, with a yield strength of 105 ksi, and an ultimate strength of 125 ksi.

A separate SAP2000 model is created for the local analysis of the RXB lug support system. This lug restraint model is a comprehensive, finite-element model of half of a single NPM wing wall. Therefore, 2.5' of the wall thickness, with two lugs on one face of the wall, are included in the model. The load is distributed as point loads to one of the lugs. The wing wall is modeled with solid elements. The liner plate, the stainless steel lug, and the bumper built-up section are modeled with shell Tier 2 3B-26 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details elements. The through bolts are not modeled explicitly; however, the axial tension of the shear lugs is used to determine the tension force in the through bolts.

Because the shear lugs transfer the shear loads from the bumper to concrete, the through bolts are considered to be under tension only. All welds along the load path are CJP welds. This includes the bumper built-up section, the bumper to the liner plate, and liner plate to the shear lugs.

In this local model, an assumed horizontal load of 3500 kips is applied to determine the stresses in components of the support. Modes of failure for lug components are checked, including tensile capacity of through bolts, punching shear and concrete bearing, and bending stresses on the liner plate. The most controlling mode of failure is bearing against concrete with a D/C=0.777. Refer to Table 3B-57 for details. Because this D/C occurs for an applied load of 3500 kips, the true capacity of the lug assembly, where D/C would reach a value of 1.0, occurs for a load of 3500 kips/0.777=4500 kips.

To check the adequacy of the lugs, the maximum seismic reaction on a lug from the NPM Seismic Analysis model is compared against the lug capacity calculated from the local lug model.

The RXB analysis produces local acceleration time histories that are used as input to the NPM seismic analysis, as described in Appendix 3A. The maximum lug reaction from the NPM Seismic Analysis model is provided in Table 8-6 of TR-0916-51502, NuScale Power Module Seismic Analysis (Reference 3B-6). The envelope of the maximum lug reaction forces from the ANSYS and SASSI dynamic analyses are provided in Table 3B-28. The design demand is less than the lug capacity of 4500 kips. This shows that the lugs are structurally qualified.

The NPM bay walls and location of the NPM lugs is shown in Figure 3B-52. The NPM lug restraint model is shown in Figure 3B-53 and Figure 3B-54. The liner plate and shear lugs are modeled as shell elements and are shown in Figure 3B-55 and Figure 3B-56. In Figure 3B-57, the outside of the bumper is removed in order to display the stiffener plates inside.

Section cuts were used to extract forces and moments for design of the NPM lug support. Table 3B-26 displays the forces and moments for the two 3500 kip load cases: W-Lug-PY+ (shown in Figure 3B-58) and W-Lug-PY- (shown in Figure 3B-59).

Figure 3B-60 shows the liner plate section cuts at the intersection of the inside face of the bumper to the liner plate. These cuts are used to find the design moment (M1) due to design loading. Figure 3B-61 shows the shear lug section cuts (fins) that occur between the liner plate and shear lugs. The shear (F2) from these cuts is summed to verify that the total 3500 kip load is being transferred to the wall as shown in Table 3B-26. Finally, maximum tension load of 804 kips occurs on the shear lug directly below the 2 plate and the maximum shear of 790 kips occurs in the shear lug at X=88.20 inches. The sign of the F1 force for the fin at X=16.25" is negative but the deflected shape of the lug support system clearly shows this is a tension force (Figure 3B-62). These values are utilized in the shear lug evaluation.

Tier 2 3B-27 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details 3B.2.7.4.1 Shear Lug Evaluation Shear lugs (steel bar fins) are used for the transfer of the NPM lug restraint loads to the concrete walls via shear. The shear lugs are rectangular shaped fins having dimensions 3 wide x 5 bar and 4 feet long embedded in the concrete.

The shear lugs are made of carbon steel (ASTM A572 Gr. 50) having a yield strength of 50 ksi and ultimate strength of 65 ksi. The 28 day strength of concrete in the walls is 5000 psi.

In addition to shear, there will be tensile load on the fins. This is because the NPM lug load is applied with an eccentricity, causing moment that results in a tensile load on some of the fins. The tensile loads are designed to be resisted by 2.5" diameter through bolts made of ASTM A193 Gr B7 material having a yield strength of 105 ksi and an ultimate strength of 125 ksi.

Figure 3B-51 shows a layout of the shear lugs and the through bolts. There are 32 through-bolts that correspond to each lug of the NPM as shown in Figure 3B-51.

The tensile capacity of the through bolts is the smaller of the bolt steel strength and the concrete strength.

The bending stress in the 2" thick liner plate can be bounded by considering the moment at the base of highest loaded shear lug as an upper bound moment in the liner plate.

From Table 3B-26, the maximum moment on the plate occurs at the shear lug at Y = 88.2" for lug load in the +Y direction. Please see Table 3B-57, which provides D/C ratios for the various lug component stress checks. The D/C ratios listed in Table 3B-57 are for the individual modes of failure for components of the lug assembly. In this table, the demand is the load that is resisted by each component, due to an applied total load of 3500 kips in the SAP2000 model.

The highest D/C ratio is for concrete bearing against the shear lugs at 0.777.

Since this maximum ratio is due to the 3500 kips load, the maximum capacity of the lug assembly is 3500 kips/0.777=4500 kips.

3B.2.7.4.2 Overall Lug Restraint Reaction Table 3B-28 presents the envelope lug reactions, for all twelve bays, using the three analysis cases with Soil Type 7 for Capitola input motion with 4 percent structural damping of the SASSI RXB model and the equivalent analysis performed on the NPM detailed seismic model (Reference TR-0916-51502).

Since the maximum lug reactions are below the lug support design capacity of 4,500 kips, the design is acceptable.

Tier 2 3B-28 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details 3B.3 Control Building 3B.3.1 Design Report Structural Description and Geometry The CRB is a Seismic Category I concrete structure at elevation 120'-0" and below, except as noted in Section 1.2.2.2. Above EL 120'-0" the CRB is a Seismic Category II steel structure. For a detailed description of the CRB, see Section 3.8.4.1.2. The CRB geometry and floor layout are shown in Figure 1.2-21 through Figure 1.2-27.

Structural Material Requirements The CRB design is based on the following material properties:

  • Concrete Compressive Strength - 5 ksi Modulus of Elasticity - 4, 031 ksi Shear Modulus - 1,722 ksi Poisson's Ratio - 0.17
  • Reinforcement Yield Stress - 60 ksi (ASTM A615 Grade 60 or ASTM A706 Grade 60)

Tensile Strength - 90 ksi (A615 Grade 60), 80 ksi (A706 Grade 60)

Elongation - See ASTMs A615 and A706

  • Structural Steel Grade - ASTM A992 (W shapes), ASTM A500 Grade B (Tube Steel), ASTM A36 (plates)

Ultimate Tensile Strength - 65 ksi A992, 58 ksi A500 Grade B and A36 Yield Stress - 50 ksi A992, 46 ksi A500 Grade B, 36 ksi A36

  • Foundation Media For a description of the soils considered in the design of the CRB, see Section 3.8.5.4.2 and Section 3.7.1.3.1.

Structural Loads The structural loads for the CRB are discussed in detail in Sections 3.7.1 and 3.8.4 for seismic and non-seismic loads respectively.

Structural Analysis and Design

  • Design Computations of Critical Elements The design methodology of CRB related Critical Elements is discussed in Section 3B.1. Specific CRB Critical Elements analyzed are discussed in Section 3B.3.

Tier 2 3B-29 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details

  • Stability Calculations Stability of the CRB is addressed in Section 3.8.5.4.1.3, Section 3.8.5.4.1.4, Section 3.8.5.5, and Section 3.8.5.6.2.

Summary of Results See Section 3B.3.2 through Section 3B.3.5 Conclusions The D/C ratios presented are all less than 1.0. Therefore, the Critical Elements satisfy the design criteria for loading investigated.

3B.3.2 Walls 3B.3.2.1 Wall at Grid Line 3 The wall at grid line 3 is an interior structural wall between EL. 50'-0" and EL.

120'-0" of the CRB. This wall is 2 feet thick. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-65, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and details are presented in Figure 3B-66 and Figure 3B-67.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line 3 is presented in Table 3B-29. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. As shown in Table 3B-29, all design check zones have no D/C exceedances. Based on the above results and evaluations, the wall is acceptable.

3B.3.2.2 Wall at Grid Line 4 The wall at grid line 4 is an exterior structural wall on the east side of the CRB that is 3 feet thick. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-68, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and details are presented in Figure 3B-69 and Figure 3B-70.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line 4 is presented in Table 3B-30. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. As shown in Table 3B-30, certain design check zones have D/C ratios in excess of 1.0.

The wall at grid line 4 was experiencing out of plane shear exceedances in the YZ plane as shown in Table 3B-30. In order to satisfy the demand, the section experiencing high out of plane shear was reinforced with an additional #6 stirrup leg. This is shown in Figure 3B-70. Table 3B-31 shows the design check of the worst shell element in the section, number 786, with the additional shear reinforcement.

Tier 2 3B-30 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details The final design check is provided in Table 3B-31. Based on Table 3B-32, where the capacity includes the added reinforcement, the wall at grid line 4 is acceptable.

3B.3.2.3 Wall at Grid Line A The wall at grid line A is an exterior structural wall on the north side of the CRB that is 3 feet thick. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-71, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and details are presented in Figure 3B-72 and Figure 3B-73.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the wall at grid line A are presented in Table 3B-33. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. Based on Table 3B-33, all design check zones have no D/C exceedances. Based on the above results and evaluations, the wall is acceptable.

In-plane shear for the adequacy of concrete wall thickness was checked for all elements in the CRB. Several individual elements in the walls encountered in-plane shear exceedances. Where individual elements in the wall at grid line A exceed in-plane shear limits, the elements are averaged as shown in Table 3B-34. The cross-section was checked based on calculating the average in-plane shear over the entire wall section, and is acceptable.

3B.3.3 Slabs 3B.3.3.1 Basemat Foundation The reinforced concrete section for the basemat is comprised of a 5 foot thick concrete slab with 3 layers of #11 bars at 12" centers each way top and bottom for main reinforcing steel, and 2 legged stirrups of #6 bars at 12" centers each way. The perimeter of the main slab contains 4 layers of #11 bars at 12" centers each way top and bottom for main reinforcing steel, and 2 legged stirrups of #6 bars at 12" centers each way. The capacity of the sections used is presented Table 3B-35 and Table 3B-36.

Figure 3B-74 shows the three zones: Tunnel Area, Perimeter Area and Interior Area, used for design of the basemat. Figure 3B-74 also shows the CRB basemat solid element numbering in the CRB finite element model. Reinforcement drawings are shown in Figure 3B-75 and Figure 3B-76.

For evaluation, total area of reinforcing steel required for axial tension, in-plane shear, and out-of-plane moment is considered. In addition, reduction of out-of-plane shear capacity of concrete due to axial tension is considered.

For the design check, bounding demand forces and moments for the basemat are considered at the following locations:

1) Basemat for the perimeter of the main CRB structure Tier 2 3B-31 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details

2) Basemat for the interior of the main CRB structure
3) Basemat for CRB tunnel Table 3B-37 shows the magnitudes of bounding demand forces and moments used for the design check of the perimeter of the basemat of the CRB structure.

Table 3B-38 shows the magnitudes of bounding demand forces and moments used for the design check of the interior of the basemat of the main CRB structure.

Table 3B-39 provides the magnitudes of bounding demand for the basemat of the CRB tunnel.

The demand forces and moments for the perimeter of the main CRB foundation evaluation are listed in Table 3B-37. The design check for the various failure modes of the main CRB foundation perimeter are shown in Table 3B-40.

The demand forces and moments for the main interior part of the CRB foundation evaluation are listed in Table 3B-38. The design check for the various failure modes of the main CRB foundation interior are shown in Table 3B-41.

Likewise, the demand forces and moments for the CRB foundation tunnel are listed in Table 3B-39. The design check for the various failure modes of the CRB foundation tunnel are shown in Table 3B-42.

3B.3.3.2 Slab EL. 100'-0" The slab at EL. 100'-0" is at grade and houses the main technical support and data area for the CRB. This elevation consists of a 3' slab and 2' slab along with a 3' tunnel slab. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-77, along with the shell element labels.

Reinforcement drawings and details are presented in Figure 3B-78 and Figure 3B-79.

A summary table of the element-based design check results for the slab at EL.

100'-0" is presented in Table 3B-43. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. Table 3B-47 provides a summary of D/C ratios after averaging. The tables showing the averaging performed are Table 3B-44 through Table 3B-46.

Shear friction was checked for all elements in the CRB. Some individual elements in the slabs encountered shear friction exceedances. For elements that exceed shear friction limits in the slab at EL. 100'-0", their averaging is shown in Table 3B-48.

3B.3.4 Pilasters 3B.3.4.1 Pilasters Grid Line 1 The pilasters on the wall at grid line 1 consist of two types of pilasters. The SAP2000 analysis model elevation view is shown in Figure 3B-80, along with the pilaster frame element labels.

Tier 2 3B-32 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Reinforcement details are presented in Figure 3B-81 and Figure 3B-82 for pilaster Type 1 and Type 2, respectively.

A summary table of the design check results for the pilasters on the wall at Grid Line 1 is presented in Table 3B-49. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. As noted in Table 3B-49, all design check zones have D/C ratios that are less than 1.0; and therefore, the pilasters are acceptable.

3B.3.5 T-Beams 3B.3.5.1 T-Beams at EL. 120'-0" The slab at elevation 120'-0" contains six T-beam sections running east-west and two T-beam sections running north-south. The SAP2000 analysis model plan view is shown in Figure 3B-83, along with the frame element labels.

The reinforcement details are shown in Figure 3B-84 and Figure 3B-85 for Type 1 and Type 2, respectively.

A summary table of the design check results for the beams at elevation 120'-0" is presented in Table 3B-50. This summary table shows the maximum D/C ratios within each design check zone. As shown in Table 3B-50, all design check zones have D/C ratios that are less than 1.0; therefore the T-Beams at elevation 120'-0" are all acceptable.

3B.4 References 3B-1 SAP2000 Advanced (Version 17.1.1) [Computer Program]. (2015). Walnut Creek, CA: Computers and Structures, Inc.

3B-2 SASSI2010 (Version 1.0) [Computer Program]. (2012). Berkeley, CA.

3B-3 American Concrete Institute, "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures and Commentary," ACI 349-06, Farmington Hills, MI.

3B-4 American National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel Construction, "Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Steel Safety-Related Structures for Nuclear Facilities," ANSI/AISC N690-12, Chicago, IL.

3B-5 American National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel Construction, "Specification for Structural Steel Buildings," ANSI/AISC 360-10, Chicago, IL.

3B-6 NuScale Power, LLC, "NuScale Power Module Seismic Analysis," TR-0916-51502.

Tier 2 3B-33 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-1: Identification of SAP2000 and SASSI2010 Loads Designation SAP2000 Output SASSI2010 Output Shell Element Loads Membrane Tension/Compression in Local X direction F11 Sxx Membrane Tension/Compression in Local Y direction F22 Syy Maximum In-Plane Shear on all faces F12 Sxy Out-of-Plane Moment about Local Y Axis M11 Mxx Out-of-Plane Moment about Local X Axis M22 Myy Maximum Twisting Moment on all faces M12 Mxy Out-of-Plane Shear on Local X Face V13 Vxz Out-of-Plane Shear on Local Y Face V23 Vyz Frame Element Loads Axial Tension or Compression P P1 Strong Axis Shear V2 P2 Weak Axis Shear V3 P3 Axial Torque T M1 Weak Axis Bending M2 M2 Strong Axis Bending M3 M3 Tier 2 3B-34 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-2: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 1 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Stress Checked RXB;1;E-D;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.11 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.39 20 Element 2580 2581 2578 2577 3902 2578 RXB;1;D-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.47 24 Element 3907 3221 2583 2583 3221 2583 RXB;1;C-B;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.25 0.08 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.51 24 Element 3918 2593 2592 2592 3232 2591 RXB;1;B-A;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.34 0.11 0.53 0.44 0.54 0.37 20 Element 2595 3923 2597 2598 3923 2595 RXB;1;E-D;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.09 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.07 20 Element 7729 5575 7725 5575 5575 7727 RXB;1;D-C;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.30 0.07 0.32 0.23 0.28 0.34 24 Element 7730 5581 7735 5585 6139 7734 3.B-35 RXB;1;C-B;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.08 0.39 0.23 0.28 0.31 24 Element 7737 5590 7736 5591 6150 5588 RXB;1;B-A;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.09 0.46 0.38 0.44 0.18 20 Element 7746 5596 7746 6155 5596 5593 RXB;1;E-D;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.15 0.62 0.40 0.33 0.09 14 Element 8843 8843 10386 10386 8839 11155 RXB;1;D-C;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.45 0.14 0.46 0.27 0.19 0.37 24 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 10391 10391 10392 10392 10391 10391 RXB;1;D-C;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.45 0.14 0.46 0.27 0.19 0.37 24 Element 10391 10391 10392 10392 10391 10392 RXB;1;C-B;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.83 0.29 0.71 0.25 0.13 0.31 22 Element 11167 11167 11167 9442 11166 10393 RXB;1;B-A;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.12 0.45 0.36 0.34 0.15 20 Element 11172 11172 11176 8860 8860 11173 RXB;1;E-D;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.04 0.41 0.19 0.17 0.08 20 Element 12319 12318 12316 12315 12315 12315 Revision 2 RXB;1;D-C;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.47 0.10 0.42 0.09 0.10 0.08 24 Element 13542 13542 12322 12320 13537 12325

Table 3B-2: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 1 (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Stress Checked RXB;1;C-B;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.64 0.19 0.87 0.41 0.10 0.14 8 Element 12326 12326 13544 13544 13544 12326 RXB;1;B-A;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.45 0.10 0.49 0.20 0.21 0.09 20 Element 13545 13545 12717 12332 12331 12331 RXB;1;E-D;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.22 0.02 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.27 20 Element 14613 15238 14612 14609 15580 15580 RXB;1;D-C;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.37 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.17 0.15 24 Element 14619 14619 14614 14929 15581 15581 RXB;1;C-B;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.62 0.15 0.66 0.29 0.21 0.24 24 Element 14621 14621 14625 14625 15592 15592 RXB;1;B-A;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.30 0.09 0.31 0.16 0.35 0.33 20 Element 14626 14626 14626 14936 15593 15593 RXB;1;E-D;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.01 0.23 0.07 0.32 0.08 20 3.B-36 Element 16645 16944 16046 16044 16047 16047 RXB;1;D-C;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.01 0.34 0.08 0.12 0.08 24 Element 16651 16950 16352 16048 16048 16048 RXB;1;C-B;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.03 0.51 0.12 0.11 0.09 24 Element 16058 16059 16058 16059 16059 16059 RXB;1;B-A;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.26 0.02 0.31 0.11 0.35 0.08 20 Element 16658 16359 16359 16060 16060 16060 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;1;E-D;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.03 0.20 0.06 0.16 0.18 14 Element 17248 14893 17245 17245 17245 17245 RXB;1;D-C;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.04 0.43 0.07 0.13 0.16 24 Element 17949 17949 17949 17949 17944 17948 RXB;1;C-B;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.03 0.47 0.08 0.14 0.16 24 Element 17257 17950 17950 17950 17955 17951 RXB;1;B-A;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.24 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.14 0.05 14 Element 17541 15191 17261 17264 17956 17570 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-3: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 3 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;3;D-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 1.44 1.04 1.40 0.72 0.60 0.26 84 Element 4951 4942 4951 4951 4942 4946 RXB;3;E-D;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.43 0.14 0.05 0.09 2 Element 15318 15318 15318 15318 15655 15655 RXB;3;B-A;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.44 0.15 0.05 0.08 2 Element 15319 15319 15319 15319 15656 15656 RXB;3;E-D;145-163 D/C Ratio 1.19 0.60 0.71 0.16 0.10 0.06 16 Element 16128 16128 16128 16131 16128 16131 RXB;3;B-A;145-163 D/C Ratio 1.20 0.60 0.72 0.16 0.09 0.06 16 Element 16135 16135 16135 16132 16135 16132 RXB;3;E-D;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.25 0.10 0.44 0.08 0.08 0.05 10 Element 14897 17545 15226 17545 17707 17573 3.B-37 RXB;3;B-A;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.10 0.43 0.08 0.08 0.05 10 Element 14898 17546 15227 17546 17708 17574 Note:

Highlighted items indicate those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8.

Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-4: Element Averaging of Horizontal Reinforcement Exceedance for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 3 Average of Shell Elements 4951/4431/4421: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 11.416 7.563 1.938 20.917 28.080 0.745 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 1.39 3.34 0.416 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 9.867 7.563 0.821 18.251 28.080 0.650 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 1.15 3.34 0.345 3.B-38 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 16.664 36,000.0 OK FAIL 129.8 0.374 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 18.213 36,000.0 OK 129.8 0.162 Note:

See Section 3B.2.2.2 and Table 3B-51.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-5: Element Averaging of Horizontal Membrane Compression Stress for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 3 Average of Shell Elements 4942/4422: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 4.031 11.149 1.790 16.971 28.080 0.604 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 2.03 3.34 0.609 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 1.574 11.149 0.836 13.559 28.080 0.483 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.97 3.34 0.291 3.B-39 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 24.049 36,000.0 FAIL FAIL 151.9 0.371 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 26.506 36,000.0 FAIL 172.4 0.141 Notes:

See Section 3B.2.2.2 and Table 3B-52.

See Section 3B.2.2.2 and Table 3B-51.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-6: Element Averaging of Vertical Reinforcement Exceedance for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 3 Average of Shell Elements 4951/4950/4949: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 15.978 7.614 1.497 25.089 28.080 0.893 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 1.91 3.34 0.572 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 11.479 7.614 0.604 19.698 28.080 0.701 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 1.25 3.34 0.374 3.B-40 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 12.102 36,000.0 OK FAIL 129.8 0.473 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 16.601 36,000.0 OK 129.8 0.117 Note:

See Section 3B.2.2.2 and Table 3B-51.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-7: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 3 After Averaging Affected Elements Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;3;D-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.75 0.61 0.70 0.72 0.60 0.26 84 Element 4951 4942 4951 4951 4942 4946 RXB;3;E-D;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.43 0.14 0.05 0.09 2 Element 15318 15318 15318 15318 15655 15655 RXB;3;B-A;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.44 0.15 0.05 0.08 2 Element 15319 15319 15319 15319 15656 15656 RXB;3;E-D;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.75 0.60 0.71 0.16 0.10 0.06 16 Element 16128 16128 16128 16131 16128 16131 RXB;3;B-A;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.75 0.60 0.72 0.16 0.09 0.06 16 Element 16135 16135 16135 16132 16135 16132 RXB;3;E-D;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.25 0.10 0.44 0.08 0.08 0.05 10 Element 14897 17545 15226 17545 17707 17573 3.B-41 RXB;3;B-A;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.10 0.43 0.08 0.08 0.05 10 Element 14898 17546 15227 17546 17708 17574 Note:

The highlighted values of the D/C ratios for the corresponding element shown in this table is based on the averaged demand values using methodology shown in Section 3B.1.1.1. It should be noted that the D/C ratios of all other elements shown in this table will be proportionally reduced if the same averaging methodology is used.

Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-8: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 4 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;4;D-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.19 0.68 0.76 0.24 0.83 16 Element 4638 4638 3071 3071 4638 3071 RXB;4;C-B;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.17 0.67 0.74 0.25 0.82 16 Element 4645 4645 3072 3072 4645 3072 RXB;4;D-C;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.46 0.39 20 Element 8070 8070 8073 5781 7300 7300 RXB;4;C-B;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.50 0.42 20 Element 8077 8077 8074 5782 7307 7307 RXB;4;D-C;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.18 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.41 16 Element 11582 9082 9678 9678 11582 11585 RXB;4;C-B;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.18 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.44 16 Element 11589 9089 9679 9679 11589 11586 RXB;4;D-C;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.95 0.35 0.48 0.29 0.38 0.28 16 3.B-42 Element 13686 13686 13686 12459 12456 12459 RXB;4;C-B;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.96 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.40 0.30 16 Element 13693 13693 13693 12460 12463 12460 RXB;4;E-D;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.11 0.49 0.22 0.06 0.12 2 Element 15364 15364 15364 15364 15701 15701 RXB;4;B-A;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.11 0.49 0.22 0.06 0.12 2 Element 15365 15365 15365 15365 15702 15702 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;4;E-D;145-163 D/C Ratio 1.07 0.76 0.64 0.21 0.08 0.08 16 Element 16180 16180 16180 16183 16180 16183 RXB;4;B-A;145-163 D/C Ratio 1.07 0.75 0.64 0.21 0.09 0.08 16 Element 16187 16187 16187 16184 16187 16184 RXB;4;E-D;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.23 0.11 0.34 0.11 0.05 0.04 10 Element 17547 17547 15228 17547 17709 17709 RXB;4;B-A;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.27 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.05 0.04 10 Element 14900 17548 15229 17548 17710 17710 Note:

Revision 2 Highlighted items indicate those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8.

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-9: Element Averaging of Reinforcement Exceedance for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 4 Average of Shell Elements 16180/16479/16778: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 4.504 5.537 0.367 10.408 18.720 0.556 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.96 3.15 0.304 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 2.174 5.537 0.089 7.800 18.720 0.417 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.38 3.15 0.120 3.B-43 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 14.216 28,800.0 OK FAIL 130.6 0.061 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 16.546 28,800.0 OK 151.4 0.030 Note:

See Section 3B.2.2.2 and Table 3B-51.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-10: Summary of D/C Ratios for RXB Wall at Grid Line 4 After Averaging Affected Elements Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;4;D-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.19 0.68 0.76 0.24 0.83 16 Element 4638 4638 3071 3071 4638 3071 RXB;4;C-B;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.17 0.67 0.74 0.25 0.82 16 Element 4645 4645 3072 3072 4645 3072 RXB;4;D-C;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.46 0.39 20 Element 8070 8070 8073 5781 7300 7300 RXB;4;C-B;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.50 0.42 20 Element 8077 8077 8074 5782 7307 7307 RXB;4;D-C;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.18 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.41 16 Element 11582 9082 9678 9678 11582 11585 RXB;4;C-B;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.18 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.44 16 Element 11589 9089 9679 9679 11589 11586 RXB;4;D-C;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.95 0.35 0.48 0.29 0.38 0.28 16 3.B-44 Element 13686 13686 13686 12459 12456 12459 RXB;4;C-B;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.96 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.40 0.30 16 Element 13693 13693 13693 12460 12463 12460 RXB;4;E-D;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.11 0.49 0.22 0.06 0.12 2 Element 15364 15364 15364 15364 15701 15701 RXB;4;B-A;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.11 0.49 0.22 0.06 0.12 2 Element 15365 15365 15365 15365 15702 15702 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;4;E-D;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.56 0.76 0.64 0.21 0.08 0.08 16 Element 16180 16180 16180 16183 16180 16183 RXB;4;B-A;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.56 0.75 0.64 0.21 0.09 0.08 16 Element 16187 16187 16187 16184 16187 16184 RXB;4;E-D;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.23 0.11 0.34 0.11 0.05 0.04 10 Element 17547 17547 15228 17547 17709 17709 RXB;4;B-A;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.27 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.05 0.04 10 Element 14900 17548 15229 17548 17710 17710 Note:

The highlighted values of the D/C ratios for the corresponding element shown in this table is based on the averaged demand values using methodology shown in Revision 2 Section 3B.1.1.1. It should be noted that the D/C ratios of all other elements shown in this table will be proportionally reduced if the same averaging methodology is used.

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-11: Summary of D/C Ratios for RXB Wall at Grid Line 6 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;6;D-C.5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.23 0.09 0.47 0.35 0.22 0.28 12 Element 3745 4884 3164 3164 4884 4885 RXB;6;C.5-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.35 0.28 0.09 0.28 12 Element 4887 4887 4887 3167 4357 4889 RXB;6;C-B.5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.33 0.28 0.10 0.29 12 Element 4892 4892 4891 3172 4362 4890 RXB;6;B.5-B;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.30 0.11 0.50 0.38 0.24 0.58 15 Element 2060 2060 2060 2060 4895 2060 RXB;6;D-C.5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.17 0.33 0.26 0.38 0.42 15 Element 7463 8202 6577 6577 8202 8203 RXB;6;C-5-C;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.09 0.34 0.20 0.16 0.27 15 Element 7151 8205 7467 6026 6580 8205 3.B-45 RXB;6;C-B.5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.11 0.34 0.21 0.07 0.26 15 Element 8209 8209 7470 6029 7470 8210 RXB;6;B.5-B;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.14 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.50 15 Element 7473 8212 6032 8213 6032 8213 RXB;6;D-C.5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.21 12 Element 9362 9362 9362 9362 9955 11678 RXB;6;C.5-C;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.04 0.11 12 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 11681 9365 11682 9365 9958 11681 RXB;6;C-B.5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.04 0.11 12 Element 11686 9963 11685 9370 9963 11686 RXB;6;B.5-B;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.21 12 Element 9373 9373 9373 9373 9966 11689 RXB;6;D-C.5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.48 0.09 0.44 0.14 0.20 0.15 12 Element 13878 13878 13468 13878 13878 13466 RXB;6;C.5-C;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.53 0.09 0.58 0.14 0.04 0.15 11 Element 13469 12986 13470 12986 13881 13469 Revision 2 RXB;6;C-B.5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.53 0.09 0.58 0.14 0.04 0.15 11 Element 13471 12991 13471 12991 13886 13472

Table 3B-11: Summary of D/C Ratios for RXB Wall at Grid Line 6 (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;6;B.5-B;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.48 0.09 0.44 0.15 0.20 0.15 12 Element 13889 13889 13473 13889 13889 13475 RXB;6;E-D;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.61 0.20 0.64 0.22 0.12 0.12 2 Element 15845 15845 15845 15845 15845 15845 RXB;6;D-C;126-145 D/C Ratio 1.27 0.59 0.40 0.19 0.33 0.14 24 Element 15846 15846 15495 15137 15846 14842 RXB;6;C-B;126-145 D/C Ratio 1.27 0.59 0.39 0.19 0.33 0.13 24 Element 15857 15857 15506 15148 15857 14851 RXB;6;B-A;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.61 0.20 0.64 0.22 0.12 0.12 2 Element 15858 15858 15858 15858 15858 15858 RXB;6;E-D;145-163 D/C Ratio 1.46 0.61 0.60 0.18 0.17 0.06 16 Element 16295 16295 16295 16594 16295 17189 RXB;6;B-A;145-163 D/C Ratio 1.47 0.61 0.60 0.18 0.17 0.05 16 3.B-46 Element 16296 16296 16296 16595 16296 17196 RXB;6;E-D;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.12 0.35 0.16 0.20 0.11 10 Element 14903 14903 17385 14903 17713 17579 RXB;6;B-A;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.12 0.35 0.16 0.20 0.11 10 Element 14904 15201 17390 15201 17714 17580 Note:

Highlighted items indicate those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8.

Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-12: Element Averaging of Horizontal Reinforcement Exceedance for RXB Wall at Grid Line 6 Average of Shell Elements 16296/16595: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 (in2) OOP Moment As3 (in2) Total As (in2) As Provided (in2) Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) 10.227 5.549 1.198 16.975 18.720 0.907 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 1.19 3.15 0.376 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 (in2) OOP Moment As3 (in2) Total As (in2) As Provided (in2) Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) 3.630 5.549 0.309 9.488 18.720 0.507 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.49 3.15 0.156 3.B-47 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 8.493 28,800.0 OK FAIL 123.2 0.139 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 15.090 28,800.0 OK 138.4 0.036 Note:

See Section 3B.2.2.2 and Table 3B-52.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-13: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 6 after Averaging Affected Elements Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;6;D-C.5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.23 0.09 0.47 0.35 0.22 0.28 12 Element 3745 4884 3164 3164 4884 4885 RXB;6;C.5-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.35 0.28 0.09 0.28 12 Element 4887 4887 4887 3167 4357 4889 RXB;6;C-B.5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.07 0.33 0.28 0.10 0.29 12 Element 4892 4892 4891 3172 4362 4890 RXB;6;B.5-B;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.30 0.11 0.50 0.38 0.24 0.58 15 Element 2060 2060 2060 2060 4895 2060 RXB;6;D-C.5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.17 0.33 0.26 0.38 0.42 15 Element 7463 8202 6577 6577 8202 8203 RXB;6;C-5-C;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.09 0.34 0.20 0.16 0.27 15 3.B-48 Element 7151 8205 7467 6026 6580 8205 RXB;6;C-B.5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.11 0.34 0.21 0.07 0.26 15 Element 8209 8209 7470 6029 7470 8210 RXB;6;B.5-B;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.14 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.50 15 Element 7473 8212 6032 8213 6032 8213 RXB;6;D-C.5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.21 12 Element 9362 9362 9362 9362 9955 11678 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;6;C.5-C;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.04 0.11 12 Element 11681 9365 11682 9365 9958 11681 RXB;6;C-B.5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.08 0.39 0.15 0.04 0.11 12 Element 11686 9963 11685 9370 9963 11686 RXB;6;B.5-B;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.21 12 Element 9373 9373 9373 9373 9966 11689 RXB;6;D-C.5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.48 0.09 0.44 0.14 0.20 0.15 12 Element 13878 13878 13468 13878 13878 13466 RXB;6;C.5-C;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.53 0.09 0.58 0.14 0.04 0.15 11 Revision 2 Element 13469 12986 13470 12986 13881 13469

Table 3B-13: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 6 after Averaging Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Affected Elements (Continued)

Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;6;C-B.5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.53 0.09 0.58 0.14 0.04 0.15 11 Element 13471 12991 13471 12991 13886 13472 RXB;6;B.5-B;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.48 0.09 0.44 0.15 0.20 0.15 12 Element 13889 13889 13473 13889 13889 13475 RXB;6;E-D;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.61 0.20 0.64 0.22 0.12 0.12 2 Element 15845 15845 15845 15845 15845 15845 RXB;6;D-C;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.91 0.59 0.40 0.19 0.33 0.14 24 Element 15846 15846 15495 15137 15846 14842 RXB;6;C-B;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.91 0.59 0.39 0.19 0.33 0.13 24 Element 15857 15857 15506 15148 15857 14851 RXB;6;B-A;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.61 0.20 0.64 0.22 0.12 0.12 2 Element 15858 15858 15858 15858 15858 15858 3.B-49 RXB;6;E-D;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.91 0.61 0.60 0.18 0.17 0.06 16 Element 16295 16295 16295 16594 16295 17189 RXB;6;B-A;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.91 0.61 0.60 0.18 0.17 0.05 16 Element 16296 16296 16296 16595 16296 17196 RXB;6;E-D;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.12 0.35 0.16 0.20 0.11 10 Element 14903 14903 17385 14903 17713 17579 RXB;6;B-A;163-181 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.12 0.35 0.16 0.20 0.11 10 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 14904 15201 17390 15201 17714 17580 Note:

The highlighted values of the D/C ratios for the corresponding element shown in this table is based on the averaged demand values using methodology shown in Section 3B.1.1.1. It should be noted that the D/C ratios of all other elements shown in this table will be proportionally reduced if the same averaging methodology is used.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-14: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line E Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;E;1-2;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.10 0.53 0.43 0.57 0.54 24 Element 2642 3257 2599 2599 3924 4526 RXB;E;2-3;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.11 0.59 0.51 0.26 0.60 28 Element 2666 4005 2659 2654 2666 4559 RXB;E;3-4;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.51 0.11 0.55 0.35 0.19 0.57 44 Element 2669 2680 2669 2680 3424 2684 RXB;E;4-5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.21 0.09 0.26 0.34 0.21 0.61 48 Element 2822 2722 2802 2774 3570 2794 RXB;E;5-6;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.24 0.08 0.35 0.35 0.20 0.55 48 Element 2940 2952 2940 2940 3586 2840 RXB;E;6-7;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.23 0.09 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.48 20 Element 2962 2962 4372 4916 4916 2962 3.B-50 RXB;E;1-2;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.08 0.65 0.38 0.49 0.28 24 Element 5613 5597 7747 6738 5597 5630 RXB;E;2-3;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.10 0.49 0.33 0.30 0.42 28 Element 7787 5662 5670 5670 7785 7789 RXB;E;3-4;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.31 0.08 0.35 0.26 0.21 0.42 44 Element 5698 5730 6262 5718 7797 7807 RXB;E;4-5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.26 0.13 0.44 48 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 5883 5810 7843 5889 6445 7843 RXB;E;5-6;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.19 0.06 0.30 0.29 0.13 0.43 48 Element 5913 5961 6559 6011 6463 7885 RXB;E;6-7;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.24 0.06 0.43 0.36 0.34 0.39 20 Element 7166 6062 7168 6062 6620 7899 RXB;E;1-2;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.37 0.04 0.78 0.36 0.41 0.26 24 Element 11177 9495 9453 8861 8861 8902 RXB;E;2-3;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.09 0.41 0.21 0.30 0.41 28 Element 8926 8921 10438 8916 8921 8966 Revision 2 RXB;E;3-4;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.27 0.09 0.32 0.17 0.21 0.47 44 Element 11267 11267 10486 9072 11241 9072

Table 3B-14: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line E (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;E;4-5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.09 0.33 0.17 0.16 0.46 48 Element 11269 11269 10576 9210 10560 9094 RXB;E;5-6;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.21 0.05 0.37 0.23 0.13 0.41 48 Element 10654 11301 10728 9350 10652 9234 RXB;E;6-7;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.23 0.04 0.48 0.32 0.28 0.33 20 Element 9386 9406 10748 9406 9406 9378 RXB;E;1-2;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.31 0.03 0.70 0.19 0.20 0.26 24 Element 12333 13584 12333 12333 12333 13584 RXB;E;2-3;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.30 0.06 0.40 0.15 0.24 0.39 26 Element 13596 13623 12375 12375 13173 12395 RXB;E;3-4;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.47 0.12 0.31 0.08 0.20 0.43 44 Element 13660 13660 12415 12819 12399 13269 RXB;E;4-5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.08 0.25 0.09 0.13 0.34 48 3.B-51 Element 13283 13695 13771 12527 13777 13695 RXB;E;5-6;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.25 0.05 0.33 0.15 0.14 0.25 48 Element 13797 13791 12599 12599 13791 12539 RXB;E;6-7;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.19 0.01 0.46 0.18 0.18 0.16 20 Element 13025 13891 13025 12655 13488 13025 RXB;E;1-2;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.26 0.05 0.42 0.12 0.35 0.38 24 Element 15613 15613 14631 14631 15613 15608 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;E;2-3;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.39 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.21 0.37 28 Element 15651 15651 14661 14661 14669 14685 RXB;E;3-4;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.47 0.13 0.27 0.06 0.26 0.69 44 Element 15348 15348 15697 15697 15697 15360 RXB;E;4-5;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.20 0.65 48 Element 15703 15366 15766 15766 15766 14791 RXB;E;5-6;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.44 0.09 0.38 0.11 0.22 0.65 48 Element 15779 15779 15779 15841 15779 14795 RXB;E;6-7;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.13 0.03 0.35 0.13 0.13 0.20 20 Revision 2 Element 15859 15859 14859 14859 14859 14853

Table 3B-14: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line E (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Stress Stress Checked RXB;E;1-2;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.34 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.31 0.27 24 Element 16985 16985 16065 16065 16088 16387 RXB;E;2-3;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.60 0.16 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.46 28 Element 17021 17021 16124 16100 16124 16423 RXB;E;3-4;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.59 0.16 0.29 0.04 0.36 0.57 44 Element 17033 17049 16176 16176 16176 16475 RXB;E;4-5;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.54 0.15 0.32 0.04 0.32 0.56 48 Element 17105 17101 16232 16188 16188 16531 RXB;E;5-6;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.54 0.12 0.43 0.09 0.31 0.54 48 Element 16543 17153 16244 16288 16244 16543 RXB;E;6-7;145-163 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.04 0.36 0.10 0.18 0.19 20 Element 16898 17205 16300 16300 17197 16599 3.B-52 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-15: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Slab at EL. 100-0 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Reinf. Checked RXB;100;1-2;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.49 0.08 0.53 0.34 1.30 0.90 17 Element 11738 11758 11760 11782 11738 11704 RXB;100;2-3;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.47 0.12 0.68 0.22 0.23 0.46 31 Element 11810 11818 11804 11804 11810 11857 RXB;100;3-4;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.37 0.07 0.87 0.27 0.25 0.81 55 Element 11960 11966 11970 11970 11937 11966 RXB;100;4-5;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.06 0.67 0.25 0.28 0.79 60 Element 11990 11976 11980 11980 11978 11976 RXB;100;5-6;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.07 0.51 0.19 0.16 0.52 60 Element 12200 12210 12100 12100 12209 12210 RXB;100;6-7;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.19 0.46 18 Element 12280 12220 12242 12220 12296 12220 3.B-53 RXB;100;1-2;C-D.a D/C Ratio 0.62 0.15 0.64 0.35 0.24 0.44 36 Element 11788 11788 11783 11783 11788 11690 RXB;100;6-7;C-D.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.22 30 Element 12301 12221 12243 12221 12222 12224 RXB;100;1-2;B-C.a D/C Ratio 0.61 0.15 0.66 0.35 0.27 0.94 36 Element 11789 11789 11794 11794 11696 11697 RXB;100;6-7;B-C.a D/C Ratio 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.23 30 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 12254 12232 12254 12232 12231 12229 RXB;100;1-2;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.40 0.12 0.44 0.30 1.06 0.42 21 Element 11755 11755 11717 11795 11755 11775 RXB;100;2-3;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.36 0.06 0.52 0.18 0.20 0.45 35 Element 11805 11807 11805 11805 11864 11864 RXB;100;3-4;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.35 0.07 0.87 0.27 0.25 0.82 55 Element 11961 11975 11971 11971 11944 11975 RXB;100;4-5;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.07 0.67 0.25 0.27 0.80 60 Element 11991 11985 11981 11981 11983 11985 Revision 2 RXB;100;5-6;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.19 0.08 0.51 0.19 0.16 0.53 60 Element 12201 12211 12101 12101 12212 12211

Table 3B-15: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Slab at EL. 100-0 (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Reinf. Checked RXB;100;6-7;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.11 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.47 18 Element 12295 12233 12233 12233 12311 12233 Note:

Highlighted items indicate those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8.

3.B-54 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-16: Element Averaging of XZ Plane Shear Exceedance for Reactor Building Slab at EL. 100-0 Average of Shell Elements 11738/11739: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) 2 (in ) 2 (in ) (in2) 1.310 1.747 0.885 3.942 9.360 0.421 E-W Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.17 2.84 0.060 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 0.590 1.747 1.144 3.482 9.360 0.372 N-S Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.30 2.84 0.107 3.B-55 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 8.050 21,600.0 OK OK 122.9 0.727 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 8.770 21,600.0 OK 129.7 0.121 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-17: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Slab at EL. 100-0 After Averaging Affected Elements Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Reinf. Checked RXB;100;1-2;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.49 0.08 0.53 0.34 0.73 0.90 17 Element 11738 11758 11760 11782 11738 11704 RXB;100;2-3;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.47 0.12 0.68 0.22 0.23 0.46 31 Element 11810 11818 11804 11804 11810 11857 RXB;100;3-4;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.37 0.07 0.87 0.27 0.25 0.81 55 Element 11960 11966 11970 11970 11937 11966 RXB;100;4-5;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.06 0.67 0.25 0.28 0.79 60 Element 11990 11976 11980 11980 11978 11976 RXB;100;5-6;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.07 0.51 0.19 0.16 0.52 60 Element 12200 12210 12100 12100 12209 12210 RXB;100;6-7;D-E.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.19 0.46 18 3.B-56 Element 12280 12220 12242 12220 12296 12220 RXB;100;1-2;C-D.a D/C Ratio 0.62 0.15 0.64 0.35 0.24 0.44 36 Element 11788 11788 11783 11783 11788 11690 RXB;100;6-7;C-D.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.22 30 Element 12301 12221 12243 12221 12222 12224 RXB;100;1-2;B-C.a D/C Ratio 0.61 0.15 0.66 0.35 0.27 0.94 36 Element 11789 11789 11794 11794 11696 11697 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;100;6-7;B-C.a D/C Ratio 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.23 30 Element 12254 12232 12254 12232 12231 12229 RXB;100;1-2;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.40 0.12 0.44 0.30 0.73 0.42 21 Element 11755 11755 11717 11795 11755 11775 RXB;100;2-3;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.36 0.06 0.52 0.18 0.20 0.45 35 Element 11805 11807 11805 11805 11864 11864 RXB;100;3-4;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.35 0.07 0.87 0.27 0.25 0.82 55 Element 11961 11975 11971 11971 11944 11975 RXB;100;4-5;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.07 0.67 0.25 0.27 0.80 60 Revision 2 Element 11991 11985 11981 11981 11983 11985

Table 3B-17: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Slab at EL. 100-0 After Averaging Affected Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Elements (Continued)

Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Reinf. Checked RXB;100;5-6;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.19 0.08 0.51 0.19 0.16 0.53 60 Element 12201 12211 12101 12101 12212 12211 RXB;100;6-7;A-B.a D/C Ratio 0.18 0.11 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.47 18 Element 12295 12233 12233 12233 12311 12233 Note:

The highlighted values of the D/C ratios for the corresponding element shown in this table is based on the averaged demand values using methodology shown in Section 3B.1.1.1. It should be noted that the D/C ratios of all other elements shown in this table will be proportionally reduced if the same averaging methodology is used.

3.B-57 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-18: Summary of D/C Ratios for RXB Roof Slab Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Reinf. Checked RXB;181;1-2;D.3-E D/C Ratio 0.26 0.12 0.26 0.04 0.11 0.24 24 Element 17275 17275 17967 17275 17583 17967 RXB;181;2-3;D.3-E D/C Ratio 0.42 0.21 0.34 0.07 0.18 0.42 28 Element 17295 17295 17981 17295 17755 17981 RXB;181;3-4;D.3-E D/C Ratio 0.37 0.21 0.34 0.08 0.29 0.51 44 Element 17305 17309 17983 17303 17777 18003 RXB;181;4-5;D.3-E D/C Ratio 0.39 0.20 0.41 0.07 0.26 0.49 48 Element 17653 17339 18027 17331 17779 18005 RXB;181;5-6;D.3-E D/C Ratio 0.38 0.16 0.42 0.08 0.23 0.48 48 Element 17677 17367 18049 17677 17803 18029 RXB;181;6-7;D.3-E D/C Ratio 0.19 0.07 0.27 0.07 0.22 0.29 20 Element 18053 18053 18053 17679 17391 17391 3.B-58 RXB;181;1-2;C-D.3 D/C Ratio 0.63 0.08 0.49 0.04 0.36 0.27 42 Element 18083 18147 18147 18083 18083 18147 RXB;181;2-3;C-D.3 D/C Ratio 0.43 0.12 0.54 0.05 0.09 0.44 49 Element 18161 18245 18245 18245 18167 18245 RXB;181;3-4;C-D.3 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.13 0.54 0.05 0.07 0.48 77 Element 18259 18399 18259 18259 18399 18399 RXB;181;4-5;C-D.3 D/C Ratio 0.37 0.13 0.61 0.05 0.08 0.48 84 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 18567 18413 18567 18413 18567 18567 RXB;181;5-6;C-D.3 D/C Ratio 0.43 0.10 0.59 0.06 0.10 0.48 84 Element 18735 18581 18735 18735 18735 18581 RXB;181;6-7;C-D.3 D/C Ratio 0.50 0.07 0.49 0.06 0.34 0.29 35 Element 18811 18749 18749 18749 18811 18749 RXB;181;1-2;A.7-C D/C Ratio 0.63 0.08 0.49 0.04 0.36 0.27 42 Element 18084 18160 18160 18084 18084 18160 RXB;181;2-3;A.7-C D/C Ratio 0.43 0.12 0.54 0.05 0.09 0.45 49 Element 18174 18258 18258 18258 18168 18258 Revision 2 RXB;181;3-4;A.7-C D/C Ratio 0.36 0.13 0.54 0.05 0.07 0.47 77 Element 18272 18412 18272 18272 18412 18412

Table 3B-18: Summary of D/C Ratios for RXB Roof Slab (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Reinf. Checked RXB;181;4-5;A.7-C D/C Ratio 0.37 0.13 0.60 0.04 0.07 0.48 84 Element 18580 18426 18580 18426 18580 18580 RXB;181;5-6;A.7-C D/C Ratio 0.43 0.11 0.59 0.06 0.10 0.47 84 Element 18748 18594 18748 18748 18748 18594 RXB;181;6-7;A.7-C D/C Ratio 0.50 0.08 0.49 0.06 0.34 0.29 35 Element 18812 18762 18762 18762 18812 18762 RXB;181;1-2;A-A.7 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.13 0.28 0.05 0.10 0.24 24 Element 17276 17276 17968 17276 17584 17968 RXB;181;2-3;A-A.7 D/C Ratio 0.42 0.20 0.34 0.08 0.18 0.42 28 Element 17296 17296 17982 17296 17756 17982 RXB;181;3-4;A-A.7 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.21 0.35 0.08 0.29 0.51 44 Element 17306 17312 17984 17304 17778 18004 RXB;181;4-5;A-A.7 D/C Ratio 0.39 0.20 0.41 0.06 0.26 0.49 48 3.B-59 Element 17654 17340 18028 17332 17780 18006 RXB;181;5-6;A-A.7 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.16 0.42 0.08 0.23 0.48 48 Element 17678 17368 18050 17678 17804 18030 RXB;181;6-7;A-A.7 D/C Ratio 0.18 0.07 0.27 0.07 0.22 0.30 20 Element 18054 18054 18054 17680 17392 17392 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-19: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Pilasters on Grid Line A Wall Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Moment Axis 2 Shear Axis 3 Compression Tension # Elems Checked RXB;PI;A2;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.66 0.70 0.20 0.13 4 Element 879 2030 1320 2030 RXB;PI;A2;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.31 0.18 0.15 4 Element 3060 2348 2348 2348 RXB;PI;A2;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.62 0.28 0.14 0.13 4 Element 5147 3803 3803 5147 RXB;PI;A2;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.60 0.42 0.08 0.16 4 Element 5342 5431 5342 5342 RXB;PI;A2;126-163 D/C Ratio 0.61 0.45 0.06 0.11 8 Element 6106 6258 5668 5872 RXB;PI;A3;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.66 0.63 0.19 0.08 4 Element 897 2036 897 2036 RXB;PI;A3;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.44 0.31 0.17 0.09 4 3.B-60 Element 3440 2378 2378 2641 RXB;PI;A3;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.73 0.40 0.10 0.04 4 Element 5151 3833 3833 3833 RXB;PI;A3;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.45 0.71 0.05 0.02 4 Element 5344 5433 5433 5628 RXB;PI;A3;126-163 D/C Ratio 0.68 0.53 0.05 0.03 8 Element 5874 6260 5874 5874 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;PI;A4;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.42 0.47 0.17 0.00 4 Element 935 935 935 2039 RXB;PI;A4;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.39 0.26 0.13 0.02 4 Element 2679 3442 2418 3442 RXB;PI;A4;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.58 0.49 0.09 0.02 4 Element 4719 3911 3911 5159 RXB;PI;A4;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.63 0.58 0.05 0.03 4 Element 5366 5630 5366 5630 RXB;PI;A4;126-163 D/C Ratio 0.71 0.63 0.06 0.05 8 Revision 2 Element 6110 5876 5876 5876

Table 3B-19: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Pilasters on Grid Line A Wall (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Moment Axis 2 Shear Axis 3 Compression Tension # Elems Checked RXB;PI;A5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.44 0.44 0.17 0.01 4 Element 1009 1009 1009 2085 RXB;PI;A5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.63 0.31 0.14 0.05 4 Element 2733 3458 2476 3458 RXB;PI;A5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.65 0.42 0.09 0.03 4 Element 5169 3993 3993 5169 RXB;PI;A5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.53 0.36 0.06 0.05 4 Element 5368 5441 5632 5632 RXB;PI;A5;126-163 D/C Ratio 0.72 0.68 0.07 0.07 8 Element 6112 5782 5878 5878 RXB;PI;A6;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.44 0.18 0.07 4 Element 1500 1087 1087 2144 RXB;PI;A6;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.51 0.31 0.17 0.14 4 Element 2797 3478 2544 3478 3.B-61 RXB;PI;A6;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.52 0.27 0.14 0.17 4 Element 4883 4077 4077 4883 RXB;PI;A6;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.51 0.18 0.11 0.26 4 Element 5385 5385 5385 5385 RXB;PI;A6;126-163 D/C Ratio 0.55 0.33 0.10 0.26 8 Element 5880 5784 5880 5880 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-20: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Beams on EL. 75'-0" Slab Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Moment Axis 3 Shear Axis 2 Compression Tension # Elems Checked RXB;TB;75;A-B;2-2 D/C Ratio 0.36 0.23 0.21 0.14 5 Element 3658 3657 3654 3654 RXB;TB;75;A-B;2-3 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.06 5 Element 3664 3668 3668 3668 RXB;TB;75;A-B;3-3 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.30 0.08 0.12 5 Element 3678 3674 3678 3678 RXB;TB;75;A-B;3-4 D/C Ratio 0.39 0.51 0.05 0.06 5 Element 3684 3684 3688 3688 RXB;TB;75;A-B;4-4 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.58 0.14 0.13 5 Element 3694 3694 3694 3698 RXB;TB;75;A-B;4-5(1) D/C Ratio 0.45 0.48 0.11 0.07 5 Element 3704 3704 3704 3708 RXB;TB;75;A-B;4-5(2) D/C Ratio 0.48 0.52 0.09 0.08 5 3.B-62 Element 3714 3714 3714 3718 RXB;TB;75;A-B;5-5 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.51 0.11 0.16 5 Element 3724 3724 3728 3728 RXB;TB;75;A-B;5-6(1) D/C Ratio 0.39 0.44 0.09 0.08 5 Element 3734 3734 3734 3736 RXB;TB;75;A-B;5-6(2) D/C Ratio 0.40 0.48 0.08 0.06 5 Element 3744 3744 3744 3748 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;TB;75;A-B;6-6 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.58 0.18 0.21 5 Element 3754 3754 3754 3754 RXB;TB;75;6-7;B-C D/C Ratio 0.38 0.22 0.07 0.06 5 Element 3773 3773 3767 3767 RXB;TB;75;6-7;C-C D/C Ratio 0.50 0.26 0.06 0.04 5 Element 3772 3772 3772 3760 RXB;TB;75;6-7;C-D D/C Ratio 0.41 0.22 0.07 0.05 5 Element 3771 3771 3765 3765 RXB;TB;75;D-E;2-2 D/C Ratio 0.26 0.14 0.20 0.11 5 Revision 2 Element 3653 3653 3653 3653

Table 3B-20: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Beams on EL. 75'-0" Slab (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Moment Axis 3 Shear Axis 2 Compression Tension # Elems Checked RXB;TB;75;D-E;2-3 D/C Ratio 0.29 0.18 0.16 0.16 5 Element 3663 3659 3660 3659 RXB;TB;75;D-E;3-3 D/C Ratio 0.70 0.55 0.10 0.18 5 Element 3673 3673 3669 3669 RXB;TB;75;D-E;3-4 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.54 0.06 0.07 5 Element 3683 3683 3679 3679 RXB;TB;75;D-E;4-4 D/C Ratio 0.37 0.59 0.14 0.13 5 Element 3693 3693 3693 3689 RXB;TB;75;D-E;4-5(1) D/C Ratio 0.46 0.48 0.11 0.07 5 Element 3703 3703 3703 3699 RXB;TB;75;D-E;4-5(2) D/C Ratio 0.48 0.53 0.09 0.10 5 Element 3713 3713 3713 3711 RXB;TB;75;D-E;5-5 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.51 0.11 0.16 5 Element 3723 3723 3719 3719 3.B-63 RXB;TB;75;D-E;5-6(1) D/C Ratio 0.38 0.44 0.08 0.08 5 Element 3733 3733 3733 3731 RXB;TB;75;D-E;5-6(2) D/C Ratio 0.40 0.48 0.08 0.06 5 Element 3743 3743 3743 3739 RXB;TB;75;D-E;6-6 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.59 0.18 0.21 5 Element 3753 3753 3753 3753 RXB;TB;75;1-2;B-C D/C Ratio 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.05 6 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 3633 3633 3648 3648 RXB;TB;75;1-2;C-C D/C Ratio 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.15 6 Element 3647 3647 3647 3647 RXB;TB;75;1-2;C-D D/C Ratio 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.05 6 Element 3646 3646 3643 3646 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-21: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Buttress at Grid Line 1 on EL. 126'-0" Slab Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Moment Axis 2 Shear Axis 3 Compression Tension # Elems Checked RXB;B;1;126;B-A D/C Ratio 0.35 0.17 0.08 0.30 5 Element 5657 5658 5657 5657 RXB;B;1;126;C-B D/C Ratio 0.43 0.24 0.16 0.58 6 Element 5656 5655 5652 5652 RXB;B;1;126;D-C D/C Ratio 0.43 0.18 0.10 0.36 6 Element 5645 5646 5650 5650 RXB;B;1;126;E-D D/C Ratio 0.38 0.25 0.01 0.06 5 Element 5644 5644 5640 5640 3.B-64 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-22: Summary of D/C Ratios for West Wing Wall at Grid Line 4 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Stress Stress Checked RXB;4;D-C;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.19 0.68 0.76 0.24 0.83 16 Element 4638 4638 3071 3071 4638 3071 RXB;4;C-B;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.17 0.67 0.74 0.25 0.82 16 Element 4645 4645 3072 3072 4645 3072 RXB;4;D-C;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.46 0.39 20 Element 8070 8070 8073 5781 7300 7300 RXB;4;C-B;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.22 0.62 0.42 0.50 0.42 20 Element 8077 8077 8074 5782 7307 7307 RXB;4;D-C;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.18 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.41 16 Element 11582 9082 9678 9678 11582 11585 RXB;4;C-B;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.18 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.44 16 Element 11589 9089 9679 9679 11589 11586 3.B-65 RXB;4;D-C;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.95 0.35 0.48 0.29 0.38 0.28 16 Element 13686 13686 13686 12459 12456 12459 RXB;4;C-B;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.96 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.40 0.30 16 Element 13693 13693 13693 12460 12463 12460 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-23: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Pool Wall at Grid Line B Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear Elems Checked Stress Stress RXB;B;1-2;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.18 0.43 0.40 0.18 0.28 20 Element 3971 3971 2613 2634 4528 4528 RXB;B;2-3;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.12 0.65 0.34 0.28 0.54 28 Element 3016 4545 3016 3016 4545 4578 RXB;B;3-4;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.57 0.07 0.55 0.22 0.97 0.58 44 Element 4596 3046 4046 3057 4584 4596 RXB;B;4-5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.06 0.41 0.19 0.28 0.46 48 Element 4116 3077 3077 4650 4650 4650 RXB;B;5-6;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.37 0.12 0.63 0.37 0.33 0.35 48 Element 3161 4878 3163 3163 4878 4878 RXB;B;1-2;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.34 0.16 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.20 21 Element 6774 6770 6130 5621 6774 6130 3.B-66 RXB;B;2-3;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.12 0.52 0.25 0.40 0.54 35 Element 5651 8010 5651 5651 8010 5651 RXB;B;3-4;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.60 0.10 0.39 0.28 0.59 0.42 55 Element 7294 8068 5770 5701 5701 8068 RXB;B;4-5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.54 0.10 0.43 0.21 0.45 0.96 60 Element 7314 7314 5892 8080 7314 8084 RXB;B;5-6;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.13 0.67 0.32 0.42 0.65 60 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 7457 6014 6014 6014 6014 6014 RXB;B;1-2;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.11 0.37 0.23 0.34 0.32 20 Element 11377 10434 10788 8894 11377 11377 RXB;B;2-3;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.54 0.09 0.55 0.20 0.39 0.38 28 Element 11536 8919 11536 8919 11536 8919 RXB;B;3-4;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.08 0.35 0.22 0.55 0.44 44 Element 9075 9075 9075 9075 9075 9075 RXB;B;4-5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.23 0.43 0.41 48 Element 10858 9121 9214 9214 11591 9096 Revision 2 RXB;B;5-6;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.44 0.13 0.59 0.26 0.39 0.54 48 Element 9947 9354 9354 9354 9354 9354

Table 3B-23: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Pool Wall at Grid Line B (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear Elems Checked Stress Stress RXB;B;1-2;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.43 0.10 0.45 0.23 0.27 0.49 20 Element 13171 13171 13554 13554 12337 13554 RXB;B;2-3;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.09 0.58 0.28 0.27 0.36 28 Element 12371 13176 12371 12371 12371 12371 RXB;B;3-4;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.49 0.06 0.52 0.19 0.77 0.54 44 Element 13683 12450 13683 12450 13683 12450 RXB;B;4-5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.05 0.37 0.20 0.63 0.51 48 Element 13715 13747 13779 12517 13697 12469 RXB;B;5-6;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.57 0.09 0.39 0.20 0.45 0.35 48 Element 13875 13875 13463 12541 13793 12541 RXB;B;1-2;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.72 0.12 0.39 0.21 0.42 0.22 24 Element 15601 15601 14634 14634 15601 15601 RXB;B;2-3;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.24 0.07 0.36 0.12 0.15 0.38 28 3.B-67 Element 15633 15641 15649 14997 14997 14997 RXB;B;3-4;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.05 0.53 0.23 0.58 1.00 44 Element 15699 15683 14739 14739 14739 14739 RXB;B;4-5;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.13 0.58 0.27 0.50 0.93 54 Element 15401 12682 15713 14761 15738 14746 RXB;B;5-6;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.63 0.12 0.47 0.21 0.90 0.76 51 Element 12688 12688 15786 15094 15440 14797 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;B;6-7;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.49 0.10 0.43 0.14 0.42 0.68 19 Element 14855 14855 14855 15510 15861 15861 Note:

Highlighted items indicate those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-24: Element Averaging of YZ Plane Shear Exceedance for Reactor Building Pool Wall at Grid Line B Average of Shell Elements 14739/14746: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 (in2) OOP Moment As3 (in2) Total As (in2) As Provided (in2) Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) 1.086 0.914 1.499 3.500 12.480 0.280 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.09 2.77 0.033 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 (in2) OOP Moment As3 (in2) Total As (in2) As Provided (in2) Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) 2.994 0.914 2.399 6.307 12.480 0.505 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.61 2.77 0.220 3.B-68 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 11.394 32,400.0 OK OK 195.0 0.503 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 9.486 32,400.0 OK 176.8 0.960 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-25: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Pool Wall at Grid Line B After Averaging Affected Elements Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear Elems Checked Stress Stress RXB;B;1-2;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.18 0.43 0.40 0.18 0.28 20 Element 3971 3971 2613 2634 4528 4528 RXB;B;2-3;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.12 0.65 0.34 0.28 0.54 28 Element 3016 4545 3016 3016 4545 4578 RXB;B;3-4;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.57 0.07 0.55 0.22 0.97 0.58 44 Element 4596 3046 4046 3057 4584 4596 RXB;B;4-5;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.06 0.41 0.19 0.28 0.46 48 Element 4116 3077 3077 4650 4650 4650 RXB;B;5-6;24-50 D/C Ratio 0.37 0.12 0.63 0.37 0.33 0.35 48 Element 3161 4878 3163 3163 4878 4878 RXB;B;1-2;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.34 0.16 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.20 21 3.B-69 Element 6774 6770 6130 5621 6774 6130 RXB;B;2-3;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.12 0.52 0.25 0.40 0.54 35 Element 5651 8010 5651 5651 8010 5651 RXB;B;3-4;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.60 0.10 0.39 0.28 0.59 0.42 55 Element 7294 8068 5770 5701 5701 8068 RXB;B;4-5;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.54 0.10 0.43 0.21 0.45 0.96 60 Element 7314 7314 5892 8080 7314 8084 Design Reports and Critical Section Details RXB;B;5-6;50-75 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.13 0.67 0.32 0.42 0.65 60 Element 7457 6014 6014 6014 6014 6014 RXB;B;1-2;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.11 0.37 0.23 0.34 0.32 20 Element 11377 10434 10788 8894 11377 11377 RXB;B;2-3;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.54 0.09 0.55 0.20 0.39 0.38 28 Element 11536 8919 11536 8919 11536 8919 RXB;B;3-4;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.08 0.35 0.22 0.55 0.44 44 Element 9075 9075 9075 9075 9075 9075 RXB;B;4-5;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.23 0.43 0.41 48 Revision 2 Element 10858 9121 9214 9214 11591 9096

Table 3B-25: Summary of D/C Ratios for Reactor Building Pool Wall at Grid Line B After Averaging Affected Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Elements (Continued)

Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear Elems Checked Stress Stress RXB;B;5-6;75-100 D/C Ratio 0.44 0.13 0.59 0.26 0.39 0.54 48 Element 9947 9354 9354 9354 9354 9354 RXB;B;1-2;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.43 0.10 0.45 0.23 0.27 0.49 20 Element 13171 13171 13554 13554 12337 13554 RXB;B;2-3;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.09 0.58 0.28 0.27 0.36 28 Element 12371 13176 12371 12371 12371 12371 RXB;B;3-4;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.49 0.06 0.52 0.19 0.77 0.54 44 Element 13683 12450 13683 12450 13683 12450 RXB;B;4-5;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.40 0.05 0.37 0.20 0.63 0.51 48 Element 13715 13747 13779 12517 13697 12469 RXB;B;5-6;100-126 D/C Ratio 0.57 0.09 0.39 0.20 0.45 0.35 48 Element 13875 13875 13463 12541 13793 12541 3.B-70 RXB;B;1-2;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.72 0.12 0.39 0.21 0.42 0.22 24 Element 15601 15601 14634 14634 15601 15601 RXB;B;2-3;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.24 0.07 0.36 0.12 0.15 0.38 28 Element 15633 15641 15649 14997 14997 14997 RXB;B;3-4;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.32 0.05 0.53 0.23 0.58 0.96 44 Element 15699 15683 14739 14739 14739 14739 RXB;B;4-5;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.46 0.13 0.58 0.27 0.50 0.93 54 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 15401 12682 15713 14761 15738 14746 RXB;B;5-6;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.63 0.12 0.47 0.21 0.90 0.76 51 Element 12688 12688 15786 15094 15440 14797 RXB;B;6-7;126-145 D/C Ratio 0.49 0.10 0.43 0.14 0.42 0.68 19 Element 14855 14855 14855 15510 15861 15861 Note: The highlighted values of the D/C ratios for the corresponding element shown in this table is based on the averaged demand values. It should be noted that the D/C ratios of all other elements shown in this table will be proportionally reduced if the same averaging methodology is used.

Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-26: NuScale Power Module Lug Support Model Cut Section Forces and Moments TABLE: Section Cut Forces - Analysis SectionCut OutputCase CaseType F1 F2 F3 M1 M2 M3 Text Text Text Lb Lb Lb Lb-in Lb-in Lb-in 2PL_Y=-16.25 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic -55,982 -1,194,526 341 11,300 620 557,494 2PL_Y=16.25 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic 5,454 884,513 756 -19,923 381 37,563 Fin_Y=00.00 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic -50,509 -309,993 1,097 -1,879 1,000 -403,151 Fin_Y=-16.25 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic -803,922 -375,879 1,056 -13,850 7,480 -312,109 Fin_Y=16.25 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic -67,116 -154,332 1,157 10,798 10,194 -205,216 Fin_Y=-32.24 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic -33,420 -468,831 691 -23,053 4,726 -540,523 Fin_Y=32.24 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic 37,226 -121,274 745 22,770 7,199 -154,530 Fin_Y=-48.23 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic 150,232 -488,802 71 -30,142 660 -584,991 Fin_Y=48.23 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic 53,268 -132,962 110 35,642 2,789 -165,157 Fin_Y=-64.22 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic 258,209 -483,067 -767 -34,319 -1,405 -576,203 Fin_Y=64.22 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic 52,628 -181,955 -779 50,037 -2,294 -225,438 Fin_Y=-88.20 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic 484,861 -488,810 -1,391 -33,526 -12,081 -594,724 Fin_Y=88.20 W-Lug-PY- LinStatic -81,465 -293,957 -1,989 65,712 -18,272 -324,996 Total -3,499,861 2PL_Y=-16.25 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic 7,442 -424,764 -279 -44,910 -433 -60,054 2PL_Y=16.25 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic -52,098 722,175 234 43,923 576 -519,329 Fin_Y=00.00 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic -44,640 297,392 -45 7,337 143 388,025 Fin_Y=-16.25 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic -16,757 144,367 8 7,183 433 182,939 Fin_Y=16.25 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic -742,945 361,735 -145 6,587 682 305,731 Fin_Y=-32.24 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic 8,663 92,366 231 6,948 -64 115,492 Fin_Y=32.24 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic -65,131 477,854 -7 3,244 -1,629 555,769 Fin_Y=-48.23 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic 11,264 70,026 301 7,001 346 86,663 Fin_Y=48.23 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic 98,943 540,322 104 -2,716 -2,074 649,873 Fin_Y=-64.22 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic 8,318 62,330 222 7,076 -590 76,984 Fin_Y=64.22 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic 198,163 608,247 242 -11,824 -424 732,111 Fin_Y=-88.20 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic -18,932 55,657 -483 5,903 307 62,272 Fin_Y=88.20 W-Lug-PY+ LinStatic 563,052 789,567 -427 -23,311 2,871 924,761 Total 3,499,864 Tier 2 3B-71 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-27: Not Used Tier 2 3B-72 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-28: Enveloped NPM Lug Support and Skirt Support Reaction Forces Using Soil Type 7 (CSDRS)

East Wing Wall West Wing Wall SRSS Horizontal Vertical Skirt N-S Lug Pool Wall E-W N-S Lug Skirt Reaction Reaction Reaction Lug Reaction Reaction Enveloped Input Case (x103 kips) (x103 kips) (x103 kips) (x103 kips) (x103 kips)

NPM Seismic Analysis 1.20 1.62 3.15 3.68 2.24 SASSI Building Seismic Analysis 1.59 1.86 2.18 2.82 2.30 Tier 2 3B-73 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-29: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Wall at Grid Line 3 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Checked Stress Stress CRB;3;B-A;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.39 0.06 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.43 15 Element 714 927 716 714 1487 1488 CRB;3;B-A;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.43 0.07 0.46 0.10 0.30 0.43 15 Element 2178 2178 2029 2029 2030 2482 CRB;3;B-A;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.34 0.06 0.43 0.11 0.22 0.70 11 Element 3131 3275 2994 3276 3276 3276 CRB;3;B-A;120-141 D/C Ratio 0.27 0.06 0.38 0.07 0.34 0.94 6 Element 3712 3712 3712 3777 3712 3712 CRB;3;C-B;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.60 0.09 0.41 0.17 0.26 0.36 29 Element 709 709 711 710 1479 1479 CRB;3;C-B;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.49 0.07 0.55 0.20 0.13 0.49 28 Element 2028 2176 2028 2026 2175 2026 3.B-74 CRB;3;C-B;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.38 0.06 0.51 0.13 0.16 0.61 22 Element 2993 3127 2993 2993 3268 2993 CRB;3;D-C;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.52 0.07 0.42 0.14 0.28 0.33 7 Element 708 916 708 708 1476 1476 CRB;3;D-C;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.42 0.08 0.35 0.10 0.20 0.33 7 Element 2169 2169 2024 2024 2471 2024 CRB;3;D-C;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.21 0.03 0.21 0.06 0.28 0.25 5 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 3121 3121 2987 2987 3264 2987 CRB;3;E-D;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.52 0.09 0.47 0.16 0.22 0.34 18 Element 706 706 705 705 1471 1472 CRB;3;E-D;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.06 0.37 0.08 0.15 0.31 20 Element 2022 2167 2022 2021 2318 2023 CRB;3;E-D;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.18 14 Element 3120 3120 2986 3259 3263 3263 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-30: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Wall at Grid Line 4 Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Checked Stress Stress CRB;4;B-A;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.63 0.11 0.78 0.21 0.55 1.16 24 Element 790 793 789 789 793 788 CRB;4;B-A;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.42 0.34 24 Element 2233 2082 2382 2082 2082 2077 CRB;4;B-A;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.34 0.32 17 Element 3328 3327 3043 3043 3185 3043 CRB;4;B-A;120-140 D/C Ratio 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.20 0.15 8 Element 3937 3937 3750 3750 3937 3749 CRB;4;C-B;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.48 0.09 0.77 0.24 0.40 1.38 32 Element 781 781 786 786 999 786 CRB;4;C-B;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.22 0.03 0.29 0.08 0.16 0.35 32 Element 2524 2076 2221 2221 2372 2528 3.B-75 CRB;4;C-B;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.20 23 Element 3324 3324 3032 3032 3173 3038 CRB;4;D-C;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.06 0.43 0.15 0.36 0.65 8 Element 779 778 778 778 778 779 CRB;4;D-C;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.25 0.19 8 Element 2218 2068 2067 2067 2218 2523 CRB;4;D-C;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.34 5 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 3172 3172 3031 3031 3315 3031 CRB;4;E-D;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.58 0.09 0.53 0.22 0.49 0.59 28 Element 777 777 775 775 1341 774 CRB;4;E-D;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.46 0.27 28 Element 2211 2060 2367 2060 2060 2064 CRB;4;E-D;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.09 0.43 0.28 20 Element 3310 3309 3025 3025 3165 3030 CRB;4;E-D;120-140 D/C Ratio 0.26 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.25 0.14 8 Element 3740 3928 3740 3739 3928 3740 Revision 2 Note: Highlighted items indicate those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8.

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-31: Control Building Wall at Grid Line 4 - Shell Element 786 with added Shear Reinforcement Shell Element 786 in Section [CRB;4;C-B;50-76]: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 1.016 1.581 0.310 2.908 6.240 0.466 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.21 2.63 0.080 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 2.559 1.581 0.694 4.835 6.240 0.775 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.62 2.63 0.236 3.B-76 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 5.224 19,589.8 OK OK 122.1 0.086 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 3.681 13,802.6 OK 108.0 0.775 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-32: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Wall at Grid Line 4 After Averaging Affected Elements Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Checked Stress Stress CRB;4;B-A;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.63 0.11 0.78 0.21 0.55 0.78 24 Element 790 793 789 789 793 788 CRB;4;B-A;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.42 0.34 24 Element 2233 2082 2382 2082 2082 2077 CRB;4;B-A;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.34 0.32 17 Element 3328 3327 3043 3043 3185 3043 CRB;4;B-A;120-140 D/C Ratio 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.20 0.15 8 Element 3937 3937 3750 3750 3937 3749 CRB;4;C-B;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.48 0.09 0.77 0.24 0.40 0.78 32 Element 781 781 786 786 999 786 CRB;4;C-B;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.22 0.03 0.29 0.08 0.16 0.35 32 3.B-77 Element 2524 2076 2221 2221 2372 2528 CRB;4;C-B;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.20 23 Element 3324 3324 3032 3032 3173 3038 CRB;4;D-C;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.06 0.43 0.15 0.36 0.65 8 Element 779 778 778 778 778 779 CRB;4;D-C;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.25 0.19 8 Element 2218 2068 2067 2067 2218 2523 Design Reports and Critical Section Details CRB;4;D-C;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.34 5 Element 3172 3172 3031 3031 3315 3031 CRB;4;E-D;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.58 0.09 0.53 0.22 0.49 0.59 28 Element 777 777 775 775 1341 774 CRB;4;E-D;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.46 0.27 28 Element 2211 2060 2367 2060 2060 2064 CRB;4;E-D;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.09 0.43 0.28 20 Element 3310 3309 3025 3025 3165 3030 Revision 2

Table 3B-32: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Wall at Grid Line 4 After Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Averaging Affected Elements (Continued)

Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Checked Stress Stress CRB;4;E-D;120-140 D/C Ratio 0.26 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.25 0.14 8 Element 3740 3928 3740 3739 3928 3740 Note:

The highlighted values of the D/C ratios for the corresponding element shown in this table are based on the averaged demand values. It should be noted that the D/C ratios of the other elements shown in this table will be proportionally reduced if the same averaging methodology is used.

3.B-78 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-33: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Wall at Grid Line A Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Horizontal Reinf. Horiz. Comp. Vertical Reinf. Vert. Comp. XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Checked Stress Stress CRB;A;1-2;50-63 D/C Ratio 0.90 0.11 0.89 0.22 0.67 0.95 16 Element 643 635 639 647 635 639 CRB;A;2-2.8;50-63 D/C Ratio 0.52 0.09 0.39 0.16 0.46 0.43 6 Element 692 692 692 903 698 692 CRB;A;2.8-4;50-63 D/C Ratio 0.54 0.09 0.47 0.21 0.54 0.84 12 Element 770 770 770 770 982 770 CRB;A;1-2;63-76 D/C Ratio 0.56 0.07 0.56 0.16 0.54 0.62 16 Element 1220 1200 1212 1200 1200 1416 CRB;A;2-2.8;63-76 D/C Ratio 0.43 0.06 0.32 0.15 0.50 0.25 6 Element 1258 1241 1251 1258 1461 1444 CRB;A;2.8-4;63-76 D/C Ratio 0.34 0.05 0.24 0.15 0.76 0.12 12 Element 1469 1340 1296 1266 1469 1521 3.B-79 CRB;A;1-2;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.05 0.39 0.13 0.40 0.51 32 Element 2122 1990 1990 1978 2273 1987 CRB;A;2-2.8;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.37 0.04 0.21 0.11 0.48 0.29 12 Element 2306 2002 2005 2002 2011 2002 CRB;A;2.8-4;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.28 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.71 0.16 24 Element 2049 2018 2514 2059 2018 2502 CRB;A;1-2;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.23 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.19 24 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 3230 2955 2937 2937 3233 3230 CRB;A;2-2.8;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.33 0.04 0.31 0.06 0.36 0.15 9 Element 3251 3251 3251 3251 2975 2961 CRB;A;2.8-4;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.20 0.04 0.25 0.08 0.78 0.41 18 Element 2982 3283 3024 3024 2982 3014 CRB;A;2.8-4;120-140 D/C Ratio 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.46 0.28 24 Element 3906 3711 3711 3711 3906 3711 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-34: Element Averaging of IP Shear Exceedance of Control Building Wall at Grid Line A Element Length Thickness Shell Sxy IP Shear Demand fc (psi) IP Shear Capacity (in) (in) (kip/in) (kip) v8Acvfc (kip)

Shell 635 64.33 36 12.83 825.1 5000 982.5 Shell 639 64.33 36 14.59 938.4 5000 982.5 Shell 643 64.33 36 15.69 1009.6 5000 982.5 Shell 647 58.33 36 15.35 895.6 5000 890.9 Shell 651 58.33 36 15.81 922.1 5000 890.9 Shell 655 58.33 36 12.46 726.6 5000 890.9 Sum = 5317.4 < 5620.3 Tier 2 3B-80 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-35: Moment and Shear Capacity: 5 Foot Thick Control Building Basemat Foundation (Type 1)

Description Parameters Value Information - 5-0 Basemat; 3 Layers EWEF (#11 @ 12 c/c);

2-Leg Stirrups (#6 @ 12 c/c)

Section thickness h (in) 60 Concrete cover dimension c (in) 3 Rebar diameter dt (in) 1.41 Stirrup diameter ds(in) 0.75 Rebar area Ast(t) (in2) 1.560 Stirrup area Ast(s) (in2) 0.44 Effective depth d (in) 51.32 Lever arm jd (in) 48.57 Out-of-Plane Moment Capacity MN (kip-ft/ft) 1,023 MN = MMN Shear Capacity provided by Concrete vVc (kip/ft) 65 Vc = v2bdv(fc)

Shear Capacity provided by Stirrups vVs (kip/ft) 169 Vs = v((Ast(s)fyd)/ss)

In-Plane Shear Capacity by Concrete vVconc(kip/ft) 76 Vconc=Acv(c(fc))

In-Plane Shear Capacity vVin-plane (kip/ft) 305 Vin-plane=Minimum of Acv(c(fc)+tfy) or v8Acv(fc)

Tier 2 3B-81 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-36: Moment and Shear Capacity: 5 Foot Thick Control Building Basemat Foundation (Type 2)

Description Parameters Value Information - 5-0 Basemat; 4 Layers EWEF (#11 @ 12 c/c);

2-Leg Stirrups (#6 @ 12 c/c)

Section thickness h (in) 60 Concrete cover dimension c (in) 3 Rebar diameter dt (in) 1.41 Stirrup diameter ds(in) 0.75 Rebar area Ast(t) (in2) 1.560 Stirrup area Ast(s) (in2) 0.44 Effective depth d (in) 49.91 Lever arm jd (in) 46.24 Out-of-Plane Moment Capacity MN (kip-ft/ft) 1298 MN = MMN Shear Capacity provided by Concrete vVc (kip/ft) 64 Vc = v2bdv(fc)

Shear Capacity provided by Stirrups vVs (kip/ft) 165 Vs = v((Ast(s)fyd)/ss)

In-Plane Shear Capacity by Concrete vVconc(kip/ft) 76 Vconc=Acv(c(fc))

In-Plane Shear Capacity vVin-plane (kip/ft) 305 Vin-plane=Minimum of Acv(c(fc)+tfy) or v8Acv(fc)

Tier 2 3B-82 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-37: Magnitudes of Bounding Demand Forces and Moments for Perimeter of Main Control Building Basemat Slab FX(Sxx) FY(Syy) Sxy Vxz Vyz MX(Myy) MY(Mxx) k/ft k/ft k/ft k/ft k/ft k-ft/ft k-ft/ft Maximum 312 291 216 143 125 406 593 Elm. No. 386 375 373 373 345 69 386 Note:

The shear forces and bending moments are obtained by the absolute sum of the static and seismic results Tier 2 3B-83 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-38: Magnitudes of Bounding Demand Forces and Moments for Interior of Main Control Building Basemat Slab FX(Sxx) FY(Syy) Sxy Vxz Vyz MX(Myy) MY(Mxx) k/ft k/ft k/ft k/ft k/ft k-ft/ft k-ft/ft Maximum 309 228 135 114 83 302 326 Elm. No. 45 347 25 45 45 99 45 Note:

The shear forces and bending moments are obtained by the absolute sum of the static and seismic results.

Tier 2 3B-84 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-39: Magnitudes of Bounding Demand Forces and Moments for Control Building Basemat of Control Building Tunnel FX(Sxx) FY(Syy) Sxy Vxz Vyz MX(Myy) MY(Mxx) k/ft k/ft k/ft k/ft k/ft k-ft/ft k-ft/ft Maximum - - 230 196 212 732 793 Elm. No. - - 547 516 485 488 486 Forces are not calculated since the west end of the tunnel is separated from the RXB by a nominal 6 inch gap Tier 2 3B-85 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-40: Design Check Control Building Basemat Foundation of Perimeter of the Main Slab Basemat Foundation for CRB Perimeter: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 5.772 3.107 2.848 11.727 12.480 0.940 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 5.393 3.107 1.952 10.452 12.480 0.838 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction Avfx vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio (in2) 6.708 25,154.2 OK OK 173.2 0.826 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction Avfy vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio (in2) 3.B-86 7.087 26,577.8 OK 176.8 0.704 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-41: Design Check Control Building Basemat Foundation of Interior of the Main Slab Basemat Foundation for CRB Interior: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 5.713 1.292 1.491 8.496 9.360 0.908 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 4.215 1.292 1.382 6.889 9.360 0.736 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction Avfx vVnx = vAvfxfy Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio (in2) (lb) 3.647 13,676.4 OK OK 178.7 0.637 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction Avfy vVny = vAvfyfy Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio (in2) (lb) 3.B-87 5.145 19,294.4 OK 193.4 0.431 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-42: Design Check for Control Building Basemat Foundation for the Control Building Tunnel Basemat Foundation for CRB Tunnel: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 0.000 3.410 3.629 7.039 9.360 0.752 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 0.000 3.410 3.347 6.756 9.360 0.722 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction Avfx vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio 2)

(in 9.360 35,100.0 OK OK 234.7 0.835 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction Avfy vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio (in2) 3.B-88 9.360 35,100.0 OK 234.7 0.905 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-43: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Slab at EL. 100'-0" Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. Stress North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Checked CRB;100;7-1;D-E D/C Ratio 0.82 0.19 0.84 0.14 0.51 1.13 10 Element 2543 2539 2538 2538 2539 2538 CRB;100;1-2;D-E D/C Ratio 0.96 0.17 0.38 0.03 0.80 0.50 55 Element 2562 2562 2561 2718 2562 2649 CRB;100;2-3;D-E D/C Ratio 0.33 0.05 0.27 0.06 0.51 0.38 22 Element 2742 2764 2764 2764 2764 2747 CRB;100;3-4;D-E D/C Ratio 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.53 0.30 25 Element 2895 2824 2893 2827 2897 2827 CRB;100;7-1;C-D D/C Ratio 0.84 0.21 0.62 0.10 0.56 0.95 10 Element 2540 2557 2541 2541 2540 2541 CRB;100;1-2;C-D D/C Ratio 1.00 0.16 0.30 0.03 1.01 0.48 16 Element 2565 2565 2610 2564 2565 2679 3.B-89 CRB;100;2-3;C-D D/C Ratio 0.20 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.37 0.39 8 Element 2749 2749 2748 2748 2789 2809 CRB;100;3-4;C-D D/C Ratio 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.52 0.44 10 Element 2829 2899 2899 2899 2898 2899 CRB;100;1-2;B-C D/C Ratio 1.09 0.13 0.53 0.04 0.84 0.32 64 Element 2566 2566 2566 2567 2573 2566 CRB;100;2-3;B-C D/C Ratio 0.25 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.66 0.35 32 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 2812 2750 2817 2816 2817 2816 CRB;100;3-4;B-C D/C Ratio 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.50 0.44 40 Element 2837 2907 2900 2834 2835 2900 CRB;100;1-2;A-B D/C Ratio 0.47 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.83 0.47 48 Element 2574 2574 2671 2740 2574 2694 CRB;100;2-3;A-B D/C Ratio 0.40 0.03 0.35 0.06 0.60 0.48 20 Element 2822 2822 2763 2802 2822 2763 CRB;100;3-4;A-B D/C Ratio 0.28 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.58 0.35 14 Element 2838 2908 2891 2890 2839 2838 Revision 2 Note: Highlighted items indicate those design check zones that exceed a D/C ratio of 0.8.

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-44: Element Averaging of East-West Reinforcement Exceedance - Control Building Slab at EL. 100'-0" Average of Shell Elements 2566/2567: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 1.337 0.645 0.636 2.618 3.120 0.839 E-W Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.21 2.42 0.087 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 0.602 0.645 0.302 1.549 3.120 0.496 N-S Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.09 2.42 0.036 3.B-90 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 1.783 6,686.1 OK OK 28.1 0.540 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 2.518 9,442.8 OK 35.8 0.277 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-45: Element Averaging of XZ Plane Shear Exceedance - Control Building Slab at EL. 100'-0" Average of Shell Elements 2565/2564: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 2.392 0.058 0.300 2.750 3.120 0.881 E-W Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.35 2.42 0.145 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 0.446 0.058 0.227 0.731 3.120 0.234 N-S Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.07 2.42 0.030 3.B-91 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 0.728 2,730.2 FAIL OK 17.0 0.727 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 2.674 10,028.2 OK 37.5 0.248 Note:

See text in Section 3B.3.3.2 and Table 3B-48.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-46: Element Averaging of YZ Plane Shear Exceedance - Control Building Slab at EL. 100'-0" Average of Shell Elements 2538/2542: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 2.148 1.538 0.865 4.551 6.240 0.729 E-W Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.31 2.63 0.117 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 1.275 1.538 1.313 4.126 6.240 0.661 N-S Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.21 2.63 0.081 3.B-92 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 4.092 15,343.3 OK OK 66.6 0.187 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 4.965 18,618.4 OK 74.8 0.601 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-47: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Slab at EL. 100'-0" After Averaging Affected Elements Demand/Capacity Ratios Section East-West Reinf. E-W Comp. Stress North-South N-S Comp. Stress XZ-Plane Shear YZ-Plane Shear # Elems Reinf. Checked CRB;100;7-1;D-E D/C Ratio 0.82 0.19 0.84 0.14 0.51 0.60 10 Element 2543 2539 2538 2538 2539 2538 CRB;100;1-2;D-E D/C Ratio 0.96 0.17 0.38 0.03 0.80 0.50 55 Element 2562 2562 2561 2718 2562 2649 CRB;100;2-3;D-E D/C Ratio 0.33 0.05 0.27 0.06 0.51 0.38 22 Element 2742 2764 2764 2764 2764 2747 CRB;100;3-4;D-E D/C Ratio 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.53 0.30 25 Element 2895 2824 2893 2827 2897 2827 CRB;100;7-1;C-D D/C Ratio 0.84 0.21 0.62 0.10 0.56 0.95 10 Element 2540 2557 2541 2541 2540 2541 CRB;100;1-2;C-D D/C Ratio 0.84 0.16 0.30 0.03 0.73 0.48 16 Element 2565 2565 2610 2564 2565 2679 3.B-93 CRB;100;2-3;C-D D/C Ratio 0.20 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.37 0.39 8 Element 2749 2749 2748 2748 2789 2809 CRB;100;3-4;C-D D/C Ratio 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.52 0.44 10 Element 2829 2899 2899 2899 2898 2899 CRB;100;1-2;B-C D/C Ratio 0.84 0.13 0.53 0.04 0.84 0.32 64 Element 2566 2566 2566 2567 2573 2566 CRB;100;2-3;B-C D/C Ratio 0.25 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.66 0.35 32 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Element 2812 2750 2817 2816 2817 2816 CRB;100;3-4;B-C D/C Ratio 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.50 0.44 40 Element 2837 2907 2900 2834 2835 2900 CRB;100;1-2;A-B D/C Ratio 0.47 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.83 0.47 48 Element 2574 2574 2671 2740 2574 2694 CRB;100;2-3;A-B D/C Ratio 0.40 0.03 0.35 0.06 0.60 0.48 20 Element 2822 2822 2763 2802 2822 2763 CRB;100;3-4;A-B D/C Ratio 0.28 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.58 0.35 14 Element 2838 2908 2891 2890 2839 2838 Revision 2 Note: The highlighted values of the D-C ratios for the corresponding element shown in this Table is based on the averaged demand values using methodology shown in Section 3B.1.1.1. It should be noted that the D-C ratios of all other elements shown in this Table will be proportionally reduced if the same averaging methodology is used.

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-48: Element Averaging of Shear Friction Exceedance for Control Building Slab at EL. 100-0 Average of Shell Elements 2566/2567: Design Check East-West Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided East-West Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 1.337 0.645 0.636 2.618 3.120 0.839 E-W Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.21 2.42 0.087 North-South Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided North-South Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 0.602 0.645 0.302 1.549 3.120 0.496 N-S Membrane Comp. Stress Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) D/C Ratio 0.09 2.42 0.036 3.B-94 Shear Friction Code Check OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) 1.783 6,686.1 OK OK 28.1 0.540 YZ-Plane Shear-Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity (kip) YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 2.518 9,442.8 OK 35.8 0.277 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-49: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building Pilasters on Grid Line 1 Wall Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Moment Axis 3 Shear Axis 2 Compression Tension # Elems Checked CRB;PI;1C;50-63 D/C Ratio 0.50 0.33 0.06 0.06 3 Element 245 2 245 646 CRB;PI;1B;50-76 D/C Ratio 0.62 0.95 0.06 0.04 5 Element 647 667 246 667 CRB;PI;1C;63-76 D/C Ratio 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.07 2 Element 666 666 656 666 CRB;PI;1C;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.41 0.24 0.02 0.09 4 Element 696 706 706 696 CRB;PI;1B;76-100 D/C Ratio 0.52 0.84 0.03 0.04 4 Element 697 677 677 677 CRB;PI;1C;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.51 0.32 0.03 0.08 3 Element 821 801 801 801 CRB;PI;1B;100-120 D/C Ratio 0.67 0.39 0.02 0.02 3 3.B-95 Element 822 812 822 802 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-50: Summary of D/C Ratios for Control Building T-Beams on EL. 120'-0" Slab Demand/Capacity Ratios Section Moment Axis 3 Shear Axis 2 Compression Tension # Elems Checked CRB;TB;120;D-E;1-2(1) D/C Ratio 0.32 0.17 0.00 0.02 7 Element 850 854 852 853 CRB;TB;120;D-E;1-2(2) D/C Ratio 0.27 0.16 0.00 0.01 7 Element 879 879 874 874 CRB;TB;120;1-3;C-C D/C Ratio 0.45 0.19 0.00 0.01 12 Element 830 830 886 904 CRB;TB;120;1-3;B-C(2) D/C Ratio 0.59 0.21 0.00 0.01 12 Element 868 837 843 831 CRB;TB;120;1-3;B-C(1) D/C Ratio 0.77 0.25 0.00 0.01 12 Element 869 838 844 832 CRB;TB;120;1-3;B-B D/C Ratio 0.75 0.45 0.01 0.01 12 Element 833 833 833 833 CRB;TB;120;1-3;A-B(2) D/C Ratio 0.58 0.21 0.01 0.05 12 3.B-96 Element 871 914 914 914 CRB;TB;120;1-3;A-B(1) D/C Ratio 0.30 0.25 0.02 0.11 11 Element 872 909 909 909 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-51: Element Averaging of IP Shear Exceedance of Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 3 Element Length Thickness Shell Sxy IP Shear fc IP Shear Capacity (in) (in) (kip/in) Demand (psi) v8Acvfc (kip) (kip)

Shell 4942 46.5 60 81.53 3791.2 5000 1183.7 Shell 4943 46.5 60 20.73 964.2 5000 1183.7 Shell 4944 53 60 9.86 522.8 5000 1349.2 Shell 4945 37 60 7.16 264.9 5000 941.9 Shell 4946 37 60 6.07 224.6 5000 941.9 Shell 4947 37 60 5.77 213.5 5000 941.9 Shell 4948 55 60 6.37 350.5 5000 1400.1 Shell 4949 52.5 60 10.17 533.9 5000 1336.4 Shell 4950 44.25 60 25.91 1146.4 5000 1126.4 Shell 4951 44.25 60 69.39 3070.5 5000 1126.4 Sum = 11082.6 < 11531.5 Tier 2 3B-97 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-52: Element Averaging of Shear Friction Exceedance of Reactor Building Wall at Grid Line 3 Average of Shell Elements 4951/4431/4421: Design Check Horizontal Reinforcement (Local X)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Horizontal Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2 ) 2 (in )

11.416 7.563 1.938 20.917 28.080 0.745 Horiz. Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fxx (ksi) Strength (ksi) Stress D/C Ratio 1.39 3.34 0.416 Vertical Reinforcement (Local Y)

Membrane Tension As1 In-Plane Shear As2 OOP Moment As3 Total As As Provided Vertical Reinf. D/C Ratio (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) (in2) 9.867 7.563 0.821 18.251 28.080 0.650 Vertical Membrane Comp. Membrane Compression Membrane Compression Stress fyy (ksi) Strength (ksi) Stress D/C Ratio 1.15 3.34 0.345 3.B-98 Shear Friction IP Shear OOP Shear XZ-Plane Shear- Friction vVnx = vAvfxfy (lb) Sxy < vVnx ? Sxy < vVin-plane ? XZ-Plane Shear Capacity XZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfx (in2) (kip) 16.664 36,000.0 OK OK 129.8 0.374 YZ-Plane Shear- Friction vVny = vAvfyfy (lb) Sxy < vVny ? YZ-Plane Shear Capacity YZ-Plane D/C Ratio Avfy (in2) (kip)

Design Reports and Critical Section Details 18.213 36,000.0 OK 129.8 0.162 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-53: Analysis Cases for NuScale Power Modules Run Case ID Ground Motion Seed Soil Type NPM Module Concrete Section NPM Module Stiffness 1 Capitola 7 1 Cracked Nominal 2 Capitola 7 1 Uncracked Nominal 3 Capitola 7 6 Cracked Nominal 4 Capitola 7 6 Uncracked Nominal 5 Capitola 7 1 Cracked Reduced (Scaled to 77%)

6 Capitola 7 6 Cracked Reduced (Scaled to 77%)

Tier 2 3B-99 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-54: Strength Reduction Factors for Reinforced Concrete Design Strength Reduction Factor Value Tension controlled m=0.9 Compression controlled (without spiral) c=0.65 Shear and torsion v=0.75 Tier 2 3B-100 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3B-55: RXB Critical Sections Structure Type Location Figure Reference Critical Dimension*

Walls Wall at grid line 1 - West outer perimeter wall at foundation level 3B-8, 3B-9 5'-0" Wall at grid line 3 - Interior weir wall 3B-11, 3B-12 5'-0" Wall at grid line 3 - Interior upper stiffener 3B-11, 3B-13 4'-0" Wall at grid line 4 - Interior wall of RXB 3B-15, 3B-16 5'-0" Wall at grid line 4 - Interior wall of RXB 3B-15, 3B-17 4'-0" Wall at grid line 6 - Upper stiffener wall 3B-19, 3B-20 4'-0" Wall at grid line 6 - Pool wall 3B-19, 3B-21 5'-0" Wall at grid line 6 - Pool wall 3B-19, 3B-21 7'-6" Wall at grid line E - South exterior wall extending upward from foundation level 3B-23, 3B-24 5'-0" Slabs Slab at EL. 100'-0" - Slab at grade 3B-29, 3B-27 3'-0" Slab at EL. 181'-0" - Slab at roof 3B-29, 3B-30 4'-0" Pilasters 3.B-101 Pilasters at grid line A 3B-32, 3B-33, 3B-34, 3B-35, 5'-0" 3B-36 Beams Beam at EL. 75'-0" 3B-38, 3B-39 2'-0" Buttresses Buttress at EL. 126'-0" 3B-41 5'-0" NPM Bay Design Reports and Critical Section Details West wing wall 3B-43, 3B-44 5'-0" Pool wall 3B-46, 3B-47 5'-0"

  • Dimensions shall be acceptable if found within the tolerances specified in ACI 117-06 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-56: CRB Critical Sections Structure Type Location Figure Reference Critical Dimension*

Walls Wall at grid line 3 - Interior structural wall 3B-66, 3B-67 2'-0" Wall at grid line 4 - East exterior structural wall 3B-69, 3B-70 3'-0" Wall at grid line A - North exterior structural wall 3B-72, 3B-73 3'-0" Slabs Basemat foundation 3B-75, 3B-76 5'-0" Slab at EL. 100'-0" - Slab at grade 3B-78, 3B-79 3'-0" Slab at EL. 100'-0" - Slab at grade 3B-78, 3B-79 2'-0" Pilasters Pilasters at grid line 1 3B-81, 3B-82 3'-0" T-Beams T-Beam at EL. 120'-0" 3B-84, 3B-85 3'-0" T-Beam at EL. 120'-0" 3B-84, 3B-85 2'-0"

  • Dimensions shall be acceptable if found within the tolerances specified in ACI 117-06 Tier 2 3B-102 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Table 3B-57: D/C Ratios for Structural Components of the Lug Supports Structural Component Stress Check Demand Capacity D/C Shear Lug Plates Concrete Bearing 3.29 ksi 4.23 ksi 77.8%

Shear Lug Plates Plate Bending 41.1 in-k 67.5 in-k 60.9%

Shear Lug Plates Plate Shear 16.5 kips 90 kips 18.3%

(Steel Plate Check)

Shear Lug Plates Plate Shear 790 kips 2523 kips 31.3%

(Concrete Check-Single)

Shear Lug Plates Plate Shear 3500 kips 5573 kips 62.8%

(Concrete Check-Group)

Shear Lug Plates Shear Friction 3500 kips 6966 kips 50.2%

(At the tip of the lugs)

Through Bolts Tensile Stress 804 kips 1576 kips 51.0%

RXM Support Wall Punching Shear 888 kips 3394 kips 26.1%

Pool Wall Punching Shear 888 kips 4412 kips 20.1%

2" Liner Plate Bearing Stress 804 kips 1989 kips 40.4%

2" Liner Plate Bending Stress 11.6 ksi 100.8 ksi 11.5%

Tier 2 3B-103 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-1: Whitney Rectangular Stress Block Tier 2 3.B-104 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-2: SAP2000 Membrane and Shear Force Definition Tier 2 3B-105 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-3: SAP2000 Bending Moment Definition Tier 2 3B-106 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-4: SASSI2010 Membrane, Shear Force, and Bending Moment Definitions Tier 2 3B-107 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-5: SAP2000 Frame Element Results Definition Tier 2 3B-108 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-6: SASSI2010 Frame Element Results Definition Tier 2 3B-109 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-7: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at RXB Grid Line 1 (Looking West)

Tier 2 3.B-110 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-8: RXB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line 1 Wall Tier 2 3B-111 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-9: RXB Reinforcement Section View of Wall on Grid Line 1 Tier 2 3B-112 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-10: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at RXB Grid Line 3 (Looking West)

Tier 2 3.B-113 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-11: RXB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line 3 Wall Tier 2 3B-114 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-12: RXB Reinforcement Section View of Pool Weir Wall on Grid Line 3 Tier 2 3.B-115 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-13: RXB Reinforcement Section View of Stiffener Wall on Grid Line 3 Tier 2 3B-116 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-14: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at RXB Grid Line 4 (Looking West)

Tier 2 3.B-117 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-15: RXB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line 4 Wall Tier 2 3B-118 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-16: RXB Reinforcement Section View of 5 ft Thick Wall on Grid Line 4 Tier 2 3B-119 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-17: RXB Reinforcement Section View of 4 ft Thick Wall on Grid Line 4 Tier 2 3B-120 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-18: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at RXB Grid Line 6 (Looking West)

Tier 2 3.B-121 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-19: RXB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line 6 Wall Tier 2 3B-122 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-20: RXB Reinforcement Section View of Upper Stiffener Wall on Grid Line 6 Tier 2 3B-123 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-21: RXB Reinforcement Section Views of Pool Wall on Grid Line 6 Tier 2 3B-124 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-22: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at RXB Grid Line E (Looking North)

Tier 2 3.B-125 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-23: RXB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line E Wall Tier 2 3.B-126 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-24: RXB Reinforcement Section View of Wall on Grid Line E Tier 2 3B-127 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-25: SAP2000 Plan View and Shell Element Numbers on Slab at RXB EL 100-0 Tier 2 3.B-128 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-26: RXB Reinforcement Plan at EL 100'-0"

(( Withheld - See Part 9 Tier 2 3.B-129 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-27: RXB Reinforcement Section View of Slab at EL 100'-0" Tier 2 3.B-130 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-28: SAP2000 Plan View and Shell Element Numbers on RXB Roof Slab Tier 2 3.B-131 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-29: RXB Reinforcement Plan for Roof Slab Tier 2 3.B-132 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-30: RXB Reinforcement Section View of Roof Slab Tier 2 3.B-133 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-31: SAP2000 View and Frame Element Numbers of Pilasters on RXB Grid Line A Wall Tier 2 3.B-134 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-32: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Pilaster Type 1 Tier 2 3.B-135 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-33: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Pilaster Type 2 Tier 2 3.B-136 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-34: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Pilaster Type 3 Tier 2 3.B-137 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-35: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Pilaster Type 4 Tier 2 3.B-138 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-36: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Pilaster Type 5 Tier 2 3.B-139 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-37: SAP2000 View and Frame Element Numbers of Beams on RXB EL 75'-0" Slab Tier 2 3.B-140 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-38: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Type 1 T-Beams at EL 75'-0" Tier 2 3.B-141 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-39: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Type 2 T-Beams at EL 75'-0" Tier 2 3.B-142 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-40: SAP2000 View and Frame Element Numbers of Buttresses at Grid Line 1 on RXB EL. 126'-0" Tier 2 3.B-143 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-41: RXB Reinforcement Detail for Buttress Type 1 Tier 2 3.B-144 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-42: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers for West Wing Wall at Grid Line 4 Tier 2 3.B-145 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-43: RXB Reinforcement Elevation at RXB Grid Line 4 Wall Tier 2 3.B-146 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-44: RXB Reinforcement Section View of 5 Foot Thick Wall on RXB Grid Line 4 Tier 2 3B-147 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 3B-45: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at RXB Wall at Grid Line B (Looking North) 3.B-148 Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-46: RXB Reinforcement Elevation at RXB Wall at Grid Line B Tier 2 3.B-149 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-47: RXB Reinforcement Section View of RXB Wall at Grid Line B Tier 2 3B-150 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 3B-48: Elevation View of the NPM Base Support at RXB Pool Floor CNV SUPPORT SKIRT PASSIVE SUPPORT RING SEAL WELD BAY 3.B-151 EMBEDDED BEARING PLATE CONCRETE FOUNDATION Design Reports and Critical Section Details Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-49: Plan View of NPM Base Support Passive Support Ring Tier 2 3.B-152 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 3B-50: Plan View of NPM Base Support Bearing Plate 120° K K 2X ALIGNMENT PIN RECESS 36X CONCRETE ANCHOR WELDED TO 22.5° UNDERSIDE OF EMBEDDED PLATE 3.B-153 W W 30X Ø1 1/2-6 UNC 4.00 Design Reports and Critical Section Details V V MATERIAL: ASTM A965, GRADE F304 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-51: NPM Lug Support Plan View and Details Tier 2 3.B-154 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-52: NPM Lug Location Tier 2 3B-155 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-53: NPM Lug Support SAP2000 Model Tier 2 3B-156 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-54: NPM Lug Support SAP2000 Model Close-Up Tier 2 3B-157 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-55: NPM Lug Support Liner Plate Section Tier 2 3.B-158 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-56: NPM Lug Support Liner Plate and Shear Lugs (Shown in Red) Tier 2 3.B-159 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-57: NPM Lug Support Model showing internal Stiffener Plates Tier 2 3.B-160 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-58: NPM Lug Support Loading (W-Lug-PY+) Tier 2 3.B-161 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-59: NPM Lug Support Loading (W-Lug-PY-) Tier 2 3.B-162 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-60: NPM Lug Support SAP2000 Model Restraints Tier 2 3.B-163 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-61: Stiffener Plate Section Cut Groups (Fins) Tier 2 3.B-164 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-62: S11 Stress plotted on the Deflected Shape due to Load Combination W-Lug-PY+ (psi) Tier 2 3.B-165 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-63: Not Used Tier 2 3.B-166 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-64: Not Used Tier 2 3.B-167 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-65: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at CRB Grid Line 3 (Looking North) Tier 2 3.B-168 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-66: CRB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line 3 Wall Tier 2 3.B-169 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-67: CRB Reinforcement Section View of Wall on Grid Line 3 Tier 2 3B-170 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-68: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at CRB Grid Line 4 (Looking West) Tier 2 3.B-171 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-69: CRB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line 4 Wall Tier 2 3.B-172 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-70: CRB Reinforcement Section View of Wall on Grid Line 4 Tier 2 3B-173 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-71: SAP2000 Elevation View and Shell Element Numbers at Grid Line A (Looking West) Tier 2 3B-174 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-72: CRB Reinforcement Elevation at Grid Line A Wall Tier 2 3.B-175 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-73: CRB Reinforcement Section View of Wall on Grid Line A Tier 2 3B-176 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-74: CRB Basemat View of Finite Element Model Tier 2 3B-177 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-75: CRB Reinforcement Plan of Basemat Foundation Tier 2 3B-178 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-76: Cross Section of CRB Basemat Showing Reinforcing Steel Tier 2 3.B-179 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-77: SAP2000 Plan View and Shell Element Numbers on CRB Slab at EL. 100'-0" Tier 2 3B-180 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-78: CRB Reinforcement Plan at EL. 100-0 Tier 2 3.B-181 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-79: CRB Reinforcement Section Views of Slab at EL. 100-0 Tier 2 3.B-182 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-80: SAP2000 View and Frame Element Numbers of Pilasters on CRB Grid Line 1 Wall Tier 2 3.B-183 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-81: CRB Reinforcement Detail for Pilaster Type 1 Tier 2 3.B-184 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-82: CRB Reinforcement Detail for Pilaster Type 2 Tier 2 3.B-185 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-83: SAP2000 View and Frame Element Numbers of T-Beams on CRB EL. 120'-0" Slab Tier 2 3B-186 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-84: CRB Reinforcement Detail for T-Beam (Type 1) at EL. 120'-0" Tier 2 3.B-187 Revision 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design Reports and Critical Section Details Figure 3B-85: CRB Reinforcement Detail for T-Beam (Type 2) at EL. 120'-0" Tier 2 3.B-188 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment Appendix 3C Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment 3C.1 Purpose This appendix describes the Environmental Qualification (EQ) program methodology for qualifying electrical equipment and mechanical equipment in accordance with the applicable requirements. The environmental qualification and seismic and dynamic qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment is addressed in Sections 3.11 and 3.10, respectively. This appendix defines the qualification methods employed to ensure the functionality of mechanical and electrical equipment (including instrumentation and controls) required to perform a design function related to safety during the full range of normal and accident loadings (including seismic), and under all normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions. 3C.2 Scope This appendix presents the methods and procedures for qualifying electrical and mechanical equipment to a range of environments to which the equipment could be exposed during normal and abnormal conditions or design basis events (DBE). These methods and procedures are applicable to mechanical and electrical equipment associated with systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal or are otherwise essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment. 3C.3 Introduction This appendix specifies the plant environmental conditions to which equipment that performs a design function related to safety, listed in Section 3.11, is designed and qualified. The environmental conditions are defined for plant conditions, including normal and abnormal operating conditions, and accident conditions including post-accident operations. The accident conditions considered are assumed events that are not reasonably expected to occur over the course of plant life and that could potentially result in creating adverse environmental conditions for qualified equipment that performs a design function related to safety. The accident conditions that are postulated are based on conservative assumptions. Pressure, temperature, relative humidity, radiation, chemical conditions, spray/wetting, and submergence are the primary environmental parameters addressed in this appendix. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.49, the environmental conditions that equipment required to perform design functions related to safety are designed and qualified to are the result of the most limiting design basis accident (DBA). The design and qualification parameters for the equipment meet the EQ program acceptance criteria. The equipment qualification parameters do not include any margins that may be required to satisfy environmental qualification requirements in other applicable code and standards. The radiation parameters in this appendix provide a conservative basis for equipment qualification and are not applicable to personnel access requirements. Tier 2 3C-1 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment The following plant areas contain equipment that performs a design function related to safety for equipment qualification:

  • Reactor Building (RXB)
  • Control Building (CRB)

The CRB and the electrical equipment rooms on RXB elevations 75'-0" and 86'-0" are, by design, considered mild environments. This section provides background for the EQ program and presents a summary of the program objectives, a program outline, and definitions for terms used in this document. Section 3C.4 identifies qualification criteria. Section 3C.5 presents design specifications. Section 3C.6 presents the equipment qualification methods, which includes: type-testing, analyses, operating experience, a combination of methods, and supplemental methods to aid qualification. Section 3C.7 and Section 3C.8 describe the documentation, including data packages, test reports, and maintenance records needed to support the equipment qualification program. 3C.4 Qualification Criteria General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 4, and 23 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A; Quality Assurance Criteria III, XI, and XVII of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B; and 10 CFR 50.49 establish the regulatory requirements for this program. Electrical and active mechanical equipment required to perform design functions related to safety, including instrumentation, must be qualified to operate in environments associated with design basis conditions. GDC 4 requires that structures, systems, and components that perform design functions related to safety be designed to accommodate the environmental effects associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, such as a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The primary objective of environmental qualification is to demonstrate with reasonable assurance that equipment for which a qualified life or condition has been established can perform its design function related to safety without experiencing common-cause failures before, during, and after applicable design basis events. The environmental design requirements apply to equipment required to perform their design function related to safety, including both mild and harsh environments. The environmental qualification procedures described in this appendix define the conditions for which equipment required to perform a design function related to safety must be qualified. Electrical equipment required to perform a design function related to safety located in a harsh environment is qualified in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. Active mechanical equipment required to perform a design function related to safety located in a harsh environment is qualified to comply with the requirements of GDC 4 by incorporating the design-basis environmental conditions into the design process. Mechanical equipment that performs an active design function related to safety during or following exposure to harsh environmental conditions is qualified in accordance with ASME QME-1, Appendix QR-B (Reference 3C-4) with the following exceptions: QR-B5200, Identification and Specification of Qualification Requirements, (g) material activation energy. Tier 2 3C-2 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment QR-B5300 Selection of Qualification Methods for determination and recording of shelf life of nonmetallics. QR-B5500 Documentation, (h) shelf life preservation requirements. These exceptions are addressed with the following alternatives: QR-B5200, Identification and Specification of Qualification Requirements, (g) material's activation energy (in conjunction with one of the above identification methods only and that is based on the material's critical failure mechanism in the intended service). Alternative: Listing the activation energy as a required identification method for commercial grade item dedication purposes has been shown to conflict with existing industry guidance regarding dedication activities (see ADAMS ML18208A208). Identification methods identified per QR-B5200 items (a) through (g) are acceptable for identification purposes for qualification, and no alternative is therefore provided. QR-B5300, Selection of Qualification Methods, last paragraph which states, The shelf life of all nonmetallics, and any applicable storage limitations, should be determined and recorded in the qualification documentation. Alternative: Shelf life and preservation requirements are documented in accordance with the NQA-1 2008, Requirement 13 and Subpart 2.2, in lieu of ASME QME-1 2007, Appendix QR-B5300. These requirements are not included in the environmental qualification record file, but are documented separately. QR-B5500, Documentation, (h) shelf life preservation requirements. Alternative: Shelf life preservation requirements are documented in accordance with the NQA-1 2008, Requirement 13 and Subpart 2.2 in lieu of ASME QME-1 2007, Appendix QR-B5500, item (h). These requirements are not included in the environmental qualification record file, but are documented separately. Mechanical and electrical equipment required to perform a design function related to safety located in mild environments is qualified in accordance with the provisions of GDC 4. For each piece of equipment selected for environmental qualification, the environmental parameters and the qualification process is listed in the associated equipment qualification record file (EQRF). 3C.4.1 Environmental Conditions The environmental conditions considered in the qualification process are pressure, temperature, humidity, radiation, flooding, chemistry effects, aging and synergistic effects. The appropriate margins to be included during qualification are addressed in Tier 2 3C-3 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment the description of the qualification program. The applied margin considers the most severe effects identified through industry operational experience or those identified by analysis. The plant environmental conditions are characterized as either harsh or mild. Harsh Environment The environmental conditions existing before, during and after a design basis event constitute a harsh environment. The consequences of a design basis event include severe or elevated effects of pressure, temperature, humidity, radiation, chemistry, and submergence. Equipment qualified to operate in a harsh environment must operate without a loss of capability to perform their design function related to safety. The equipment requiring qualification for a harsh environment, as identified in Section 3.11, includes the following:

  • equipment within the containment and outside the containment under the bioshield
  • equipment required to detect, mitigate, monitor the event or those related to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown
  • equipment connected to, supporting, or in the vicinity of equipment in either of the two preceding categories
  • equipment subject to the environmental effects of a rod ejection accident (environmental conditions are bounded by inadvertent opening of one reactor vent valve)
  • equipment subject to environmental conditions that are more severe for other parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure, humidity, flood level, spray/wetting, radiation) such as those resulting from a fuel handling accident or moderate-energy line break Instruments and devices requiring qualification include the associated sensors, and supporting loop components. The supporting components of a sensor, such as cables, connectors, terminals, junction boxes, preamplifiers, or other signal processing equipment, is qualified for the environmental conditions at the component's location.

Electrical equipment in a harsh environment is qualified according to the requirements of IEEE Std. 323-1974 (Reference 3C-2). Mechanical equipment located in harsh environmental zones is designed to perform under appropriate environmental conditions. The primary focus for mechanical equipment concerns materials that are sensitive to environmental effects (e.g., seals, gaskets, lubricants, fluids for hydraulic systems, and diaphragms). The harsh environmental zones within the RXB are listed in Table 3C-1. Mild Environment A mild environment is never more severe than the normal plant environment, including during anticipated operational occurrences. To qualify equipment operating in a mild environment, the environmental conditions are described quantitatively in the equipment specification that is provided to the vendor or supplier. Certification Tier 2 3C-4 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment from the vendor or supplier that the equipment will operate in the environment described in the specification is sufficient to qualify the equipment. Additional analysis or testing may be required for seismic and aging qualification. IEEE Std. 323-2003 (Reference 3C-1), as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.209, "Guidelines for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants," addresses qualification of computer-based I&C systems to mild environments that may affect their performance. Parameters that can affect computer-based I&C systems are ionizing doses in a mild environment and smoke. Qualification of computer-based I&C components for the mild environment that can exist during a DBE is necessary to assure that computer-based I&C systems can perform their design functions related to safety. Other equipment located in a mild environment with no significant aging mechanisms does not require environmental qualification. For equipment requiring seismic qualification, pre-aging prior to the seismic testing is necessary only when there is a known correlation where aging adversely affects seismic performance. (Note that EPRI NP-3326 (Reference 3C-7) indicates for most equipment there is no aging seismic correlation). 3C.4.2 Aging Equipment is qualified for aging by testing and analysis. The qualification process considers natural aging effects that are present during the installed service life of the equipment. The objective of the qualification program is to place the test specimen(s) in an end of life condition prior to exposure to simulated accident conditions. All significant types of degradation that can affect the ability of the equipment to perform its design function related to safety during or following exposure to harsh environmental conditions must be considered in the qualification process. Typical aging mechanisms that are addressed as part of a qualification test program includes:

  • Thermal aging or thermal degradation
  • Radiation aging
  • Cyclic aging or wear related degradation Periodic inspection, testing, and calibration can monitor equipment for aging effects which are otherwise difficult to quantify or are not able to be fully simulated by the accelerated aging applied during a qualification test program.

The concept of condition based qualification may be used to supplement the concept of qualified life. As the qualified life of the equipment approaches the end of its theoretical qualified life, periodic condition monitoring may be implemented to determine if actual aging is occurring at a slower rate such that further qualified service is possible based on the condition monitoring results. The use of condition monitoring is tied to the ability to monitor one or more condition indicators to determine whether equipment remains in a qualified condition. The trend of the condition indicator is determined during the performance of age conditioning of the test specimen during the qualification testing. The condition indicator must be measurable, linked to Tier 2 3C-5 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment functional degradation of the qualified equipment, and have a consistent trend from unaged through the limit of the qualified pre-accident condition. Thermal Aging As stated in NUREG-0588 (Reference 3C-16), the Arrhenius methodology is considered an acceptable method of addressing accelerated thermal aging. The development of the accelerated thermal aging parameters and activation energies shall consider or be based on the applicable guidance in IEEE Std. 1 (Reference 3C-9), IEEE Std. 98 (Reference 3C-10), IEEE Std. 99 (Reference 3C-11), IEEE Std. 101 (Reference 3C-12), and IEEE Std. 1205 (Reference 3C-13). The selection of activation energies shall be based on material properties that are representative of the design function related to safety of the item. Justification shall be provided for any use of Thermogrametric Analysis to establish an activation energy that demonstrates that the resulting qualified life is conservative or representative of actual degradation under normal service conditions. The minimum acceptable accelerated aging time shall be greater than 150 hours. Thermal aging of materials where diffusion limited oxidation effects have the potential to not fully simulate actual thermal aging degradation effects, the thermal acceleration rates are adjusted to minimize or otherwise account for these effects. Radiation Aging Radiation aging may be performed separately from the accident radiation exposure or the accident radiation exposure may be performed as part of the radiation aging. Radiation aging shall be performed using either a Cobalt-60 or Cesium-137 source. The maximum acceptable dose rate is 1.0 MRad/hr (10 k Gr/hr). For radiation aging of materials where diffusion limited oxidation effects have the potential to not fully simulate actual aging degradation effects from irradiation, the dose rates should be adjusted to minimize or otherwise account for these effects. Cyclic Wear Aging Cyclic wear aging is used to simulate electrical or mechanical degradation of the equipment due to normal operation of the equipment. This aging is intended to simulate wear related degradation as well as fatigue effects. The definition of the required number of cycles to be simulated during the qualification test program shall consider expected service conditions and be based on a conservative estimation of equipment cycles during power operation, module startup, module shutdown, outages, maintenance activities, surveillance activities, transients, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident conditions. Qualified Life Objective The qualified life objective shall be based on a specified set of harsh environment service conditions. Pre-service conditions shall be considered if significant aging occurs before equipment is placed into service. Qualified life can be demonstrated by age conditioning a test sample to simulate effects of significant aging mechanisms during a time equal to the qualified life objective. An adjunct to establishing a qualified life objective is to establish an end-condition objective of equipment condition indicators Tier 2 3C-6 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment that correlate to the ability of equipment to perform its design function related to safety. In this case, the end condition is the basis of qualification, and the time to reach that end condition in service may be more or less than the qualified life established by age conditioning. The fundamental objective of qualified life of equipment ensures that the equipment possesses the capability to perform its required design function(s) related to safety at the end of the qualified life with demonstrated margin to failure. Design Life Equipment in mild environment locations is expected to perform satisfactorily during the design life (Reference 3C-1) for the specified set of mild environmental service conditions. The design life of equipment is obtained from manufacturer's literature. Surveillance or trending programs also assist in verifying the design life or the need for re-evaluation. Shelf Life The equipment and material controlled storage program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This program verifies that equipment is handled and stored in accordance with the manufacturer's or vendor's recommendations, the engineering requirements, or general industry practices. In addition, the shelf life of non-metallic materials is considered and used in specifying the maximum allowable time a component or material can be stored. Materials are removed and replaced when they reach their established shelf life. Qualified Life Equipment in harsh environment locations is expected to perform satisfactorily during the qualified life (Reference 3C-16) for the specified set of harsh environmental service conditions for the required operating time with margin to failure. The margin included ensures that the accident function can be performed if the accident occurred just prior the item's replacement at the end of the qualified life. 3C.4.3 Synergistic Effects Environmental qualification in accordance 10 CFR 50.49 requires that synergistic effects be considered. Regulatory Guide 1.89, Revision 1, Section C.5.a provides further guidance for addressing synergisms. The synergistic relationship between multiple stresses usually cannot be deduced from physical principles; rather, an experimental approach must be employed. Synergistic stresses usually require extensive testing to reveal their magnitudes, since most interaction effects are minute by comparison to the primary effects, and thus require significantly more experimental evidence to identify. Current research, as referenced below, indicates that synergistic effects can typically be categorized under two main headings:

  • Test sequence effects - The sequence in which radiation and thermal aging exposures occur is an important consideration. Radiation combined with elevated temperatures or radiation followed by elevated temperatures may produce more Tier 2 3C-7 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment material degradation than when thermal aging precedes radiation exposure (NUREG/CR-3629 (Reference 3C-14)).

  • Radiation dose rate effects - For many materials, it has been observed that lower dose rates produce more degradation than a higher dose rate for the same total applied dose (NUREG/CR-2157 (Reference 3C-15)).

Test Sequence Effects An important aging consideration is the possible existence of synergistic effects when multiple stress environments such as radiation and elevated temperatures, are applied simultaneously. Currently, sequential exposure is the only commercially available means of testing; no commercial facility offers simultaneous steam and radiation exposure. Although sequential and simultaneous tests can produce variances in degradation, the differences tend to be minor compared to total degradation. The possibility that significant synergistic effects may exist is addressed by the using the "worst-case" aging sequence, conservative accelerated aging parameters and conservative, DBE test levels to provide confidence that any synergistic effects are enveloped. Radiation Dose Effects The need for qualification due to radiation exposure is evaluated for each piece of equipment. The radiation environment is based on the type of radiation, the total dose expected during normal operation over the installed life of the equipment, and the radiation environment associated with the most severe design basis accident during or following which the equipment is required to remain functional. In general, dose rate effects occur over long periods and, therefore, need only be addressed during the radiation conditions that occur during normal plant operation. 3C.4.4 Operating Time Equipment required to be environmentally qualified has one or more of the following design functions related to safety: reactivity control, decay heat removal, post-accident monitoring, containment isolation, maintenance of RCS pressure boundary integrity, control room habitability, event severity mitigation or system support functions. For each function, a period of operability is assigned that ranges from less than 1 hour to a maximum of 2400 hours. The assignment of these post accident operating times is separated into the five different time frames that are related to plant status or system functional requirements. These operating time designations and durations are summarized in Table 3C-4. Equipment that performs its design function related to safety prior to significant changes in its environment may be qualified for shorter durations. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.89, justification for shorter duration includes:

  • the consideration of a spectrum of pipe break sizes
  • the potential need for the equipment later in an event or during recovery operations Tier 2 3C-8 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment

  • Subsequent failure of the equipment is shown to not be detrimental to plant safety or to mislead the operator Post-accident operating times for equipment to be qualified shall be specified in the EQ Master List and as shown in Table 3.11-1.

3C.4.5 Performance Criterion The qualification test program demonstrates the capability of the equipment to meet the design function related to safety performance requirements defined in the EQRF (Section 3C.8). As stated previously, the primary objective of qualification is to demonstrate that equipment, for which a qualified life or condition has been established, can perform its design functions related to safety without experiencing common-cause failures before, during, and after applicable DBEs. The continued capability for this equipment and its interfaces (Reference 3C-16) to meet or exceed its specification requirements is provided through an operational program that includes, but is not limited to, design control, quality control, qualification, installation, maintenance, periodic testing, and surveillance. 3C.4.6 Margin The purpose of using margin in the qualification program is to account for commercial production variability, errors in establishing satisfactory performance, and errors in experimental measurements, thereby providing greater assurance that the equipment can perform under the specified service conditions. Table 3C-5 presents the margins for various environmental parameters. The margins shown in the table are those recommended in IEEE Std. 323 (Reference 3C-1). 3C.4.7 Treatment of Failures Any failure to meet the acceptance criteria is analyzed to determine the cause. Equipment modifications, equipment retesting, or equipment use limitations are imposed as necessary to address the failure. 3C.5 Design Specifications The equipment design specification identifies the applicable codes and standards, required operating times, performance requirements, design functions related to safety, operational service conditions, environmental service conditions, accepted methods of qualification, and acceptance criteria. The design specification also provides the basis for establishing the EQ of the specific equipment or the family of equipment. Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment The environmental conditions for which equipment is qualified are the most severe conditions resulting from the DBE for which the equipment is required to perform its design function related to safety. The equipment qualification life of electrical and mechanical equipment is established as a conservative 60 years unless otherwise noted on the equipment's specification. Periodic inspection and testing shall be used during the life of the equipment to verify its ongoing qualification. Tier 2 3C-9 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment The amount of time, after a design basis event, for which some equipment must remain functional, may be a few minutes or several hours depending on its design function related to safety. Environmental Qualification of Mechanical Equipment Both passive and active mechanical equipment (Reference 3C-3) is qualified according to the criteria and methodology described in this document. Non-metallic components like O-rings, seals, gaskets, and lubricants for mechanical equipment with a design function related to safety are also qualified in accordance with these criteria. Equipment that only has the design function related to safety of maintaining its structural integrity, for support or to protect the integrity of a pressure boundary, is qualified in accordance with the requirements specified in Section 3.11. The design specification will also identify if qualification to ASME QME-1 is required for active mechanical equipment. 3C.5.1 Normal Operating Conditions Normal operating conditions are summarized in Table 3C-6. For qualification under normal operating conditions, the equipment is mounted, connected, interfaced, and operated in a manner that simulates its normal inservice conditions, and the equipment's design functions related to safety are demonstrated during exposure to normal service conditions. Data are recorded for later reference as required by Section 3C.8. Normal Radiation Dose The normal radiation integrated doses for equipment are based on the maximum normal reactor coolant system (RCS) radionuclide activities and system parameters to determine bounding normal cumulative doses both inside and outside of the containment, as shown in Table 3C-6. These values were determined based on 60 years (bounding environmental qualification life) of continuous operation and steady-state operating conditions, and take into account radiation exposure because of recirculatory fluid for equipment outside the containment. The integrated doses shown in Table 3C-6 represent the direct dose to equipment and bound any additional airborne doses. 3C.5.2 Seismic The methods, including applicable seismic loads, used for the seismic qualification of mechanical, electrical, and I&C equipment are addressed in Sections 3.7 and 3.10. 3C.5.3 Containment Test Environment The design pressure of containment is 1000 psia, though it is hydrostatically tested at the manufacturing facility at a hydrostatic pressure of 1250 psia (1.25 times design pressure). Subsequent testing will be conducted as described in Section 6.2.6. Tier 2 3C-10 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment 3C.5.4 Design Basis Event Conditions Design Basis Events (DBE) Design basis events are defined as normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, and design basis accidents as analyzed within the scope of Section 3.6 and Chapter 15. Design-Basis Accidents (DBAs) The design basis accidents were reviewed and evaluated to determine which DBAs are addressed in FSAR Chapter 15. Based on this review, the following DBAs are evaluated to determine the mechanical and electrical equipment that requires environmental qualification. FSAR Section 15.1.5 - steam system piping failure inside and outside of containment. This covers main steam line breaks (MSLB) inside and outside of containment. For the purpose of environmental qualification, main steam line breaks are considered inside the CNV even though the main steam piping is classified as leak before break (LBB). FSAR Section 15.2.8 - feedwater system pipe break inside and outside of containment. This covers feedwater line breaks (FWLB) inside and outside of containment. For the purpose of environmental qualification, feedwater line breaks are considered inside the CNV even though the FW piping is classified as leak before break (LBB). FSAR Section 15.4.8 - rod ejection accident (REA) reflects a potential break in the RCS pressure boundary. The equipment relied upon to mitigate this accident is the same as that used for the spectrum of small break loss of coolant accidents addressed by FSAR Section 15.6.5. The REA is analyzed as a reactivity event. FSAR Section 15.6.5 - loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) from spectrum of postulated pipe breaks within the RCS pressure boundary inside and outside of containment. There are no large break LOCA events for the NuScale design. The small break LOCAs are the result of CVCS pipe rupture events that are postulated inside or outside of containment. FSAR Section 15.7.4 - radiological consequences of fuel handling accidents. This covers the FHAs within the RXB pool area. Infrequent Events (IE) FSAR Section 15.6.2 - radiological consequences of failure of small lines carrying primary coolant outside of containment. Similar to FSAR Section 15.6.5, this covers chemical and volume control systems (CVCS) pipe rupture events that are postulated inside or outside of containment. Other Design Basis Events FSAR Section 3.6 - high energy line breaks (HELB) outside containment. This covers HELB outside of containment that are not already addressed by FSAR Sections 15.1.5, Tier 2 3C-11 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment 15.2.8, or 15.6.5, such as the postulated rupture of the module heatup system (MHS) piping in the gallery areas of the RXB. FSAR Section 3.6 - moderate energy line breaks (MELB) outside containment. Normal and Bounding Conditions Containment vessel and reactor building pressure and humidity experienced during the indicated DBE are shown in Table 3C-7. Equipment that is required to perform a design function related to safety, and could potentially be subjected to the design basis environments, is qualified to these conditions for the required operating time. RPV and containment vessel metal temperatures in the lower (liquid) space with corresponding liquid temperatures for the bounding DBAs are shown on Figure 3C-1. RPV and containment vessel metal temperatures in the upper (vapor) space with corresponding vapor temperatures for the bounding DBAs are shown on Figure 3C-2. The average vapor temperatures at the top of module for the bounding DBAs, and assuming a vented bioshield, are shown on Figure 3C-3. The maximum vapor temperatures for elevation 145' in the RXB from the same bounding DBAs are shown on Figure 3C-4. Design Basis Event Radiation Doses NuScale Topical Report, TR-0915-17565-P (Reference 3C-5) provides the methodology for determining the accident source terms for equipment following design basis events. The limiting event and associated source terms from the design basis accidents discussed above were used to determine total integrated doses for equipment qualification. The accident conditions integrated doses within the reactor building were determined using the maximum normal core radionuclide inventory. The maximum normal core inventory bounds the equilibrium cycle burnup for the NuScale Power Module reactor and is representative of operating cycle characteristics for environmental qualification purposes. The required dose used for environmental qualification considers the total integrated dose consisting of the normal dose plus the accident dose corresponding to the required post-accident operating time. The normal dose considers gamma and neutron effects, while the accident dose considers the gamma and beta dose that is expected at the equipment location. Based on the above, the integrated doses following a design basis event are shown in Table 3C-8. For discussion on gamma and beta radiation effects, refer to Section 3.11.5. 3C.6 Qualification Methods A qualification program plan defines tests, inspections, performance evaluation, acceptance criteria, and required analysis to demonstrate that, when called upon, the qualified equipment can perform its specified design function(s) related to safety for the required post-accident operating time with margin to failure. Tier 2 3C-12 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment This section describes the methodologies used to qualify equipment. Alternative approaches are available; however, the equipment vendor selects the methods best applied to the equipment. The result is an auditable record demonstrating that the equipment can perform its design function related to safety, under the specified service conditions, if an accident occurred at anytime during its Qualified Life. IEEE Std. 323-2003 (as endorsed by RG 1.209 for computer-based digital I&C equipment in a mild environment) and IEEE Std. 323-1974 allow various qualification methods (e.g., testing, analysis, operating experience, or a combination of methods) as applicable to the equipment scope. Although type testing is the preferred method of qualification, a qualification program usually involves some combination of these methods. The qualification methods used depend on factors such as the:

  • materials used in construction of the equipment
  • applicable normal, abnormal, and DBE service conditions
  • operational requirements during and after accidents
  • nature of the required design function(s) related to safety
  • size of the equipment
  • dynamic characteristics of the expected failure modes (e.g., structural or functional)

In general, analysis may be used to supplement test data. 3C.6.1 Type Testing The type test shall demonstrate that equipment performance meets or exceeds the design function related to safety requirements. Type test conditions shall meet or exceed specified service conditions. Appropriate margin shall be added to design basis event parameters if not otherwise included in the specified service conditions. The type test program is designed to demonstrate that the equipment can perform its design functions related to safety within the accuracy and response time requirements applicable for normal, abnormal, and DBE service conditions. The type test consists of a demonstration of design functions related to safety under a planned sequence of environmental tests both before and after age conditioning (Reference 3C-1). Regulatory Guide 1.180 specifies electromagnetic compatibility design requirements for electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference and power surges for equipment and is independent of the EQ Program. A test plan is prepared at the beginning of the test program, which includes the qualification methodology, its intent and purpose, and a description of the tests in sufficient detail to demonstrate compatibility with specified requirements. As a minimum, the plan includes:

  • applicable codes and standards
  • equipment description
  • number of test specimens
  • acceptance criteria Tier 2 3C-13 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment

  • failure definition
  • service conditions (environmental and operational)
  • testing sequence
  • aging technique with justification
  • test levels that envelope or equal the service conditions
  • parameters to be monitored
  • test equipment to be used
  • mounting and connection methods
  • qualified life goal and design life
  • documentation to be maintained Similarity Analysis may be employed to demonstrate that the test results obtained for one piece of equipment are applicable to a similar piece of equipment. Documentation of this analysis conforms with the guidelines in IEEE Std. 323-1974, IEEE Std. 323-2003 and IEEE Std. 627-1980 (Reference 3C-8).

3C.6.2 Analysis Analytical techniques are used in qualification in a variety of ways, including evaluating aging effects, demonstrating qualification for particular DBE conditions, and evaluating differences between installed and tested equipment. Qualification by analysis requires a logical assessment or a valid mathematical model of the equipment to be qualified. When quantitative analysis is used for qualification, it needs to be supported by test data, operating experience, or physical laws of nature to demonstrate that the equipment can perform its design function(s) related to safety under specified conditions. 3C.6.3 Operating Experience Operating experience can serve as a basis for determining or modifying the Qualified Life of equipment, including systems, elements, components, modules, and other constituent parts. Auditable data are maintained for environmental qualification of equipment qualified on the basis of operating experience that addresses the following criteria:

  • the equipment cited for operating experience is identical or justifiably similar to the equipment to be qualified
  • the equipment cited for operating experience has operated under service conditions that equal, or exceed in severity, service conditions for which the equipment is to be qualified, and has performed its design function related to safety under these conditions Tier 2 3C-14 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment

  • the normal and abnormal service condition requirements were satisfied prior to the occurrence of the DBE conditions
  • margin has been considered in determining the accident service conditions for the equipment to be qualified Operating experience has been used to address the qualification of mechanical equipment principally because of the severe process conditions experienced by mechanical equipment during normal service applications.

Operating experience has been used on an infrequent basis to qualify electrical equipment to harsh environments, principally because LOCA-type pipe break accidents rarely occur. Therefore, qualification of electrical components can be qualified using operating experience as a basis when used with a combination of other methods per Section 3C.6.4. When the above criteria are met the equipment may be qualified. 3C.6.4 Combination of Methods Equipment may be qualified by test, analysis, previous operating experience, or any combination of these three methods. Using a combination of methods may be appropriate under a variety of circumstances, such as:

  • equipment is too complex for analysis alone or too large for testing alone
  • test data are available on samples of similar design and materials that are of different sizes, so extrapolation may be possible
  • verification of a mathematical model using partial type test to determine mode shapes and resonant frequencies
  • operating experience provides the basis for developing simulated aging techniques
  • analysis of an assembly to determine the environment to which components are to be tested
  • two subassemblies that have been tested and qualified separately are combined into a complete assembly, and analysis of certain parameters (e.g., individual subassemblies' error rates and response times) demonstrates that the combination is also qualified The combined qualification demonstrates that the equipment can perform its design function related to safety under normal, abnormal, and DBE service conditions throughout its Qualified Life. Combined qualification provides auditable data by which the various primary qualification methods may be brought together to satisfy the qualification program requirements.

3C.7 Equipment Qualification Maintenance Requirements The equipment qualification maintenance requirements consider condition monitoring and preventive maintenance activities to ensure effective aging management. Tier 2 3C-15 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment These maintenance requirements documents typically consist of the following sections:

1) Equipment Description Tag numbers, equipment numbers, description of function, location, manufacturer, and model number; general information for completing maintenance orders.
2) Technical References Reference information useful for preparing for or conducting maintenance.
3) Installation and Maintenance Requirements a) Installation Requirements Tasks essential to achieving installations that conform to EQ requirements; derived from vendor technical manuals and equipment EQ test reports.

b) Electrical Connection Interface and Data Requirements The requirements for environmentally qualified connections; the information represents the current physical configuration. c) Maintenance Requirements Tasks and their frequencies necessary to maintaining the equipment's EQ; derived from vendor technical manuals and equipment EQ test reports; to be incorporated into the plant surveillance test procedures or preventive maintenance program, as applicable. d) Post-Maintenance Test Requirements Testing to be performed after EQ maintenance is completed. e) Condition Monitoring Requirements Monitoring required to detect and assess degradation of materials or performance; derived from review of qualification documentation, evaluation of degrading mechanisms, and engineering judgment.

4) Replacement Parts The description, manufacturer, and model number of parts needed to maintain EQ equipment; includes items routinely used in the maintenance activity.

3C.7.1 On-going Qualification The equipment qualification program may employ on-going qualification, though this method is not acceptable as a sole means for qualifying equipment for DBE conditions. Its use is generally limited to areas subjected to mild environment conditions or as a method in which to modify the Qualified Life that was established using another qualification method. Supplemental test, analysis, or experience data to address equipment qualification and performance during and after a seismic DBE is also required. Tier 2 3C-16 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment 3C.8 Documentation The equipment qualification program documentation consists of equipment qualification data packages, equipment qualification test reports, and qualification maintenance requirements. Equipment Qualification Record File The EQRF for each equipment item contains the documentation that demonstrates that the equipment or system is environmentally qualified for its application, and can accomplish its specified design functions related to safety. An equipment item refers to equipment categorized by manufacturer and model, which is representative of identical or similar equipment in plant areas potentially exposed to the same bounding environmental conditions during and after a design basis event. Documentation that supports EQ for the equipment is compiled in the EQRF or referenced therein. The elements of the EQRF include: equipment identification, interfaces, qualified life, design functions related to safety, service conditions (e.g., normal, abnormal, DBE), qualification program plan, and qualification program implementation following the guidance of IEEE Std. 323-1974 (Reference 3C-2) for harsh environment applications and IEEE Std. 323-2003 (Reference 3C-1) for mild environment applications. Equipment Qualification Test Reports The equipment qualification test report is prepared by the equipment vendor or an independent testing laboratory. This report documents the tests that demonstrate the capability to meet specified functional requirements under specified environmental conditions and operational parameters. These tests subject one or more equipment samples to conditions designed to simulate normal, abnormal, containment test, DBE, and post-DBE conditions, as applicable. 3C.9 References 3C-1 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Generating Stations," IEEE Standard 323-2003, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-2 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," IEEE Standard 323-1974, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-3 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," IEEE Standard 344-2004, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-4 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, "Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants," ASME QME-1-2007, New York, NY. 3C-5 NuScale Power, LLC, Accident Source Term Methodology, TR-0915-17565-P, Rev. 2. Tier 2 3C-17 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment 3C-6 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Generating Stations," IEEE Standard 497-2002, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-7 Electric Power Research Institute, "Correlation Between Aging and Seismic Qualification for Nuclear Plant Electrical Components," EPRI NP-3326, Palo Alto, CA, 1983. 3C-8 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Standard for Design Qualification of Safety Systems Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations," IEEE Standard 627-1980, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-9 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "General Principles for Temperature Limits in the Rating of Electrical Equipment and for the Evaluation of Electrical Insulation," IEEE Standard 1-2000, Reaffirmed 2005, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-10 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "The Preparation of Test Procedures for the Thermal Evaluation of Solid Electric Insulating Materials," IEEE Standard 98-2016, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-11 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Recommended Practice for the Preparation of Test Procedures for the Thermal Evaluation of Insulation Systems for Electric Equipment," IEEE Standard 99-2007, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-12 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Guide for the Statistical Analysis of Thermal Life Test Data," IEEE Standard 101-2004, Reaffirmed 2010, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-13 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Guide for Assessing, Monitoring, and Mitigating Aging Effects on Class 1E Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations and Other Nuclear Facilities," IEEE Standard 1205-2014, Piscataway, NJ. 3C-14 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "The Effect of Thermal and Irradiation Aging Simulation Procedures on Polymer Properties," NUREG/CR-3629, April 1984. 3C-15 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Occurrence and Implications of Radiation Dose-Rate Effects for Material Aging Studies," NUREG/CR-2157, Sandia National Laboratories, June 1981. 3C-16 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment," NUREG-0588, Rev. 1, July 1981. Tier 2 3C-18 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment Table 3C-1: Environmental Qualification Zones - Reactor Building EQ Zone(1) Description Environment A Room 010-022, Containment Vessel - bottom of containment (6") to Harsh bottom of upper core plate (142") B Room 010-022, Containment Vessel - bottom of upper core plate (142") Harsh to bottom of riser transition (236") C Room 010-022, Containment Vessel - bottom of riser transition (236") to Harsh bottom of baffle plate (587") D Room 010-022, Containment Vessel - bottom of baffle plate (587) to top Harsh of pressurizer (697) E Room 010-022, Containment Vessel - top of pressurizer (697") to bottom Harsh of torispherical head (841") F Room 010-022, Containment Vessel - bottom of torispherical head (841") Harsh to top of containment (904") G Room 010-022, Module pool bay vapor space - outside containment and Harsh under the BioShield (Top of Module) (Figure 1.2-19: Reactor Building East and West Section View) H Rooms 010-022, 010-422, and 010-423 above pool level to ceiling (RXB Harsh Pool Room Vapor Space) (Figure 1.2-16: Reactor Building 100'-0"' Elevation thru Figure 1.2-18: Reactor Building 145'-6" Elevation) I Room 010-022, 010-023 and 010-024 up to top of pool level (RXB Pool Harsh Room liquid space) (Figure 1.2-10: Reactor Building 24'-0" Elevation) J Rooms 010-101, 010-102, 010-103, 010-104, 010-005, 010-106, 010-107, Harsh 010-112, 010-114, 010-115, 010-116, 010-117, 010-118, 010-119, 010-120, 010-121, 010-122, 010-123, 010-125, 010-126, 010-127, 010-128, 010-129, 010-130, 010-131, 010-133, 010-134 (Figure 1.2-12: Reactor Building 50'-0" Elevation) K Rooms 010-201, 010-202, 010-203, 010-204, 010-005, 010-206, 010-207, Harsh 010-208, 010-242, 010-275 (Figure 1.2-14: Reactor Building 75'-0" Elevation) L Rooms 010-201, 010-202, 010-203, 010-204, 010-005 Harsh (Figure 1.2-15: Reactor Building 86'-0" Elevation) M Rooms 010-005, 010-401, 010-402, 010-403, 010-404, 010-405, 010-406, Harsh 010-407, 010-408, 010-409, 010-410, 010-411, 010-412, 010-414, 010-415, 010-416, 010-417, 010-418, 010-419, 010-420 (Figure 1.2-16: Reactor Building 100'-0" Elevation) N Rooms 010-005, 010-501, 010-502, 010-503, 010-504, 010-506, 010-507, Harsh 010-508, 010-509, 010-510 (Figure 1.2-17: Reactor Building 126'-0" Elevation) Note:

1) EQ Zones listed are those areas within the Reactor Building that are harsh environments and contain equipment that requires environmental qualification.

Tier 2 3C-19 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment Table 3C-2: Designated Harsh Environment Areas Area Basis Comment/Remarks EQ Zones A, B, C, D, E and F Harsh environment as a result of primary and secondary Inaccessible post-accident HELBs potential to occur in this area and during normal Total integrated dose (60 yrs + accident) > 1.0E4 Rads operation. EQ Zone G Harsh environment as a result of primary and secondary Inaccessible post-accident HELBs potential to occur in this area Total integrated dose (60 yrs + accident) > 1.0E4 Rads EQ Zone H Harsh environment as a result of primary and secondary Harsh due to HELBs HELBs potential to occur in the Top of Module (TOM) potential to occur under 120F and > 18F increase above normal operating the bioshield conditions with RH 85% EQ Zone I Harsh environment as a result of primary and secondary HELBs potential to occur in the TOM Total integrated dose (60 yrs + accident) > 1.0E4 Rads EQ Zones J, K, L, M, and N These areas will contain high and moderate energy Harsh by preliminary piping. Total integrated dose exceed > 1.0E3 Rads (60 design for HELBs. year normal + 30 day accident dose) for equipment with solid state circuitry and > 1.0E4 Rads (60 year normal + 30 Zone J is harsh due to post-day accident dose) for electrical or mechanical accident radiological equipment. equipment qualification requirements exceeding source term doses of > 1.0E4 Rads (60 year normal

                                                                                              + 30 day accident dose) for electrical or mechanical equipment. Zone M is harsh due to post-accident radiological equipment qualification requirements exceeding source term doses of > 1.0E3 Rads (60 year normal + 30 day accident dose) for equipment with solid state circuitry.

Tier 2 3C-20 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment Table 3C-3: Designated Mild Environment Areas Area Basis Comments/Remarks CRB No harsh environment DBA or IE are postulated to occur in the Satisfies MILD environment control building. criteria Total integrated dose (60 years + accident 1.0E3 Rads) Control building does not contain any high energy piping systems (>200F or > 275 psig) and flooding analysis demonstrates that no equipment designed to perform a function related to safety is submerged. Max temp is < 120F with humidity < 85% EDS equipment rooms on No harsh environment DBA or IE are postulated to occur in these Satisfies MILD environment RXB elev. 75' Gallery areas, rooms. criteria specifically: Total integrated dose (60 years + accident 1.0E3 Rads) EDSS battery rooms Max temp is < 120F with humidity < 85% MPS rooms EDSS SWGR rooms Diesel Generator Building No harsh environment DBA or IE occur in this building. Satisfies MILD environment criteria Total integrated dose (60 years + accident 1.0E3 Rads) Diesel Generator Building Ventilation maintains DGB temperatures Supports PAM function within design specification for backup diesel generator (BDG). beyond 72 hours Tier 2 3C-21 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment Table 3C-4: Equipment Post-Accident Operating Times Description Time Frame (hours) Actions Accomplished Basis Short Term (ST) 1

  • Event Detection Note 1
  • Initiation of Trip and ESF actuation
  • Achievement of Hot Shutdown Intermediate Term (IT) ST IT 36
  • Achievement of Safe Shutdown Note 2
  • RCS Depressurization and Cooldown
  • Maintain Fission Product Barrier Integrity Long Term (LT) IT LT 72
  • Maintaining Safe Shutdown Note 3
  • Maintain Fission Product Barrier Integrity Extended LT Extended 720
  • Maintaining Safe Shutdown Note 4
  • Maintain Fission Product Barrier Integrity Extended PAM LT Extended 2400
  • Monitoring of Fission Product Note 5 Barrier Integrity Notes:
1. The Short Term post-accident operating time (PAOT) is assigned to components associated with event detection, reactor trip initiation, or Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation that occur very early in the accident sequence. This includes the Module Protection System (MPS) initiation of:
  • Reactor Trip,
  • Containment Isolation,
  • Decay Heat Removal System (DHRS) actuation,
  • Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuation,
  • De-energizing the Pressurizer Heaters, and
  • Isolation of demineralized water Short Term actions are also associated with the achievement of Hot Shutdown.
2. Intermediate Term actions are associated with the achievement of Safe Shutdown using DHRS. The Intermediate Term time frame extends to 36 hours and is used to qualify equipment that is relied upon to support the ECCS hold for up to 24 hours.

Examples of equipment assigned an Intermediate Term PAOT includes:

  • Reactor Vent Valves
  • Reactor Recirculation Valves
3. The Long Term time frame extends to 72 hours. This category is considered the maximum post-accident operating time for HELB and MELB events outside containment in areas that are readily accessible after break termination or isolation.

Examples of equipment assigned to this category includes the following:

  • Equipment that is relied upon to mitigate a HELB or MELB outside containment, that are located outside of the top of module area (outside containment and under BioShield).
  • Highly Reliable DC Power System (EDS) Batteries for separation groups B and C which are sized to support an extended loss of AC power for up to 72 hours.
4. The Extended time frame of 720 hours represents the maximum post-accident operating time used to qualify equipment that is relied upon to maintain a safe shutdown condition. Equipment assigned to this post-accident operating time category are typically located inside the CNV or in an inaccessible area outside of containment, such as under the BioShield.

Tier 2 3C-22 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment Table 3C-4: Equipment Post-Accident Operating Times (Continued) Description Time Frame (hours) Actions Accomplished Basis This duration is selected to align with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, 10 CFR 50 Appendix K, as well as control room habitability analysis timeframes. This duration is considered appropriate for an advanced light water reactor design that employs passive means to maintain a safe shutdown condition. This duration is also applicable to equipment assigned to support the following, including equipment located in the top of module area (outside containment and under BioShield) or in the Reactor Pool / Pool Bays:

  • Containment Integrity
  • RCS pressure boundary integrity
  • Decay Heat Removal/Emergency Core Cooling (DHRS/ECCS)
  • Mitigation of Fuel Handling Accidents
  • Supporting Control Room Habitability
  • PAM Type B and D variables
5. Extended PAM category specifically applies to RG 1.97 Type C variables and is consistent with Reference 3C-6.

Tier 2 3C-23 Revision 2

Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mechanical Equipment Table 3C-5: EQ Program Margin Requirements Parameter Required Margin(1) Notes Peak Temperature +15°F For accident profile. Peak Pressure + 10% of gauge, but not more than 10 psig Radiation +10% On accident dose only. Power Supply Voltage +/-10% Of rated value, not to exceed equipment design limits. Equipment Operating Time +10% For the period of time the equipment is required to operate following the start of a DBE. See also Section 3C.4.5 and Table 3C-4. Seismic Vibration +10% Margin added to acceleration requirements at the mounting point of equipment. Line Frequency N/A Line frequency margin is N/A because the relied upon electrical power is from EDSS (DC power). Time +10% In addition to the period of time the equipment is required to be operational following the DBE. Environmental Transients 2 or more The initial transient and the dwell at peak temperature shall be applied at least twice Notes:

1. The margins apply unless it can be shown that the derivation of environmental conditions contain conservatisms that can be quantified to show that appropriate margin exists.

Tier 2 3C-24 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3C-6: Normal Operating Environmental Conditions Maximum Relative 60 Years Integrated Dose Pressure (psig) Humidity 60 Years Integrated N Dose (Rads) (Includes fission , N- Water Level (ft. above RXB pool Zone Temperature (°F) (Nominal) (%) (1) (Rads) , coolant) floor) A 487 (lower RPV wall) <(-14.6)(2) 0 2.42E8 9.01E10 47' (inside CNV for refueling) B 491 (RPV wall) <(-14.6) (2) 0 6.71E8 4.51E10 (inside CNV for refueling) 295 (CNV wall) C 551 (RPV wall) <(-14.6)(2) 0 1.10E9 4.11E7 47' (inside CNV for refueling) D 618 (outside top of PZR) <(-14.6) (2) 0 6.00E7 3.01E6 47' (inside CNV for refueling) 295 (CNV wall) E 581 (surface of MS piping) <(-14.6)(2) 0 4.77E7 2.26E6 47' (inside CNV for refueling) F 295 (upper CNV volume) <(-14.6)(2) 0 3.55E7 1.51E6 - G 140 0 <100 1.85E6 4.35E4 - H 105 0 <100 above bioshield 2.65E1 above bioshield 1.60E3 - EL 145 5.50E0 EL 145 3.90E2 I 140 0 plus N/A pool center 0 pool center (coolant 4.93E3 69' (normal operating level 3C-25 submergence only) outside CNV) Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and head next to operating 8.70E7 next to operating 1.53E10 module module J 105 0 <100 0 6.53E04 - K 85 0 <100 0 1.58E01 - L 85 0 <100 0 1.58E01 - M 105 0 <100 0 5.26E00 - N 105 0 <100 0 - - Notes:

1. Normal service relative humidity outside of the containment vessel is shown as <100%; the relative humidity inside the containment vessel is 0% because the environment is normally maintained in a vacuum.
2. The pressure inside the CNV is maintained less than the saturation pressure corresponding to the reactor pool pressure; this results in a vacuum.
3. The boron concentration in the pool areas will be nominally 1800 ppm. EPRI primary water chemistry guidelines show the pH of a pool with 1800 ppm Mechanical Equipment boron concentration to be 4.75.

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3C-7: Design Basis Event Environmental Conditions Water Level Relative (ft. above RXB Water Spray Zone(3) DBE Temperature (F) DBE Pressure (psig)(2) DBE Humidity (%) pool floor) (pipe rupture) A HELB See Figure 3C-1 HELB 958.4 All Events 100 24 (inside CNV to - support ECCS operation) B HELB See Figure 3C-1 HELB 958.4 All Events 100 24 (inside CNV to - support ECCS operation) C HELB See Figure 3C-2 HELB 958.4 All Events 100 - Yes D HELB See Figure 3C-2 HELB 958.4 All Events 100 - Yes E HELB See Figure 3C-2 HELB 958.4 All Events 100 - Yes F HELB See Figure 3C-2 HELB 958.4 All Events 100 - Yes G HELB See Figure 3C-3 HELB 2.5 All Events 100 - Yes H Conditions See Figure 3C-4 Conditions 2.75 Conditions 100 - - resulting from resulting from resulting from HELB and fuel HELB and FHA in HELB and FHA in 3C-26 handling accident the pool area/ the pool area/ Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and (FHA) in the pool TOM TOM area/top of module (TOM) Mechanical Equipment Revision 2

Table 3C-7: Design Basis Event Environmental Conditions (Continued) Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Water Level Relative (ft. above RXB Water Spray Zone(3) DBE Temperature (F) DBE Pressure (psig)(2) DBE Humidity (%) pool floor) (pipe rupture) I Conditions 212(1) Conditions 2.75 (Equipment Conditions N/A 75 (top of pool, - resulting from resulting from located below resulting from not DBA HELB and FHA in HELB and FHA in water level will be HELB and FHA in condition) the pool area/ the pool area/ affected by the pool area/ TOM TOM hydrostatic TOM pressure plus atmospheric overpressure) Notes:

1. The long term pool temperature will remain at 212°F due to all modules being on DHRS from a loss of power. Equipment exposed to this environment will need to be qualified at 212°F for as long as the equipment is required as specified in Table 3.11-1.
2. Refer to TR-0516-49084 for the CNV pressure for the spectrum analyses of primary and secondary mass and energy releases. NRELAP5 was used for development of the pressure and temperature envelop for qualification of equipment within containment and has been shown to be equivalent to COMTEMPT-LT for this purpose.
3. DCA EQ Zones J, K, L, M, and N are preliminarily designated as harsh environments in the RXB because these areas contain high or moderate energy piping.

Additionally, Zone J is harsh due to post-accident radiological equipment qualification exceeding source term doses > 1.0E4 Rads (60 year normal + 30 day 3C-27 accident dose) for electrical or mechanical equipment. Zone M is harsh due to post-accident radiological equipment qualification requirements exceeding Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and source term doses of > 1.0E3 Rads (60 year normal + 30 day accident dose) for equipment with solid state circuitry.

4. The CNV post-accident pH for any postulated accident that results in core damage is 6.9 at 1000 ppm boron concentration and 8.3 at 200 ppm boron concentration. These values remain essentially unchanged between 25C and 200C.

Mechanical Equipment Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3C-8: Accident EQ Radiation Dose Accident Integrated Dose (rads) Zone Dose 1 hour 36 hours 72 hours 720 hours 2400 hours Integrated 6.40E02 8.89E03 1.23E04 2.59E04 2.82E04 A Integrated 2.09E03 2.10E04 2.78E04 6.55E04 8.84E04 Integrated 6.40E02 8.89E03 1.23E04 2.59E04 2.82E04 B Integrated 2.09E03 2.10E04 2.78E04 6.55E04 8.84E04 Integrated 2.91E05 4.38E06 6.38E06 2.00E07 3.94E07 C Integrated 8.96E05 9.07E06 1.20E07 2.85E07 3.84E07 Integrated 2.91E05 4.38E06 6.38E06 2.00E07 3.94E07 D Integrated 8.96E05 9.07E06 1.20E07 2.85E07 3.84E07 Integrated 2.91E05 4.38E06 6.38E06 2.00E07 3.94E07 E Integrated 8.96E05 9.07E06 1.20E07 2.85E07 3.84E07 Integrated 2.91E05 4.38E06 6.38E06 2.00E07 3.94E07 F Integrated 8.96E05 9.07E06 1.20E07 2.85E07 3.84E07 Integrated 7.58E01 3.13E03 6.28E03 9.58E04 6.33E05 G Integrated 7.27E03 7.71E04 1.05E05 3.34E05 6.66E05 3C-28 Integrated 5.50E01 1.69E03 2.99E03 1.56E04 2.48E04 H Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and Integrated 7.65E01 2.32E03 4.08E03 2.22E04 3.95E04 Integrated 6.40E00 1.60E02 2.69E02 1.80E03 4.75E03 I Integrated 1.94E01 5.78E02 1.02E03 7.89E03 2.25E04 J Integrated - - - - - Integrated 6.17E02 1.24E04 1.71E04 3.95E04 5.39E04 K Integrated - - - - - Integrated 1.56E-02 3.00E-01 3.73E-01 4.74E-01 4.76E-01 L Integrated - - - - - Integrated 1.56E-02 3.00E-01 3.73E-01 4.74E-01 4.76E-01 M Integrated - - - - - Integrated 3.60E01 6.81E02 8.94E02 1.85E03 2.63E03 Mechanical Equipment N Integrated - - - - - Integrated 2.78E-04 5.70E-03 7.00E-03 7.00E-03 7.00E-03 Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 3C-1: Containment Liquid Space Metal and Liquid Temperatures with Bounding Curve (Zones A and B) d& 3C-29 Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and d

                                         >d                                        Es/^Dd Mechanical Equipment ZWsK^Dd                     Ž>^

Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 3C-2: Containment Vapor Space Metal and Gas Temperatures with Bounding Curve (Zones C, D, E, and F) 700 650 645 650 605 600 550 500 Temperature (°F) 450 450 400 3C-30 350 Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and 300 250 200 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 Vapor Temperature Time (sec)  CNV Inside Surface Metal Temperature RPV Outside Surface Metal Temperature Bounding Curve - Vapor Space Mechanical Equipment Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 3C-3: Bounding Envelope for Average Vapor Temperature at Top of Module (Zone G) 600 520 520 500 500 480 Temperature (F) 400 300 212 200 120 3C-31 100 Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and 0 1 10 100 1000 Time (sec) Bounding Curve - TOM Mechanical Equipment Revision 2

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 3C-4: Bounding Envelope for Maximum Vapor Temperatures at Reactor Building El 145'-0 (Zone H) 350 300 300 250 250 Temperature (F) 212 212 200 150 100 100 3C-32 Methodology for Environmental Qualification of Electrical and 50 0 1 10 100 1000 Time (sec) Mechanical Equipment Revision 2}}