05000461/LER-2018-002, Division 2 Diesel Generator Inoperability Due to Air Receiver Remaining Isolated Following Clearance Removal Resulting in Unplanned Shutdown Risk Change
| ML18199A106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/2018 |
| From: | Stoner T Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| U-604434 LER 2018-002-00 | |
| Download: ML18199A106 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4612018002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Clinton Power Station 8401 Power Road Clinton, IL 61727 U-604434 July 16, 2018 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2018-002-00 1
Exelon Generation 10 CFR 50.73 SRRS 5A.108 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2018-002-00: Division 2 Diesel Generator lnoperability Due to Air Receiver Remaining Isolated Following Clearance Removal Resulting in Unplanned Shutdown Risk Change. This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report.
Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Dale Shelton, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (217) 937-2800.
Respectfully~,---
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Theodore R. Stoner Site Vice President Clinton Power Station KP/lam Attachment: License Event Report 2018-002-00 cc:
Regional Administrator - Region Ill NRC Senior Resident Inspector-Clinton Power Station Office of Nuclear Facility Safety - Illinois Emergency Management Agency
U-604434 SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report 2018-002-00 bee:
NRG Project Manager, NRR - Clinton Power Station Director - Licensing, Clinton Power Station Cantera Manager - Licensing, Clinton Power Station Cantera Exelon Document Control Desk Licensing T. R. Stoner B. T. Kapellas H.J. Weissinger D. Shelton T. Krawcyk R. Champley T. Dean W. Marsh R. Bair J. Cunningham K. Pointer G. Sanders Maintenance Rule Coordinator, V-130E Plant Fatigue Coordinator, V-130E ICES Coordinator, V-130E Simulator Coordinator, V-922 TREQ Coordinator, V-922 B. Golladay Licensing Vault Copy (SRRS SA.108)
NRC FORM 366 (04-2018)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020
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, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 1. Facility Name Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
- 2. Docket Number 05000461 3.Page 1
OF 4
- 4. Title Division 2 Diesel Generator lnoperability Due to Air Receiver Remaining Isolated Following Clearance Removal Resulting in Unplanned Shutdown Risk Change
- 5. Event Date Month Day Year 05 17 2018
- 6. LER Number Year I Sequential Number 2018 002 I
Rev No.
00
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year 05000 Facility Name Docket Number 07 16 18 05000
- 9. Operating Mode
- 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201 (bl D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 4 D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.22os(a)(s)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(iil D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D so.3s(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71 (a)(s)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.4s(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 000 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[gj
- 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) j D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D Other (Specify in Abstract below or in An investigation determined that the air start isolation valves remained closed as directed during clearance order removal on May 9, 2018. The required procedures to restore the Division 2 EOG to standby were tracked in Operator logs. Subsequent turnover gaps resulted in the log entry being closed prior to restoring the EOG to standby. As a result, the Division 2 EOG was inappropriately declared operable at 0800 on May 12, 2018. The Division 1 EOG was made inoperable to support scheduled work at 0030 on May 14, 2018, requiring the Division 2 EOG to be operable per TS 3.8.2.
The Division 2 EOG was also being credited as the onsite power supply to isolate Residual Heat Removal isolation values to control RPV water level per TS 3.5.2.
C.
Cause of the Event
The cause of this event was determined to be Operations relied on log entries to track the Division 2 EOG component configuration, contrary to Exelon governance. Inadequate procedure use and adherence by Operations personnel and inadequate turnover were identified as contributing causes.
D.
Safety Consequences
This event resulted in an unplanned change in shutdown plant risk. The plant was in Mode 4 and nearing the end of its scheduled refueling outage. There were no actual safety consequences associated with the condition described in this report since offsite power remained operable during the time the condition existed. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Multiple methods existed to restore onsite power and to establish RPV makeup.
This condition is reportable under the provisions of 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as, "any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident," and 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as, "any operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications."
E.
Corrective Actions
The following corrective measures were established:
Plant specific procedures were revised to eliminate the allowance to track plant configuration using log entries.
Approved methods for tracking plant status control were reinforced with Operators.
Training was conducted with Operators on procedure use and adherence related to partial procedure performance.
Operator rounds points for EDGs were revised.
F.
Previous Similar Occurrences
'SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 REV NO.
00 There were no previous events identified associated with components left out of the required position.
G.
Component Failure Data
None. Page _4_ of _4_