ML18198A239

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EA-18-050_The Nacher Corporation; Notice of Violation and NRC Inspection Report 15000017/2018001
ML18198A239
Person / Time
Site: 15000017
Issue date: 07/17/2018
From: Troy Pruett
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety IV
To: Boudreaux D
The NACHER Corporation
References
EA-18-050 IR 2018001
Download: ML18198A239 (14)


See also: IR 015000017/2018001

Text

July 17, 2018

EA-18-050

David J. Boudreaux

Radiation Safety Officer

The NACHER Corporation

108 Lois Road

Houma, Louisiana 70363

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND NRC INSPECTION REPORT 150-00017/2018-001

Dear Mr. Boudreaux:

This letter refers to the announced U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection

conducted on April 24, 2018, at your facility located in Houma, Louisiana. The inspection was

conducted in response to an event notification report (Event 53306) involving the malfunction of

a radiography exposure device, and the subsequent actions taken by two radiographers who

were not properly trained to perform source recovery activities.

The inspection focused on understanding the facts and corrective actions relative to the event,

to conduct interviews with involved personnel, perform time and motion studies related to the

doses received by those personnel, independently assess those dose estimates, and to review

and assess adherence to your Agreement State license conditions and procedures. The

enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. The inspector discussed the preliminary

inspection findings with you at the conclusion of the on-site portion of the inspection. A final exit

briefing was conducted with you on June 21, 2018.

Based on the results of this inspection, two apparent violations have been identified and are

being considered for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-

nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violations involved: (1) the failure to

conduct an adequate equipment check, as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR) 34.31(a), which resulted in a radiography device guide tube disconnect

and an unshielded 77 curie iridium-192 source being stuck out of the exposure device; and (2)

the failure to follow emergency procedures, as required by 10 CFR 150.20(b)(5), resulting in a

hazardous source recovery operation by untrained individuals. The circumstances surrounding

the apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective

corrective actions were discussed with you at the inspection exit meeting.

Since your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two

inspections, and based on our understanding of your corrective actions, a civil penalty may not

be warranted in accordance with Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy. The final decision will

be based on you confirming on the license docket that the corrective actions previously

described to the NRC staff have been or are being taken.

D. Boudreaux 2

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:

(1) respond, in writing, to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within

30 days of the date of this letter; or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC).

If a PEC is held, it will be open for public observation and the NRC may issue a press release to

announce the time and date of the conference. If you decide to participate in a PEC please

contact Mr. Michael C. Hay, Chief, Materials Licensing and Inspection Branch, at 817-200-1455,

within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify us of your intentions. A PEC should be held

within 30 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to

Apparent Violations in NRC Inspection Report 150-00017/2018-001; EA-18-050 and should

include for each of the apparent violations: (1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if

contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been

taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when

full compliance will be achieved.

Your written response to the apparent violations may reference or include previously docketed

correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. Your

response should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document

Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy mailed to Mr. Troy Pruett, Director,

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV,

1600 East Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76011-4511 within 30 days of the date of this letter. If an

adequate response is not received within the time specified and an extension of time has not

been granted, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.

If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your

perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take

into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a PEC does

not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action

will be taken. The conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in

making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include

information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance

of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to

any corrective actions taken or planned.

In presenting your corrective actions, you should be aware that the promptness and

comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the

apparent violations. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, Suggested Guidance

Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action, may be helpful. You can

find an updated excerpt from NRC Information Notice 96-28 on the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0612/ML061240509.pdf.

Please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations described in

the enclosed report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by

separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In addition, based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a Severity

Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation was evaluated in accordance

with the NRC Enforcement Policy, and is cited in the Notice of Violation (Notice) included in

Enclosure 1 and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject

inspection report. The violation is being cited because it was identified by the NRC during the

D. Boudreaux 3

inspection and it involved the failure to assign a deep-dose equivalent for the part of the body

receiving the highest exposure. You are required to respond to the Notice in Enclosure 1 and

should follow the instructions specified in the Notice when preparing your response. If you have

additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your

response to the Notice. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further

enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

The NRC determined that the licensee is monitoring personnel radiation dose by the use of

direct ion storage dosimetry and that the licensee has met the criteria in NRC Enforcement

Guidance Memorandum 18-001, Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Apparent Violations of

10 CFR Parts 34, 36 and 39 Requirements Resulting from the use of Direct Ion Storage

Dosimetry During Licensed Activities, dated May 11, 2018 (EA-18-050).

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a

copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for

public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents

Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary

information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy

or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide a

bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a

redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of

such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to

have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the

disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the

information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential

commercial or financial information).

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Michael C. Hay of my staff

at 817-200-1455.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Troy Pruett, Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket: 150-00017

License: 10 CFR 150.20

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation

2. NRC Inspection Report 150-00017/2018-001

cc w/Enclosures:

Jeff Dauzat, Administrator

State of Louisiana Radiation Control Program

D. Boudreaux 4

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND NRC INSPECTION REPORT 150-00017/2018-001 DATED

JULY 17, 2018

DISTRIBUTION:

RidsOeMailCenter Resource; RidsNmssOd Resource; RidsOgcMailCenter Resource;

RidsSecyMailCenter Resource; RidsOcaMailCenter Resource; RidsOigMailCenter Resource;

RidsEdoMailCenter Resource; EDO_Managers; RidsOcfoMailCenter Resource;

RidsOiMailCenter Resource; RidsRgn1MailCenter Resource; RidsRgn3MailCenter Resource;

RidsNsirOd Resource; R4DNMS_MLIB; DCylkowski, ORA

KKennedy, RA BMaier, ORA ABoland, OE

SMorris, DRA MHay, DNMS FPeduzzi, OE

TPruett, DNMS JKramer, ORA RSun, NMSS

CAlldredge, ORA LSreenivas, OE SHoliday, OE

KNorman, OE LHowell, DNMS JWeaver, ORA

RErickson, DNMS VDricks, ORA BTharakan, DNMS

JBowen, OEDO JWeil, CA MVasquez, ORA

MLayton, NSIR AMoreno, CA MHerrera, DRMA

SCoker, NSIR JPeralta, OE

S:\RAS\ACES\ENFORCEMENT\_EA CASES - OPEN\NACHER EA-18-050\CHLTR_EA-18-050_NACHER.docx

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML18198A239

SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:

By: JCD Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive

OFFICE HP:MLIB C:MLIB TL:ACES RC D:DNMS

NAME JDykert MHay GVasquez DCylkowski TPruett

SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

DATE 7/17/18 7/17/18 07/12/18 07/16/18 7/17/18

OFFICAL RECORD COPY

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

The NACHER Corporation Docket No. 150-00017

Houma, Louisiana License No. 10 CFR 150.20

EA-18-050

During an NRC inspection conducted on April 24, 2018, one violation of NRC requirements was

identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 20.1201(c) requires, in part, that the assigned deep-dose equivalent must be for

the part of the body receiving the highest exposure. The deep-dose equivalent may be

assessed from surveys or other radiation measurements for the purpose of

demonstrating compliance with the occupational dose limits, if the individual monitoring

device was not in the region of highest potential exposure.

Contrary to the above, from March 31 through May 10, 2018, the licensee failed to

assign a deep-dose equivalent for the part of the body receiving the highest exposure.

The deep-dose equivalent was not assessed from surveys or other radiation

measurements for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with the occupational dose

limits when the individual monitoring device was not worn in the region of highest

potential exposure. Specifically, a radiographers dose monitoring device was worn near

the individuals hip during a source recovery operation; however, the individuals chest

and arm to the elbow were in the region of highest potential exposure and the licensee

failed to assign a deep-dose equivalent for those parts of the body.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.3.d).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, The NACHER Corporation is hereby required to

submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional

Administrator, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd. Arlington, Texas 76011, within 30 days of the

date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).

This reply should be clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-18-050 and should

include for the violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing

the violation or severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results

achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will

be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if

the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not

received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be

issued requiring information as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or

revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is

shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public

Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

Enclosure 1

(ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To

the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary

information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy

or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide a

bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a

redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of

such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to

have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the

disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the

information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential

commercial or financial information).

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within 2 working days

of receipt.

Dated this 17th day of July 2018

2

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket: 150-00017

License: General License pursuant to 10 CFR 150.20

Report: 2018-001

EA No: EA-18-050

Licensee: The NACHER Corporation

Location Inspected 108 Lois Road, Houma, Louisiana

Inspection Dates: April 24, 2018

Exit Meeting Date: June 21, 2018

Inspector: Jason Dykert, Health Physicist

Materials Licensing and Inspection Branch

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Observed by: John Fontenot, Environmental Scientist III

Office of Environmental Compliance

Assessment Division

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality

Approved by: Michael C. Hay, Chief

Materials Licensing and Inspection Branch

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Attachment: Supplemental Inspection Information

Enclosure 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NACHER Corporation

NRC Inspection Report 150-00017/2018-001

On April 24, 2018, the NRC conducted a special inspection at the licensees facility in Houma,

Louisiana in response to a hazardous radiography source recovery operation following the

malfunction of the radiography exposure device.

Program Overview

The NACHER Corporation (licensee) was authorized under reciprocity via Louisiana Agreement

State license LA-13065-LO1, to possess and use byproduct material, including iridium-192 (Ir-

192), for industrial radiographic operations in NRC jurisdiction. Licensed activities were

authorized to be performed at temporary job sites in the Gulf of Mexico.

Inspection Findings

Two apparent violations were identified regarding the licensees: (1) failure to perform an

adequate equipment check, as required by 10 CFR 34.31(a), which resulted in a guide tube

disconnect and an unshielded 77 curie Ir-192 radiography source being stuck out of the

exposure device; and (2) failure to follow emergency procedures, specifically to contact the

radiation safety officer in the event that a source cannot be fully retracted to the fully shielded

position, and only attempt source recovery operations after specific approval has been

authorized by the radiation safety officer.

A Severity Level IV violation was identified involving the licensees failure to assign a deep-dose

equivalent for the part of the body receiving the highest exposure. The licensee used an actual

dosimetry measurement, but the dosimeter was worn on the hip opposite the exposed source

while the radiographers shoulder and arm to the elbow nearest the source received the highest

exposure.

The NRC determined that the licensee is monitoring personnel radiation dose by the use of

direct ion storage dosimetry and that the licensee has met the criteria in NRC Enforcement

Guidance Memorandum 18-001, Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Apparent Violations of

10 CFR Parts 34, 36 and 39 Requirements Resulting from the use of Direct Ion Storage

Dosimetry During Licensed Activities, dated May 11, 2018.

Corrective Actions

The radiation safety officer immediately reported the event to the NRC on the same day that it

occurred. The licensee provided classroom training and hands-on in person coaching to the

radiographers involved in the event. A safety stand-down was held companywide. All

radiography personnel were sent a safety bulletin covering the importance of equipment

inspections, the definition of source recovery, the requirement to stop work and call the radiation

safety officer in the event of source recovery, and source recovery activities must be performed

only by trained and authorized individuals. The licensee also committed to put lead shot bags

and lead shielding sheets in every offshore darkroom such that a source could be immediately

shielded if needed.

2

REPORT DETAILS

1. Program Overview (Inspection Procedure 87121, 87137)

1.1. Program Scope

The NACHER Corporation was authorized to perform radiography in federal jurisdiction

through a reciprocity application pursuant to 10 CFR 150.20. Licensed activities were

authorized to be performed at temporary job sites in the Gulf of Mexico at various

offshore locations.

This inspection focused on licensed activities performed in federal jurisdiction under

reciprocity and the general license that involved Event 53306.

1.2. Inspection Scope

The NRC inspector conducted interviews with radiographers to understand the facts

relevant to the event, and assessed the causes and the corrective actions that the

licensee implemented or planned to implement relative to the event. The inspector

performed time and motion studies. The inspector also reviewed and assessed the

adherence to operating and emergency procedures, license conditions and federal

regulations. The inspector reviewed records and independently assessed the doses

received by the radiographers. A Louisiana Agreement State inspector accompanied to

observe the inspection.

2. Inspection Observations and Findings (Inspection Procedure 87121)

2.1. Observations

On April 24, 2018, the inspector conducted an announced inspection at the licensees

facility located in Houma, Louisiana. The event occurred on March 31, 2018, at the

bottom of an offshore platform near the risers that lift the platform out of the Gulf of

Mexico. The radiographers had reached the work location by boat, and were performing

riser inspections at various offshore platforms over the course of a few weeks. The

radiographers performed these inspections using various non-destructive testing

techniques that included industrial radiography.

The event occurred while performing radiography work approximately 10 feet above sea

level on a metal platform surrounding the offshore platform risers. Except for the

radiographers, no other individuals were in the vicinity of the radiography area. Prior to

conducting radiography activities the radiographers indicated on a utilization log that all

the equipment being used that day was inspected and in good working condition.

During the first exposure of the day, the radiographer realized that there was an

equipment malfunction because he had to turn the crank-out mechanism too many times

for the length of guide tube being used. He used a survey meter to verify that the source

was not fully retracted and visually identified that the guide tube was disconnected from

the exposure device with the quick connect coupling stuck on a lip of the metal platform.

The radiographer attempted to crank the source back into the fully locked and shielded

position, but was unsuccessful. The radiographer noted that the survey meter indicated

3

the source was partially shielded by the metal from the guide tubes quick connect

coupling and requested the assistant radiographer keep pressure on the crank so the

source assembly would move towards the shielded position. The radiographer lifted the

guide tube with three fingers on his right hand, approximately 1 foot away from the quick

connect coupling and freed it from the metal walkway. As the radiographer lifted the

stuck and misaligned guide tube, the source was retracted into the shielded position by

the assistant radiographer.

The re-enacted event to retrieve the source to the fully shielded position took

approximately 7 seconds to complete. The licensee found that the root cause of the

equipment failure was because of the dirty condition of the quick connector of the guide

tube.

During interviews with the inspector, the radiographer stated that quick connect coupling

was found dirty and gummy prior to using it on the day of the event, and that he should

have cleaned it prior to using it that day. The radiographer believed he had checked to

see if the quick connect coupling was engaged with the camera prior to using it that day.

The radiographer also stated that when he realized the equipment had malfunctioned he

did not think about what he was doing and improperly reacted to the situation in an

attempt to correct the equipment malfunction.

The licensees operating and emergency procedures address both equipment checks

and the inability to fully retract a source to the fully shielded position. However, the

radiographers lack of understanding about source recovery operations and inexperience

using radiographic exposure equipment led to the guide tube disconnect and his reaction

during the event.

The licensee immediately reported the event to the NRCs Headquarters Operations

Officers as required by 10 CFR 30.50(c)(1). The RSO provided classroom training and

hands-on in person coaching to the radiographers involved in the event to address the

apparent causes of the event. The licensee also required that a safety stand-down be

held companywide that included review of a bulletin sent to all radiography personnel.

The bulletin covered the importance of equipment inspections, defined source recovery

operations, reviewed the requirement to stop all work and call the RSO in the event that

a source cannot be fully retracted into the fully shielded position, and re-enforced that

those operations must only be performed by a trained individual.

Additionally, the licensee committed to providing lead shot bags and lead shielding

sheets in each offshore darkroom so that a source can be shielded temporarily by the

radiography crew immediately present. These corrective actions and licensee event

report are found under the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management

System (ADAMS) Accessions ML18150A687 and ML18127A043.

The NRC inspectors independent calculated dose to the radiographers hand was in

agreement with the licensees dose assessment. The licensee and the NRC estimated

that the radiographers hand received approximately 630 millirem.

The licensee was using direct ion storage (DIS) dosimetry (instadose') to monitor the

radiographers whole body exposure. The dosimeter was worn on the radiographers

belt, and was immediately evaluated by a National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation

Program (NVLAP) accredited processor after the event.

4

The licensee assigned a whole body dose of 7 millirem to the radiographer based upon

the actual measured exposure on the dosimeter. The dose measured by the DIS

dosimeter would have been accurate if the whole body had been the same distance

away from the source as the DIS dosimeter. However, because the arm to the elbow

was the closest part of the whole body to the unshielded source, and the radiographer

had worn the dosimeter on the hip on the opposite side of the exposed source, the NRC

questioned if this assigned dose was accurate. Subsequently the licensee provided an

updated whole body dose that was based on an evaluative survey for the part of the

body receiving the highest dose.

The deep-dose equivalent to the whole body calculated from that evaluative survey was

157.5 millirem. This value was also in agreement with the NRC inspectors dose

assessment to the whole body. Due to the limited amount of time spent near the source,

no dose limits were exceeded.

2.2. Findings

The inspector identified two apparent violations resulting from the event that involved

failures to: (1) perform adequate equipment checks ensuring equipment is in good

working condition before use, and (2) follow emergency procedures resulting in a

hazardous source recovery operation by individuals not properly trained to conduct

those activities.

Apparent Violation of 10 CFR 34.31(a)

Title 10 CFR 34.31(a) requires, in part, that the licensee shall perform visual and

operability checks on radiographic exposure devices and associated equipment before

use on each day the equipment is to be used to ensure that the equipment is in good

working condition. If equipment problems are found, the equipment must be removed

from service until repaired.

Contrary to the above, on March 31, 2018, the licensee failed to adequately perform

visual and operability checks on a radiographic exposure device and associated

equipment before use on that day to ensure that the equipment was in good working

condition. Specifically, a guide tube disconnect occurred because the licensees

operability check did not ensure that the grease, dirt, and grime was cleared from the

guide tubes connection to the exposure device, which ultimately resulted in the inability

to return the source to the shielded position. (150-00017/2018-001-01)

Apparent Violation of 10 CFR 150.20(b)(5)

Title 10 CFR 150.20(b)(5) requires, in part, that the licensee comply with all terms and

conditions of the specific license issued by an Agreement State except such terms or

conditions as are contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 150.20.

License Condition 10 of Louisiana license LA-13066-L01, Amendment 36, states, in part,

that the licensee is authorized to do source retrieval in accordance with company

operating and emergency procedures.

5

Operating and Emergency Procedures, NTOPMI-031-NDT-OE, Section 7, Procedures

for Lay Barges & Offshore Platforms, Revision 4; Section 10.0, Emergency

Procedures, step 10.2 requires, in part, that radiographic personnel are to contact the

radiation safety officer (RSO) in the event a source cannot be fully retracted to the fully

shielded position. Only radiographers who have been specifically authorized by the

RSO may attempt source recovery operations, and then only after specific RSO

approval.

Contrary to the above, on March 31, 2018, the licensee engaged in activities in

Non-Agreement States under the general license provided in 10 CFR 150.20, and failed

to comply with all terms and conditions of the specific license issued by an Agreement

State. Specifically, radiographic personnel failed to contact the RSO when a source

could not be fully retracted to the fully shielded position. In addition, the radiographers

performed source recovery operations without having been properly trained and without

RSO approval. (150-00017/2018-001-02)

Severity Level IV Violation of 10 CFR 20.1201(c)

After reviewing the event, the inspector identified a Severity Level IV violation that

involved the licensees failure to assign a deep-dose equivalent for the part of the body

receiving the highest exposure.

Title 10 CFR 20.1201(c) requires, in part, that the assigned deep-dose equivalent must

be for the part of the body receiving the highest exposure. The deep-dose equivalent

may be assessed from surveys or other radiation measurements for the purpose of

demonstrating compliance with the occupational dose limits, if the individual monitoring

device was not in the region of highest potential exposure.

Contrary to the above, from March 31 through May 10, 2018, the licensee failed to

assign a deep-dose equivalent for the part of the body receiving the highest exposure.

The deep-dose equivalent was not assessed from surveys or other radiation

measurements for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with the occupational dose

limits when the individual monitoring device was not in the region of highest potential

exposure. Specifically, a radiographers dose monitoring device was worn near the

individuals hip during a source recovery operation, however the individuals chest and

arm to the elbow were in the region of highest potential exposure and the licensee failed

to assign a deep-dose equivalent for those parts of the body.

The licensees failure to assign a deep-dose equivalent for the part of the body receiving

the highest exposure was identified as a Severity Level IV violation

of 10 CFR 20.1201(c). (150-00017/2018-001-03)

The licensee corrected this violation on the same day that the inspector discussed the

deep-dose equivalent with the RSO. The licensee requested that Mirion assign a deep-

dose equivalent of 157.5 millirem to the radiographer. Corrective actions to prevent

recurrence in the future have not yet been specified by the licensee.

Use of Direct Ion Storage (DIS) Dosimetry

The inspector reviewed the licensees compliance with personnel dosimetry

requirements under 10 CFR 34.47 and determined that the licensee is using direct ion

6

storage (DIS) dosimetry designed for remote data evaluation to meet this requirement.

The inspector reviewed the conditions described in NRC Enforcement Guidance

Memorandum (EGM)18-001, Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Apparent Violations

of 10 CFR Parts 34, 36 and 39 Requirements Resulting from the use of Direct Ion

Storage Dosimetry During Licensed Activities, dated May 11, 2018, (EA-18-050).

The inspector determined that: (1) the DIS dosimeters are being provided and dose

data evaluated and reported for the dose of record by a National Voluntary Laboratory

Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredited processor; (2) the licensee and NVLAP

processor have implemented specified quality controls to ensure that the dosimeter is

calibrated and/or replaced appropriately; and (3) the licensee has maintained the

necessary documentation and records to demonstrate that the criteria of EGM-18-001

are being implemented.

Future inspections will review and determine whether the criteria of EGM-18-001

continue to be met. If the NRC identifies that DIS dosimetry arrangements do not meet

the criteria of EGM-18-001, a violation of 10 CFR 34.47(a) and (a)(3) will be considered.

Such reviews will continue for as long as EGM-18-001 criteria remain in effect.

3. Exit Meeting Summary

On June 21, 2018, a final telephonic exit meeting was conducted with The NACHER

Corporation RSO and a Regional RSO from Mistras Group, Inc. to discuss the

inspection findings. The NRC representatives described the NRCs enforcement

process and the options for the licensee to respond in writing to this inspection report or

attend a pre-decisional enforcement conference with the NRC.

7

SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

David Boudreaux, Radiation Safety Officer, The NACHER Corporation

Kevin Brackens, Regional Radiation Safety Officer, Mistras Group, Inc.

Matt Kim, Corporate Radiation Safety Officer, Mistras Group, Inc.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

87121 Industrial Radiography Programs

87137 10 CFR Part 37 Materials Security Programs

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

150-00017/2018-001-01 APV Failure to perform an adequate equipment check, before

use, to ensure equipment was in good working condition.

(10 CFR 34.31(a))

150-00017/2018-001-02 APV Failure to follow Emergency Procedures to contact the

RSO and obtain approval prior to source recovery

operations. (10 CFR 150.20(b)(5))

150-00017/2018-001-03 VIO Failure to assign a deep-dose equivalent for the part of the

body receiving the highest exposure. (10 CFR 20.1201(c))

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DIS Direct Ion Storage

EGM Enforcement Guidance Memorandum

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

PEC Predecisional Enforcement Conference

RSO Radiation Safety Officer

Attachment