ML18152B324
| ML18152B324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1988 |
| From: | Ernst M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Cartwright W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18151A513 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8812220021 | |
| Download: ML18152B324 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1988032
Text
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Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281
/Virginia Electric and Power Company
~ ATTN:
Mr. W. R. Cartwright
Vice President
Nuclear Operations
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Gent1emen:
e
December 1,5, 1.988
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/88-32 AND 50-281/88-32
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This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted by
G. A. Belisle on September 12 - 16, September 26 - 30, and November 14 -18,
1988.
The inspection included a review of activities authorized at your Surry
facility.
At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed
with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report.
A Confirmation of Action Letter was also sent to you on November 2, 1988.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report.
Within
these areas, the inspection consisted of selecti~e examination of procedures
and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of
activities in progress.
The inspection findings indicate that certain activities appeared to violate
NRC requirement? .in that the service water systems would not have met their
safety design objectives without relying on nonsafety-grade equipment.
The
apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report are under
consideration for escalated enforcement action.
Accordingly, no Notice of
Violation is being issued at this time, and no response to this letter is
required for these apparent violations.
However, please be advised that the
number and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed
Inspection Report may change as a result of further NRC review.
An Enforcement
Conference to discuss these apparent. violations will be scheduled in the near
future.
You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our
deliberations on this matter.
However, you have agreed to resolve these issues
prior to restart of either unit.
The inspection findings also indicate that certain activities appear to deviate
from your commitments to NRC Generic Letter 83-28, Required Actions Based on
Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events, issued on July 8, 1983, and your
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report commitment to IEEE-279, Standard Nuclear
Power Plant Protection Systems, dated August 1968.
No Notice of Deviation is
being issued at this time, and no response to this letter is required for these
apparent deviations.
You will be advised by separate correspondence of the
results of our deliberation on this matter.
8812220021 881215
ADOCK 05000280
G
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Virginia Electric and Power Company
2
December 15, 1988
Your attention is
inspection report.
invited to the unresolved items identified in this
These matters will be pursued during future inspections.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this 1 etter and its enclosures are not subject to
the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as pequirea by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Enclosures:
1.
Executive Summary
2.
NRC Inspection Report
cc w/encls:
M. Kansler, Station Manager
,1L E. Hardwick, Manager:... Nuclear
Programs and Licensing
Commonwealth of Virginia
bee w/encls:
vNRC Resident Inspector
DRS Technical Assistant
Document Control Desk
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(Original si.gned by M. L.. Ernst)
Malcolm L. Ernst
Acting Regional Administrator
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ENCLOSURE 1
Executive Summary
An announced Safety System Functional Inspection on the Service Water (SW),
Recirculation Spray (RS), and associated electrical systems was conducted on
September 12-16, 26-30, and November 14-18, 1988.
The inspected activities
included design control, operations, maintenance, surveillance, and qua1ity
assurance/quality control. The inspection objective was to assure that these
systems would perform their safety function as required by the design basis of
the plant.
The SW systems for Surry Units 1 and 2 were designed to remove sufficient decay
heat from these plants to prevent fuel damage following coincident Loss of
Coolant and .Loss of Offsite Power accidents.
This design objective could not
have
been
met
during
previous Surry operations without relying
on
nonsafety-grade equipment.
The Surry upper intake canal provides the only source of service water for the
station. This upper intake canal (reservoir) is separated from the James River
by an earth dam.
The canal is filled by circulating water pumps during normal
operation and by emergency service water pumps when offsite power is lost. The
upper intake canal water level is higher than the river level. The inspection
revealed that the upper intake canal could be siphoned back to the river
through idle circulating water pumps following loss of offsite power if
non safety-grade siphon breakers on the pump discharge piping failed.
Water
would also drain from the upper intake canal by gravity flow if nonsafety-grade
canal level instrumentation failed to close main condenser isolation valves.
The rate of loss of water from the upper intake canal under either circumstance
could far exceed the makeup capacity of the emergency service water pumps
resulting in l-0sing the service water supply to both units.
essential for decay heat removal following a design basis accident.*
Other significant findings concerning service water operability included the
questionable reliability and capacity for the emergency service water pumps.
The inspection identified that the emergency service water pumps could not
meet the design basis flow requirements.
There was extensive fouling of the
service water heat exchangers and upstream piping.
Therefore plant operation
was conducted since plant startup with canal level too low to provide suffi-
cient service water inventory to support the design basis.
Some of the factors contributing to these deficiencies included the following:
Inappropriate assumptions in the original plant design were not questioned
by the licensee.
Failure to properly maintain the plant .
Inadequate surveillance testing to ensure continued operability.
e
Executive Summary
2
Failure to maintain appropriate design basis documentation.
Failure to take adequate corrective action on upper intake canal l~vel
issue (i.e., errors in the justification for continued operation when
first identified by the licensee).
Inaccurate plant drawings.
Inadequate quality assurance (i.e., the licensee did not identify tf\\ese
problems sooner).
Both units were shut down (Unit 2 was in an outage and Unit 1 was
resolve diesel load sequencing problems) during the inspection.
agreed to resolve all issues regarding operability of the service
prior to restarting either unit .
shut down to
The licensee
water system