ML18152A536
| ML18152A536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1993 |
| From: | Belisle G, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A537 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-93-07, 50-280-93-7, 50-281-93-07, 50-281-93-7, NUDOCS 9305030376 | |
| Download: ML18152A536 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1993007
Text
Report Nos.:
50-280/93-07 and 50-281/93-07
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
March 7 through April 3, 1993.
Inspectors:
Approved by:
Z.2§ W
J. ~~ing Senior Resident
Inspector
S. G. ~Mesidhspector
G. A. Belisle, Se<rti-On Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
~/9- Y3
Date Signed
f-19'--Y:>
Date Signed
'Wrlrs
Date Sifgned
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the area of plant
status, operational safety verification, maintenance inspections, surveillance
inspections, safety assessment and quality verification, action on previous
inspection items, and licensee event review.
During the performance of this
inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee's
backshifts, holiday or weekend operations on March 7, 13, 18, 21, 23, 26, 28,
31, and April 1, 2, and 3.
Results:
In the operations area, the following items were noted:
A strength was identified relating to the sensitivity of a reactor
operator's observation that a fire watch had certain conditions that may
have prevented the performance of the assigned functions (paragraph
3. a).
9305030376 930419
ADOC~ 05000280
G
2
The evolutions associated with defueling unit 2 were well organized and
efficiently accomplished (paragraph 3.b).
A review determined that when the containment air recirculation system
is shut down, the radiation monitors for the system are inoperable
during refueling operations. A non-cited violation was identified for
this discrepancy (paragraph 8).
In the maintenance/surveillance functional area, the following items were
noted:
During the installation of a code repair on a service water line,
quality assurance's coaching of the craft indicated that the craft was
not adequately prepared to do the job. This is considered to be a
weakness.
(paragraph 4.c).
Non-intrusive testing of accumulator discharge check valves to verify
full stroke was an improvement over the previous test method that
required the check valves to be periodically disassembled, inspected and
reassembled.
This new method of testing also resulted in a reduction in
radiation exposure (paragraph 5.a).
In the engineering/technical support area, the following item was noted:
An unresolved item was identified in the area of evaluation for open
issues identified during implementation of the design basis
documEntation program (paragraph 3.c).
In the safety assessment/quality verification area, the following items were
noted:
The corrective actions implemented to verify proper operation of steam
traps in the steam supply lines to the turbine driven auxiliary feed
pump to preclude further failures were adequate (paragraph 4.b).
The methodologies approach for assessing station performance was an
innovative method for performing audits.
The methodologies audits
performed on the Maintenance Department indicated that the performance
of the maintenance department is slowly improving (paragraph 6.b).
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. Allen, Supervisor, Operations
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services
M. Bowling, Manager, Corporate Nuclear Licensing
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Engineering
D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection
B. Foster, Supervisor, Station Engineering
- R. Gwaltney; Superintendent of Maintenance
- L. Hartz, Manager-Nuclear, Quality Assurance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
C. Luffman, Superintendent, Security
- R. MacManus, Supervisor, System Engineering
A. Meekins, Supervisor, Administrative Services
J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
B. Stanley, Supervisor, Station Procedures
- J. Swientoniewski, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety
NRC Personnel
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- J. York, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators,
shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
- Plant Status
Unit 1 began the reporting period in power operation.
The Unit was at
power at the end of the inspection period, day 52 of continuous
operations.
Unit 2 began the reporting period in a refueling outage which is planned
to continue until May 3 .
2
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 42700)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify
proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved
procedures.
The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed
operator logs on a daily basis to verify operations safety and
compliance with TSs and to maintain awareness of the overall operation
of the facility.
Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically
reviewed from control room indication to assess operability.
Frequent
plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection
programs, radiological work practices, plant security programs and
housekeeping.
Deviation reports .w.~re reviewed to assure that potential
safety concerns were properly addressed and reported.
a.
Operator Rounds*
On March 17 during rounds in the SGR, an operator noted that four
temporary 480 volt power leads were running through the Unit 2 SGR
door.
These cables would have prevented closing this fire door.
The fire watch that was posted in the area was instructed to trip
open breaker 24Cl-7 and then cut the four 480 volt power leads in
case of a fire in the Unit 2 SGR.
The fire watch was then to move
the leads out of the path and close the door.
The operator noted
that the fire watch could not have cut the one inch diameter cable
with the tool provided.
In addition, the operator did not feel
that it safe for the fire watch to be manipulating 480 volt
breakers even though the unit was in cold shut down.
The operator
notified the shift supervisor and wrote station deviation
S-93-0339.
This action denotes a high level of sensitivity by the
operator and is identified as a strength.
b.
Unit 2 Refueling Operations
C.
On March 23 the inspectors attended the reactor vessel head lift
pre-job brief, and witnessed the lifting of the reactor vessel
head and the placement of the head in the containment basement.
This evolution was accomplished in accordance with Sections 5.8
and 5.9 of 2-0P-FH-001, Refueling Operations, dated
February 18, 1993.
The inspectors also witnessed other evolutions
associated with defueling unit 1.
These evolutions were well
organized and efficiently accomplished.
Design Basis Documentation Program
On April 2 the inspectors met with the Manager of Nuclear
Engineering to discuss the design basis documentation program.
The North Anna NRC Resident Inspectors had opened unresolved item
50-338/92-32-01, DBD Concerns, in their Inspection Report
50-338, 339/92-32. This item concerned the methodology and
resolution of open items identified during the DBD review.
The
inspectors also reviewed a QA assessment of this area that was
conducted from January 11 through February 4, 1993, (Reference-
3
Configuration Management Project, 93-01-ES-Ol-C, dated March
1993).
Among some of the items noted in this assessment were that
procedures do not have a systematic approach for resolving open
issues and that there were a large number of open issues.
Many of
the same issues identified for North Anna are also applicable to.
the Surry.
Until additional inspection can be conducted in this
area, this issue will be identified as Unresolved Item 50-280,
281/93-07-01, Evaluation of DBD Program.
Within the areas inspected, one URI item was identified.
4.
Maintenance Inspections (62703) (42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the following
maintenance activities to assure compliance with t~e appropriate
procedures.
a.
Replacement of a Relay in the Hi-Hi CLS System-Unit 1
While performing surveillance 1-PT-8.5, Consequence Limiting
Safeguards Logic (Hi-Hi Train), I&C technicians noted smoke coming
from the top of train B high-high CLS cabinet upon termination of
the test. Annunciator BC5 (CLS test coil failure) activated and
the technicians noted relay 3-CLS-2BM-Y was deenergized indicating
a failure of the relay.
The inspectors observed electrical craftsman replacing this relay
using WO 3800138357 and procedure No. O-ECM-1806-01, Protective
Relay and Associated Control Circuit Replacement, dated
December 3, 1992.
The system engineer was at the job site
supporting the craft for the replacement of the relay.
Visual
examination of the relay revealed a burnt condition.
The
inspectors noted that a second electrical craftsman was
independently verifying the work properly.
No problems were
identified in the maintenance activities.
b.
Unit 1 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Trap Replacement.
On March 26, the Unit 1 turbine drive AFW pump, l-FW-P-2,
automatically tripped after being started for a monthly
surveillance test. The licensee concluded that the steam trap
located in the turbine steam supply piping had failed that allowed
water into the turbine causing the turbine to trip on overspeed.
The licensee replaced the steam trap in accordance with
WO 3800138831 and procedures O-MCM-1004-01, Flange, Gasket
Replacement, dated June 14, 1991 and O-MCM-1801-01,
Piping/Component/Repair/Replacement, dated December 18, 1992.
The
inspectors observed portions of the steam trap replacement and
reviewed the post maintenance test requirements .
The inspectors reviewed the post maintenance test requirements
after the maintenance was completed and the equipment returned to
4
service.
The inspectors discussed the test requirements with the
system engineer and concluded that the PMT data sheet did not
specify all the correct tests. Discussion with the system
engineer indicated that the trap should be tested by monitoring
movement of the steam trap's internals with ultrasonic test
equipment.
The PMT data sheet required that a leak test be
performed and that the trap be primed, but did not specify an
ultrasonic test.
Discussion with the PMT coordinator indicated that poor
communications between the planner who enters the test on the PMT
test data sheet and system engineer who specified the PMT was the
cause for the omitted test.
The PMT coordinator issued a PMT
Alert instructing planners when contacting a system engineer via
telecommunication, to reverify the PMT with the system engineer
prior to recording it on the PMT data sheet. Although the
ultrasonic test was not specified on the PMT data sheet, the
system engineer directed station personnel to perform an
ultrasonic test when the steam trap was returned to service. This
was performed.
Previously, on January 15, 1993, an identical event occurred when
the Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump tripped after being started for
a monthly surveillance test. The steam trap located in the
turbine steam supply piping had failed. This resulted in water
intrusion into the turbine which caused the turbine to trip on
As a result of the Unit 1 and 2 turbine driven AFW
pump failures, the licensee began verifying proper operation of
the steam traps with ultrasonic test equipment on a daily basis.
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance histories for the Unit 1
and 2 turbine driven AFW pumps and concluded that these pumps did
not have a history of tripping upon starting. The inspectors
considered that the licensee was aggressively pursuing corrective
measures in order to preclude recurrence.
c.
Installation of Patch on Unit 1 SW Line
On March 26, the inspectors witnessed the installation of a code
repair (a temporary patch) on a 1/4 inch crack in bondstrand SW
piping.
The crack was located downstream of SW pump 1-SW-P-lOB,
which required the pump be isolated for maintenance.
With the
isolation of the pump, a TS twenty-four hour LCO was entered.
The
maintenance was done well within the LCO time restraints in
accordance with WO 3800138798 and vendor instructions that were
approved by SNSOC.
While observing this maintenance, the inspectors reviewed the work
package and identified several minor paperwork discrepancies that
were corrected at the job site. This maintenance was also
observed by station QA.
The inspectors noted QA's coaching the
craft on how to install the patch in accordance with the
5
requirements of the vendor's procedure.
At one point, QA stopped
the job and requested engineering assistance in determining the*
acceptability of the surface preparation for the patch and in
evaluating the proper cure time for the adhesive that secured the
patch to the pipe.
The coaching by QA, indicated to the inspector
that the craft was not properly prepared to do the job.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Inspections (61726, 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure ~nd TS
requirements.
a.
Accumulator Discharge Check Valve Testing
b.
The inspectors reviewed the results of 2-0PT-SI-006, SI
Accumulator Discharge Check Valves Full Open Test, dated
March 9, 1993, that was performed on March 11.
The purpose of the
test is to verify that the accumulator discharge check valves
stroke fully open in accordance with the licensee's ASME Section
XI Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves.
The test was accomplished with the plant depressurized.
The MOV
downstream of the accumulator was shut.
Each accumulator was
pressurized to approximately 140 psig with nitrogen.
The
accumulator level was established at 60%.
The discharge MOV was
opened and the accumulator discharged to approximately 40% level.
Temporary acoustical monitors were installed on the accumulator
discharge check valves to verify that the check valves fully
stroked.
The test was completed satisfactory.
The inspectors concluded that this new method of testing
accumulator discharge check valves was an improvement over the
previous method that required the check valves to be periodically
disassembled, inspected and reassembled.
GL 89-04, Guidance on
Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs, dated April 3,
1989, states that non-intrusive testing to verify check valve full
stroke is preferred over disassembly and inspection.
In addition,
the check valves are located in the basement of the containment
which is a high radiation area.
Radiation exposure required for
non-intrusive testing was significantly less than the exposure for
disassembly and inspection.
Testing of the 2H Bus
On March 9, the inspectors observed part of the licensee's testing
on the Unit 2 2H emergency bus using procedure 2-0PT-ZZ-001, ESF
Actuation With Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage-2H Bus, Rev. 2,
dated March 1, 1993.
The test purposes were to verify the train A
SI function, to perform ERFCS verification, and to perform 3/4
6
logic verification for the CLS Hi and Hi-Hi systems.
The
inspectors observed the prejob briefing and noted various
components in operation i.e., the containment spray pump, the 3A
MDAFW pump, the LHSI pump, and EDG 2.
The inspectors noted that
operators were taking readings for the test on the instrumentation
for these pumps and recording the data in the test procedure data
sheets.
The procedure was reviewed and some of the results of the
test were discussed with the system engineer.
The requirements of
the logic test were satisfied since all of the proper signals were
received.
No discrepancies were noted.
c.
Type C Containment Testing
On March 16 the inspectors were in Unit 2 containment and
witnessed containment isolation valves 2-SS-TV-203A and B testing
in accordance with section 6.50 of 2-0PT-CT-201, Containment
Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Testing (Type C Containment
Testing).
The inspectors attended the pre-test brief, observed
the test equipment installation, and observed the actual testing.
No discrepancies were identified.
6.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500)
a.
On March 24 the licensee presented a self-assessment to the Region
II NRC management.
This self-assessment covered a performance
review of certain business plan goals (capacity factor, forced
outages, EDG availability etc.), a self-assessment as defined by
SALP categories, and a summary of quality program evaluation of
Surry's performance.
Not only were strengths identified but also
areas of challenge for the facility.
b.
Maintenance Methodology Assessement
The inspectors reviewed the results of the Station Maintenance
Program audit conducted by QA during November 18 through December
14, 1992.
The audit utilized Performance Methodologies to assess
the maintenance department.
A Performance Methodology is a
documented systematic approach in assessing performance in a given
area to a standard or set of criteria.
Examples of performance
objectives are assignment of correct pri6rities to work orders,
verifying that all maintenance procedures are on the job site, or
verifying that the PMT instructions are adequate.
QA observes
maintenance personnel perform these objectives and rates the
performance.
The performance objectives are rated 1.0, Fully
Acceptable; 2.0, Acceptable; 3.0, Unsatisfactory; or 4.0,
Unacceptable.
The overall rating of the 1992 audit was 2.0.
Station Maintenance Program audits utilizing Performance
Methodology performance objectives were *accomplished in August
1990, and March and December 1991.
The results of the overall
ratings of these and the 1992 audits indicate that the performance
of the maintenance department is slowly improving.
The inspectors
7
concluded that the methodologies approach for assessing station
performance was an innovative method for performing audits.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
7.
Action on Previous Inspection Items (92701,92702)
a.
(Closed) Part 21 50-280, 281/P2191-09, Nuisance Tripping of
Heater Coils used in Cutler-Hammer C300 Overload Relays.
On
September 12, 1991, Eaton Corporation made a notification that
Hlll2 heater coils in C300 overload relays were defective and
should be replaced with a new design heater coil. Heater coils
Hlll3 and Hlll4 were identified as being potentially defective and
the notification recommended that they also be replaced.
The
licensee reviewed the application of Hlll2, Hlll3, and Hlll4
heater coils in safety-related systems and identified five
components that utilized these heater coils.
The heater coils
were installed in control room damper motor operators for
l-VS-MOD-103A, B, C, and D and in the Unit 1 charging pump
1-CH-P-lA auxiliary oil pump motor.
The inspectors reviewed
WOs 105516, 107042, 107041, 105058, and 104184 and verified that
the heater coils were replaced as corrective action for the
notification.
b.
(Closed) URI 50-280/93-05-03, Operability of Containment
Recirculation Spray System With Radiation Monitor Cabinet 1-2
This issue involved the licensee declaring both
trains of containment recirculation spray inoperable due to the
failure of radiation monitor cabinet 1-2.
The inspectors
questioned the design of the containment recirculation spray
system in that a single failure caused both trains of a safety
system to be inoperable. Deviation Report S93-0207 documented the
failure of radiation monitor cabinet 1-2 and the inspectors
reviewed the corrective actions assigned to this DR.
The
licensee's DR analysis concluded that the operability of the
containment recirculation spray system was not dependent on the
operability of the RSHX SW radiation monitors.
The inspectors
agreed with this analysis.
It is recognized, however, that the
RSHX SW radiation monitors are important to safety, and the
licensee stated that procedures should *be revised to provide
instructions for loss of the radiation monitor power supply.
The
analysis also concluded that the RSHX SW radiation monitors were
appropriately classified as Regulatory Guide 1.97 instruments and
their power supply met the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
C.
(Closed) URI 50-280/93-05-04, Effects of MSVH Inlet Air Louver on
Operation of the AFW Pumps.
During the previous inspection
period, the Unit 2 MSVH air inlet louver actuator arm failed which
disabled the ability of the louvers to automatically operate.
When this failure occurred, engineering instructed operations that
the AFW pumps were operable but that the louvers should be
manually opened when operating the AFW pumps.
As a result of this
8
failure, the inspectors questioned if operating the AFW pumps was
dependent on opening the MSVH air inlet louvers to maintain the
required ambient air temperature.
In a memorandum from the
Supervisor of System Engineering to the Superintendent of
Engineering, dated March 23, 1993, the effect of the MSVH air
inlet louvers on the AFW pumps was addressed.
In this memorandum,
engineering concluded that there is no operability tie between the
louvers and the AFW pumps for outside air temperature in the range
of the ventilation system destgn.
The inspectors agreed. with the
licensee's conclusion.
Within the areas inspected, no viGlations were identified.
8.
Licensee Event Review
The inspectors reviewed the LER listed below and evaluated the adequacy
of the corrective action.
The inspector's review also included followup
of the licensee's corrective action implementation.
(Closed) LER 50-280, 281/93-003, Containment Air Recirculation System
Shutdown Renders Containment Radiation Monitors Inoperable During
Refueling Operations-Violation of TS.
A review which was concluded on
February 13, 1993, of the containment air particulate and gaseous
radiation monitors operability requirements revealed that the monitors
are rendered inoperable when the containment air recirculation system is
shut down.
This condition also applied to North Anna Nuclear Station.
The design functions of these monitors are to monitor airborne
radioactivity levels in containment, activate an alarm when airborne
exceeds an established level, automatically stop the containment purge
ventilation supply fans, and close the containment purge isolation
valves.
A licensee review of the previous Unit 1 outage (February-May
1992) indicated that the containment air recirculation system was
shutdown during refueling. Therefore, Unit 1 radiation monitors
l-RM-RMS-159 and 160 were not operable during refueling operations as
required by TS 3.10.A.2 and 3.10.A.4.
The manipulator crane area
radiation monitor was operable during this event and performs a similar
function as these two monitors.
In addition, continuous air monitors
equipped with audible alarms were operating during this period.
The root cause for this event was that inadequate design documentation
resulted in developing operating procedures that provided insufficient
- direction to ensure that the subject monitors were operable during the
refueling operation.
The inspectors reviewed operations surveillance procedure
l/2-0SP-ZZ-004, Safety Systems Status List for Cold Shutdown/Refueling
Conditions, dated March 19, 1993, which has been modified as one of the
corrective actions to ensure that the manipulator crane is operable.
Another corrective action will be to change the TS (ref. CTS no. 2039)
to allow the securing of containment purge dtiring refueling operations
if the automotive isolation functions become inoperable.
9
This violation of TS requirements is identified as NCV
50-280, 281/93-07-02, Containment Air Recirculation System Shutdown
Renders Containment Radiation Monitors Inoperable During Refueling
Operations.
This violation will not be subject to enforcement action
because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the
violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the
9.
Exit Interview
The results were summarized on April 5, 1993, with those individuals
i dent ifi ed by an asterisk in Paragraph 1.
The fa 11 owing summary of
inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exit:
Item Number
Status
50-280,281/P2191-09
Closed
Part 21
LER 50-280,281/93-003
Closed
URI 50-280/93-05-03
Closed
- URI 50-280/93-05-04
Closed
URI 50-280,281/93-07-0l
Open
NCV 50-280,281/93-07-02
Closed
Descri ptfon
(Paragraph No.)
Nuisance Tripping of Heater
Coils used in Cutler-Hammer
C300 Overload Relays
(paragraph 7).
Containment Air Recirculation
system Shutdown Renders
Containment Radiation Monitors
Inoperable During Refueling
Operations-Via of TS
(paragraph 8).
Operability of Containment
Recirculation Spray System
With Radiation Monitor Cabinet
1-2 Inoperable (paragraph 7).
Effects of MSVH Inlet Air
Louver on Operation of the AFW
Pumps (paragraph 7).
Evaluation of DBD Program
(paragraph 3.c).
Containment Air Recirculation
System Shutdown Renders
Containment Radiation Monitors
Inoperable During Refueling
Operations (paragraph 8).
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments
were not received from the licensee .
.,.
10.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms
-
CLS
DR
-
EOG
ERFCS -
GL
l&C
- LER
LHSI
-
MDAFW -
MSVH
-
NRC
-
-
-
SGR
SNSOC -
TS
AMERICAN SOCIETY.OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
CONSEQUENCE LIMITING SAFEGUARDS
COMMITMENT TRACKING SYSTEM
DESIGN BASE DOCUMENTATION
DEVIATION REPORT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY COMPUTER SYSTEM
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
GENERIC LETTER
INSTRUMENTATION AND CALIBRATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION
MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
MAIN STEAM VALVE HOUSE
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GAUGE
QUALITY ASSURANCE
RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
SWITCHGEAR ROOM
SAFETY INJECTION
SURRY NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
UNRESOLVED ITEM
WORK ORDER