ML18152A498
| ML18152A498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/24/1991 |
| From: | Decker T, Mcneill N, Seymour D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A499 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-91-34, 50-281-91-34, NUDOCS 9201140072 | |
| Download: ML18152A498 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1991034
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MA~IETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
DEC 2 71991.
Report Nos. 50-:280/91-34 *and 50-:281/9_1-:34
Licensee: Virginia Electric .and *p*ower Company
Glen Allen, VA 230_60
Docket Nos. 50~280 and 50-281
Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2
License Nos. DPR-32 and .DPR-37
Inspection Conduc?ed:;December 2-:6, 1991
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- Inspectors: \\-/)(P-Le-'P~ -,µLf......
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N: G. McNeilJ/T
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~S, . 2;;?-=====
D. A. Se~._
Approved by: V~Aie:110-c
- * * .
T.*R. Decker, Chief
Radiological Effluents and Chemistry
Section.
Dhtcrsigned
DaTsighed
12/zf/crr
Date Signed
Radiological Protection and Emergency
- Preparedness Branch
Division of ~adi~t~on .S~fety and S~feguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas
. of the Environmen~al Monitoring Program, liquid effluents, the
Meteorological Monitoring Program, the Post Accident High*
Radiation Sampling*system (HRSS), and the Radwaste Facility post-
operational status.
Results:
The inspectors accompanied Surry personnel on the Environmental
Sampling Route and observed sample collection and equipment use
and ~alibration. The personnel were proficient in these areas. and.
the samples were properly processed a.ccording to procedures
(Paragraph 2) *
The Meteorological Tower was visited and found to be in operating
condition and well maintained (Paragraph 3).
9201140072 9i1227
ADOCK 05000280
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The licensee had an effective program for controlli_ng and
monitoring liquid waste effluents from the Surry Radwaste
Facility (Paragraph 4).
The program for the Post Accident High Radiation Monitoring
System (HRSS) was effectively.implemented and maintained
(Paragraph 5).
The low estimation of flow for*a plant vent did not result in
significant differences in -the dose reported to the general
public (Paragraph 6) .
DEC 2 7 1991
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees;
REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- M. Biron, Supervisor, Radiation Engineering
E. Batiste, Technician,* Decontamination
- P. Blount, Supervisor, Radiation Analysis
- E. Castillo, Senior Technician, Chemistry
- R. Cox, Senior Technician, Chemistry
- D. Erick.son, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- B. Garber, Supervisor, Health Physics
- D. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- R. Irwin, Senior Staff, Health Physics
- M. Kansler,. Station Manager
- L. Morris, Superintendent, Radiological Waste
- E. Swindell, Supervisor, chemistry
s. Tross, Technician, Health Physics
M. Troy, Nuclear Instrumentation Technician
DEC 2 7 1991
Other licensee employees contacted during* this.inspection
included en9ineers, technicians, and administrative staff.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- T. R. Decker, Section Chief
- S. G. T_ingen, Resident Inspector
- Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are
listed in the last paragraph (Paragrapn 8).
2.
Environmental Monitoring Program (84750)
Section 6.5*.1.a.1 of Surry's Offsite Dose calculation Manual
(ODCM) specifies. that the Radiological Environmental
Monitoring Program (REMP) be conducted as outlined.in
Attachment 20 of that manual. Attachment 20 specifies the
exposure pathway and/or sample, the numbers of samples and
sample locat.ions, the sampling.and collection frequency, and.
the type and frequency of analysis. .The REMP provides
measurements of radiation and radioactive materials in those
exposure pathways and for those radionuclides that lead to
the highest potential exposures of the maximum exposed
. member of the public resulting from the station operation~
The REMP also verifies that radioactive materials and levels
of radiation in the environment are*not higher than expected
based on effluent measurements and modeling of the-exposure
. pathways .
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Pursuant to these requirements,-the inspectors accompanied
licensee personnel during a portion of their regular
collection of week-long _air samples from air sampling
~tations established for_the Surry site. The inspectors
observed sample change inethods and noted that good sample
handling practices were used. The licens.ee knew the sampling
route and locations and performed their tasks_ in a competent.
manner*. All sampling equipment was well-maintained. One air
sampling unit was found to be non-functional and was _
replaced in the field. Documentation of the change as well
as noting sample time and duration corrections were _ *
completed. Sample enclosures.were clean and free of debris
arid extraneous materials. Collected samples were clearly
lapeled as to volume, sample type, sampling on and off
times, and air flow rates .. Samples were to be shipped to the
vendor for analysis. The inspectors also observed the
collection of milk and water samples; these were also
collected in a like manner.
The inspectors* discussed various aspects of the REMP with
cognizant licensee personnel, includ1ng sample collection
arid compositing.of liquid samples, and vegetation and milk
sampling.
Based on this selective review, the inspectors *determined-
that. the REMP was effectively managed.
- **N:o violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Meteorological Monitoring Program (84750)
Section 6.6.3 of Surry's ODCM specifies that Meteorological
data collected over the previous year shall be in the.form
of -joint frequency distributions of wind speed, wirid __
direction, and atmospheric stability. The Meteorological
Monitoring Program provides information criti<;:al to
determining offsite doses due to gaseous effluents; and:
would provide key information for the determination of
gaseous pathways and resultaµt doses in the event .of an
accident
Pursuant to these requirements, the inspectors reviewed the
Meteorological Monitoring Program to determine whether the
meteorological instrumentation and equipment.*were operable,
calibrated, and maintained.
The inspectors deter~ined, through direct observation,
discussions with *the _licensee~ and review of records, the
following: Surry had two meteorological towers, a 150-foot
primary tower, and a 30-foot backup tower. The primary tow~r
had two sets of instrumentation located at either the *35 or*
150 foot levels. Wind speed, wind direction, wind direction
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fluctuation (sigma theta), and delta temperature were
located at both levels. Dew point and temperature were also
located at the 35 foot level. The backup tower had wind
speed, wind direction, and wind direction fluctuation
instrumentation located at .the 30 foot level. The locati6ri
of the.towers was such that there would be no interference
with the fiow of air.
The inspectors verified by direct observation and by records*
review that the meteorological monitoring in.strumentation
channels were operable and well maintained. The inspectors
reviewed selected portions*of the meteorological monitoring*
instrumentation channel calibration records and procedures
for: wind speed and direct:ion monitoring systems_, ambient
-temperature.and differential temperature monitoring system,
delta T loop cc3.libration, the MRI tipping bucket calibration
procedure, and the sigma theta loop calibration procedure.
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According to the Control Room Log for December 2, 1991,
during the time frame of 14:40 hours to 16:05 hours, power
.was* lo.st to the primary system. This data was also included
in the.Liquid Waste Operators Log for*the same date.and
time. The.backup system was fully operational during this
time and continued to operate effectively. Power was
.restored_ to the system and calibration reviews determined
there was no loss _of functionality to the system. The*
advantages of the backup system's presence for just such a
situation were apparent and both systems were operated in a
competent and professional manner.
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Based on this selective review, the inspectors determined
that the meteqrological instrumeptation and equipment were
operable, calibrated, and maintained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Liquid Radwaste Systems (84750)
Surry's ODCM establishes the requirements of the Radioactive*
Effluent Monitoring Program, and includes the methodology
and parameters for liquid e*ffluent monitoring alarm/trip
setpoints. Section 6.2.1 of the ODCM specifies liquid
effluent concentration limits. Section 6.2.2 of the ODCM
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specifies requirements for the radioactive liquid effluent
monitoring instrumentation. Section 6.2.4 specifies the
requirements for_the Surry Radwaste Facility (SRF) liquid
radwaste treatment. The amounts arid types of liquid effluent
- releases have a direct impact on offsite dose.
DEC 2 7 1991"
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Pursuant to these requirements, t_he inspectors observed a
liquid batch.release from the Liquid Waste Monitoring Tank-A
(LWMT-A) of the Liquid Waste System_ (Lws*) , 1-ocated in the
SRF.
The inspectors observed all phases of the release
which included: *agitation of-the LWMT-A, pre.:...release tank
sampling and gamma radionuclide analysis, effluent monitor
setpoint calculation and adjustment; review of the actual-
release data, and valve line up and actual discharge of the
tank. The inspectors_ noted that the chemistry personnel as
-. well as the Radwaste Operations Facili_ty persopnel worked
.closely together in the discharge. All phases of the LWS are
monitored in the _Radwaste control Room and*the operators
were competent and proficient in the tasks performed.
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At the time of th_is inspecti*on; the SRF had approximately
seven weeks of full operability. The inspectors determined
through discussions with the licensee that the evapor_ator
was.being used approximately 50 percent.of the time. The
inspectors reviewed SRF Evaporator Release Summary sheets
for October and November, 1991, and determined that 1511
inicrocuries. were released iri 759,064 gallons of water. Much
of this activity was attributed to start-up testing which
_involved determining the decontamination factors.of the
demineralizers.
Also, for this.time frame, the licensee was
not processing laundry waste water.-
The licensee planned ori processing the laundry waste water
iri December, 1991, and anticipated having 11 0 11 curies
released from the SRF (counting at effluent Lower Limit of
Detection levels).
The inspectors dete*rmined, based on this review, that the
licensee had an effective progra~ for controlling and
monitor_ing liquid waste effluents from the_ SRF.
No violations or deviations were-identified.
5.
Post Accident High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS), (84750)
NUREG-0737, Criterion 2a provides specifications for the
establishment of onsite radiological analysis capabilities
to provide quantification-of noble gases, iodines, and non-
_- volatile radionuclides in the reactor coolant system - (RCS)
- and containment atmosphere.
Technical Specification (TS)
6. 8. 4. d requires that. *a program _ be established, implemented
-and maintained to ensure the capability to obtain and
analyze, under accident conditions, reactor coolant,
radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous
effluents, and containment atmosphere samples. The HRSS
should provide these capabilities, and should enable the
licensee to obtain information critical to the efforts to
assess and control the course and effects of an accident.
0£C 2 7 1991
s*
Pursuant to these specifications, .. the inspectors reviewed
portions of selected procedures for the operation,
maintenance, and testing*of the HRSS, and discussed system
operation, performance testing, and analytical capabilities
of. the HRSS *with the licensee.
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The. inspecto*rs determ.ined *that the HRSS at Surry was divided
into three subsystems; these were:
the Liquid Sampling
- Sy.s.tem,- the. C~ritainmen:t A.tmospheric Sampling System, and the
.Chemical Analysis.* Syste111.*' Each of these systems had two
in.struinerit panels; **one which housed sampling* and analysis
equipment; and, ~ second panel {remotely located) which *
allowed for moni~oring and control. In addition, there was a
Post-Accident Monitoring Panel in the Control Roo~ which
allowed monitoring of the sampling and housed the controls
- for the Containment .Isolation Valve.
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The Liquid Sampling system would be used for obtaining a
depressurized, *diluted or undiluted reactor coolant system
- sample, an in-line pressurized RCS sample, or a sample df
the off-gas frqm a RCS sample. This RCS off-gas could be*
used to determine hydrogen gas concentration. This system
also *provided the'ability to obtain liquid samples .from the
containment sump and the Chemical and Volume control System.*
The Containment Atmospheric Sampling system woulo. be used to
obtain samples of iodines, particulates and gases which.
would be used for lab analysis of containment atmosphere .. In
this system, a small*aliquot of the gas sample is passed
through a particulate air filter and a silver zeolite
cartridge into a dilution flask fitted with a septum. The*
particulate filter would be isotopically analyzed, the
silver-zeolite cartridge would be analyzed for iodine; and
the gas.in the dilution flask could be sampled with a
syringe through the septuma.nd analyzed for hydrogen.
concentration or isotopic noble gases.
This system also allowed for _the transfer of a gas sample to
the Chemical Analysis System*for hydrogen gas analysis of
containment atmosphere, and for obtaining additional grab
samples in shielded containers for offsite analysis *
. The Chemical Analysis'System would be used for in-line
chemical analysis *of pH, dissolved oxygen, chlorides, .,and
boron in the RCS; and. for hydr.ogen* gas concent.ration
analysis of RCS off-gas a.rid *coht'ainment atmosphere.
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The inspectors reviewed selected portions of procedure PT-
38.48, "High Radiation Sampling System Operability Test and
Operator Training," dated May 25, 1989. This periodic test
{PT) was run bimonthly on each unit. There were several
purposes for this periodic test; it ensured that the
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analytical results were within*acceptable limits, provided
operator training on the instrumentation, and ensured that
the equipment received mainten~nce when required. The
inspectors reviewed the results of this PT for the time
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frame of January to November, 1991. These records summarized
. the results' o_f the monthly tests in terms of passing or
- failing the.comparisons between HRSS analyses and routine
RCS sampling, as detailed in NUREG-0737 Criterion 10 and
Attachment No. 1 to the Generic Letter.* This PT included
pH;*boron, hydrogen*and oxygen concentrations; and liquid
and stripped gas isotopics. The point of this comparison is
. to verify that the HRSS system operates, and that the
dilution ratios _and sample volumes have been accurately
d~termined~ In general, there was good agreement with the*
analytical results between the HRs*s sample and the samples
- obtained from routine RCS sampling points *.
This PT requires the licensee to "ensure that current lab
analysis data is available to evaluate the HRSS results. ,i *
The licensee representative indicated that the results from-
the last acquired RCS sample was to be used to make-this*
comparison, however this sometimes resulted in a comparison
being made with two or three_day old. RCS routine* sample.
results. A licensee representative indicated that this
procedure was going to be amended to specify that,the RCS
sample used for this comparison be acquired in the same time*
frame (within hours) as the HRSS sample. This improvement is
expected-to.increase the agreement between the two samples.*
The inspectors also reviewed.selected portions of PT-38.47,
"High Radiation Sampling System Chemistry Instrumentation
Calibration," dated December 18,- 1988. The inspectors
determined that this PT was performed weekly, and that the
purpose of this PT was to ensure the operability of the HRS
chemistry instrumentation. This calibration included.the
oxygen monitor, boron titrator, pH meter, and the gas
chromatograph used for the hydrogen concentration
determinations. The* inspectors reviewed the results of this
PT for the time period of January 8 to November 26, i991,
and determined that_the PT had been performed as required,
and that maintenance problems with the instrumentation had
been addressed.
The- inspectors also reviewed the data sheets for PT-38.49,
"High Radiation Sampling System Containment Air*Sample
Routine Operation and Operator Training," dated March 9,
1989. This PT was performed bimonthly. The purpose of this
PT was to maintain system operability, and to provide HRSS
training for the operators. The inspectors reviewed the
results of this PT for the time period of February 12, 1991
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to November 1i, 1991, and.determined that the PT had been
perf armed as required. In general, *however, the level of
~ctivi1;:y in the containment atmoSpperic samples were too low
to provide meaningful results~
From a review of reco.rds, the inspectors determined that the
licensee had experienced continuing difficulties performing
PT 38.62, "HRSS Waste Tank Valve Test for Post.Accident
Conditions." This test was required te> be performed *
- . quarterly by procedure. The inspectors determined that a
maintenance request to.correct this. problem had been issued.
The inspectors discussed, with licensee management, the
importance of maintaining the HRSS in a fully operational
condition. This issue will be reviewed during Subsequent
inspections.
The insp~ctors .also reviewed selected portions of the
following procedures:.
COP-16.2, Post Accident High Radiation Sampling System,
dated April 17, 1990.
COP-16.3, High Radiation sampling System - Contai:hment Air *.
Sample, dated January 19,.1988.
COP--16.8, "HRSS Containment Sump Sampling (Diluted Sample);
dated July 27, 1989.
The inspectors determined that the portions of the
procedures reviewed were adequate for their intended
purpose.
The inspectors also reviewed the training that the chemistry*
technicians received on the HRSS. This included interviews
with the licensee,* and a document *review. The inspectors .
determined that new, or previously untrained, technicians
initially received three weeks of training; portions of
which addressed the HRSS. Annually, each technici'an also
received an additional four days of emergency preparedness
and HRSS retraining. This annual retraining included eight
hours of experience with .a HRSS simulator, running through
- different accident scenarios. This training included "hands-
on" experience, as well as observation of other technicians
performing the required tasks. The HRSS simulator.was almost
identical to the HRSS instrumentation and control panels*
located in the.plant. *In addition, technicians received "on-
the-job" training.by performing the weekly, bimonthly, and
quarterly PTs.
The inspectors also discussed the licensee's ability to
provide an alternate source of power to the HRSS, in the
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event of the loss of site power during an accident, .as
required by the criteria of NUREG 0737. The licensee
provided information to the inspectors that indicated that
this_capability existed.
- 1 The inspectors determined; based on this selective review,
that the HRSS program was effectively implemented and
mai,ntained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Effluent S_tack Monitoring Calibration
Pursuant to 10 CFR 20 .-201. (b), this area was inspected to
determine whether the.licensee had a system .sufficient.to
perform. the surveys necessary to adequately evaluate the
extent of radiation haz~rds.
During interviews with the licensee and with the resident
inspectors, the inspectors determined that from October 9,
1991 to October 15, 1991, the flow in Vent FL-VS-116 was
underestimated by approximately 20 percent. This error.was
- due to a calibration error involving the flow measuring
.device on the vent. The error occurred when an
Instrumentation and. Control technician inadvertently used
the wrong fluid in a*manometer during the calibration
process. The flow*measurementdevice on this stack was the
only 'I'S flowmeter affected by this mistake. This error was
discovered by. th.e licensee_ and prompt*. corrective actions
~ere *emacteo.*~*.; *"rhese corrective actions included eliminating
the* manometers'for-this measurement.by switching to
electronic, digital read-out instrumentation.
The inspectors reviewed the results of licensee's evaluation
for this issue for the time frame in question. Based on this
evaluation, * the licensee determine*d * that the low. estimation
of flow resulted in an effluent dose discrepancy of
approximately 3.14 E-05 ~illirem to the thyroid. The
inspectors determined that the error in the stack flow
measurement was approximately the same magnitude as the
error associated with the. isokinetic sampler for the vent~
It was determined, due to the low safety impact of this
event and the licensee's prompt corrective actions, that the
licensee would not be cited.
No violations or deviations wer~ identified.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on December
6, 1991 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The
- inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in
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detail the inspection results as listed ih the summary. No
violations or deviations were identified. Proprietary
information is not contained in this report. Dissenting
c;::omments .were not received-from the licensee.
8.
Acronyms and Initialisms
HRSS
LWS
LWMT
NRC
ODCM *
SRF
TS
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Final Safety Analysis Report
High Radiation Sampling System
Liquid Waste System
Liquid Waste Monitor Tank
Nuclear Regulatory-Commission
Off site Dose Calculation Manual**
Periodic Test
Reactor Coolant* Sy~tem
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Surry Radwaste Faci.li ty
- Technical Specifications