ML18152A421
| ML18152A421 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1990 |
| From: | Jape F, Moore R, Casey Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A422 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-08, 50-280-90-8, 50-281-90-08, 50-281-90-8, NUDOCS 9004190006 | |
| Download: ML18152A421 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1990008
Text
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
B. Caulder, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
R. Dillard, Maintenance Engineer
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
R. Green, Supervisor, System Engineering
- D. Hart, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- B. Hargrave, Quality Assurance
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- A. Keagy, Superintendent Material Management
T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering, Nuclear
- R. MacMarus, Supervisor ISI/NDE and Engineering Program
- G. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers, Superintendent Engineering
G. Thompson, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering
- J. Weinbrenner, Supervisor, Procurement Engineering
Other 1 i censee emp 1 oyees contacted during this inspect ion inc 1 uded
engineers and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the.
last paragraph.
2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
a.
(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation (280,281/88-32-05)
Failure to establish adequate measures to maintain material traceability.
The licensee response dated July 14, 1989, was considered acceptable
by Region I I.
The i rispector reviewed the fo 11 owing corrective actions
implemented by the licensee.
Virginia Power memorandum dated June 7, 1989, was issued to
re-emphasize the importance of handling QA documents in an acceptable
manner to prevent the loss of material traceability.
Additionally,
Vi rgi ni a Power memorandum dated October 28, 1989, documents the
results of an evaluation performed to assess the means by which .
materials are i dent ifi ed and contra 11 ed.
Recommended improvements
included review and approval of the Procurement/Materials Management
Process Standard and Administrative Procedures by SNSOC.
900419000A 9004 0?
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Procedure number VPAP-0702, Identification and Control of Material,
- . Parts,
and
Components,
Revision 0, establishes requirements,
responsibilities, and the methodology to iden~ify .and control
materials, parts, and components.
These measures are adequate to
ensure traceability is maintained throughout storage and issuance of
an item.
Based on the above corrective action thi.s*item is ~losed .
. b.
(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation (50-280,281/88-11-0l)
. This item addres*sed the failure*to verify, by appropriate testing
that corrective maintenance adequately resolved a
NOLIE plant
condition which re~ulted from a control rod bank failure.
The licensee response dated July 7, 1988, was considered acceptable
by Region II.
Review of a memorandum from J. Bailey to the Operations Staff
addressed the need for SROs to adequately assess and test components
prior to declaring component operability.
This information in
conjunction with improved performance demonstrated by the licensee
in this area, are the bases for closure of this item.
c.
(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation (50-280,281/88-11-02)
This item addressed failure to meet T.S. requirements for control
.' .. ' ,'_~.~. :* , .
.-.
- . ~- * ...
rod bank operability due to programing circuitry failure and subsequent
failure to meet appropriate operating limitations.
This condition
occurred due to' the failure to identify that contro 1 rod bank
operability was challenged subsequent to inadequate post maintenance
testing addressed in violation 50-280,281/88-11-0l.
Corrective
action
addressed
in the* licensee- response dated
July 7, 1988, was considered acceptable by Region II.
Completion of
this corrective action in addition to lack of recurrence of similar
violations, are the bases for closure.
d.
(Closed). Inspector Follow-up Item (280,2~1/88-32-25)
This item addressed a discrepancy regarding Service Water Pump
periodic test frequency as stated in the UFSAR a~d in* the
surveillance program. This item is closed based on review of UFSAR
Change Request Package FS-90-03, dated February 26, 1990.
3.0 Setpoint Control Program
The objectives of the recently developed Setpoint Control Program
are to accomplish the following:
(1)
Develop procedures and standards that define the
methodology to calculate and control
setpoint and device
calibration.
3
(2)
Provide software to t~lculate and ~etain setpoints and
calibration results.
(3)
Provide design basis documentation of existing setpoints.
The
licensee has identified development and implementation of the
Setpoint Control Program as task number 076, Inst~umentatio~ Information
and Setpoint tontrol Program.
Supporting activities whose completion are
required for achieving the above objectives are delineated in a Level II
- Action Items List.
The inspectors reviewed selected activities and
interviewed licensee management concerning completion of the assigned
tasks relative to identified milestones.
The following are the results
of this review.
'
a.
Setpoint Control Program Milestone 1
Activities related to milestone 1 involved development of a methodology
for performing instrument loop accuracy calculations.
The inspectors
verified that this committment was met by development and approval for
use
of
Electrical
En~ineering Standard STD-EEN-0304,
Calculating
Instrumentation Uncertainties by the Square Root of -the Sum of the
Squares Method, Revision 0.
The above standard establishes the methodology for calculating instrument
uncertainties. The ~ethodology is based on guidelines delineated in NSSS
vendor documents;
NRC Regulatory guide * 1.105 Revision. 0, Instrument
Setpoints for Safety Related Systems; NUREG/CR3659, A Mathematical Model
for Assessing the Uncertainties of Instrumentat i ona l Measurements for
Power and Flow of PWR Reactors; and other industry guides and standards.
Instrument uncertainties that are random and independent are combined by
the square root sum of the squares method.
Additionally, uncertainties
that are not random or independent are combined algebraically into groups
to form independent groups which can be statistically combined.
The
requirements of the standard* applies to safety related, regulatory
significant, and non-safety related instrumentation.
b. * Setpoi nt Control Program Mil es tone 2
Activities related to milestone 2 involved determining those setpoints to
be included in the setpoint control program.
The inspectors reviewed
implementing procedure number SSPD, Revision 2,' and verified that a
listing of setpoints for different equipment types were*contain.ed within*
this document.
The listing is grouped into six major sections as follows:
- (1) Instrument Setpoints, (2) Protective Relays; (3) .MDV (Thermal
Overloads and thrust values); (4) Relief Safety Valves; (5) 480 V
Switchgear Setpoints and (6) Instrument Air Regulator Setpoints .
The licensee schedule for completion of milestone 2 was verified as
having been met pursuant to the above review.
4
c.
Setpoint Control Progrjm Milestone 3
Activities related to milestone 3 involved development of setpoint
standards: The inspectors reviewed the following program documents which
collectively establish and implement the requirements of the licensee
setpoint program:
Procedure
No.
SUADM-ENG-04,
Setpoint Change
Control
Program,
December 12, 1989.
Engineering Nuclear Standard NO. SfD-GN-0030, Revising Nuclear Plant
. Setpoints, Revision 0.
Engineering
Nuclear Standard
NO.
EEN-0211,
Setpoint * Document
Standard, Revision 1.
Engineering
Nuclear
Standard
NO.
STD-EEN-0304,
Calculating
Instrument uncertainties by th.e square root of the sum of the
squares methocj.
Engineering Procedure No, SSPD, Surry Setpoint Document, Revision 0.
Procedure SUADM-ENG-04, specifies the method for initating, analyzing,
implementing, and documenting changes to Surry Setpoi rit Contra l Program.
It defines the scope of the program, specifies requirements, and assigns
responsibilities for* implementation of the program.
Nuclear Plant
setpoints can be changed only by a design change package or an
Engineering Work Request. This ensures that setpoint ~hanges are treated
as. design changes and are subjected to the design controls of the
lice~see 1 s approved ANSI N45.2.11-1974 progra~.
Based on review of the above program documents the inspectors determined
that the program scope and. requirements specified in standard number
EEN-0211 were* inconsistent with the other. standards and procedure.
Licensee management concurred with the inspector 1s observatio".
The
root causes for the program document
inconsistencies were
(1) re-organization of the design-engineering organization with assignment
of new responsibilities and (2) failure to cancel this procedure which is
no longer needed.
Licensee management committed to implementing the
.following corrective actions; cancellation of STD-EEN-0211, and revising
appropriate
remaining
standards
to
remove
program
requirement
inconsistencies.
Corrective action is scheduled to be completed by
April 15, 1990.
This committment is identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-280,
281/90-08-01, Co~rective actions required for eliminating setpoint program
inconsistencies.
5
Based on review of objective evidence the inspectors toncluded that the
licensee met the schedular requirements of Milestone 3.
The existing
program documents define the program scope and establish requirements:for
a* ma:nua 1 based set-point contra 1 program.
Continued* enhancements are
being made to the program.
Provis1on for transition to a computer based
setpoint configuration control program with enhanced capabilities.are_ in
progress.
d~
Setpoint Control Program Milestone 4
Activities related to Milestone 4 included calculating instrument loop*
accuracy for EQ instrumentation 1 oops. . These tasks were covered urider
C:T.
Item 86-5163-022 which addresses the requirement to include
performance data in QDRs.
The inspectors determined that ECR No. 0672,
dated December 20, 1989, was initiated to* revise QDRs to include
performance characteristics .demonstrated by various technical reports ..
An attachment to ECR No. 0672, Surry QDR Inde~ ,. provided a l .i sting of QDRs
identified by a number, revision level, and associated technical report
number.
A total of 54 QDRs were listed on this attachment .
The following selected sample of technical reports were reviewed by the
inspectors to verify that loop accuracy ca lcul at ions had been performed
for instrumentation circuits subjected to harsh environment:
Report No. EE0031, Performance Requirement Assessment for Rosemount
Model 1153 Series D Transmitters, Revision 0.
Report No. EE0024, Generic Performance Requirement Assessment for
Cable, Terminal Block, Splice and Circuitry Performance at NAPS and
SPS, Revision 0.
Report
No.
EE0030,
Performance
Requirement
Asse_ssment. for
Miscellaneous Instrument and Control Equipment, Revision 0.
Report No. EE0033, Perfo~mance Requirement Assessment for Weed
Resistance Temperature Detectors, Revision 0.
Report No.
EE0034, Performance Assessment for Con ax Resistance
Temperature Detectors, Revision 0.
Based on review of the above technical reports, the inspectors_ verified
that loop accuracy c'3,lculations had been prepared for instrumentation
circuits.
Additional discussions with licensee management revealed that
the techn i ca 1 reports had been added to the QDR packages 1 i sted on the
Surry QDR Index.
The *inspectors concluded that the 1 i censee has met the
schedules delineated in milestone 4 .
4.0 Procurement Program
The inspectors verified completion of licensee 1 s activities required to
meet the. following milestones by review of activities delineated on the
Level II Nuclear Project Report actions items list.
The following are
the results of this review.
6
a.
Procurem~nt Program Milestone 1
Activities related to milestone 1 involved ,development of a draft*
procurement report.
The inspectors were provided with a_ copy _ of
11The
Virginia Power Topical Report for Procurement of Safety Related Equipment
for Nuclear Power Stations
11 , updated first draft, dated May 24, 1989, for-
review. _ This document describes Virginia Power's general policy for
establishing and maintaining a formal foundation for procurring nuclear
safety relate_d equipment and: defines the goals and objectives of the
procurement program .. The purpose of the Topical Report is addressed in
paragraph 1.4 of the draft report and is as follows:
As a readil_y understandab 1 e source for over a 11
Company 'po 1 icy,
objectives, and goals.
As a top 1 eve 1 reference document forming the basis for subt i er
Company Standards, Guides, Procedures, and Handbooks.
As top level commitment to excellence in Nuclear Procurement for
Safety Related Equipment.
To
provide common
Company generic coverage necessary for the
in~eractive roles of the various disciplines.
Pursuant to d{~cussions with litensee management, the insp~ctors were
informed that*the.draft Topical Report was never officially approved or
issued for use by the licensee.
However, it* was used as a source
document for deve 1 oping re qui remerits de 1 i neated in procurement program
procedures issued in December 1989. The licensee stated that the Topical
Report does not necessarily reflect the current views of Virgina Power.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had met the schedules delineated
in Milestcine 1 concerning development of the draft procurement report.
b.
Procurement Program Mi 1 es tone 2
Activities related to milestone 2 a~e identified as licensee. task 57-5,
and involves revision and approval of NOD
Policy and Standards.
Additional
Level
II action items included (1) Development of a
procurement Engineering Handbook; (2) Finalizing staffing levels and (3)
De~eloping draft procedures for perf6rming sampling plan.
The inspectors verified that the 1 i censee had comp 1 eted ta_sk 57-5 by
review of the following objective evidence:
NODPS-MM-01, Virginia Power Nuclear Policy Statement, approved by
Senior Vice President - Nuclear, September 15, 1989.
Nuclear
Standard
No.
NODS-MM-01,
Procurement
and
Materials
Manageme~t Process, Revision 4.
7
Additional discussions with licensee management revealed that development
of the Procurement Engineering Handbook is 40 percent complete and is on
schedule.
Licensee management anticipates that the Handbook will be
issued by May 30, 1990.
Staffing levels were also .. discussed with the
Supervisor, Procurement Engineering, and objective evidence was presented
c6ncerning budget and
staffing levels for. current Virgina ~Power,
employ~es,.1989 and 1990 vacancies, and contractors vacancies. ~Sampling
~lans for attribute verification are specified in procedure VPAP~1802, QA
Program for Procurement/Materials Management .. The_ inspectors concluded
that the licen~ee had met the committments delineated in milestone 2.
c.
Procurement Program Milestone 3
Activities related to milestone 3 are identified as licensee task 57-6
and involved complete development of station administrative procedures
- and approval by SNSOC.
Development of a co~tinuing Procurement Engineer
training pr6gram was also listed as a related Level II action item.
The
inspectors verified that the 1 i censee had comp 1 eted the above
activities by review of the following documents.
Procedure No. ENAP-0004, Procurement Technical Evaluation, Revision o-
Procedure No. ENAP-0005, Item Equivalency Evaluation, Revision 0
ProcedOre No. ENAP-0019, Commercial_ Grade Item Evaluation, Revision 0
Procedure NO~ ENAP-0020~ Installation/Procurement Specification
Development and Control ,_Revision 0
Procedure No. ENAP-0021, Part Safety Classification Evaluation,
Revision 0
Procedure No. ENAP-0022, Consumable Material-Evaluation, Revision 0
The above procedures were selected for review from a group of 18 procedures
which establish and implement the requirements of the Pr6curement
Engineering Program.
The procedures were issued in December 1989, upon
initial implementation of the program;
Training provided to the procurement Engineering Staff to d~te has
consisted of procedure reviews and a mandatory reading list.
The
licensee has not completely developed a formalized training program for the-
procurement engineering staff.
The inspectors considered this limited
training. a programmatic weakness particularly as it relates to items
procured to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
The licensee site QA organization also identified the absence of a
formalized training program as a deficiency which is documented in audit
report ~umber S90-19.
A res~onse to the audit findi~g from responsible
management is awaiting expiration of the 30 days response time allowed.
However, at the exit interview the inspectors inform'ed *1icensee*management
of the need for effective corrective action to address this programmatic
deficiency. The licensee's position is that the training program is being
continually developed and .takes time to be established as a~_-formalized
training program.
The program is presently 20 percent complete.
The
inspectors concluded the 1 i censee had met the schedule commitments
delineated in milestone 3 concerning development of station administrative
procedures and Procurement Engineer training program.
d.
Procurement Program Milestone 4
Activiti~s related to milestone 4 are identified as licensee t~sk 57-7,
and involved the construction of a procurement administration building
and relocation of the combined staff.
The inspectors determined that
personnel from Testing and Material Receiving groups were relocated to
the top floor of the administrative building on November 1, 1989.
The
due date of March 1, 1990, shown on the Level II Nuclear Project Report*
action i terns 1 i st is the comp 1 et ion date for the second phase of
construction,
i.e.
the
lower
floor
and
additional
construction
activities.
However, discussions with licensee management revealed that
the presently scheduled construction completion date is April 15, 1990.
Additionally, May 1, 1990, was also mentioned as a more realistic date
for completing construction.
Relocation of the Procurement Engineering
staff will occur after construction is completed arid office furniture has
been procured.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee activities-related to
milestone 4 are essentially on
schedule,
with
some
slippage of
construction completion date.
The objectives of milestone 4 are being met.
e.
Procurement Program Milestone 5
Activities related to milestone 5 are identif~ed as licensee task 57-8,
and involved implementin~ the newly developed procurement program.
Completion
of the following
Level
II activities were listed as
requirements of milestone 5. -
Perform 10 commercial grade dedications to demonstrate the process.
Start on July 21, 1989.
Develop training and qualification requirements for dedication
testers, 1990 requirements.
The inspectors verified by review of objective evidence that eight
commerci a 1 grade dedications had been performed.
This represents 80
percent of the task which is greater than the 33 percent shown as having
been completed on the Level II Nuclear Project Report action item list.
Additionally,
the
inspectors discussed the status
of activities
delineated on the Level II Dedication Tester Qualification actions item
list with licensee management.
5.
9
The licensee has not been successful in developing job performance
- measures for these personne 1 .
Efforts- are ohgoi ng to accomp 1 i sh this.
Objective evidence was also presented by licensee management to show that
additional training would be given to this group by representative from
Edward Valves Inc.
The inspectors concluded that the objectives of milestone *S are *being
met.
Root Cause Analysis Program
The licensee has initiated a root cause analysis program in accordance
. with the Root Cause Evaluation
project schedule.
This
schedule
implemented the Level I nuclear report action item to develop a Root
Cause Evaluation Program.
Schedule milestones specified to be met prior
to this inspection include.; overall program development and procedures
drafted, specific MDV failure analysis program in place, and training and
procedures implemented .. These milestones have been achieved.
The
individual programs which encompass the Root Cause Analysis program have
been in.place since January 1990, with the exception of the MDV program
which was *implemented in 1989. * Du~ to the relatively short implementation
period an assessment of program effectiveness was not accomplished by this
inspection.
There were. three primary activities encompassed by the Root Cause
Analysis Program.
The first of these activities was referred to as the
Root Cause Analysis Program.
This activity includ!;!d the comprehensive
special
team
review of critical events, such as reactor trips,
fatalities, or overexposure, or as directed _by management.
A less
compreh~nsive cause analysis was developed to evaluate ~eviation reports
categofized as significant or potentially significant.
This Cause
Determination Evaluation (COE) was performed by individual technical
support personne 1.
Station Deviation Report procedure,. SUADM-LR-13,
dated December 29, 1989, provided guidance to identify the level of root
cause evaluation required by identified deficiencies or events.
A Root
Cause Evaluation Manual provided information on information gathering and
analysis methods.
The Manual was issued in November, 1989.
Training for
the technical .staff on the Root Cause Evaluation Program was administered.
in December, 1989.
The four houf training sessions addressed the basic
root cause evaluation process, evaluation techniques, and documentation
of evaluations.
Review of the lesson plan, TSCT-89.4-LP-3, Root Cause
Analysis Training, indicated that this training would provide a~ adequa~e
general understanding of the function, process, and documentation of root
cause analysis activity.
There were two technical staff personnel which
had rec~iv~d the more extensive three day tra{ning required to lead the
comprehensive root cause evaluation (RCE) team analysis. The majority of
the root cause evaluations are anticipated to be_ at the level of CDEs,
significant and potentially significant eve~ts. Critical events requiring
the more comprehensive RCE are anticipated at less than three in a year,
therefore the present level of training was adequate for anticipated
activity.
'**.-.
'
.
.
.
. - ~-., .;: .~ ... _ \\;._ **~*.{_
10
A licensee root cause analysis program assessment performed in
February, 1990 identified program deficiencies related to timeliness
requirements of CDE development, interface with the maintenance Component
Failure Evaluation (CFE) program and differences from the North Anna .RCE
program implementation. Resolution of these findings will provide program
enhancement.
The performance of this self assessment was indicative of
the licensee's commitment to establish an effective root cause evaluation
program at Surry.
An assessment of program performance was limited by the lack of completed
cause evaluations. One RCE and one CDE were near completion.
An RCE was
initiated to evaluate the
root cause of an
improper Rosemount
_ transmitter installation in the
118
11 steam generator level transmitter
circuit.
This evaluation was initiated by management direction and
provided an opportunity to exercise the RCE process implementation.
Review of* the evaluation documentation demonstrated the Root Cause
Evaluation Manual and technical training were adequate to accomplish this
1 evel of root cause eva 1 uat ion.
A COE on a Vi ta 1 Bus vo 1 tage spike
adequately evaluated and documented this event.
Although the available
product was too limited to provide an adequate basis to assess program
implementation, these examples demonstrated that the guidance and
training provided was adequa~e to accomplish program activity.
Additional elements of Surry's overall root cause analysis program include
the MOV Failure Analysis Program and the CFE Program.* The MOV Program
was addressed in an NRC inspection during February, 1990, (NRC Inspection
Report Number 50-280,281/90-04). The report stated that this program was
fully implemented, therefore the related milestones have been achieved.
The CFE program was implemented in January, 1990.
Program scope generally
included all safety related component malfunctions except MOVs which were
addressed by the specific program previously discussed.
Procedure
SUADM-M-48, Component Failure Evaluation Program, dated December 29, 1989
provided* guidance for program activities.
Responsibility for CFE was
assigned to maintenance engineering.
All responsible personnel have
received training on failure analysis.
-Discussions with maintenance
engineers demonstrated that personnel responsible for CFE were knowledgable
of the applicable procedure and process.
Assessment of program implementa-
tion was limited by available completed evaluations .. Review of a CFE
near completion demonstrated an evaluation which was technically detailed*
and adequately documented.
Tracking and trending of component failures
was to be accomplished by interfaces with the station deviation reporting
system and NP RDS.
The effectiveness of these mechanisms in i dent ifyi ng
trends will not be evident until a sufficient volume of CFEs has been
processed.
In conclusion, the licensee has developed a formalized program for the
root cause evaluation and documentation of critical and significant plant
events and malfunctions.
The projected milestones for the Root Cause
Evaluation Program have been achieved.
11
The programs were developed and implemented and training has been provided
to applicable personnel.
The program scope was ambitious and represented
a significant increase in root cause evaluation capability.
Review of
available evaluations indicated the guidelines and training were adequate
to accomplish the required evaluatfons.
However, a greater volume of
completed evaluations will be required to assess overall* program
effectiveness .
. 6.
System Engineering Program
The milestones indicated by the Virginia Power Level II Nuclear Project
Report re 1 ated to the System Engineering Program have been achieved.
These milestones include:
define program and
scope, finalize SE
responsibilities,
and revise the System Engineering Administrative
Procedure.
The SE program was reviewed previously by an NRC inspection
in December, 1989 (NRC Inspection Report Number 50-280,281/89-39). This
report indicated that the SE program was adequately implemented with the
exception of a formal system trending methodology.
The SE program and scope were adequately defined by SUADM-ENG-06, System
Engineering, dated December 12,* 1989.
This was the most recent revision
to this procedure.
SE responsibilities were documented in SSES-1.03,
dated* January
16,
1990,
Station
Site
Engineering
Or-ganizatioh *
Relationship with Station Departments and Corporate Engineering, and
SSES-1.02, dated January 16, 1990, Station Engineering Organization.
Review of SE activity and quarterly reports to management from system
engineering indicated that a system trending methodo 1 ogy was under
development.
The previous inspection discussed (NRC Inspection Report
No. 50-280,281/89-39) and a maintenance team inspection (Inspection
Report No. 50-280, 281/90-07) performed concurrent with this inspection
address SE performance. This inspection was limited to verification that
the projected System Engineering Program milestones were achieved.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 2, 1990, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Licensee
management was informed that three previous violations and one IFI
discussed in paragraph 2 were closed during this inspection.
Inconsistencies concerning the scope and requirements of the setpoint
contro 1 program were* i dent i fi ed among the set point contro 1 program
documents.
Licensee management committed to implement corrective action
by April 15, 1990.
This item is identified as IFI 50-280,281/90-08-01,
corrective
actions
required
for
eliminating
setpoint
program
inconsistencies.
12 .
8.
Acronyms and Initialisms
CFE
I FI
NOD
SNSOS
SSPD
SUADM
Cause Determination Evaluation
Comportent Failure Evaluatiori
Committment Tracking.
Engineering Change Request
Inspector Followup Item
Motor Operated Valve
North Anna Power Station
Notice of Unusual Event
Nuclear Operation Department
Pressurized Water Reactor
Quality.Assurance
Qualification Document Review
Root Cause Evaluation
Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee
System Engirteering
Surry Power Station
Surry Setpoint Document
Surry AdminJstrative (procedure)