ML18152A416
| ML18152A416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1989 |
| From: | Dan Collins, Stoddart P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A417 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-11, 50-281-89-11, NUDOCS 8906280121 | |
| Download: ML18152A416 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1989011
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR R EGU LATO RY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
JUN i 2. 1989
Report Nos.:
50-280/89-11 and 50-281/89-11
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
May 15-19, 1989
Inspector: riY' /J? ' ~
-~ P. G. Stoddart
Approved by: .£2, //1 '~
Scope:
D. M; Collins, Acting Chief
Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological
Protection Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Date Signed
(,-'Y-if9
Date Signed
Thj s routj ne, unannounced inspection was in the areas of pl ant chemistry,
radwaste, effluent monitoring, environmental monitoring, and review of
Semiannual Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports and 1988 Environmental
R~port.
Results:
Review of the Semiannual Effluent Release Reports for 1988 indicated that the
licensee continued to release radioactivity in liquid effluents and radioactive
iodines and particulate~ in gaseous effluents at a rate among the highest of
licensees in Region U.
There appeared to be signs of progress in the
replacement of process* and effluent radioactivity monitors which had been
either out-of-service or radi cacti vely contaminated for over six years.
An
oxygen monitor in the waste gas system had been authorized for a design change
after being out-of-service for approximately two years.
The plant chemistry
program was functioning well and chemistry technician training was adequate;
the chemistry program and the chemistry technician training program were
considered to be licensee strengths.
Sludge lancing results from the 1988
shutdowns indicated continuing problems with system piping corrosion,
especially in Unit 2.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified .
8906280121 890612
ADOCK 05000280
G
PNV
r.
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
A. Brown, Instructor, Licensed Operator Training
J. Carson, Engineer, Instrumentation and Electronics
- D. Erickson, Superintendent, Health Physics
- B. Garber, Supervisor, Health Physics
- M. Kansler, Site Manager
C. Mehalie, Instructor, Training Center
L. Morris, Engineer Maintenance
- E. Swindell, Supervisor, Chemistry
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
engineers, operators, security force members,
technicians, and -
administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- W. Holland
- Attended exit interview
2.
Status of Inspector Followup Items and Information Notices (84750)
(Closed) Information Notice (IN) 50-280, 281/88-IN-31:
tube rupture analysis defj ci ency.
The inspector determined that the
licensee had received the IN and had initiated remedial action.
On the
basis of conservative analyses, the licensee*determined that the Exclusion
Area Boundary (EAB) doses would be within 10 CFR Part 100 dose limits but
would exceed the Standard Review Plan (SRP) 15.6.3 criteria. The licensee
also determined that, on the basis of conservatisms in the above analyses,
the radiological consequences of the postulated event would be less than
calculated.
The licensee concluded that, while the analysis using
conservative assumptions produced radiological results higher than
SRP 15.6.3 criteria, the licensee would actively participate in the
Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) program, along with other util'ities, to
seek a generic resolution of this potential safety concern.
When the WOG
work is finalized, the licensee intended to reevaluate the plant's steam
generator tube rupture accident analysis and would then submit the results
of NRR for review.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, this matter
was considered closed for tracking purposes.
(Closed) IN 50-280, 281/88-IN-22:
Disposal of sludge from onsite sewage
treatment facilities.* Inspection Report (IR) No. 50-280, 281/88-13,
Section 3, page 2, described the method used to dry sludge for packaging
for shipment to the Surry County (VA) landfill.
Shipments were normally
2
made about twice a year in volumes of 20 to 30 cubic feet (ft3) per
shipment.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
procedure for monitoring of shipments of dried sludge to the Surry County
(VA) landfill.
The licensee's procedures for preventing the inadvertent
shipment of radioactive material to the county landfill were considered to
be adequate.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, this matter is
considered closed.
(Open) Inpsector Followup Item (IFI) 87-02-03:
Resolve the inoperability
pro bl em of component cooling service water monitor RM-SW-107.
The
existing monitor had been out-of-service since approximately 1978, when
fouling of pumps and pump intakes precluded reliable automated sampling.
As
built,
the
monitor
took
samples
from ,four
separate
service-water-to-component-cooling-water heat exchangers by means of four
pumps.
Debris in the service water (river water) caused plugging of
sampling lines and jamming of pumps on a frequent basis and made the
monitor essentially useless, at which time the licensee opted for periodic
sampling and analysis of the service water.
During this inspection, the
inspector was informed that this monitor problem had recently been
elevated to "Type 3" engineering study status the licensee's most urgent
priority.
Consideration was being given to installing a detector in a
"well". on the manway cover of one of the service water heat exchangers;
however, no firm solution or date had been established.
Since this matter
had not been fully resolved, it remained open for tracking purposes.
3.
Chemistry:
Primary and Secondary Cool ant Chemistry and Radiochemistry
(84750)
At the time of this inspection, both units had been shut down for over six
months.
A number of chemistry-related operations had taken place during
the shutdown and in the interval si nee the chemistry inspection of
February 16-19, 1988 (IR No. 50-280, 281/88-06).
Pipe-thinning continued to be a major concern and the licensee was
participating actively in industry efforts to minimize the problem.
Sludge lancing of Unit 1 steam generators in the Spring of 1988 produced
43 pounds of sludge from A steam generator, 35 pounds from B steam
generator and 58 pounds from C steam generator.
Lancing of Unit 2 steam
generators in Fall of 1988 produced 440 pounds from A steam generator,
170 pounds from B steam generator and 180 pounds from C steam generator.
These quantities were consistent with the sludge removed from Units 1 and
2 during the 1986 outages
(see
IR
No.
50-280,
281/88-06,
Paragraph 4.a.(2)) and were indicative of continued piping thinning. The
licensee's chemistry program had been able to monitor plant chemistry
within the owner's group guidelines but this appeared to have had little
effect on the amount of corrosion material removed * from the steam
generators.
-
The licensee contracted with an outside company to evaluate corrosion
product transport in the secondary systems of both units as a result of an
increase in secondary coolant pH from 8.8 to 9.16 and to identify, if
3
possible, differences in plant chemistry which occurred over the history
of the Surry units.
The change in pH resulted in no apparent improvement
in iron transfer, but transport of nickel and copper was found to have
jncreased.
A decrease in the concentration of dissolved oxygen in the
secondary coolant as the result of increased water purity control was seen
as the only apparent change in water chemistry since about 1980.
The inspector reviewed logs and records of completed chemical analyses and
reviewed trending graphs for principal plant chemical parameters.
The licensee had installed an on-line monitoring system for principal
plant parameters and was in the process of testing and calibrating the
system prior to formal acceptance.
The system was to provide essentially
continuous on-line monitoring and to provide computerized data logging.
The system will be backed up by frequent grab sampling and analysis as a
quality control measure.
Approximately five percent of condenser tubes were eddy current tested
during the last shutdowns.
This was up from four percent in previous
inspections but did not reach the eight percent level forecasted in IR No.
50-280, 281/88-06.
The condenser tubes were hydrolased during the last
shutdowns (1988).
The licensee employed a private consultant to review plant chemistry data
to determi~e if any significant changes had taken place in the chemistry
of the secondary coolant since 1980.
A licensee representative stated
that the only apparent change was in a lowered concentration of dissolved
Graphic trending was being employed extensively by the chemistry
department and by other licensee groups.
Employment of trending was
anticipating to increase when the on-line chemistry monitoring system
became operational.
Licensee chemistry representatives stated that the biggest chemistry
problem recently had been sulfate throw from the condenser demineralizers.
A system was being installed to separate resins for better regeneration
and less fragmenting of resin beads.
The licensee estimated that anion
resins would be regenerated every second cycle, or one bead every 10 days.
Cation resins were expected to be regenerated about once each five days.
It was considered that such a program would reduce sodium concentrations
in the secondary system to about 1 ppb.
The licensee had not seen
problems with silica to date.
Some calcium was apparently being
introduced into the system from makeup but was seen primarily as hideout
return during startup and shutdown.
The licensee had experienced very little river water intrusion since
titanium condenser tubes were installed.
Based on the above, the licensee's chemistry program was a licensee
strength .
4
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Chemistry: Training and Staffing (84750)
The chemistry staffing level, as of the time of this inspection, was 22,
including the Chemistry Supervisor.
The Chemistry Supervisor reported to
the Superintendent of Technical Services, who reported to the Assistant
Station Manager for Operations and Maintenance, who, in turn, reported to
the Station Manager.
The inspector was informed that, as a result of
increased attention to plant chemistry, authorization had recently been
given to add three new positions to the chemistry staffing level.
Training of chemistry personnel was coordinated through the licensee's
onsite training center.
The inspector inspected the chemistry training
facilities, discussed chemistry training with members of the training
center staff, and reviewed selected portions of chemistry lesson plans,
self-study materials, training aids and visuals, and reviewed typical
examinations and ~xamihation results.
The two chemistry instructors were
former plant chemists and appeared to have a good background in the
various phases of chemistry applicable to nuclear power plants.
Special chemistry training facilities included a full equipped chemistry
laboratory and an operating mockup of the licensee's High Range Sampling
System (HRSS) or Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).
Formal training requirements were divided into eight modules or
11 steps,
11
with chemists-in-training expected to complete each
11 step
11 within a
nominal six-month period.
The licensee had been generally successful in
biring new chemistry staff members with a minimum of a Bachelor's degree
in chemistry or a related field such as biology.
In each step, an
individual would be assigned to one week in training status in each
six-week segment, with each week of training devoted to 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> formal
classroom training,
11 on-the-job
11 training or a combination of both.
The
fully qualified chemists subsequently received a minimum of 96 ho~rs of
continued training annually.
A low turnover of chemistry personnel was demonstrated by the training
status, with only five out of 22 not having completed the full four-year
training program.
A 1 i censee representative stated that no contractor
chemistry personnel were employed at the site.
The low turnover rates and the resultant continuity of s'taff, backed up by
a commendable training program and adequate management support, were
licensee strengths.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) (84750)
The licensee's PASS was designated by the licensee as the HRSS and will be
referred to in this inspection report as HRSS.
The inspector discussed
~ -;,c;:;;.*
'----:,
5
the HRSS with licensee representatives of the Chemistry Department and of
the Training Department.
The Chemistry Department had principal
responsibility for operation of the HRSS, while the Training Department
had responsibility for training and periodic training of Chemistry
technicians in HRSS operation.
Licensee's administrative procedure ADM 9.7 required a monthly status
report on the operational availability of the HRSS.
The ADM 9.7 status
report of May 16, 1989, showed the PASS at an overall availability rating
of 75 percent(%).
For reactor coolant analyses, the boron analyzer had
been inoperable since May 16, 1989, because of a failed memory board;
however, the licensee retained the alternative of procuring a diluted grab
sample for local analysis.
The status report incorrectly showed the
availability of the containment air sampling module of the HRSS as 100%;
however, the report details showed TV'."'HC-208B, as inoperable since
February 9, 1989, which prohibited sampling from the Unit 2 containment
and availability should have been 55%, not 100% as stated.
The Unit 1
containment sump sampling was reported to have been out-of-service since
May*of 1987; repairs were to have been made during the current outage of
Unit 1, but licensee representatives indicated that the needed repairs had
not been completed as of, the time of this inspection.
The. inspector discussed HRSS training of Chemistry technicians with
licensee representatives and reviewed training plans and self-study
-material. Training plans and self-study material appeared to be adequate.
It was noted by the inspector that revision of this material had been
undertaken and was in a near-final draft form.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Semiannual Effluent Release Reports (84750)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Semiannual Radioactive Effluent
Release Reports for January-June 1988 and July-December 1988.
The reports
appeared to be complete and were submitted on a timely basis.
The
contents of the reports were discussed with licensee representatives.
In a comparison of site radioactive effluents with other Region II sites,
on a "per unit" release basis, with 22 other operating pressurized water
reactor (PWR) units, it was observed that releases of noble fission
product gases and gaseous and liquid tritium were below Region II averages
for 1988 unit releases.
However, releases of radioiodines and
particulates in gaseous (airborne) releases were a factor of 8.4 greater
than Region I I unit averages and were the highest in Region I I.
The
inspector and licensee representatives discussed these releases and
concluded that most of the activity was probably the result of fuel
defects.
The licensee shut one unit down after a short run because of
fuel 1 eaks, and took action to remove the defective fuel.
The unit had
not been restarted as of the end date of this inspection .
r
6
Liquid radioactive releases of fission and activation products for 1988
were lower than.licensee's releases in any year since 1980.
This was
considered to be partially attributable to improvements in radioactive
waste processing and partially to extended plant shutdowns during 1988.
The licensee had previously recognized that there was room for improvement
in the areas of radwaste processing and* radwaste management and at the
time of this inspection was in the process of contracting an extensive
radwaste building designed to provide improvements in several areas of
radwaste processing, including a
11 super compactor
11 for dry wastes, a
solidification system for resins and high activity liquids, and improved
capacity for demineralizer treatment of liquid wastes.
The licensee
tentatively projected a December 1990 completion date for that facility.
Other compensatory measures already in place to minimize or reduce liquid
effluents included a plant-wide leak reduction program, administrative
control measures to eliminate introduction of orqanics into the radio-
active drains system, and the installation of larger capacity
demineralizers in the liquid radwaste treatment system.
While the liquid
radwaste treatment system normally operated with one filter vessel and two
demineralizers in series, the system had the capability of adding two more
demineralizers in series.
Gaseous effluent releases occurred from two principal paths; the-gaseous
radwaste treatment system and the ventilation effluent high efficiency
particulate air* (HEPA) filter and charcoal absorber systems.
The gaseous
radwaste treatment system processed off gases from the pl ant primary
coolant system by holdup to allow for radioactive decay of short-lived
fission product noble gases and gaseous neutron activation products.
The
ventilation exhaust treatment system used HEPA fi 1 tration to remove
radioactive particulate material from ventilation exhaust treatment
systems and absorption of gaseous radioiodine on activated charcoal beds.
The 1 i censee al so reported that there were no unplanned releases of
radioactive materials for the period January through December 1988.
Operability of radioactive liquid and gaseous process and effluent
monitoring instrumentation was also reported by the licensee.
The
Component Cooling Service Water Monitor ( RM-SW-107) continued to be
out-of-service.
The inspector noted and discussed with the licensee that
this monitor had been out-of-service essentially continuously since
approximately 1978.
In the interim, the licensee had performed alterative
surveillance of this potential release pathway through regular sampling
and analysis, as provided by the Technical Specifications.
Licensee
representatives were reminded that the purpose of the alternative
surveillance provisions of the Technical Specifications (TSs) was to
provide the licensee with a reasonable but unspecified period of time in
which to repair or replace the monitor.
The licensee was informed that it
was not the intent of the TSs to permit the 1 i censee, in effect, to
permanently change the design basis of the monitor and circumvent the
basic function of the monitor indefinitely.
The licensee was also
reminded that two related monitors (RM-SW-105/106) were, for practical
r
7
purposes, out-of-service as the result of high radiation background
readings for approximately the same time period as the result of
radioactive co-ntamination of the Component Cooling Water Circulatory
System; these were not TS monitors and were not requfred to be reported.
The inspector was notified that a high priority level Design Change had
been initiated for installation of redesigned monitors to replace all
' three monitors (RM-SW-105/106/107).
No specific date was defined for
placing the redesigned monitors in service.
Since an existing IFI
(50-280, 281/87-02-03) was already in place for tracking resolution of the
inoperability of RM-SW-107, the licensee was notified that IFI 50-280,
281/87-02-03 would remain as an open item for tracking purposes.
The licensee also reported that the Waste Gas Holdup System oxygen
monitor, which has the function of assuring that an explosive mixture of
hydrogen and oxygen gases does not develop in the Waste Gas Holdup System
by verifying that the percentage of oxygen in the system does not exceed
four percent, continued to be out-of-service.
The inspector was notified
that the replacement of the oxygen monitor had been assigned a high
priority for design change, but no completion date was committed to by the
licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7 .
Audi ts ( 84 7 5 0)
The inspector reviewed licensee audit files for audits concerning matters
within the scope of this inspection and conductd or issued since the
previous inspection (IR No. 50-280, 281/88-13, issued May 26, 1988).
Audit S88-19, dated August 22, 1988, was concerned with Health Physics and
Radiological Environmental Monitoring.
Four findings, three concerns and
two comments were identified and the auditor noted that the discrepancies
indicated an overall weakness in the effectiveness of the Radiation
Protection Program.
The licensee's responses to the audif findings
appeared to be timely and were considered to be adequate to meet the
specified concerns.
Audit S89-17, dated March 28, 1989,
11Qua 1 i ty Assurance Chemistry Audit,
11
and Audit S89-ll,
11 Process Control Program Audit,
11 dated April 18, 1989,
were also reviewed by the inspector.
Audit S89-ll had three findings
relating to purchasing, procurement, and onsite storage of shipping
containers for radioactive resins and the use of forms in radwaste
processing.
Two findings had been evaluated and corrected at the time of
the inspection, while resolution of the thi.rd matter was due after the end
date of this inspection.
No adverse findings were reported in
Audit S89-17, but two
11 observations
11 were dismissed.
Licensee's
responsiveness and timeliness of responses were considered adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- -*--::. .:.:.::-:-.;.~-::..,
.. , -----*
8
8.
Liquid and Gaseous Radwaste Processing (84750)
In Paragraph 6 of this report pertaining to the Semiannual Radwaste
Effluent Re 1 ease Reports, it was noted that certain effluents were in
excess of annual averages for operating PWRs in RII.
A summary of past
years' experience at Surry is illustrative.
Year
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
Effluent Releases, Curies Per Year (for 2 Units)
Liquids - Fission and
Activation Products
2.41E+OO
5.lOE+OO
8. 77E+OO
8.50E+OO
9.73E+OO
1. 45E+Ol
6.70E+OO
6. llE+OO
Gases
NobTe"Gases
3.66E+02
3.08E+02
1. 99E+03
2.07E+03
6.96E+03
5.49E+03
2.10E+04
1.40E+04
It should be noted that releases for 1987 and 1988 were lower than in
previous years; however, this could be largely due to the ongoing extended
plant shutdowns.
The licensee had earlier recognized that lower releases were practicable
and had developed a long-term plan for reducing the curie content of both
liquid and gaseous effluents.
One major feature of that plan was the new
consolidated radwaste processing facility, which was in an early
construction stage at the time of this inspection.
The present liquid radwaste processing system was based on five stainless
steel demineralizer vessels, each having a capacity of 30 ft 3 of resin and
a nominal flow rate of 50 gpm.
A typical operating configuration was
three vessels in series, the first containing a combination of activated
charcoal, cation resin and a mechanical filter, the second containing
cation resin, and the third containing mixed anion and cation resins.
Processing was normally on a once-through basis to a sampling or
monitoring task where the processed water was sampled and analyzed prior
to discharge under a radwaste release permit system.
Discharge from the
sampling or monitoring task was to the plant circulating water system
which in turn discharged to the James River.
Final control of discharge
in the event of error was provided by the waste release monitor,
RM-LW-108, an in-line scintillation monitoring system which in the event
of alarm would signal for the automatic termination of flow through
closure of the discharge control valve.
Post operational experiences with demineralizer resins as the method of
choice for plant-generated liquid radwaste had shown the present system to
be capable of operating within the permissible discharge limits of the
plant TSs and of other applicable State and Federal regulations and
r
9
guidelines.
While the demineralizer system was technically capable of
reducing discharges by as much as a factor of 10 below the actual
discharges, the in-plant control of resin-depleting wastes such as oils,
sol vents, and detergents had been inadequate to prevent premature
aepletion of the demineralizer resins, thus reducing the effective
decontamination factor of the radwaste processing system.
To alleviate
this situation, the licensee implemented an action plan to eliminate or
minimize the introduction of resin-fouling materials.
Drains were
specially labelled, sinks were posted with signs restricting use, and
plant-wide indoctrination programs were held.
Parallel programs for
minimizing leaks plant-wide*were also initiated.
The new radwaste faci 1 ity, under construction at the time of this
inspection, was to have added capacity for holdup and reprocessing, and
for additional flexibility in processing methods.
Leak reduction programs were al so established for waste gas systems.
Reduction of leaks would permit use of longer decay times for gas holdup
tanks, thus reducing the concentration of short-lived noble gases in decay
tank releases and could also reduce the fraction of short-lived noble
gases being discharged via the system and to maintain the subatmospheric
containment pressure used for the licensee
1 s reactor units.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Radiological Environmental Report (84750)
The inspector reviewed the licensee
1s Radiological Environmental Report
for 1988 and discussed the report with licensee representatives.
The
report appeared to be complete and to contain the necessary information.
Analyses of river water samples taken near the plant discharge at
downstream locations failed to show any gamma-emitting fission products in
excess of the Lower Limit of Detection (LLD); however, tritium, above
anticipated background levels-of approximately 300 pCi/1, was measured in
16 of 24 quarterly composite samples, with an average of 411 pCi/1 and a
range of 150 to 820 pCi /1.
The 820 pCi /1 sample, taken at the Surry
Stition water intake, was confirmed by reanalysis.
The average tritium
activity of the Surry Station liquid effluent was 450 pCi/1, with a range
of 420 to 490 pCi/1.
For control stations, the average concentration was
280 pCi/1, with a range of 140 to 440 pCi/1.
All of the samples were
analyzed at sensitivity levels well below the required LLD of 2E+03 pCi/1.
Analyses of shoreline sediments indicated the presence of one man-made
nuclide Cs-137 in one sample.
The activity of the sample was 16.3 pCi/kg
(dry weight).
All other samples showed only anticipated levels of the
naturally-occurring nuclides.
Analyses of milk from local dairies did not indicate the presence of I-131
in any of 60 samples. * Naturally-occurring K-40 was detected in all
samples.
Cs-137 was identified in two out of 60 samples, with an average
~* * .. '*? ::~~-
\\
10
activity of 7.5 pCi/1 and a range of 6.3 to 8.8 pCi/1; required LLD was
18 pCi/1.
The CS-137 was considered to be a remnant of past atmospheric
global weapons testing.
Twelve milk samples were collected in participation with the State split
sampling program and analyzed for Sr-89 and Sr-90;
Sr-89 was not detected
in any samples.
Sr-90 was detected in 10 of 12 samples at an average
level of 2.45 pCi/1 and a range of 0.71 to 4.5 pCi/1.
It was noted that
during the preoperational radiological monitoring program for the
licensee's site, Sr-90 was routinely detected in milk samples at levels of
5.2 to 13 pCi/1.
Direct radiation in the plant environs was monitored by a thermoluminscent
dosimetry (TLD) array placed in two concentric rings around the plant
site, one ring at the site boundary and the other at approximately five
miles distance in each of 16 sectors. Supplemental TLDs were also placed
in special interest locations such as population areas and nearby
residences and at distant locations for control purposes.
Dose
measurements for the sited environs averaged 6.3 mR/standard month; with a
range of 4.2 to 9.2 mR/standard month.
Control station doses were
reported at an average 5.7 mR/standard month, with a range of 5.1 to 6.6
mR/standard month.
Natural radiation background at seal level has been
reported at 80 to 100 mR/year or approximately 6.7 to 8.3 mR/standard
month.
The licensee's plant TS 6.6.B.2 requires that a Land Use Census be
conducted annually within a five-miles radius of the plant.
The 1988 Land
Use Census reported that no changes had occurred which would require
changes to the Monitoring Program or to the dose calculational model.
Based on the inspector's review of the licensee's Environmental Report for
1988, it appeared that no significant environmental input had occurred as
a result of 1988 plant operations, that the report contained sufficient
information to meet regulatory guidelines for reporting, and that the
report was considered to be adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 19, 1989, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas
inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed above.
Although proprietary information was reviewed during this inspection, none
is contained in this report.
Dis sent i ng comments were not received from
the licensee.
The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports and the Radiological
Environmental Report for calendar year 1988 were reviewed and discussed.
The reports were determined to be adequate.
Releases of mixed fission and
activation products in liquid effluents and iodine 131 and particulates in
.... ::;::.
11
gaseous effluents were higher than average releases from all PWRs in
Region II for 1988.
The plant chemistry program appeared to be
functioning well and chemistry technician training- was adequate; the
chemistry program and the chemistry technician training program were
considered to be licensee strengths.
Sludge lancing results from 1988
shutdowns indicated continuing problems with system corrosion, especially
with respect to Unit 2.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
r