ML18152A121
| ML18152A121 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1995 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A122 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-95-10, 50-281-95-10, NUDOCS 9508020062 | |
| Download: ML18152A121 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1995010
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
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.
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July 27, 1995
Report Nos.:
50-280/95-10 and 50-281/95-10
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Docket Nos.:
50-280, 50-281
License Nos.:
Inspection Conducted:
June 12-16, 1995
Inspector: ,p~~
W. M. Sartor, Jr.
Accompanying Personnel:
Barss, NRR
Cohen, NRR
Clark, RII
Tingen, Resident Inspector
~-r--C:.:::::>
7 /21/9..s-
Date Si~ned
Approved By: --=-1-~......._.,__....__....,....,....--'---=~-=--------------
K.
. Barr,
igned
Scope:
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards.
SUMMARY
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the annual emergency preparedness exercise. This NRC/FEMA evaluated exercise
was conducted from 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> to 1420 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.4031e-4 months <br /> on June 14, 1995.
The scope of
the onsite inspection focused on the adequacy of the licensee's emergency
response program, the implementation of the Emergency Plan and procedures in
response to the simulated emergency conditions, and the effectiveness of the
emergency response training program as reflected by the players' performance
during the exercise.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The
performance of the emergency response organization was considered fully
satisfactory with the exception of the untimely response of the damage control
team responding to the failed safety valve {exercise weakness, Paragraph 10).
Exercise strengths included accident recognition and classification, and the
exercise critique process.
9508020062 950727
ADOCK 05000280
G
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1.
2.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- D. Christian, Station Manager
- J. Costello, Staff Emergency Planner
- B. Fisher, Vice President, Radiation Protection
- S. Harrison, Staff Emergency Planner
- M. Kansler, Vice President, Nuclear Services
- R. Kulp, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- B. McBride, North Anna Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- J. McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager
- W. Madison, Staff Emergency Planner
- M. Olin, Supervisor, Health Physics Technical Services
- T. Philips, Staff Emergency Planner
- J. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- S. Wood, Staff Emergency Planner
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
Other Organizations
- G. Casto, INPO, Corporate Support Division
- C. Grant, INPO, Corporate Support Division
- Y. Huang, Taiwan Power Company, Shift Engineer
- W. Yu, TPC, Taiwan Power Company, Executive Secretary Emergency
Preparedness
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- M. Branch, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Abbreviations used throughout this report are identified in the last
paragraph.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine
whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and
a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee,
State, and local emergency plans and organization as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b}{l4), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
r
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2
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed
with licensee representatives. The scenario developed for this exercise
was challenging and fully exercised the onsite and offsite emergency
organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the
State and local government agencies for their full participation in the
exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that :primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and
that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required
by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been
made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were
adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The
initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee
representatives and the capability for long term or continuous staffing
of the emergency response organization was discussed and planning for
relief was initiated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
5.
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine
that the responsibilities for emergency response were defined, that
adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident
response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces
were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's onsite emergency
organization was well defined and was effective in dealing with the
simulated emergency.
Adequate staffing of the emergency response
facilities was provided for the initial accident response and the
interfaces between the onsite organization and offsite support agencies
were adequate to ensure prompt notification and support from offsite
agenc.i es as required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting
and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether
arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel in the LEOF were
adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the
planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A.
. '
..
3
The licensee's EP provided information for additional support and
resources that may be called upon to assist in an emergency.
Representatives of the Commonwealth of Virginia's Department of
Emergency Services and Department of Health were accommodated in the
LEOF.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Classification System (82301}
7.
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to
The inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in
effect as stated in Section 4.2 and Appendix 10.8 of the Surry Power
Station EP.
The system was effectively used to classify the emergency
and escalate to more severe emergency cl~sses as the simulated emergency
progressed. This was an exercise strength.
No violations or deviations were identified .
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301}
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been
established for notification by the licensee of State and local response
organizations and emergency personnel; that the content of initial and
followup messages to response organizations had been established; and
that means to provide early notification to the populace within the
plume exposure pathway EPZ had been established as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b}(5}, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been
established and were used to provide information concerning the
simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response
organizations.
Communications for the notifications of the initial
emergency classifications were initiated at 0927 hours0.0107 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.527235e-4 months <br /> for the Alert
declared at 0919 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.496795e-4 months <br />, at 1137 hours0.0132 days <br />0.316 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.326285e-4 months <br /> for the SAE declared at
1131 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.303455e-4 months <br />, and at 1223 hours0.0142 days <br />0.34 hours <br />0.00202 weeks <br />4.653515e-4 months <br /> for the GE declared at 1216 hours0.0141 days <br />0.338 hours <br />0.00201 weeks <br />4.62688e-4 months <br />.
Section 7.6 of the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan stated that
"prompt alerting and notification of the population within the 10-mile
EPZ would be accomplished using the EWS."
installed and maintained by the licensee, route alerting utilizing State
and local emergency vehicles, institutional alerting initiated by
State and local governments, the EBS, and personal notifications.
The
primary EWS consisting of 61 sirens was activated at 1525 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.802625e-4 months <br /> by Surry
County.
An earlier attempt to activate the sirens at 1326 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.04543e-4 months <br /> was
4
unsuccessful from both the primary (Surry County) and alternate (James
City County and State EOC) activation points.
The exact cause for the
failure was not known but has resulted in surveillance modifications and
planned physical modifications that should lead to improved system
reliability.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for
prompt communications among principal response organizations and
emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II. F.
Communications between the licensee's ERO and offsite authorities were
good throughout the exercise. Likewise, the communications among the
licensee's ERFs were good.
No communications related problems of any
significance were identified during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public
as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II. G.
A news release was made available to the public prior to the exercise
informing them of the approximate time of the exercise and the extent of
offsite actions/field demonstrations that might be observed.
During the
exercise, the licensee established its JPIC in the company's Innsbrook
Technical Center located in Glen Allen, VA.
The company also had a LMC
established in the Nuclear Information Center approaching the entrance
to Surry. A total of four News Releases were provided from the JPIC
during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency
facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided
and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section 11.H.
5
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of
selected ERFs and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during
the exercise.
a.
CRS - An inspector observed that CRS personnel acted promptly to
initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency.
The Shift
Supervisor declared himself as interim Station Emergency Manager
and directed the site's response to the simulated emergency until
turning over the responsibility to the SEM in the TSC after a
thorough briefing.
Emergency procedures were readily available
and used effectively.
b.
TSC - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification
by the SEM of the simulated emergency condition leading to the
Alert emergency classification. The TSC appeared to have adequate
equipment for the support of the assigned staff.
c.
OSC - The OSC was staffed expeditiously following the order to
activate. Although necessary emergency equipment was available to
support OSC damage control team activities, all teams were not
dispatched in a timely manner to accomplish designated tasks.
Observations made by the inspector to support the above findings
include:
0
A damage assessment team to investigate any damage caused by
a suspected bomb was authorized at 1003 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.816415e-4 months <br />.
Team members
were briefed in the OSC that non-radiological respirators
would be required to perform the task. After obtaining the
respirators from the tool room they proceeded to HP to be
briefed on radiological requirements and were then informed
that SCBA would be required. Additionally, at 1055 hours0.0122 days <br />0.293 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />4.014275e-4 months <br />
the partially assembled team was still waiting for an
operator to join them.
Because the team was not needed for
bomb damage assessment, it was later assigned the task to do
walkdowns in accordance with procedure AP-37 following the
simulated earthquake. Although this was designated as a
priority #1 mission at 1152 hours0.0133 days <br />0.32 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.38336e-4 months <br />, the team was not ready
for dispatch until 1235 hours0.0143 days <br />0.343 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.699175e-4 months <br />.
0
At 1236 hours0.0143 days <br />0.343 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.70298e-4 months <br /> the SEM authorized as priority #1 a team to
gag shut the stuck open safety relief valve.
The initial
team assigned the task and dispatched to the RCA entrance
after OSC and HP briefings had to be cancelled and
reconstructed because 3 of the 4 team members were not
respirator qualified which was required for the mission.
As
a result, a respiratory qualified team was not ready until 1
hour and eleven minutes after the task assignment which was
considered priority #1 because it would terminate the
release. Additionally, the street clothes directed as
protective clothing on the HP briefing sheets were
questionable for the assigned task of gagging a stuck open
steam safety valve.
6
The above observations were summarized as an exercise weakness as
follows:
Exercise Weakness 50-280, 281/95-10-01:
Damage control
teams were not expeditiously managed to perform prioritized tasks
designated for accident mitigation.
d.
LEOF - An inspector observed that the LEOF was staffed and
promptly activated following the Alert declaration. The inspector
observed the operation of the HVAC system for providing a filtered
atmosphere under positive pressure, the security program in place
for access control, and the radiation protection program for
personnel in the facility. The LEC'F appeared to have adequate
equipment for the support of the assigned staff.
One Exercise Weakness but no violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems,
and equipment of assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use a
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite
and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
The radiological
dose assessment projections for offsite personnel were done in the LEOF
under the direction of the Radiological Assessment Director.
Dose
assessment personnel in the TSC performed confirmatory calculations to
backup the primary dose assessment functions provided in the LEOF.
The
results of the dose assessments were compared to reports from the field
teams and differences were promptly analyzed.
In the TSC, the Technical
Support team provided engineering assessments to the SEM and his staff
concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to prevent release of
radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency condition.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective
actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were
developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers,
including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented
promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in
An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for
formulating PARs for the offsite populace within the 10-mile EPZ.
The
proper PARs were provided by the licensee to the State with the General
Emergency notification message.
Earlier, site personnel were promptly
accounted for and non-essential personnel were evacuated from the site.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- "
'*
13.
7
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether means for controlling
radiological exposures during an emergency were established and
implemented for emergency workers, and that these means included
exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled
throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency
workers and by.periodic surveys in the ERFs.
Exposure guidelines were
in place for various categories of emergency actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency was observed to determine
whether deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and .
weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were
formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted player critiques following the exercise
termination. * A formal licensee critique of the emergency exercise was
held on June 16, 1995, with exercise controllers, licensee management,
and NRC personnel attending.
The licensee reviewed the exercis~
objectives and objectively evaluated the performance of the emergency
organization in meeting the objectives.* The critique was thorough and
was an exercise strength.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Exit Interview
16 .
The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 16, 1995, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the exercise weakness listed
below.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number
50-280, 281/95-10-01
Status
Open
Federal Evaluation Team Report
Description and Reference
EW - Damage control teams were not
timely dispatched (Paragraph 10).
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region III staff) concerning
the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded
by separate correspondence.
l1'
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17.
Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Control Room Simulator
DES
Department of Emergency Services
Emergency Action Level
EBS
Emergency Broadcast System
Emergency Operations Center
Environmental Protection Agency
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
Emergency Planning Zone
Emergency Response Facility
Emergency Response Organization
EW
Exercise Weakness
Early Warning System
Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Emergency
Health Physics
JPIC Joint Public Information Center
Local Emergency Operations Facility
LMC
Local Media Center
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operational Support Center
Protective Action Recommendation
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
Site Area Emergency
SEM
Station Emergency Manager
Attachments:
Exercise Scope and Objectives
and Scenario Narrative
.. ---*-.-, .... ,*. *- ***-
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. .,..... --* .,.:,**, _. *-
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
EXERCISE SCOPE
The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate major
portions of the Surry Emergency Plan, associated implementing
procedures,
and selected portions of the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan in accordance with 10CFRS0.47(b) (14), and to support
the implementation of state and local governments emergency
response plans.
This plume exposure pathway exercise will be held in conjunction
with emergency response demonstrations by the Commonwealth of
Virginia and several local governments.
The exercise will
demonstrate
that
the
individuals
and
agencies
assigned
responsibilities in a
radiological emergency are capable of
coordinating and assessing necessary protective measures to ensure
the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at
Surry Power Station.
The exercise will demonstrate responses to the emergency classes,
commensurate with the stated exercise objectives, established by
NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
Power Plants.
Free play is encouraged and controllers will be
allowed to interface with the participants to provide information.
The cont*rollers will only alter the participants' responses if the
exercise lags behind schedule, if emergency response personnel take
inappropriate actions to carry them to the next event, or if action
is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier
than scheduled by the scenario.
The focus items of this exercise are:
Use of MIDAS and associated procedures
Use of revised EALs
The exercise will fulfill the following drill requirements:
Semi-annual Radiation Monitoring Drill
Annual Medical Emergency Drill
Annual Communications Drill
At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the
safe operation of the station.
Station management may, at their
discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary
to ensure this goal.
Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the
simulated incident.
S&0-1
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VIRGINIA P8WER
SURRY POWER STATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the
Surry Power Station Emergency Plan,
the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan, and associated implementing procedures.
The objectives of this exercise are to demonstrate by actual
performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions as
they relate to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan.
The
simulated
accident
will
involve:
-emergency
classification,
notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated
actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of
accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope
with the event.
The event will include a simulated off-site
radiological release to support a plume exposure pathway exercise.
As applicable to the events developed by the exercise scenario, the
Surry Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Facilities
(ERFs)
will be activated.
Each ERF staff will demonstrate
functions described in the implementing procedures.
Emergency
response functions which are impractical to demonstrate will be
simulated.
The attached objectives, as numbered in the Virginia Power Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Six Year Plan, will be demonstrated as
applicable to the schedule provisions of this plan.
A matrix,
identifying the objectives and the Virginia Power
Emergency
Response Facilities/Groups where they will be demonstrated, is
provided.
The Control Room Simulator will be used in lieu of the
actual Station Control Room.
The following is a list of corporate and station emergency response
facilities and groups with their associated acronyms:
(1)
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
(2)
Technical Support Center (TSC)
(3)
Operational Support Center (OSC)
(4)
Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
(5)
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
(6)
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
(7)
Local Media Center (LMC)
(8)
Health Physics (HP)
(9)
Security (SEC)
(10)
Chemistry (CHEM)
(11)
Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF)
S&0-2
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---~-- ---- ...... _- -* -- --~-- .. ---'*'*-*-*-*--**--*-***----
____ ......... _. **'"-**-**-* .
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
The following objectives establish the scope, the extent of play
and extent of evaluation for this exercise. Also these objectives
ensure that required events are included in the exercise scenario.
1.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess
Emergency Action
Level
{EAL)
parameters,
and correctly
classify the emergency.
Extent of Play
The CRS and TSC Emergency Response Organizations {ERO) will
demonstrate this objective by use of EPIP-1. 01 and appropriate
operational procedures.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify, mobilize, and sustain the
Surry
Power
Station
and
Corporate
Emergency
Response
Organizations.
Extent of Play
The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will
notify and mobilize the ERO.
Station and corporate ERO
notification will
be
conducted in accordance
with the
Emergency Personnel Notification List {EPNL).
The TSC,
LEOF,
CERC,
and JPIC will demonstrate sustaining
continuous response capability by formulating shift relief
rosters.
If required, the process for obtaining logistical
and technical support for emergency response personnel may be
simulated.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
3.
Demonstrate
the ability to notify the State and local
governments and the NRC within established time constraints.
S&0-3
-'.: -~;;.. .. *; :.:- ..
. Extent of Play
- - - ., .......... -,. ~ ,*. *:* '~ -~ ..... - -... -;- .
. . ... -- -"'
~~ - -- .. - - . ._~ ~- .,- __,,_... - - -.... - ~ -~
As appropriate to the communications process, the CRS, TSC,
and LEOF will demonstrate this objective by providing up-to-
date information to the federal, state, and local governments
within the required time limits.
a.
State and Local Government Communications
An Emergency Communicator (EC) will perform initial and
follow-up communications in accordance with EPIP-2.01.
The SEM will retain the responsibility for state and
local
government
communications until the
is
activated. Following LEOF activation, responsibility for
communications will be transferred to the Recovery
Manager (RM) .
b.
NRC Communications
An EC*will perform initial and follow-up communications
in accordance with EPIP-2. 02.
The EC will transmit
information to a phone cell simulating the NRC.
The
responsibility for NRC communications remain with the TSC
ERO.
Heal th Physics Network
(HPN)
communications will be
performed in
accordance
with EPIP-4.33.
The
communicator will transmit information to a phone cell
simulating the
NRC.
The
responsibility
for
communications will be with the LEOF ERO.
The
Emergency Response Data
activated in the CRS only.
transmitted to the NRC.
Extent of Evaluation
System
(ERDS)
will be
Plant data will not be
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability
of personnel within the Protected Area.
Extent of Play
The Station Security Staff will demonstrate this objective in
accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.03. Also, to support the
overall accountability process, the Assembly Area Leaders will
perform area accountability.
S&0-4
- ~::.::,....A.~>-.,, .. -____ a;-. ___ , ____ * ** ***~- ________ h......, .. ---
... -,_, ... ~.-=-..,..*_. _ . .:... .. --- __ . ------~- ...... _ ----*--..,,~ . .,__ .. ---*~'-* ---~- * .. : ... -.. , * .,_ .. ~- ........ ..,.. __ ._, __ ______ ,..._.: _: * __ ..,._':* *, * ... ,.,,, _ _. .,.,_ .. _, ...... ,-.. ,__ ____ . * *** --*~---- -.. -
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-
site emergency teams to perform response activities.
Extent of Play
As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, OSC, and Health Physics staffs
will demonstrate this objective by briefing, dispatching, and
controlling teams in response to scenario events within the
Station Protected Area.
The CRS staff will demonstrate this
objective by initiating applicable procedures.
Following
facility activation, the TSC and OSC staffs will demonstrate
this objective by implementing EPIP-3 .-02, EPIP-3. 03, and EPIP-
5. 08.
Extent of Evaluation
This
objective
will
be
fully
evaluated,
participant self-evaluation.
including
6.
Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement
appropriate
protective
measures
for
emergency
response
personnel,
including site access
control,
contamination
control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as
appropriate, the process for authorizing the use of potassium
iodide (KI).
Extent of Play
This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among
the CRS, TSC, LEOF and OSC ERO in which the TSC staff will
monitor and authorize protective measures for site access,
contamination control, and exposure control.
The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor
(RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and
direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site property
per EPIP-4. 01 and EPIP-4. 02 and associated procedures to
assess
radiological
conditions.
Protective
measures,
appropria~e
for
conditions,
will
be
developed
and/or
implemented for emergency response personnel.
Security will implement access control measures in accordance
with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.04.
The OSC Staff and other site personnel will implement any
necessary
actions
associated
with
protective
equipment
requirements and in-plant access control.
S&0-5
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or
TSC and OSC staffs may demonstrate the process for requesting
and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency
exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-
4.04.
Also, if necessary, the TSC staff will demonstrate the
KI authorization process per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-5.07.
If necessary, in response to scenario.events, the TSC will
demonstrate the planning and notification processes for
protective measures and simulate evacuating non-essential
personnel in accordance with EPIP-4.07 and EPIP-5.05.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Off-site
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on assessment
of plant conditions arid off-site dose projections and/or
measurements.
Extent of Play
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM
from the TSC or by the RM in the LEOF by implementation of
EPLP-1.06 .. Additional information for PAR determination may
be obtained from EPIP-4.07.
The TSC and LEOF organizations
may monitor plant conditions and perform off-site dose
projections to support formulation of PARs.
Responsibility
for PAR development is transferred from the TSC to the LEOF
following activation of the LEOF.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
Extent of Play
As appropriate, this objective may be demonstrated by the TSC
and LEOF
staffs.
The ability to perform initial dose
assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of
EPIP-4. 01 and associated dose assessment procedures.
As
required, the CERC will act in a back-up capacity to perform
off-site dose assessment.
S&0-6
.
_, _; .. -.. -, ... :... ..
' .. ,.. --
--- * *---~*- .._ ________ -~
- -*
__....,_.-...--..== .. ___ -~. ----~---*-*-* ------------~--- -- ----~
- --* ..* c
..,-..~-~---*.,'-*~--
- ---._..__. .... *.----,*.--% ...... -JC~-
- Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4. 01, EPIP-
4. 02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment
effort.
As appropriate, these teams will be directed by the
RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staffs.*
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
9.
As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and
Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities,
including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample
analysis.
Extent of Play
As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis
for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated in
accordance with EPIP-4 .*02.
Post Accident Sampling activities
may be performed in accordance with EPIP-4.22 and EPIP-4.23.
Field monitoring teams will perform radiological monitoring
activities in accordance with EPIP-4.15 and EPIP-4.16.
Reactor coolant and/or containment
samples will not be
obtained utilizing the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS).
Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring
capabilities will be provided by the controller during
simulated sample collection.
Isotopic analysis data will be
provided following demonstration of proper sample preparation
and upon expiration of spectrum collection and analysis times.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated (except actual elevated
HRSS sampling), including participant self-evaluation.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively activate the emergency
response
facilities
and
associated
emergency
response
processes.
Extent of Play
Activation of facilities and emergency processes by the TSC,
OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and the LMC will be demonstrated in
accordance with the appropriate procedures.
As appropriate,
demonstrated by
Security.
activation of emergency processes will be
the
CRS,
Health Physics,
Chemistry and
S&0-7
--* -
, .. ~ .. -- _..,_~ .. _. -... _ .... ***-*~ -
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
11.
Demonstrate
that facility layout
and
equipment
support
emergency response activities in each facility.
Extent of Play
This objective will be demonstrated in the CRS,
TSC,
LEOF,
CERC,
JPIC,
LMC,
Security,
Health
Physics,
Chemistry.
Extent of Evaluation
osc,
and
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
12.
Demonstrate the abiliti to establish and maintain effective
communications.
Extent of Play
Physics, Chemistry,
objective.
LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Health
and Field Teams will demonstrate this
Use of backup communications systems will only be demonstrated
if primary communications fail.
Extent of Evaluation
This
objective
will
be
fully
participant self-evaluation.
evaluated,
including
13.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control of the
emergency response effort.
Extent of Play
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command
and control from the CRS*and TSC.
The RM will demonstrate
command
and
control
of
the
emergency
response
effort
associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility.
The Corporate Response Manager wil~ demonstrate command and
control of the emergency response effort associated with the
CERC upon activation of that facility.
The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area are
informed of emergency event status by the use of emergency
alarms, the plant paging system (Gai-tronics) and selected
S&0-8
!--~--*-*****--*. *,.---,-..
I
I
14.
____ ..,_,,_.,.. : __ .. - --*-*""*-~~*,~-.**-~.-*"h .. ,:_. ......... ~ .... -... ~,.,_ .. _,..,. -
personnel pagers.
Remaining site personnel will be notified
by other verbal communication methods.
Announcements should
be preceded and terminated with the phrase:
"This is a
drill.
11
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate the ability to
transfer appropriate command and control functions.
a.
The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
(1)
Notifications to the state, local governments, and
NRC.
(2)
Developing and transmitting PARs to the state.
(3)
Determining the emergency classification.
(4)
Authorizing emergency exposures.
b.
The TSC functions that will transfer to the LEOF are:
(1)
Notifications to the state and local governments
and to the NRC via the HPN.
(2)
Developing and transmitting PARs to the state.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate preparation, review and
release of timely and accurate information to the public.
Extent of Play
The CERC, JPIC, LEOF, and LMC staffs will demonstrate this
objective.
Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and may
be transmitted to the LEOF for technical review.
Following
approval by the RM and/or the Corporate Response Manager, the
process for issuing press releases will be demonstrated.
The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and
make them available to the media in the JPIC and LMC.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation .
S&0-9
!
,*
r
-~,,-:-,"-****'-.*-'
- --'"*~**.,*--;'
15.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control
functions.
Extent of Play
Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective by establishing
an emergency hotline in accordance with CPIP-2.1.
Questions
will be called into the Public Information Room requiring
response as part of the scenario.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support and to
package and transport a contaminated injured person to an off-
site medical facility.
Extent of Play
This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team
implementing treatment appropriate for the victim's level of
injury
and
by
Health
Physics
employing
the
necessary
radiological controls.
EPIP-5. 01 and HP-1061. 010 wil], be
implemented to remove the victim from the accident scene and
transport to the off-site medical facility.
As required, the CERC will implement CPIP-7.0.
As necessary, the Shift Supervisor directs Station Security to
summons off-site support.
Station Security will prepare for
station access by off-site support in accordance with EPIP-
5.09.
Transport of the victim to an off-site medical facility will
be demonstrated.
Off-site
medical
support
agencies
and
facilities
will
participate.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant
self-evaluation.
S&0-10
i ..
. ..
' .
......... :-.- *-- - ..... *-- --- *- _.
-- - --- ... --: .... ----;.~-- -
-. ---~***-- :-.-.: ..
17.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to, control and mitigate
the consequences of a fire.
Extent of Play
This objective will not be demonstrated.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will not be evaluated.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization
and to develop a Recovery Plan.
Extent of Play
This objective will not be demonstrated.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will not be evaluated.
19.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a self-critique and to
identify areas for improvement.
Extent of Play
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry,
and Health Physics will conduct a self-critique to identify
weaknesses and improvement items .
S&0-11
SURRY POW~K
TATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES DEMONSTRATION MATRIX
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
osc
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CERC
X
X
X
X
X
JPIC
X
X
X
X
LMC
X
X
X
SECURITY
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CHEMISTRY
X
X
X
X
X
- =Denotes objective not to be demonstrated
S&0-12
13
14
15
16
17
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
- - ~*. ___ ,_ ... ~ .. *--** --~- .... -*-**---
.
( .
18
19
X
X
X
X
X
I
X
X
X
X
X
,.
i,
t
!.
i
' "
~ '
...
'*.
i,:
i i
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- - ,. -~-< ,.,-. - ... - --- ..-..- -. -. ..-*-. "'>>'- -
--- -*:'> ~.* .,.- *
- -
.._~,.._
-
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.. .__ ..._ ... ,-* ,..__, ---* .. -~
~ ... __ ,. ~ ~ ------. -- - ---* .... ~, ... -.---~ *-*-* .. - .* -- -' .. -~-. ':':" -* ? ;,*' '..--.. .. :;. ...... ~*:.,.,<-c(. ,..C. -
- , ** ,:.=Y~ -, .... **_;.*.**-
VIRGINIA POWER
SORRY POWER STATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO NARRATIVE
A full scale plume exposure pathway exercise is scheduled to be
conducted at the Surry Power Station.
For the purpose of the
exercise, Unit 1 is designated as the affected unit.
Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions near
end of life.
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with
no equipment out of service.
The exercise begins at 0900.
At 0905 a Security Officer making
rounds identifies a device, that looks like a bomb, attached to the
discharge piping of 1-RS-P-2A.
Security notifies the Operations
Shift Supervisor and implements their contingency procedure. Since
the device is located in an area that potentially affects safety
related equipment, the declaration of an Alert is warranted.
A minor earthquake occurs at 1011 resulting in no damage.
Reactor
Coolant System activity increases slightly. At 1022 "A" Boric Acid
Storage Tank level transmitter 1-CH-LT-1161 fails low and at 1037
Control Room Chiller 1-VS-E-4B trips.
Charging Pump 1-:-CH-P-lB
trips at 1043.
During investigation of the Charging Pump trip, the
medical emergency occurs.
At 1107° a Design Basis Earthquake occurs and causes fuel clad
damage.
The earthquake drives the declaration of a Site Area
Emergency (SAE).
This event results in both units being ramped off
the line. Containment Sump Pump Discharge Valve 1-TV-DA-lOOA fails
shut at 1139.
A loose part develops in the lower reactor vessel at
1157.
The loose part results in additional clad damage.
At 1206 Reactor Coolant Pump 1-RC-P-lC trips and a tube rupture
occurs in the "C" steam generator.
At the same time a safety valve
for the "C" steam generator fails in the open position allowing a
radiological release to the environment.
These conditions require
the declaration of a General Emergency.
Also, the steam dumps fail
to open and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2 overspeeds.
Escalation through the applicable emergency classifications will
provide activities designed to exercise both on-site and off-site
response organizations. Sufficient time will be permitted to allow
the response organizations to perform the required assessment and
appropriate response actions.
At 1430 the exercise will be terminated.
Facility critiques are scheduled to begin approximately fifteen
minutes after termination of the exercise.
SOE-9
TIME
0745
0815
0900
0905
0945
1000
1011
VIRGI"a-WER
SURRY POWER STATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
C/0 exercise day briefing.
Final preparation for exercise.
Controller to ensure all changes and questions
are addressed.
Simulator briefing.
CRS Lead Controller to brief the operations
shift on the initial conditions and simulator
set up.
Start exercise.
Simulator
to "Run."
Security officer, making rounds,
Security notifies the ss and implements their
identifies something that looks like a
contingency procedure.
SS enters EPIP-1.01 and
bomb strapped to the discharge piping
declares an Alert per Tab J-4.
Notify state &
of l-RS-P-2A (mini-scenario #1
locals (EPIP-2. 01) and NRC (EPIP-2. 02) .
I
Suspected Bomb).
Security requests assistance form the Virginia
State Police.
Approximate time accountability should
1'
I
be completed.
Approximate time that facilities
Full participation by the corporate and station
should be activated.
emergency response organizations.
Full
participation by the state.
Minor earthquake occurs (mini-scenario
AP-37.00 entered.
Enter EPIP-1.01, SEM
- 2 Minor Earthquake), RCS activity
identifies NOOE per Tab L-3, may conduct plant
increases slightly at 1016.
walkdowns, notify state, locals (EPIP-:2. 01) and
NRC (EPIP-2.02, control cell).
I&C may perform
l-PT-39.7, "Seismic Instrumentation After A
Seismic Event".
SOE-10
~~~~~---------------
-
"*
TIME
After
1011
1022
1037
1043
1107
1111
VIRGI"
WER
SURRY PO......
STATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
Medical emergency occurs (mini-
CRS informed of medical emergency.
Gai-Tronics
scenario #7 Medical Emergency).
announcement for First Aid Team to respond.
First Aid Team responds to scene, renders first
aid, packages, and transports victim to off-
site medical facility;
EPIP-5.01, "Transport
of Contaminated Injured, 11 entered.
"A" Boric Acid Storage Tank level
ss request operators to investigate status of
transmitter 1-CH-LT-1161 fails low
transmitter and tank level.
Anticipate TSC to
(min-scenario #3 1-CH-LT-1161 Fails
prioritize as a damage control evolution.
Low}.
Control Room Chiller 1-VS-E-4B trips
ss request operators to investigate status of
(mini-scenario #4 1-VS-E-4B Control
chiller and requests starting another.
Room Chiller Failure}.
Anticipate TSC to prioritize as a damage
control evolution.
I
Charging pump 1-CH-P-lB trips (mini-
ss request operators to investigate status of
scenario #5 1-CH-P-lB Shorted Motor
the charging pump.
Anticipate TSC to
Winding).
Letdown isolates.
prioritize as a damage control evolution.
Earthquake greater than a DBE occurs
AP-37.00 entered.
Assess plant conditions and
(mini-scenario #6 Design Bases
using EPIP-1.01, SEM declares SAE per Tab L-1.
Earthquake), RCS activity increases
Plant walkdowns will probably be performed.
significantly at 1111.
TSC notifies the NRC (EPIP-2. 02) .
Letdown radiation monitor indication
SEM reviews EPIP-1.01 for possible
rapidly increases to >1 X 106 cpm.
classification.*
SOE-11
i
I
I
I
'i'.
i
i
/:
' i
(..
TIME
1139
1157
1206
1207
1213
VIRGJ"
R
SURRY P~
ATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
Containment sump pump discharge valve
1-TV-DA-lOOA fails shut (mini-scenario
- 8, Containment Sump Pump Discharge
Valve 1-TV-DA-lOOA Failure).
Loose parts alarm locks in (mini-
scenario #9, Loose Parts).
The alarm
is in the lower reactor vessel area.
1-RC-P-lC Reactor Coolant Pump trips
on overcurrent (mini-scenario #10, "C"
Reactor Coolant Pump Failure) causing
reactor trip and steam driven AFW pump
1-FW-P-2 overspeeds (mini-scenario
- 11, Terry Turbine Overspeeds).
Tube rupture
valve fur SG
scenario #12
Radiological
environment.
occurs in "C" SG,
safety
"C" fails open, (mini-
Safety Valve Failure).
release begins to the
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B
fails (mini-scenario #13 1-FW-P-3B
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump).
SOE-12
ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
Operators/maintenance may investigate cause of
valve failure.
Plans may be made to enter the
containment to determine the leak source and/or
repair the valve.
Operators will investigate the cause of the
alarm.
Fuel clad damage increases.
Operators respond to the reactor trip using
1-E-O.
Ant.icipate TSC to prioritize as a
damage control evolution.
DC Teams to conduct
investigation, assessment and repairs.
Assess plant conditions and using EPIP-1.01,
SEM declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY per Tab B-8.
Develop PAR
(EPIP-1.06) and notify state &
locals (EPIP-2.01) and NRC (EPIP-2.02).
Track
plume (EPIP-4.15, 4.16), perform dose
assessment (EPIP-4.03).
The stability class is
B.
The affected sectors are NPQ. The wind
direction is from the ESE (115°).
The PAR
should be #1.
Anticipate TSC to prioritize as
a damage control evolution.
DC Teams to
conduct investigation, assessment and repairs.
As required, HP performs surveys inplant,
onsite and off-site.
SS informs TSC of the pump failure.
Anticipate
TSC to prioritize as a damage control
evolution.
-~
)I
' l
/,
.~
B' ,,
,
I
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i
l.,
..
VIRGT
R
SURRY P1..
...
TATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
TIME
EVENT DESCRIPTION
ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
1242
Service Water Pump (service water to
ss informs TSC of the pump failure.
Anticipate
charging pumps) 1-SW-P-lOA fails
TSC to prioritize as a damage control
(mini-scenario #14, Service Water Pump
evolution.
1-SW-P-lOA Failure).
1400
Terminate emergency.
ERO put ERFs back to state of readiness,
paperwork collected for the exercise and given
to the Lead Controllers.
1400-
Controllers and Observers conduct
1430
preliminary review.
1430
Conduct facility critiques.
Perform critique process.
Summary:
1.
Suspected bomb potentially affecting safety systems drives ALERT and subsequent ERO activation.
2.
Minor earthquake occurs.
3.
DBE earthquake drives a SAE.
RCS activity increases significantly, but decays off.
4.
Medical emergency occurs.
Requires off-site rescue squad response and transport of patient to an
off-site medical facility.
5.
A loose part develops in the reactor coolant system, resulting in additional fuel damage.
6.
A reactor coolant pump trips resulting in a reactor trip.
Subsequent to the reactor trip a steam
generator tube rupture occurs and an associated safety valve opens, resulting in a radiological
release to the environment.
Results in a General Emergency classification.
SOE-13
'
' ,
.;
I
VIRGIN-
l'eflER
SURRY POWER STATION
JUNE 1995 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
Success Paths:
1.
Implement Emergency Plan and applicable procedures.
Activate ERO.
2 .
3.
Establish DC process.
Prioritization and use of manpower.
Provide first aid to victim, package and transport to off-site medical facility.
4.
Establish monitoring teams and track plume.
5.
Cooldown plant to terminate release.
SOE-14
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