05000416/LER-2018-006, Secondary Containment Roof Hatch Left Open Due to Inadequate Corrective Actions

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Secondary Containment Roof Hatch Left Open Due to Inadequate Corrective Actions
ML18145A291
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf 
Issue date: 05/25/2018
From: Emily Larson
Entergy Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GNRO-2018/00025 LER 2018-006-00
Download: ML18145A291 (7)


LER-2018-006, Secondary Containment Roof Hatch Left Open Due to Inadequate Corrective Actions
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
4162018006R00 - NRC Website

text

  • ~Entergy GNR0-2018/00025 May 25, 2018 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. 0. Box756 Port Gibson, MS 39150 Eric A. Larson Site Vice President Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Tel. (601) 437-7500 10CFR50.73

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report 2018-006-00, Secondary Containment Roof Hatch Left Open Due To Inadequate Corrective Actions Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29

Dear Sir or Madam:

Attached is Licensee Event Report 2018-006-00. This report is being submitted in accordance with 1 OCFR50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

This letter contains 'no new commitments. If you have any questions or require additional inforr:nation, please contact Douglas Neve at 601-437-2103.

Sincerely, Eric A. Larson Site Vice President Grand.Gulf Nuclear Station

- EAU ram

Attachment:

License~ Event Report 2018-006-00 cc: see next page

GNR0-2018/00025 Page 2 of 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A TIN: Ms. Lisa M. Regner Mail Stop OWFN 8 81 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Port Gibson, MS 39150 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Kriss Kennedy, NRR/DORL (w/2)

Regional Administrator, Region IV 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511

GNR0-2018/00025 Page 1 of 1 Attachment Licensee Event Report (LER) 2018-006-00

NRC FORM366

. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (02-2018)

, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not reauired to respond to the information collection.

  • 1 ~*Facmty*Name
2. OocketNumber r.Page Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 05000-416 1 OF4
4. Title Secondary Containment Roof Hatch Left Open Due To Inadequate Corrective Actions
5. *Event Date
6. LER Number
7. Report Date
8. Other Facilities Involved Sequential Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Number No.

Month Day Year N/A OSOOON/A 04 05 2018 2018 006 00 05 25 2018* "Facmty*Name Docket-Number r

NIA OSOOON/A

9. Operating Mode
11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 D 20.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1 >

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

IZI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73. 77(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73. 77(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

D Other {Specify in Abstract below or in The work instructions did not contain content that translated the identified need for appropriate controls to maintain Secondary Containment integrity into specific actions to be performed by the work crew.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The following actions were completed or planned:

Completed:

Immediate: The enclosure building roof hatch was closed and secured.

Interim: Issued standing order for a licensed operator in communication with the control room to be stationed at the enclosure building roof hatch for all tasks that require the hatch to be opened to ensure the hatch is

_open _only _during.normal en.try.and _exit, and.then promptly _closed.

Planned. action included in the corrective action program which may be changed in accordance with the corrective action program:

Create a briefing paper based on this event and distribute to all licensed operators.

Review the model work order to clarify work order instructions. The clarifications will provide controls that will ensure the hatch is only open during access I egress.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The result of the failure to close the secondary containment roof hatch was that the secondary containment was breached during quarterly roof inspections without the knowledge of the shift manager which resulted in the failure to enter the Limiting Condition for Operation for Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment. There were no actual consequences to general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety and radiological safety for this event.

The potential consequences to the members of the public from the failure to close the secondary containment roof hatch would be the increased risk of dose to the general public during postulated accidents. No abnormal event or release occurred during the time of the event, therefore, no radiological consequence occurred.

Based on statements from the individual(s) performing the tasks, the time period the hatch was open was less than 30 minutes. Further, Entergy had an individual stationed at the door with constant communication with a control room operator in the control room. This individual understood his function was to close the hatch if directed to by the control room. Entergy has performed an evaluation of the event and determined it had positive control ofthe hatch and the ability to close the hatch if an event were to occur.

- Based on the above and *in accordance With the gu-idance provided *in NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Section 2.2, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Sub-Section, Safety System Functional Failures, Page 30, Lines 27 through 30; this condition will not be counted as a safety system functional failure against Performance Indicator MS05, Safety System Functional Failures.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR OCCURRENCES

- LER 2016-003-00, -Loss -of -Secondary-Containment Safety-Function During -Routine -Roof lnspection SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- 006 Entergy has reviewed the corrective actions implemented following the 2016 event and determined they were not specific enough to prevent the occurrence of the event documented in this licensee event report.

REV NO.

- 00 NRC FORM 3668 (02-2018)