ML18139C134
| ML18139C134 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1982 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8212060138 | |
| Download: ML18139C134 (7) | |
Text
- -*
Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 Mr. W. L. Stewart e
- Vice President - Nuclear Operations Virginia Electric and Power Company Post Office Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261
Dear Mr. Stewart:
DISTRIBUTIO, Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR ORB 1 File D. Eisenhut OELD E. L. Jordan D. Neighbors C. Parrish NSIC J.M. Taylor ACRS (10)
J. Heltemes R. Ferguson T. Wambach
- 0. Parr By letter dated December 4, 1981, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) related to the safe shutdown capability (Appendix R to 10 CFR 50) of the Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.
The SER identified three open items for which additional information was needed.
You provided additional information by letters dated February 12 and June 18, 1982.
Enclosed is our Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) which addresses the referenced open items related to Appendix R, and includes the approval of the proposed modification regarding the relocation of one charging pump service water pump and its respective water source of each unit from the service building to the turbine building.
In addition to the open items discussed in the SSER, you requested exemptions from the requirements of Appendix Ron July 23, 1982, which would remove the requirement to install a fixed fire suppression system in the control room and emergency switchgear rooms.
Our review of these exemptions requests will be the subject of separate correspondence.
We conclude that the Surry Power Station is in compliance with the require-ments of Sections III.G. 3 and III.L to Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 except for a fixed suppression system in the control room and emergency switchgear rooms.
0212060130--021 fie PDR ADOCK 05000280 F
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page Sincerely, Of,iginal signed b.W8
,So A.. varsa Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing SEE PREVIOUS FORM 318 FOR PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE*
RB 4
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335*960
-r Docket Nos. 50-280 50-281 Mr. H. L
- Stewart Vice resident - Nuclear Operations Virgin* a Electric and Power Company Post Of *ce Box 26666 Richmond, ~irginia 23261 Distribution:
Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR ORB #1 Rdg DEisenhut OELD E. L. Jordan D. Neighbors C. Parrish NSIC J.M. Taylor ACRS (_l O)
JHeltemes rt.
RFerguson TWambach 0 PairV-By letter dat cember 4, 1981, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) related 11e safe shutdown capability (Appendix R to 10 CFR 50) of the Surry Power St~i~n, Unit Nos. 1 and 2.
The SER identified three open items for which addit1.qnal information was needed.
You provided additional information by letters~d February 12 and,June 18, 1982.
Enclosed is our Supplernen~ Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) which addresses the referenced open items r~ted to Appendix R, and includes the approval of the* proposed modification l'egarding the relocation of one charging pump service water pump and its res~tive water source of each unit from the service building to the turbine o~ding.
In addition to the open items discus~d in the SSER, you requested exemptions from the requirements of Appendix R Orl\\.\\July 23, 1982 which would remove the requirement to install a fixed fire"\\~uppression system in the control room and emergency switchgear rooms.
Our'\\review of these exemptions requests will be the subject of separate correspond~ce.
We conclude that the Surry Power Station is ~~ompliance with the require-ments of Sections III.G.3 and III.L to Appendix~l\\,of 10 CFR 50 except for the contro 1 room and the emergency switchgear rooni"'s~
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/encl:
See next page Sincerely,
"' ", ~,
Steven A. Varga, Chief
~~
Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Licensing DL*O DL:ORB#l OFFICE.......... **
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THambacihr1
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DATE *
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NRC:: FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335-960
e Mr. W. L. Stewart Virginia Electric and Power Company cc:
Mr. Michael W. Maupin Hunton and Williams Post Office Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23213 Mr. J. L. Wilson, Manager P. 0. Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 Donald J. Burke, Resident Inspector Surry Power Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 166 Route l Surry, Virginia 23883 Mr. J. H. Ferguson Executive Vice President - Power Virg1nia Electric and Power Company Post Office Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator: Region II U. S~ Nuclear Regulatory Commission 191 ~arietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 e
Introduction e
e SURRY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50, ITEMS III.G.3 ANO III.L The staff's Safety Eva1uat1(?n Report (SER) date~ December 4, 1981,regarding the safe shutdown capability of the Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, was based on the submittals from the licensee dated October 29, 1980, October 31, 1980, May 19, 1981 and October 12, 1982, and a conference call on September 22, 1981.
The SER identified three open items for which additional information was needed in order to complete our review (Items 1-3 below), and one open item which required further staff evaluation (Item 4 below).
- 1. Cold leg temperature or Tavg, steam generator pressure, source range neutron flux monitoring and process fluid tank level indication at the auxiliary or remote shutdown panels should be provided,
- 2.
Procedures and manpower requireraents needed to perfonn safe shutdo.wn tasks* have not been addressed.
- 3. The:effects of associated circuit interactions with respect to alternate s~shutdown functions have not been addressed *
. 4.
The adequacy of signal isolators has not yet been evaluated (staff action).
The licensee was also requested to suooiit a final design proposal and analysis of the *modification regarding the relocation of two charging pump service' water pumps and their respective water sources.
By letters dated February 12, *1982 and June 18, 1982, and a conference call on July 2, 1982, the licensee provided a discussion for each of the open items, and provided their final desi.gn proposal of the modification regarding the relocation of two charging pump service water pumps.
Evaluation Open Item l - Cold leg temperature or Tavg, steam generator pressure, source range neutron flux monitoring and process fluid tank leve_l indic~:tiori a~ _the auxiliary or rem.ate shutdown panels should be provided.
The licensee has stated that cold leg temperature, steam generator pressure and source range neutron flux indication will be provided on the remote panels.
However, tank level indication would not be provided at the remote panel since direct tank* level readings could be obtained at the tanks themselves.
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e e Based on the above, we find that the licensee's response. with respect to cold leg temperature, steam generator pressure and source range neutron flux indication is.acceptable.
We also conclude that the licensee's response regarding tank level indication at the remote shutdown* panel is acceptable since direct readings may be obtained from the tanks.
Open Item 2.- Procedures and manpower needed to perfonn safe shutdown tasks hav~ not been addressed..
The 1 icensee has stated that two systems which are required for cold shutdown that may require repair in order to reach cold shutdown are the residual.
heat removal (RHR) system and the pressurizer heaters. The licensee has provided *a schedule of the tasks tnvolved, time required, and men involved**
to accomplish each task and has verified that manpower is available fn order to assure the capability to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.*
.We.have reviewed the.information sutmitted by the licensee.and concluded that
- the 1 icensee meets the manpower and schedular,requirements.
Open Item 3 - The effects of associated circuit interactions with respect to alternate safe shutdown functions have not been addressed.
The licensee has provided an associated circuits study utilizing th~ Fire
~,rea Approach as described in the Clartficat1on of Generic Letter 81-12.
The licensee has stated that a*lternate shutdown may be required in* the event of*a ftre in the control room, emergency switchgear rooms, cable.
vault and ~unnel areas/ cable tray rooms, and portions of the auxiliary buil dltrg
- and auxiliary feedwater pumphouses.
An alternat~ shutdown panel, located in each of the respective unit's emergency switchgear*room, contains the necessary controls for safe shutdown and is electrically isolated from the control room to th~-,*
extent that a fire in the control room will not affect its function.
However, a ;fire in the emergency switchgear room which affects the.
alternate shutdown panel could impair the operability of controlsiand instrumentat.ion in the control room.
Thus,. an electrically isolated remote panel will be installed in the cable tray room to.provide instru-mentation ri~~ded for process monitoring.
The two systems/components which could be affected by a fire, corrmon to all of the above identified areas are the auxiliary-*feedwater pumps and the eves charging pumps. A fire in any of:these areas could render the*
unit's.auxiliary feedwater (AFW} pumps and/or the eves charging pumps inoperable from the control room.
As such, the licensee has provided a
11 cross-tie 11 capaoility which al-lows the component(s) of the oppos~te untt to fulfill.the shutdown requirements of the affected unit *in the event such a configuration is needed *. No other components or instru-mentation need to be cross-tted to achieve safe shutdown conditions stnce other plant functions will be controlled or monitored by the nonnal equtpment or the.
11new 11 remote panel.
The 1 tcensee, has _veri. fi ed that all,upport s~stem~ including instrumentation a~d emergen~y power sources needed for the alternative shutdown method will be available.
l
e e :
The licensee has provided* a cable routing summary of power cabling which shows that p~wer and c~ntrol feeds for t.he al ternattve shutdown equipment do not enter into.any fire,area of the nonnal safe shutdown equtpment.
Circuits which are.required for a1t7rna~e shutdown are equipped-with breakers which are coordin~ted.and that fire induced hot shorts, open circuits_or jhorts to ground will not prevent operation or cause maloperatton of the alternative method.
The licensee has* provided a summary of valves and cables.which were considered f~r spurious operation: _The.charging pump.discharge, auxtliary feedwater*
- d1s~harge, and safety inJectTon MOV valves, though not required to operate during the shutdown procedur-=B, are required to open and remain open when t~e alternative shutdown procedure is used. Procedures wf-11 be written to ensure corr7c~. a1ternate shutdown system ali"gnment in order to maintain safe plant _
-conditions.
Valves whose spurious operation could cause an accident or adversely affect the shutdown effort are: *the RHR interlock valves, the. pressurizer relief valves, and atmospheric dump valves. To ensure reactor pressure boundary integrity-when the primary system pressure is above the RHR system operating pressure, the breaker to one of the two ~eries RHR valves will be open.
To prevent an inadvertent depressurization via the pressurizer relief _valves, procedural guide1 ines wi 1l include opening of the power supply breakers for these valves if the pressurizer level and pressure begin to drop. *,The atmospheri'c dump valves* have similar cunt:".ol *Circuits as* the press~rizer -
relief valves and will.fail closed if the contrpl circuit power is* de-ener-gi _ze~L :< A l!terna ti ve. shurt~own methods procedures wi ~ 1 instruct that_. :~ne brea.ker* be de-energized,n the event the atmospheric dump valves will not close.
The licensee will verify all procedures such that safe plant condi-tions can_ be maintained at all times.
The li"censee 1s study ha*s revealed no circuits which share a common:*e*nclosure with cirtuits of th~*alternative shutdown systems. Also, n6.new e,ectric~l
'isolation.is required to be made as a result of the methodology required by the studies listed above.
We*:concl ude that the 1 icensee has adequately addressed the effects o~
associated circuits interactions, and that the necessary precautions and procedures are adequate to ensure that such circuit interactions will not prevent or adversely *affect safe shutdown.
Open Item 4 - The adequacy of signal isolators have not yet been evaluated (staff action).
The staff finds that the signal isolators to be adequate* provided. thaf_.the isolators are rated for the loads involved, and that they meet an apprcived national standard such as NEMA.
l I
e e The licensee has provided. a final design proposal regarding the relocation of.
the charging pump service water (CPSW) pumps, Two CPSW pumps will be relocated in a seismically designed cubicle in the turbine building, so that redundant fire protected trains will be provided for service water to charging pumps.
The relocated pumps and associated piping will be installed to the. same level of capability as before re1oca_tion.
The charging pump service water* system redesign is in corilplia*nc*e with the applicable portions of the Standard Review Plan based on the following:
- 1. Section 3.4. 1, "Flood Pc_otection."
The relocated pumps will be protected from flooding in accord~11ce with the original plant design basis.
- 2. Section 3.5.l.ls "Internally Generated Missiles Outside Containment."
These relocated pumps* will be inside a seismically designed cubidle in the-turbine building. The new location of the pumps and the separ-ation provided will meet the requirements of SRP 3.5.1.l.
- 3.
Section 3.5.1.4, "Mi~siles Generated by Natural Phenomena.
11 All components will* be inside tornado protected barriers and wil.1 be protec.ted from tornado generated missiles.*
- 4. Section 3.5.2, i*structures, Systems and Components to be Prote:cted from t~ternally Generated Missiles."
These.relocated pumps will be inside a cubical in the turbine:*building.
The puinps wi 11 b~ p*rotected from externa 1 miss i 1 es. *
- 5.
Section 3.6.1, "Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping*
Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment."
This sy_stem will be protected from postulated piping failures b,Y:_separa-tion of trains.
Conclusions '
Based on the above, we conclude that the Surry Power Station is in compliance with the requirements of Sections III.G.3 ~nd I!I.L to Appendix R of 10 CFR so.
except -For the control room ind emergency switchgear rooms* which are st1,11
- t*ndcr review and will be addressed later.