ML18139B049

LER 81-001/03L-0:on 810102,one Boric Acid Flow Path to Core Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Inadvertently Closing Valve 2-CH-226.Flow Path Restored & Personnel Reinstructed

ML18139B049
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	01/30/1981
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139B048	List: ML18139B047 ML18139B049 ML18139B050 ML18139B051 ML18139B052 ML18139B053
References
LER-81-001-03L-01, LER-81-1-3L-1, NUDOCS 8102050571
Download: ML18139B049 (2)

Text

LIC!SEE EVENT REPORT* -

CONTROL BLOCK:

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V!::NT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

With Unit No.2 at 100% power, valve 2-CH-226 was inadvertaot)y closed This made I one of the two boric acid flow paths to the core inoperable. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.2.B.4 and *:r;eportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). The redundant flow path, from the RWST, was available. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

The cause of the event was nersonne1 error in that a Unit No.2 valve was closed instead of a Unit No. 1 valve. A unit rampdown was commenced while restoring the flow path,

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The p~Fsonnel involved have been reinstructed.

9 80 cACILlTY STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS @

METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

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NyMBER DESCRIPTION,~

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..ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 REPORT NO:

DOCKET NO:

81-001/03b-0 EVENT DATE: 01-02-81 50-281 TITLE *oF REPORT: THPROPER. VALVE LINEUP

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With Unit No. 2 at 100% power, valve 2-CH-226 was inadvertantly closed. This made one of the two boric acid flow paths to the core inoperable. The inoper-able flow path was discovered soon thereafter when operators attempted to use the boric acid blender to replenish the Volume Control Tank. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.2.B.4 and.is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.*(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES Ai'ID STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

Boric Acid is one of the two methods that are utilized to normally control re-

• ,activity. The .othe,r method is .the control rods, which were available at all times. The redundant boric acid flow path to the core, from the RWST, was oper-able and would have been used in case of an accident. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The cause of this event was personnel error. Unit No. l's valve, l-CH-226, was to be tagged closed. However, an operator inadvertantely closed the Unit No. 2 1 s valve, 2-CH-226.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

After confirming a loss of a boric acid flow path, a unit rampdown was commenced.

Subsequent investigation revealed a valve out of position. This valve was opened, boric acid flow verified and the unit returned to 100% power.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The seriousness of the event was stressed to all personnel involved, and the individual was appropriately disciplined.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.