05000281/LER-1999-004-02, :on 981109,EDG Was Inoperable Longer than Allowed by TS Due to Governor Compensation Valve.Root Cause Evaluation Being Performed to Determine How Compensation Valve Became Closed
05000281/LER-1999-004-02, :on 981109,EDG Was Inoperable Longer than Allowed by TS Due to Governor Compensation Valve.Root Cause Evaluation Being Performed to Determine How Compensation Valve Became Closed
During an administrative review of completed Periodic Test (PT) procedures, certain discrepancies in the documenting of completed PT's were noted.
The following is a description of the.discrepanci1:s:(1) PT-18.8 (charging pump component Cooling & Service Water pump ASME Section IX Testing) Cannot be doc-umented as being completed during the months of April and May 1980 (2) PT-19.1 (RWST CAT MOV Cyclying) cannot be documented as being completed prior to exceeding 350°F/450 psig on May 10, 1980.
P'.Ji'_:...18.8 is part of the ASME SECTION XI program that has been submitted to NRR for approval.
However, PT-18.8 is not currently a Technical Specification requirement.
The above events are being reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6. 6. 2. b (3) *-
2.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT PT-18.8 The.availability and operability of the components covered by t1iis PT are subject ta:a:.Technica.l.Specifica:tion~*Lcp.r :As>such:;.,1any*-.failure:.-to perf*orm their intended function is documented by Station Deviation reports and associated LER's.
These components are listed in the "Minimum Equipment List" which will document their availibity.
This checklist is performed daily during reactor operation.
In ad-dition, Equipment Rotation-records indicates that these components were operable during the months*of April and May.
These components were operable, however, the Failure to performe the assigned PT's resulted in a loss of data that could be used to schedule pump maintenance.
P.T-19,. l Technical Specification 4.5 has provision for the waivering of this PT during extended reactor shutldowns provided that it is performed prior to reactor start up.
This PT was sucessfi.ily completed in March and should have been performed prior to exceeding 350°F/450° psig at 2215 hrs on May l'O, 1980.
However, the PT was performed a few hours later on May 11, 1980 and the components operated satisfactory.
The above components did meet the required acceptance criteria when periodic testing was performed and supplementary information for PT-18.8 is available to prove.that.the respective components were operable.
Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
3.
CAUSE
The cause of the events was due to an oversight on the part of operations personnel.
The immediate corrective action was to verify that periodic testing had been performed on the affected components since the start up of Unit No. 1 in May 198Q.
5.
SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION All available documentation was reviewed in an attempt to locate any evidence of the completion of the missing PT's.
6.
ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE An imp1:oved Periodic Test Management System is. under development.
This system should reduce the possibility of overdue PT's going unidentified past their grace period.
This system, using~ in house computer, should be operational early in 1981.
In ~ddition, a seperate individual has been assigned to oversee the conduct of the Operational PT program.
/03L-0:on 800101,w/unit at Cold Shutdown,Snubber 1-WFPD-HSS-14 Found W/Empty Reservoir & Declared Inoperable Per Tech Spec.Caused by Leakage Around Pipe Nipple Threads on Valve Block & Extended Seal Washers.Snubber Replaced
/01T-0:on 800310,review of Delta Flux Computer Program Revealed Deficiency in Periodic Test 28.9, Incore- Excore Hi Calibr. Caused by Failure to Extend Calibr of Control Board Delta Flux Meters to 120% Power Range
/03L-0:on 800106,during Routine Release of Lwtt 80-95,LW Effluent Flow Recorder Paper Did Not Rotate & Thus No Record of Flow Note Was Obtained.Caused by Inadequate Mesh Between Recorder Drive Gears & Recorder Paper Roll
/01T-0:on 800320,insp of Containment Following Type a Leak Rate Revealed Eight 1/4 Inch Holders Drilled Through Containment Liner.Caused by Improper Interpretation of Procedure During Design Change 78-48.Repair Planned
/03L-0:on 800107,during Prestartup Testing, Feedwater Bypass Valve HCV-FW-155B Did Not Fail Closed Upon Loss of Instrument Air as Per Design.Caused by Sticking, Dirty Pilot Valve.Valve Cleaned & Returned to Svc
MOV-CW-200B Found Inoperable.Caused by Electrical Malfunction Due to Mechanical Repair in Progress.Redundant Water Box Inlet Valve MOV-CW-206B Was Shut
/01T-0:on 800108,during Routine Startup,Check Valve 1-FW-89 in Discharge Line of Auxiliary Feed Pump Stuck Open.Cause to Be Evaluated by Vendor.Feed Pump & Motor Operated Valves Cycled to Close Valve
/01T:on 800521,during Cold Shutdown,Pressure Transmitter 458 Inoperable Due to Wiring Problem & Isolation Valve for Pressure Transmitter 403 Found Closed,Negating Overpressure Mitigating Sys.Caused by Cable Problem
/01T-0:on 800306,during Preparation for Type a Testing,Leakage Found Through RSHX Diaphragm Plate Seal Welds.Caused by Lack of Fusion & Slag Inclusion.Defects to Be Repaired & Inspected by Nondestructive Test Methods
/03L-0:on 800115,during Routine Surveillance of Liquid Waste Release,Discovered That Unsampled Waste from Tank 5A Was Being Pumped to Tank 5B.Caused by Inadvertent Operation of Transfer Pump.Waste Release Terminated
/03L-0:on 800527,contrary to Tech Spec 3.1.G.2.b. (1),Containment 2 Pressurizer Level Exceeded 33% W/O Mitigation Protection.Caused by Addition of Water to Primary Sys to Maintain Level Indication.Rcs Drained
/03L-0:on 800116,during Normal Operation,Heat Tracing Circuit 4 on Line 1-CH-56-152,boric Acid Supply to Blender Failed.Caused by Water Penetration of Heat Tracing Tape.Tape Replaced W/Higher Water Resistant Tape
/03L-0:on 800606,w/unit in Cold Shutdown,Smoke Detectors Found Inoperable.Caused by Breaker Trip at Motor Control Ctr Which Feeds Detectors.Cause of Breaker Trip Unknown
/01T-0:on 800116,during Power Operation,Valve Inadvertently Closed,Preventing Boric Acid Flow in One of Two Flow Paths to Core for Approx 3-h.Caused Not Stated. Valve Opened & Boric Acid Flow Verified
Westinghouse LOCA-ECCS Reanalysis Indicated Residual Penalty of 0.007 in Fq Exists from Fuel Rod Burst Model.Caused by Reduction in Clad Heatup Rate Which Shifts Fuel Clad Burst Curve
/03L-0:on 800123,during Normal Operation,Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-CH-P-2A Lost Flow.Caused by Broken Pump Shaft Inside Pump Casing.Caused by Improper Installation.Pump a Replaced & Maint Procedures Revised
/01T-0:on 800718,Westinghouse LOCA ECCS Reanalysis Indicated Error in Fuel Clad Burst Model.Caused by Reduction in Clad Heatup Rate Which Shifts Fuel Clad Burst Curve & Results in Earlier Clad Burst.Limit Will Be Controlled
Overstress on 18-inch Line CC-9-121,unit 2 Supply to RHR Exchanger,Found During Pipe Stress Reanalysis on Show Cause Lines.Caused by Supports Installed to Prevent Overstress During DBE
/01T-0:on 800819,at 12% Power,Steam Flow Transmitters (FI-474,475,484,485,494 & 495) Isolated Contrary to Tech Spec-3.7.B.Caused by Transmitters Being Isolated Following Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test
/03L-0:on 800128,during Normal Operations,Heat Tracing Strip Heater on 1-CH-P-2A Circuit 25A (Panel 9) Failed.Caused by Penetration of Water Leakage from Pump Flange.Strip Heater Replaced & Leak Repair Requested
/03L-0:on 800202,while Performing PT-27D,amperage Readings for Circuit 25A,panels 1 & 2,were Below Acceptance Criteria.Repairs to Tape Not Completed within 2-h Limit.Unit Rampdown Intiated.Caused by Water Penetration
/03L-0:on 800815,review of Unit 2 Pipe Support Showed That Seismic Support for Charging Pump 2-CH-P-1B Had Not Been Installed.Caused by Administrative Error.Support Installed
/03L-0:on 800815,during Startup Testing,Boric Acid Concentration of 13.8% Was Reported in 1-CH-TK-1C & 2-SI-TK- 2.Caused by Pumping Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank to Boric Acid Storage Tank W/O Sampling
Valve HCV-1852A to Tank 1-SI-TK-1A Delayed Closing 30-50 Secs,Resulting in Tank Draining Below Tech Spec Level.Caused by Moisture in Air Lines Feeding Valve Operator.Tank Filled to Tech Spec Level
/01T-0:on 800320,informed by Westinghouse That Incident of Stress Corrosion Cracking in Control Rod Support Pins & Flexures Noted in Foreign Plant.Vendor Testing & Assessment Program in Progress.Appropriate Action Planned
/03L-0:on 800816,w/reactor Critical,Discovered Level in Refueling Water Storage Tank & Cat Below Min Set by Tech Specs.Caused by Excessive Makeup to B SI Accumulator W/O Refilling
During Radiation Monitoring Test,Radiation Alarm Setpoint for Component Cooling Sys Found Greater than Twice Background.Caused by Instrument Drift.Activity Levels Verified
/03L-0:on 800816,after Pressurization of Accumulator Tanks,Level Indicator for B SI Accumulator Indicated 61% Level,Above Tech Spec Max of 58.3%.Caused by Condensation & High Pressure in Nitrogen Feed Line
/03L-0:on 800916,w/unit Operating Steady State at 100% power,TV-SS-201B Would Not Remain Closed When Control Switch Was Released.Cause Undetermined.Inside Trip Valve Closed & Air Secured to TV-SS-201B