ML18136A066
| ML18136A066 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Proffitt W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910190290 | |
| Download: ML18136A066 (10) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NuCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 SEP 2 7 1979 Virginia Electric and Power Company Attn:
W. L. Proffitt Senior Vice President, Power P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Gentlemen:
The enclosed Bulletin 79-24 is forwarded to you for action. Written responses are required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Enclosure:
- 1.
- 2.
Designated Applicants for Operating Licenses Sincerely,
~~-
James P. O'Reilly Director
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Virginia Electric and Power Company cc w/encl:
W.R. Cartwright, Station Manager Post Office Box 402 Mineral, Virginia 23117 P. G. Perry Senior Resident Engineer Post Office Box 38 Mineral, Virginia 23117 W. L. Stewart, Manager Post Office Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 e
SEP 2 ~ 1919 e
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Accession No. 7908220114 SSINS No:
6820 OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 September 27, 1979
- IE Bulletin No. 79-24 FROZEN LINES Summary:
On January 3, 1979, an unusual event occurred at Davis-Besse, Unit 1.
The event involved the freezing of the water in a portion of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system recirculation line that is common to both high pressure coolant injection pumps.
The line was not thawed until January 5, 1979, and the event was not reported to NRC until March 12, 1979.
In addition, over the past five years, there have been several events involving frozen instrument and sampling lines.
Description of Circumstances:
The condition was discovered on January 3, 1979, while the reactor was operating at approximately 96 percent power.
During a monthly surveillance test of the HPCI pumps, there was no flow through the recirculatio.n line from the pump discharge to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST).
Investigation revealed that water in a portion of the line exposed to the outside weather was frozen.
This portion of the line to the BWST is common to both HPCI pumps.
The line has redundant heat tracing (a heated wire to prevent freezing); it is insulated; and it has a low-temperature alarm system to warn of freezing conditions.
Water in the line froze apparently because of prolonged sub-freezing temperatures and a defect in the insulation.
There was no apparent malfunction of the heat tracing or temperature alarm ~ircuits, although the temperature sensing elements are located in an area not exposed to the coldest temperature conditions.
This recirculation line serves two purposes:
One is to provide a flow path for surveillance testing, and the other is to provide a minimum flow path to prevent possible damage to the pump in the event it is operated against a closed discharge valve or a reactor coolant system pressure greater than the maximum discharge pressure of the pump (approxim~tely 1600 psig).,
In the initial review of the event on January 3, 1979, the licensee concluded that the pumps were still operable with the recirculation line frozen.
Therefore, no immediate action was taken to thaw the frozen section of the line.
On January 5, 1979, the line was thawed and the surveillance test of the pumps was*successfully completed.
IE Bulletin No. 79-24 Cause of Event:.
September 27, 1979 Page 2. of 2 This event is attributed to an inadequate design.
The heat traci~g provided on this recirculation line was unable to prevent freezing when the line was exposed to sub-freezing temperatures for a prolonged period of time.
The temperature sensors which control the heat tracing and which trigger the low~temperature alarm were located in an area not exposed to the coldest temperatures to which the piping is subjected.
Corrective Action:
To prevent recurrence, the licensee increased the temperature setting of the thermostat for the heat tracing on the recirculation line. Further, a temporary enclosure was built around the line and additional heat tracing was installed.
After the line was thawed and blown down, surveillance testing to verify pump operability was performed.
An.engineering evaluation was initiated by the licensee to develop long-term corrective action.
Other Frozen Lines:
In addition to this event at Davis-Besse, there have been many events involving frozen instrument and sampling lines. During the last five years, facilities experiencing events of this kind include:
Arkansas Nuclear One Davis-Besse Duane Arnold Hatch Fitzpatrick Haddam Neck Indian Point Millstone Action To Be Taken:
Oconee Pilgrim Point Beach Salem Surry Trojan Zion
. a All licensees and construction permit holders receiving this Bulletin for action are requested to review their plants to determine that adequate protective measures have been taken to assure that safety-related process, instrument, and sampling lines do not freeze during extremely cold weather.
The results of these reviews should be reported to the Regional Director by October 31, 1979.
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Approved by GAO (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for generic problems.
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L Salem 2 North Anna 2 Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 Sequoyah 1 McGuire 1 San Onof.re 2
- summer Watts Bar 1 & 2 e
DESIGNATED APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSES
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IE Bulletin No. 79-24 September 27, 1979 Bulletin No.
79-24 79-23 79-14 (Supplement
- 2) 79-22 79-13 (Rev. 1) 79-02 (Rev. 1)
(Supplement
- 1) 79-14 (Supplement) 79-21 79-20 79-19 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST SIX MONTHS Subject Date Issued Frozen Lines 9/27/79 Potential Failure of 9/12/79 Emergency Diesel Generator Field Exciter Transformer Seismic Analyses For 9/7/79 As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems Possible Leakage of 9/5/79 Tubes of Tritium Gas Used in Timepieces for Luminosity Cracking in Feedwater 8/30/79 System Piping Pipe Support Base Plate 8/20/79 Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts Seismic Analyses For 8/15/79 As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems Temperature Effects 8/13/79 on Level Measurements Packaging Low..:Level 8/10/79 Radioactive Waste for Transport and Burial_
Packaging Low-Level 8/10/79 Radioactive Waste for Transport and Burial e
Enclosure Page 1 of 5 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License or a Construction Permit All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP Each Licensee who Receives Tubes of Tritium Gas in Timepieces for Luminosity All Designated Applicants for OLs All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All PWRs with an operating license All Materials Licensees who did not receive Bulletin No. 79-19 All Power and Research Reactors with OLs, fuel facilities except uranium mills, and certain materials licensees
IE Bulletin No. 79-24 September 27, 1979 Bulletin No.
79-18 79-05C&06C 79-17 79-16 79-14 (Rev. 1) 79-15 (Supp. 1) 79-15 79-14 (Correc-tion) 79-14 (Supp. 2) 79-14 (Rev. 1)
LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST SIX MONTHS Subject Date Issued Audibility Problems 8/7/79 Encountered on Evacua-tion of Personnel from High-Noise Areas Nuclear Incident at Three 7/26/79 Mile Island - Supplement Pipe Cracks in Stagnant 7/26/79 Borated Water Systems at PWR Plants Vital Area Access Controls 7/26/79 Seismis Analyses for As-7/18/79 Built Safety-Related Piping System Deep Draft Pump 7/18/79 Deficiencies Deep Draft Pump 7/11/79 Deficiencies Seismic Analyses for 7/27/79 As-Built Safety-Related Piping System I
Seismic Analyses for _
9/7 /79/
As-Built Safety-Related Piping System Seismic Analyses for 7/18/79 As-Built Safety-Related Piping System e
Enc_losure Page 2 of 5 Issued T_o All' OL' s for action All CP's for information To all PWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL All PWR' s with operating license All Holders of and applicants f.or Power Reactor Operating Licenses who anticipate loading fuel prior to 1981 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All Power Reactor Licensees with a CP and/or OL All Power Reactor Licensees with a CP and/or OL All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All Power Reactor facilities with an OL or a CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP
IE Bulletin No. 79-24 September 27, 1979 Bulletin No.
79-14 79-13 (Rev. 1) 7CJ-13 79-02 (Rev. 1) 79-0lA 79-12 79-11 79-10 79-09 79-08 79-07 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST SIX MONTHS Subject Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety-Related Piping System Cracking in Feedwater System Piping Cracking in Feedwater System Piping Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment (Defi-Date Issued 7 /2/79 8/30/79 6/25/79 6/21/79 6/6/79 ciencies in the Environmental Qualification of ASCO Sole-noid Valves)
Short Period Scrams at 5/31/79 BWR Facilities Faulty Overcurrent Trip 5/22/79 Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems Requalification Training 5/11/79 Program Statistics Failures of GE Type AK-2 4/17/79 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems Events Relevant to BWR 4/14/79 Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident Seismic Stress Analysis 4/14/79 of Safety-Related Piping Enclosure Page 3 of 5 Issu~d T.o All"Power Reactor facilities with an OL or a CP All PWR's with an operating license All PWRs with an OL for action. All BWRs with a CP for information
.All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP.
All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All GE BWR Facilities with an 01 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an 01 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an 01 All Power Reactor Facilities with an 01 or CP
r IE Bulletin No. 79-24 September 27, 1979 Bulletin No.79-06B 79-06A (Rev. 1)79-06A 79-06 79-06C 79-05C 79-05B 79-05A 79-05 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST SIX MONTHS Subject Review of Operational Errors and System Mis-alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident Review of Operational Errors and System Mis-alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident Review of Operational Errors and System Mis-alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident Review of Operational Errors and Sy.stem Mis-alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island - Supplement Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island - Supplement Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island Date Issued 4/14/79 4/18/79 4/14/79 4/11/79 7/26/79 7/26/79 4/21/79 4/5/79***
4/1/79 e
Enclosure Page4 of 5 Issued T_o All*Combustion Engineer-ing Designed Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License All Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities of Westinghouse Design With an 01 All Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities of Westinghouse Design With an 01 All Pressurized Water Power Reactors With an 01 except B&W facilities To all PWR Power Reactor Facilities with an 01 To all PWR Power Reactor Facilities with an 01 All B&W Power Reactor Facilities with an 01 All B&W Power Reactor Facilities with an OL All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL and CP
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IE Bulletin No. 79-24 September 27, 1979 Bulletin No.
79-02 (Rev. 1)
(Supp. 1) 79-02 (Rev. 1) 79-0lA LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST SIX MONTHS Subject Date Issued Pipe Support Base Plate 8/20/79 Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts Pipe Support Base Plate 6/21/79 Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts Environmental Qualification 6/6/79 of Class lE Equipment (Deficiencies in the Envi-ronmental Qualification of ASCO Solenoid Valves)
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Enclosure Page 5 of 5 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a*CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
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