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NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BYOMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-96)
EXPIRES 04/30198 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COUECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION (See reverse for required number of AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T ~ F33~
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20
, AND TO digits/characters for each block)
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAllE (1)
I uu..,.c I **----* l"'I PAGE (3)
SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 05000311 1 OF4 TITLE (4)
Waste Gas Decay Tank Oxygen Concentration Exceeded Technical Specifications Limit EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
YEAR I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL
'REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Salem Unit 1 05000272 01 09 11 96 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 01 96 96 -
002 -
05000 OPERATING N
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check orie or more) (11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(v)
S~c~in Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Dennis v. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE I
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS 111111111111111111111111111 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
'YES XINO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On April 24, 1996, the Unit 2 Waste Gas System was taken out of service for maintenance and was vented to atmosphere.
Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 requires the oxygen concentration to be less than 2% at all times.
This Technical Specification was not considered applicable at the time because the system was not being used for waste gas storage.
However, further evaluation by Plant Management and Licensing personnel determined that this interpretation was not correct. Contrary to the Technical Specification, the concentration of oxygen was greater than 2% for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
In addition, the concentration of oxygen was greater than 4% and was not reduced imnediately.
The cause of the occurrence was determined to be poor wording and interpretation of the Technical Specifications. Corrective actions include restoring the Oxygen concentration levels to Technical Specifications limit at Salem Unit 2.
Oxygen concentration levels were restored at Unit 1 on August 1, 1996.
The need to comply with the intent exact wording of the Technical Specifications has been communicated to the operating crews.
A request to resolve Technical wording problems was submitted to reportable in accordance with 10 plant's Technical Specifications.
--- 9609180094 960911 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S
PDR CFR the 73(a)
Specification 3.11.2.5 administrative NRC August 15, 1996.
This event is (2) (i) (B)' any condition prohibited by the and
NRC FORM 3~6A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'~
(4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 96 -
002 -
01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Waste Gas Disposal
{WE/-}*
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as (SS/CCC)
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE OF 4
At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On April 24, 1996, the Unit 2 Waste Gas System was taken out of service for maintenance and was vented to atmosphere.
Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 was not considered applicable at the time because the system was not being used for waste gas storage.
However, further evaluation by Plant Management and Licensing personnel determined that this interpretation was not correct.
The Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) states "the concentration of oxygen in the waste gas holdup system shall be limited to less than or equal to 2% by volume." If this condition is not met, the actions required are to: (1) With the concentration of oxygen in the waste gas holdup system greater than 2% by volume but less than or equal to 4% by volume, reduce the oxygen concentration to within limits within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />; or (2) With the concentration of oxygen in the waste gas holdup system greater than 4% by volume immediately suspend all additions of waste gasses to the system and reduce the concentration of oxygen to less than or equal to 2% by volume without delay.
The Technical Specifications state that these actions are applicable "at all times."
As such, the following non-compliance issues existed from April 24 to July 10, 1996, at Unit 2:
(1)
The concentration of oxygen was greater than 2% for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
In addition the concentration of oxygen was greater than 4% and was not reduced without delay.
(2)
All waste gas additions to the system were not secured when oxygen concentrations exceeded 4%.
It was also noted, however, that isolation of waste gas additions from all of the decay tanks once the system is in operation may not be practical.
This could result in uncontrolled waste gas release into the auxiliary building.
This Technical Specification compliance problem is also applicable to Unit 1.
The Unit 1 Waste Gas System was taken out of service on August 26, 1995, and the gas decay tanks were vented to atmosphere.
The oxygen concentration levels in the Unit 1 tanks were restored to Technical Specification limits as of August 1, 1996.
NRC FORM 36A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'.;f (4-95)
FACILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 96 -
002 01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE PAGE (3) 3 OF 4
The issues identified above were discovered during the period from July 1 to July 24, 1996.
The issue identified on July 1 was that oxygen levels had exceeded 2% for greater than forty eight hours. On July 24, during investigation of the original issue, it was determined that the Technical Specification should apply even when the system is not being used for waste gas storage.
Although not validated, similar occurrences may have occurred in. the past.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the occurrence was determined to be poor wording and interpretation of the Technical Specifications.
Specific issues were:
(1) An administrative error was created when corrections to Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 Amendments 64 and 36 inadvertently removed hydrogen applicability wording in the LCO.
On December 5, 1984, the Salem Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications were amended (Amendments 59 and 28, respectively) to add Section 11 "Radioactive Effluents Explosive Gas Mixture."
The Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) stated that "the concentration of oxygen in the waste gas holdup system shall be limited to less than or equal to 2% by volume whenever the hydrogen concentration exceeds 4% by volume."
On May 30, 1985, Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 Amendments 64 and 36 were issued to correct typographical errors, but did not change the LCO wording
"..... whenever the hydrogen concentration exceeds 4% by volume."
Less than a month later (June 21, 1985), the NRC issued a correction to Amendments 64 and 36 which inadvertently removed the LCO hydrogen applicability wording.
The amendments' Safety Evaluation did not address the reason for the hydrogen applicability wording change.
PSE&G did not identify the discrepancy. Since the systems were vented to atmosphere and hydrogen was not being used in the plant, use of the hydrogen exclusion would have negated the need to enter the action statements of Technical Specification 3.11.2.5.
(2) Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 was poorly interpreted to apply at all times when the system was being used for waste gas storage, rather than at all times.
This is also a wording problem because the specification should specify at all times when the system was being used for waste gas storage, to allow for maintenance activities.
(3) Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 was poorly interpreted to apply to individual decay tanks vice all of the tanks at the same time.
This is also a wording problem because the waste gas holdup tanks should be treated as individual units, as described in the Salem UFSAR.
Otherwise, uncontrolled waste gas release into the auxiliary building could result.
NRC FORM 3f36A (4-96)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 96 -
002 -
01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES PAGE (3) 4 OF 4
In the past two years there has been one similar LER.
LER 311/96-003-00 identified an occurrence where an erroneous determination was made regarding Technical Specification applicability.
The Technical Specifications contained a surveillance for an auto-start feature in the FHB Ventilation System that was not installed.
Corrective actions were to install the auto-start feature and the continuation of the Technical Specification Improvement Project.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
During the period when the oxygen concentration in the Waste Gas System exceeded the Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation, the system was vented to atmosphere, or was being returned to service following an extended system outage.
Consequently, there was no concentration of hydrogen which would create the potential for an explosive gas mixture with oxygen.
The build up of hydrogen under the current condition is not credible.
Therefore, there was no actual safety significance with this occurrence.
The health and safety of the public was not affected.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. Oxygen concentration levels were restored to Technical Specifications requirements at Unit 2.
- 2. Oxygen concentration levels were restored to Technical Specifications requirements at Unit 1 as of August 1, 1996.
- 3. The problems with this Technical Specification have been communicated to the operating crews.
Isolation of waste gas from all holdup tanks, if oxygen levels exceed 4 percent, will be carefully evaluated since such action may cause uncontrolled release of waste gas into the Auxiliary Building. If isolation of all waste gas is not practical, the tank with the high oxygen levels will be isolated and purged, and another tank will be placed in service, as described in the UFSAR.
If this occurs prior to a change to the Technical Specifications, a supplement to this LER will be submitted.
- 4. Operations Management has emphasized the need to comply with the intent and the exact wording of the Technical Specifications, and to immediately address any issues where the intent and the wording are in conflict.
- 5. A request to resolve Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 administrative/wording problems was submitted to the NRC on August 15, 1996.
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| 05000272/LER-1996-001, :on 960103,discovered Insufficent Thermal Overload Relay Heater Margin.Caused by Inadequate Design of TOLs in 1970s.Issued Calculation ES-18.007 for Sizing of Thermal Overload Heaters for SR Rotating Loads |
- on 960103,discovered Insufficent Thermal Overload Relay Heater Margin.Caused by Inadequate Design of TOLs in 1970s.Issued Calculation ES-18.007 for Sizing of Thermal Overload Heaters for SR Rotating Loads
| | | 05000311/LER-1996-001-01, :on 960109,TS Violation Occurred Re Failure to Perform Chemistry Sampling within Required Timeframe.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled & Chemistry Dept Shift Turnover Process Improved |
- on 960109,TS Violation Occurred Re Failure to Perform Chemistry Sampling within Required Timeframe.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled & Chemistry Dept Shift Turnover Process Improved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000311/LER-1996-002-02, :on 960701,waste Gas Decay Tank Oxygen Concentration Exceeded TSs Limit.Caused by Poor Wording & Interpretation of Tss.Oxygen Concentration Levels Restored. Request to Resolve TS 3.11.2.5 Submitted to NRC on 960815 |
- on 960701,waste Gas Decay Tank Oxygen Concentration Exceeded TSs Limit.Caused by Poor Wording & Interpretation of Tss.Oxygen Concentration Levels Restored. Request to Resolve TS 3.11.2.5 Submitted to NRC on 960815
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1996-002, :on 960110,evaluation Determined That Motor Operated Gate Valves Susceptible to Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding.Caused by Inability to Meet GL 95-07 Criteria.Test Procedure Changed |
- on 960110,evaluation Determined That Motor Operated Gate Valves Susceptible to Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding.Caused by Inability to Meet GL 95-07 Criteria.Test Procedure Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) | | 05000311/LER-1996-003-02, :on 960515,failed to Perform Surveillance for Fuel Handling Bldg (Fhb) Ventilation Sys Auto Start.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls for Surveillance Procedures. Added auto-start Capability |
- on 960515,failed to Perform Surveillance for Fuel Handling Bldg (Fhb) Ventilation Sys Auto Start.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls for Surveillance Procedures. Added auto-start Capability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1996-003-01, :on 960220,TS Radiation Monitor Sampling in non-compliance.Caused by Failure of Plant Chemistry to Fully Understand TS Sample & Analysis Requirements.Established Process for Controlling Analyses |
- on 960220,TS Radiation Monitor Sampling in non-compliance.Caused by Failure of Plant Chemistry to Fully Understand TS Sample & Analysis Requirements.Established Process for Controlling Analyses
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000311/LER-1996-004-02, :on 960515,failed to Perform Compensatory Radiological Survey.Caused by Personnel Error.Performed Survey,Revised Radiation Protection Schedule,Purchased Alarm Clocks & Counseled Personnel Re Event |
- on 960515,failed to Perform Compensatory Radiological Survey.Caused by Personnel Error.Performed Survey,Revised Radiation Protection Schedule,Purchased Alarm Clocks & Counseled Personnel Re Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1996-004-01, :on 960307,surveillance Was Missed for Salem Generating Station.Caused by Lack of Adequate Control for Development & Maintenance of TS Surveillance Procedures. License Change Will Be Submitted |
- on 960307,surveillance Was Missed for Salem Generating Station.Caused by Lack of Adequate Control for Development & Maintenance of TS Surveillance Procedures. License Change Will Be Submitted
| | | 05000272/LER-1996-004, :on 960307,containment Isolation Valve Missed TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls & Inadequate Design Review.Ts Surveillance Improvement Project Has Been Initiated for Plant,Units 1 & 2 |
- on 960307,containment Isolation Valve Missed TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls & Inadequate Design Review.Ts Surveillance Improvement Project Has Been Initiated for Plant,Units 1 & 2
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1996-005-05, Forwards LER 96-005-05 Re Surveillance for turbine-driven AF Pump.Commitments Encl as Attachment a | Forwards LER 96-005-05 Re Surveillance for turbine-driven AF Pump.Commitments Encl as Attachment a | | | 05000272/LER-1996-005-01, :on 960325,channel Checks for Average Temp Not Performed as Required by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Controls for Development & Maint of TS Surveillance Procedures.Tssip Initiated |
- on 960325,channel Checks for Average Temp Not Performed as Required by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Controls for Development & Maint of TS Surveillance Procedures.Tssip Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1996-005, :on 971224,inadequate TS Testing of Containment Airlock Door Gasket Leakage Was Noted.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls & Understanding of Development. Appropriate Procedures Reviewed |
- on 971224,inadequate TS Testing of Containment Airlock Door Gasket Leakage Was Noted.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls & Understanding of Development. Appropriate Procedures Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000311/LER-1996-005-02, :on 960627,surveillance of Fuel Handling Bldg Ventilation Sys Charcoal Adsorber Test Was Missed.Caused by Inattention to Detail.Individual Involved Received Appropriate Level of Positive Discipline |
- on 960627,surveillance of Fuel Handling Bldg Ventilation Sys Charcoal Adsorber Test Was Missed.Caused by Inattention to Detail.Individual Involved Received Appropriate Level of Positive Discipline
| | | 05000272/LER-1996-005-15, Forwards LER 96-005-15, Inadequate TS Testing - Feedwater Sys Isolation Functional Test/Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Service Water Flow Control Valves | Forwards LER 96-005-15, Inadequate TS Testing - Feedwater Sys Isolation Functional Test/Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Service Water Flow Control Valves | | | 05000272/LER-1996-005-03, :on 960325,TS Surveillance Requirement Implementation Deficiencies Identified.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls & Understanding of Development Weakness. Procedures Revised |
- on 960325,TS Surveillance Requirement Implementation Deficiencies Identified.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls & Understanding of Development Weakness. Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000311/LER-1996-006-02, :on 960717,sample Flow to non-radioactive Liquid Radwaste Monitor Was Not Adequate to Meet Plant Ts.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Design of 2R37 Sample Line Has Been Revised |
- on 960717,sample Flow to non-radioactive Liquid Radwaste Monitor Was Not Adequate to Meet Plant Ts.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Design of 2R37 Sample Line Has Been Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1996-006-01, :on 960421,missed Independent Verification of Release Lineup on Waste Gas Decay Tanks (Wgdt) Due to Personnel.Wgdt Releases Suspended Pending Rev of Procedures. Procedures Revised |
- on 960421,missed Independent Verification of Release Lineup on Waste Gas Decay Tanks (Wgdt) Due to Personnel.Wgdt Releases Suspended Pending Rev of Procedures. Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1996-006-01, :on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With |
- on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000272/LER-1996-007-01, :on 960524,determined P-12 Setpoint Above Tech Spec Table 3.3-3 Value.Caused by Incorrect Conversion from Standard Tech Spec for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors. Revised Procedures |
- on 960524,determined P-12 Setpoint Above Tech Spec Table 3.3-3 Value.Caused by Incorrect Conversion from Standard Tech Spec for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors. Revised Procedures
| | | 05000311/LER-1996-007, :on 980130,missed Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Occurred.Caused by Failure to Tag 35 Amp Breaker.Surveillance Testing for Breakers 1ELC-1 & 1ELC-3 Will Be Completed |
- on 980130,missed Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Occurred.Caused by Failure to Tag 35 Amp Breaker.Surveillance Testing for Breakers 1ELC-1 & 1ELC-3 Will Be Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1996-007-02, :on 960716,containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Circuit Breakers Had Not Been Demonstrated Operable Per Ts.Caused by Failure to Assure That Info Was Incorporated Into Sr.Procedures Reviewed |
- on 960716,containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Circuit Breakers Had Not Been Demonstrated Operable Per Ts.Caused by Failure to Assure That Info Was Incorporated Into Sr.Procedures Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1996-008-01, :on 960613,failed to Meet Tech Spec Requirement While in Mode 5 for Natural Circulation.Caused by Insufficient Technical Input for Development of Controls. Revised Operating Logs for Mode 5 |
- on 960613,failed to Meet Tech Spec Requirement While in Mode 5 for Natural Circulation.Caused by Insufficient Technical Input for Development of Controls. Revised Operating Logs for Mode 5
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1996-008-02, :on 960613,failure to Meet TS Requirements While in Mode 5 for Natural Circulation Was Noted.Caused by Insufficient Technical Input for Development of Controls. Revised Plant Operating Logs for Mode 5 |
- on 960613,failure to Meet TS Requirements While in Mode 5 for Natural Circulation Was Noted.Caused by Insufficient Technical Input for Development of Controls. Revised Plant Operating Logs for Mode 5
| | | 05000311/LER-1996-008-02, :on 960729,battery Chargers Were Declared Inoperable Due to Mfg Discrepancies.Unit 2 Battery Chargers Will Be Reworked to Design Specifications by 960915 |
- on 960729,battery Chargers Were Declared Inoperable Due to Mfg Discrepancies.Unit 2 Battery Chargers Will Be Reworked to Design Specifications by 960915
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960530,concluded Potential Common Mode Failure for 4 Kv Magne-Blast Breakers.Caused by Misalignment of Breaker Mechanism & Internals.Assessed Breaker Mechanism Misalignment for Each Breaker |
- on 960530,concluded Potential Common Mode Failure for 4 Kv Magne-Blast Breakers.Caused by Misalignment of Breaker Mechanism & Internals.Assessed Breaker Mechanism Misalignment for Each Breaker
| | | 05000311/LER-1996-009-02, :on 960808,determined Current Shift Schedules Deviates from License Condition 2.C(24)(a).Caused by Inadequate Review of License Requirements.Will Continue to Operate on 12-hour Schedule |
- on 960808,determined Current Shift Schedules Deviates from License Condition 2.C(24)(a).Caused by Inadequate Review of License Requirements.Will Continue to Operate on 12-hour Schedule
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000272/LER-1996-010-01, :on 960619,identified Pressurizer Relief Tank Hydrodynamic Loads Had Not Previously Been Considered in Support Design.Caused by Failure to Consider Hydrodynamic Loads Caused by Water Discharge.Supports Revised |
- on 960619,identified Pressurizer Relief Tank Hydrodynamic Loads Had Not Previously Been Considered in Support Design.Caused by Failure to Consider Hydrodynamic Loads Caused by Water Discharge.Supports Revised
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1996-010, Forwards LER 96-010-00 Re Inadequate Pressurizer Relief Tank Supports.Attachment a Represents Commitment Made to NRC | Forwards LER 96-010-00 Re Inadequate Pressurizer Relief Tank Supports.Attachment a Represents Commitment Made to NRC | | | 05000311/LER-1996-010-02, :on 960819,TS 4.0.5 Surveillance for Two Pressurizer Welds Was Missed Due to Insufficient Verification & Validation of Entry of Data Into Database. Exam of Pressurizer Spray Nozzle Was Completed |
- on 960819,TS 4.0.5 Surveillance for Two Pressurizer Welds Was Missed Due to Insufficient Verification & Validation of Entry of Data Into Database. Exam of Pressurizer Spray Nozzle Was Completed
| | | 05000311/LER-1996-011, Forwards LER 96-011-00 Regarding Missed Surveillance for Sampling Boron Concentration of Refueling Canal as Required by Ts.Commitments Encl as Attachment a | Forwards LER 96-011-00 Regarding Missed Surveillance for Sampling Boron Concentration of Refueling Canal as Required by Ts.Commitments Encl as Attachment a | | | 05000311/LER-1996-011-01, :on 951206,missed Surveillance for Sampling Baron Concentration of Refueling Canal as Required by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of Tech Specs Requirements.Procedure Revised |
- on 951206,missed Surveillance for Sampling Baron Concentration of Refueling Canal as Required by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of Tech Specs Requirements.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000272/LER-1996-011-02, :on 960620,pressurizer Safety Relief Valves Were Found Outside of TS Tolerance.Caused by Minor Testing Instrument Error.Valves Were Refurbished & Successfully Retested to within TS Tolerance |
- on 960620,pressurizer Safety Relief Valves Were Found Outside of TS Tolerance.Caused by Minor Testing Instrument Error.Valves Were Refurbished & Successfully Retested to within TS Tolerance
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000311/LER-1996-012-02, :on 961005,two Potential Transformer Fuses Opened While Performing an Electrical Test of 21 Svc Water Pump.Cause Unknown.Work Practices for Specialized Electrical Testing Will Be Reviewed for Adequacy |
- on 961005,two Potential Transformer Fuses Opened While Performing an Electrical Test of 21 Svc Water Pump.Cause Unknown.Work Practices for Specialized Electrical Testing Will Be Reviewed for Adequacy
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1996-012-01, :on 960723,potential Loss of Residual Capability Identified.Caused by Inadequate Valve Design.Rhr Flow Control Valves Replaced |
- on 960723,potential Loss of Residual Capability Identified.Caused by Inadequate Valve Design.Rhr Flow Control Valves Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1996-013-01, :on 960711,scaling Error of Over Temperature Delta Temp Resulted in Inoperable Protection Channels.Cause Under Investigation.Scaling Calculations Revised |
- on 960711,scaling Error of Over Temperature Delta Temp Resulted in Inoperable Protection Channels.Cause Under Investigation.Scaling Calculations Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1996-013, :on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With |
- on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1996-013-02, :on 961010,surveillance for Performing Tritium Grab Samples When Refueling Canal Is Flooded Was Missed. Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements. Corrective Actions Include Procedure Revs |
- on 961010,surveillance for Performing Tritium Grab Samples When Refueling Canal Is Flooded Was Missed. Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements. Corrective Actions Include Procedure Revs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1996-014-02, :on 960717,potential Hydrogen Embrittlement on 4kV Breaker Parts Identified.Caused by Cracked Roll Pin,Due to Lack of Knowledge of Plating Induced Hydrogen Embrittlement.Cause Evaluation Being Conducted |
- on 960717,potential Hydrogen Embrittlement on 4kV Breaker Parts Identified.Caused by Cracked Roll Pin,Due to Lack of Knowledge of Plating Induced Hydrogen Embrittlement.Cause Evaluation Being Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1996-014-03, :on 961201,EDG Automatic Start Resulted in ESF Actuation.Caused by Defective anti-pump Relay in 23 Csd Vital Infeed Breaker.Defective anti-pump Relay Identified |
- on 961201,EDG Automatic Start Resulted in ESF Actuation.Caused by Defective anti-pump Relay in 23 Csd Vital Infeed Breaker.Defective anti-pump Relay Identified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1996-014, Corrected LER 96-014-00:on 960717,potential Hydrogen Embrittlement on 4kV Breaker Parts Identified.Root Cause Investigation Being Conducted.All NLI Refurbished Breakers Removed Except 2B4D from Vital Loads | Corrected LER 96-014-00:on 960717,potential Hydrogen Embrittlement on 4kV Breaker Parts Identified.Root Cause Investigation Being Conducted.All NLI Refurbished Breakers Removed Except 2B4D from Vital Loads | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1996-015-01, :on 960722,inadequate Cfcu Heat Removal Capability Identified.Caused by Failure to Effectively Chlorinate Service Water.Cfcu Monitoring Program Developed & Procedures & Training Revised |
- on 960722,inadequate Cfcu Heat Removal Capability Identified.Caused by Failure to Effectively Chlorinate Service Water.Cfcu Monitoring Program Developed & Procedures & Training Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000311/LER-1996-015-02, :on 961219,breach of Containment Closure During Core Reload Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Inplementation of Outage Scheduling & Risk Management Requirements.Containment Closure Was Reestablished Using Alternate Isolation Poi |
- on 961219,breach of Containment Closure During Core Reload Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Inplementation of Outage Scheduling & Risk Management Requirements.Containment Closure Was Reestablished Using Alternate Isolation Points
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1996-015, Forwards LER 96-015-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Salem Generating Station,Unit 2 on 961219.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 96-015-00,documenting Event That Occurred at Salem Generating Station,Unit 2 on 961219.Commitments Made within Ltr,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1996-016-02, :on 961220,missed Surveillance for Determining Response Time of High Containment Gaseous Radioactivity ESF Actuation Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 961220,missed Surveillance for Determining Response Time of High Containment Gaseous Radioactivity ESF Actuation Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1996-016-01, :on 960719,missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior to Entering Mode 4.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Control for Verification of Change Requirements |
- on 960719,missed Surveillance for RHR Pump Dynamic Head Prior to Entering Mode 4.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Control for Verification of Change Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1996-017-01, :on 960725,surveillance Was Missed for Plant Vent.Caused by Personnel Error.Lco Compensatory Action Was Immediately Completed Upon Discovery of Missed TS Requirement |
- on 960725,surveillance Was Missed for Plant Vent.Caused by Personnel Error.Lco Compensatory Action Was Immediately Completed Upon Discovery of Missed TS Requirement
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1996-018-01, :on 960719,potential Performance Impact on ECCS Identified Involving non-safety Related Refueling Water Storage Tank Piping.Caused by Design Discrepancy.Design Reviewed & Revised |
- on 960719,potential Performance Impact on ECCS Identified Involving non-safety Related Refueling Water Storage Tank Piping.Caused by Design Discrepancy.Design Reviewed & Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1996-019-01, :on 960729,misclassification of Blow Down Sample Valves Noted.Caused by Flawed Engineering Evaluation. Review of Other Salem Piping Penetrations Performed |
- on 960729,misclassification of Blow Down Sample Valves Noted.Caused by Flawed Engineering Evaluation. Review of Other Salem Piping Penetrations Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000311/LER-1996-020, Provides Notification of Change in Commitment Implementation Schedule Re Potential for Thermal Overpressurization of Containment Fan Coil Unit Piping Per LER 96-020 | Provides Notification of Change in Commitment Implementation Schedule Re Potential for Thermal Overpressurization of Containment Fan Coil Unit Piping Per LER 96-020 | | | 05000272/LER-1996-020-01, :on 960820,containment Fan Coil Units Were Outside Plant Design Basis.Caused by Failure of Plant Design Change to Update Plant Design Basis.Mod to Provide Overpressure Protection Will Be Implemented |
- on 960820,containment Fan Coil Units Were Outside Plant Design Basis.Caused by Failure of Plant Design Change to Update Plant Design Basis.Mod to Provide Overpressure Protection Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability |
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