:on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept| ML18101B013 |
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| Site: |
Salem  |
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| Issue date: |
09/21/1995 |
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| From: |
Ranalli J Public Service Enterprise Group |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML18101B012 |
List: |
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| References |
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| LER-95-006-02, LER-95-6-2, NUDOCS 9509260078 |
| Download: ML18101B013 (5) |
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Similar Documents at Salem |
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NRCFORll 366 U.S. NU R REGULATORY COMMISSION OVED BY OllB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95)
EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION (See reverse for required number of AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-e i;:J* U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 55-0001, AND TO digits/characters for each block)
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315<M>104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAllE (1)
DOCKET NUllBER (2)
PAGE 13)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 05000311 1 OF 5 TITLE (4)
MISSED SURVEILLANCE -
CHARCOAL ADSORBER TESTING EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT TIME LIMIT EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
YEAR I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL
'REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 08 22 95 95 006 00 09 21 95 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §; (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 5 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x
- 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(iir
- 50. 73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v)
Spec~ln Ab11tract below or In C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Mr. Jerome Ranalli, Technical Manager - Salem 609-339-2068 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
~~1~@fM~~l
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS I TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
'YES xjNO SUBMISSION (If yea, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE(15)
ABSTRACT (Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On 8/23/95 a *charcoal adsorber sample. for the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (EACS) was removed after approximately 988 hours0.0114 days <br />0.274 hours <br />0.00163 weeks <br />3.75934e-4 months <br /> of operation. This exceeded Technical Specifications. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.6.1.c of "after 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br />" (including the 25% allowance per the Technical Specifications). The sample removed on 8/23/95 was analyzed and found to meet the testing acceptance criteria. The safety significance for this event was determined to be low.
The apparent cause for this event was the utilization of an informal process to monitor the charcoal adsorb er run time hours combined with personnel error.
.This is reportable as a missed surveillance in accordance with 10 CFR
- 50. 73(a) (2) ( i) (B) ' any operation or condition. prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
9509260078 950921 PDR ADOCK 05000311
- - s PDR NRC FORM 366 (4-95)
,. (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) -
DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000311 LER NUMBER (6).
PAGE (3)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 95 -
006 -
00 TEXT (If more apace i* required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (EACS) - Charcoal Adsorber Filter {VI/FLT}*
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as {SS/CCC}.
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE 5
The Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) 4.7.6.1.c requires the Control Room EACS charcoal adsorber (filter) to be tested after 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation.
on 8/22/95 it was identified that the charcoal adsorber sample was overdue.
On 8/23/95 the sample was removed after approximately 988 hour0.0114 days <br />0.274 hours <br />0.00163 weeks <br />3.75934e-4 months <br />s* of operation which exceeded the Technical Specifications limit (including the 25% allowance in TS).
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Mode 5, Reactor Power D%
The Control Room EACS was placed in the recirculation mode in mid July due to concerns with meeting GDC 19 criteria, which was addressed in LER 272/95-017-00.
In the recirculation mode the system flow is through the charcoal adsorber which led to the increased use of the adsorber.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE The control room charcoal adsorber for Salem Unit 2 had approximately 315 cumulative hours of operation (run time) as of July 15, 1995.
On July 18, 1995 the Control Room EACS was placed in the recirculation mode due to concerns with GDC 19 as reported in'LER 272/95-017-00.
At this point, the rate at which run time accumulated for the charcoal adsorber increased significantly.
On July 24, 1995 the Salem Operations Department and Radiation Protection Chemistry Support Group were informed by the Engineering Support Engineer of the run time for the.charcoal adsorber.
The Engineering Support Engineer subsequently departed for two weeks of military leave, returning on August 21, 1995.
On August 22, 1995 the Engineering Support Engineer discovered that the surveillance had not been
.performed.
At the time the sample was removed, there were approximately 988 hours0.0114 days <br />0.274 hours <br />0.00163 weeks <br />3.75934e-4 months <br /> of cumulative hours of operation for the charcoal adsorber.
'/, (4-96)
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6) 05000311 V I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION EAR NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 95 -
006 00 TEXT (tf more apace ia required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
PAGE (3) 3 OF 5
At the end of July the Salem Unit 1 charcoal adsorber had approximately 180 more run time hours than the Unit 2 adsorber.
The Unit 1 charcoal adsorber surveillance was performed on August 3, 1995 within the acceptable Technical Specifications surveillance time limit.
However, no work orders were initiated for the Unit 2 filter surveillance.
The Unit 1 and 2 Control Room EACS were placed back in the normal mode of operation in late August 1995.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The apparent cause of this event was the utilization of an informal process to monitor the charcoal adsorber run time hours combined with personnel error.
The process did not require written notification and depended on verbal communication to schedule the surveillance.
The guidance provided to the Engineering Support Engineer was to notify the Radiation Protection Chemistry Support Group when the surveillance was due.
The Engineer used voice mail for this notification with no assurance the message was
- received, understodn":'hr acted upon.
Contributing factors included:
Failure of the Operations Department to ensure monitoring of the run time hours on the charcoal adsorber was current and compared to the TS limits.
Failure of the Engineering Support Engineer to assure that his notification to the Radiation Pr6tection Chemistry Support Group was received. and appropriate action taken.
Lack of recognition within the Technical Department management of the responsibilities of the Engineering Support Engineer and providing qualified back up to Engineering Support Engineer.
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES There were no previous similar reportable occurrences of failure to perform adsorber testing.
A review of LERs for the last six years for both Salem units did identify numerous LERs which involved missed surveillances.
Most of the missed surveillances involved communication problems, but did not involve an informal process such as with the charcoal adsorber.
.. (4-95).
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6) 05000311 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 95 -
006 00 TEXT (tf more apace is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES (cont'd)
PAGE (3)
- 4. OF 5
However, there were three LERs since 1989 that did contain corrective actions which had the potential to identify the informal process used for the charcoal adsorber surveillance.
One of the corrective actions in LERs 311/89-015-00 and 272/90-007 was to perform a verification audit of the
- j Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Surveillances, ensuring all I
requirements will be performed.
The focus of this audit was to ensure there were procedures or tasks in place to perform all surveillances.
However, the audit did not focus on the scheduling of surveillances and in particular did not address the monitoring and scheduling of Conditional Surveillances.
The apparent cause in LER 311/94-005-00 was inadequate communication within Maintenance.
This event did not involve the Engineering Support Engineer responsible for cyclic data monitoring and as such the corrective actions in that LER did not include the Engineering Support Engineer.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The purpose of the adsorber is to remove iodine from the environment inside the control room areas following a LOCA.
The 720 hour0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> time limit between samplings ensures the capability of the adsorber to perform this emergency function for the control room environment.
A review of Regulatory Guide 1.52, ANSI Standards N509-1976 and N510-1975, and the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook indicate the 720 hour0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> period is the 30 day period following a postulated LOCA (DBA).
There is a 31 day period after the sample is taken for the sample analysis of the adsorber to be complet~d. Although the sample was removed after approximately 988 hours0.0114 days <br />0.274 hours <br />0.00163 weeks <br />3.75934e-4 months <br />, the adsorber sample was tested within 31 days of reaching the 720 hour0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> time limit.
The results of the adsorber sample test was satisfactorily.
Based on the successful adsorber sample test, the safety significance of this event was low.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The responsibility for monitoring the cumulative hours of operation on the charcoal adsorber will be assigned to the Operations Department.
This will simplify the process, reduce the possibility of miscommunication, and provide the Operations Department with ready access to information concerning the hours of operation on the adsorber.
The applicable Operations Department procedures will be revised to monitor and track the cumulative hours of operation for the Control Room EACS charcoal adsorber.
This will be completed by October 15, 1995. (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COlllllSSION FACILIT\\' NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6) 05000311 YEAR I SE.fil'J~~AL I =~
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 95 -
006 00 TEXT (If more apace ia required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
(cont'd)
PAGE (3) 5 OF 5
The Operations Department will review TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS to ensure there are no other surveillances which depend on an informal or non-proceduralized scheduling process.
This review will be completed by October 30, 1995.
Procedure revisions, if required, will be completed by December 31, 1995.
The Engineering Support Engineer currently monitors numerous non-periodic and cyclic information for assuring scheduling of TS surveillances.
This information is maintained.in the Cyclic Data Log.
The Cyclic Data Log maintenance process will be transferred from Engineering to the Operations Department to preclude the possibility of a similar repeat occurrence involving other cyclic data monitoring actions.
This action will be completed by June 1, 1996.
The Engineering Support Engineer has been counseled concerning management expectations of personnel accountability and communication.
Responsible Engineering (formally Technical) management have.been made fully aware of and recognize the TS surveillance monitoring responsibilities of the Engineering Support Engineer.
Additionally, until the Cyclic Data log maintenance process is transferred from Engineering to the Operations Department, a backup engineer will be trained by October 1, 1995 in the actions required to fulfill these responsibilities.
An action request has been issued to evaluate the effectiveness of past corrective actions in light of recent problems with scheduling of TS surveillances.
This action request was processed in accordance with the requirements of NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0006(Q), Corrective Action Program.
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| 05000311/LER-1995-001, :on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities |
- on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed |
- on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken |
- on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made |
- on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-02, :on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited |
- on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-03, :on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures |
- on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-004-01, :on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR |
- on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004-02, :on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers |
- on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004, :on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators |
- on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-005-02, :on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample |
- on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-005-01, :on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause |
- on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-005, Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-005, :on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved |
- on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006, Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | | | 05000272/LER-1995-006-01, :on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed |
- on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006-02, :on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept |
- on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-007-02, :on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency |
- on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-007, :on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised |
- on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-008-02, :on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised |
- on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-008-01, :on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced |
- on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-009, :on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability |
- on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010-01, :on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs |
- on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010, :on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation |
- on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000272/LER-1995-011, :on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review |
- on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-012, :on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed |
- on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-012-01, :During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed |
- During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-013-01, :on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved |
- on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-014-01, :on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup |
- on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-015-01, :on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures |
- on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-016-01, :on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS |
- on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-016, Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | | | 05000272/LER-1995-017, :on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied |
- on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-018, :on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731 |
- on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-019, :on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6 |
- on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-020, Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-020-01, :on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts |
- on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-021-01, :on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired |
- on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000272/LER-1995-022, :on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced |
- on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023-01, Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023, :on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed |
- on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-024, :on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed |
- on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-025, :on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised |
- on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-026, :on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination |
- on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000272/LER-1995-026-01, :on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits |
- on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-027-01, :on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr |
- on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-028-01, :on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied |
- on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-029, :on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear |
- on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1995-029-01, :on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced |
- on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability |
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