ML18101A628
| ML18101A628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1995 |
| From: | Cooper R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Eliason L Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101A629 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9504170012 | |
| Download: ML18101A628 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000272/1995002
Text
EA# 95-62
Mr. Leon R. Eliason
Chief Nuclear Officer & President
Nuclear Business Unit
April 7, 1995
. Public Service Electric and Gas Company
- P .0. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ
08038
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION NOS. 50-272/95-02; 50-311/95-02
Dear Mr. Eliason:
The enclosed report documents an inspection for public health and safety,
conducted by Mr. C. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector and other members of
the NRC resident and regional staff at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station
for the period between January 29, 1995 and March 22, 1995.
The inspectors
discussed the findings of this inspection with Mr. J. Summers, General
Manager-Salem Operations, and other members of your staff. '
Within the scope of this inspection, relative to Salem Unit 2, the inspectors
identified several examples of continued weaknesses relative to corrective
action determination and effectiveness, and an example of inadequate measures
to assure proper configuration control for a safety-related system following
modification of pressurizer safety valve loop seals.
As a result, the Unit
was operated outside the design basis for an entire operating cycle. These
apparent violations, as described in Enclosure 1, are being considered for
escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), 10 CFR
Part 2, Appendix C.
Accordingly, a Notice of Violation is not being issued
for these inspection findings at this time.
The number and characterization
of the apparent violations may change as a result of further NRC review.
Accordingly, no response to these matters is required at this time.
Additionally, we consider a violation concerning failure to collect grab
samples of the waste gas decay tank a non-cited issue since the item conforms
with our enforcement policy as described in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section
VII.
The details of all of these matters are described in the enclosed
inspection report .
. These apparent violations (as described in the enclosure) were discussed
between Mr. John Summers, General Manager, Salem Operations and Mr. John White
of our office on April 7, 1995.
An Enforcement Conference will be scheduled
with your organization in the near future. This conference will be closed to
public observation .
~ ""~ r. r, ' "
- til,:ull
9504170012 950407
ADOCK 05000272
Q
-**
Mr .. Leon R. Eli as on
2
The decision to hold an Enforcement Conference does not mean that violati~ns
have occurred, or that enforcement action will be taken.
The purposes of this
conference are: (1) to discuss the apparent violations, including cause and
safety significance; (2) to provide you with an opportunity to point out
errors in our inspection report, and identify corrective actions, taken or
planned; and (3) to discuss any other information that will help us determine
the appropriate action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
The
conference is also an opportunity for you to provide any information
concerning your perspectives on the severity of the apparent violations, and
the application of the factors that the NRC considers when it determines the
amount of a civil penalty that may be assessed in accordance with Section
VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Your cooperation with us is appreciated.
Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Wayne Lanning for
R1cnard W. Cooper, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.
50-272; 50-311
Enclosures:
1. Apparent Violations
2.
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/95-02; 50-311/95-02
cc w/encl:
J. J. Hagan, Vice President-Operations
S. LaBruna, Vice President - Engineering and Plant Betterment
C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.
P. J. Curham, Manager, Joint Generation Department,
Atlantic Electric Company
R. Burricelli, General Manager - Information Systems & External Affairs
J. Summers, General Manager-Salem Operations
J. Benjamin, Director of Quality Assurance and Safety Review
F. Thomson, Manager - Licensing and Regulation
R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs
A. C. Tapert, Program Administrator
R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire
M. J. Wetterhahn, Esquire
Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate
William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township
Public Service Commission of Maryland
D. Screnci, PAO (2)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of New Jersey
State of Delaware
.
.
Mr .. Leon R. Eliason
3
Distribution w/encl:
Region I Docket Koom (with concurrences)
K. Gal 1 agher
E. Kelly, DRS (section 4.6 and 4.8)
PUBLIC
Distribution w/encl: (Via E-Mail)
L. Olshan, NRR
W. Dean, OEDO
J. Stolz, PDl-2, NRR
M. Callahan, OCA
Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
J. Lieberman, OE
D. Holody, EO,RI
py without attachmentf enclosure 'E" = Copy with
I
ENCLOSURE 1
~PPARENT VIOLATIONS
A.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and
Drawings", requires that measures to ensure activities affecting safety
are satisfactorily accomplished.
The following example of a failure to
meet this requirement occurred in May 1993:
B.
During a modification to install a drain system for the Salem Unit 2
pressurizer code safety loop seals, the licensee did not adequately
ensure that the drain valves were properly positioned prior to plant
startup after the modification. Specifically, valve 2PR66, a valve in a
common drain line for the 2PR3, 2PR4, and 2PR5, pressurizer safety
valves, was left closed throughout the operating cycle between May 1993
and October 1994.
As a result, the licensee operated Salem Unit 2 in
that period with the loop seals filled with water.
No analysis was
performed to assess the effect of filled loop seals on the discharge
piping or on system operability. Subsequently, in an effort to
demonstrate that thrust loading from the water in the loop seals would
not damage safety valve discharge piping sufficiently to prevent the
pressurizer code safety valves from limiting Reactor Coolant System
pressure, the licensee initiated a detailed engineering calculation,
scheduled for completion in April 1995.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI "Corrective Action", requires in
part, that licensees identify significant conditions adverse to quality,
determine their causes, and take corrective action to preclude
recurrence. Three examples of failure to meet this requirement
occurred:
1)
On June 7, 1994, the licensee identified that material management
documentation for limit switches related to the reactor head vent
valves, improperly classified the components as non-safety
related. A nuclear design discrepancy evaluation form (DEF)
identified that a switch short circuit could render two head vent
valves inoperable since the components were powered from the same
common circuit. Notwithstanding, the DEF did not identify any
concern relative to operability or safety. The reviewers
determined that switches obtained as safety-related or non-safety
related were essentially the same part, with the exception that
the qualified part is certified by testing.
2)
It was not until February 1995, that the licensee determined that
non-safety related limit switches were installed in reactor head
vent valves 1RC41 and 1RC43 at Salem Unit 1. Subsequently, the
licensee failed to perform and document an engineering evaluation
to demonstrate the acceptability of continued Salem Unit 1
operation with non-safety-related parts installed in a safety-
related application.
On February 24, 1995, at 8:58 p.m. Unit No. 1 operators placed
control of a Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) in the manual
mode, rendering it inoperable, and failed to adhere to the
3)
2
Technical Specification 3.4.3 action statement which required
operators to close the block valve within one hour. A shift
supervisor discovered the error and corrected it on February 25;
1995 at 7:10 p.m. (about 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> later). This performance error
is similar to a violation of the same technical specification
requirement involving on Salem Unit No. 2 on March 24, 1994.
The
licensee's corrective actions for the previous occurrence appear
to have been ineffective in preventing recurrence of this type of
performance deficiency.
On July 6, 1994, safety-related reactor head vent valve 2RC40
failed to operate (stroke open) during testing while Unit No. 2
was in cold shutdown. Subsequently, the licensee speculated that
the low reactor coolant system temperature which may have promoted
boric acid crystallization that adversely affected valve
operation, and later confirmed function of the valve when RCS
temperature was increased. Subsequently, the valve was returned
to normal service on July 10, 1994, without any review or
assessment in accordance with established procedures.
In this
case, the licensee failed to process this occurrence in accordance
with the applicable "Work Control Process" procedure.
Consequently, this failure of a safety-related component was never
documented and formally assessed relative to preventive
maintenance, operability, actions to prevent recurrence, or
generic implications .
3)
2
Technical Spec}fication 3.4.3 action statement which required
operators to close the block valve within one hour. A shift
supervisor discovered the error and corrected it on February 25,
1995 at 7:10 p.m. (about 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> later). This performance error
is similar to a violation of the same technical specification
requirement involving on Salem Unit No. 2 on March 24, 1994. * The
licensee's corrective actions for the previous occurrence appear
to have been ineffective in preventing recurrence of this type of
performance deficiency.
On .July 6, 1994, safety-related reactor head vent valve 2RC40
failed to operate (stroke open) during testing while Unit No. 2
was in cold shutdown.
Subsequently, the licensee speculated that
the low reactor coolant system temperature which may have promoted
boric acid crystallization that adversely affected valve
operation, and later confirmed function of the valve when RCS
temperature was increased. Subsequently, the valve was returned
to normal service on July 10, 1994, without any review or
assessment in accordance with established procedures.
In tr.~s
case, the licensee failed to process this occurrence in accordance
with the applicable "Work Control Process" procedure.
Consequently, this failure of a safety-related component was never
documented and formally assessed relative to preventive
maintenance, operability, actions to prevent recurrence, or
generic implications .