ML18100A996

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Provides Actions That Should Be Taken Re Util Cold Shutdown Condition Until Corrective Measures Have Been Satisfied,Per 940407 Reactor Trip
ML18100A996
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/08/1994
From: Martin T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Miltenberger S
Public Service Enterprise Group
References
CAL-RI-94-05, CAL-RI-94-5, NUDOCS 9404150098
Download: ML18100A996 (21)
v • d • e


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  • Docket No. 50-272 License No. DPR-70 CAL No. 1-94-005 Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Dear Mr. Miltenberger:

APR - 8 l99d

SUBJECT:

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER 1-94-005 On April 7 and 8, 1994, in telephone discussions, William Kane, Deputy Regional Administrator, informed Mr. Joseph Hagan, Acting General Manager, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, of our decision to dispatch an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to review and evaluate the circumstances and safety significance of the Unit 1 reactor trip and safety injection that occurred on April 7, 1994. The event was complex and may have involved personnel error, equipment failure, or a combination of both. The AIT was initiated because of the complexity of the event, the uncertainty of the root causes of some of the conditions and equipment problems encountered during the event, concerns relative to the proper functioning of engineered safety features, and possible generic implications. The AIT, led by Mr. Robert Summers of our office, is expected to commence their activities at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station on April 8, 1994.

In response to our request, Mr. Hagan agreed to place Salem Unit 1 in a cold shutdown condition and maintain that condition until the AIT acquired all the information needed for their assessment and was satisfied that any necessary corrective measures have or would be taken; and that your staff would take actions to:

1.

Assure that the AIT Leader is cognizant of, and agrees to, any resumption of activities that involve the operation, testing, maintenance, repair, and surveillance of any equipment, including protection logic or associated components, which failed to properly actuate in response to the reactor trip and safety injection(s) of April 7, 1994.

2.

Assemble or otherwise make available for review by the AIT, all documentation (including analyses, assessments, reports, procedures, drawings, personnel training and qualification records, and correspondence) that have pertinence to the equipment problems leading up to the reactor trip and safety injection(s), and subsequent operator response and recovery actions.

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APR - 8 /99'1 2

3.

Assemble or otherwise make available for review by the AIT, all equipment, assemblies, and components that were associated with the problems encountered during the events leading up to, and subsequent to the reactor trip and safety injection(s).

4.

Make available for interview by the AIT, all P,ersonnel that were associated with, or have information or knowledge that pertains to the problems encountered during the events leading up to, and subsequent to the reactor trip and safety injection(s).

5.

Gain my agreement prior to commencing any plant startup.

Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, and 10 CFR 2.204, you are hereby required to:

1.

Notify me immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above.

2.

Notify me, if for any reason, you require modification of any of these agreements.

Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude issuance of an Order formalizing the above commitments or

  • requiring other actions on the part of the licensee, nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action if violations of NRC regulatory requirements are identified through the actions of the AIT. In addition, failure to take the actions addressed in the Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action.

The responses directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L.96-511.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely, Original Signed By;

/1)~~//~

///!./ Thomas T. Martin

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Regional Administrator

APR - 8 lOOf>

3 cc:

J.J.Hagan, Acting General Manager - Salem Operations C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.

S. La.Bruna, Vice President - Engineering R. Hovey, General Manager - Hope Creek Operatiops F. Thomson, Manager, Licensing and Regulation R. Swanson, General Manager - QA and Nuclear Safety Review J. Robb, Director, Joint Owner Affairs A. Tapert, Program Administrator R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire M. Wetterhahn, Esquire P. J. Curham, Manager, Joint Generation Department, Atlantic Electric Company Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township K. Abraham, PAO (2)

Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector State of New Jersey

bee:

J. Taylor, EDO J. Milhoan, OEDO W. Russell, NRR L. Reyes, NRR A. Thadani, NRR J. Calvo, NRR C. Rossi, NRR C. Miller, PD 1-2, NRR F. Miraglia, NRR C. Berlinger, NRR

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{V ;);- Lanning, DRP, RI J. Durr, DRP, RI W. Hodges, DRS, RI J. Wiggins, DRS, RI R. Blough, DRS, RI C. Hehl, DRSS, RI S. Shankman, DRSS, RI J. Stone, NRR W. Parler, O~

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J. Rieha:t=Gson, NRR J. Wermeil, NRR E. Wenzinger, DRP, RI J. White, DRP, RI B. Grimes, NRR B. Boger, NRR E. Jordan, AEOD D. Ross, AEOD V. McCree, OEDO J. Larkins, ACRS P. Jefferson, DRMA, RI AIT Team Members

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v. Mccree, OEDO J. Larkins, ACRs P. Jefferson, DRMA, RI AIT Team Members RI:DRP*

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J. Lieberman, OE W. Kane, ORA, RI R. Lanning, DRP, RI J. Durr, DRP, RI W. Hodges, DRS, RI J. Wiggins, DRS, RI R. Blough, DRS, RI C. Hehl, DRSS, RI S. Shankman, DRSS, RI J. Stone, NRR J. Wermeil, NRR E. Wenzinger, DRP, RI J. White, DRP, RI R. Summers, DRP, RI D. Chawaga, SLO, RI D. Holody, EO, RI RI:DRP*

WLanning 41 194 RI:EO*

DHolody 41 194 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

  • See Previous Concurrence NRR*

CMiller 41 194 A: SALEM.CAL

ATTACHMENT 3 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER April 8, 1994 Docket No. 50-272 License No. DPR-70 CAL No. 1-94-005 Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Dear Mr. Miltenberger:

SUBJECT:

CONFIRMATORY ACTION.LEITER 1-94-005 On April 7 and 8, 1994, in telephone discussions, William Kane, Deputy Regional Administrator, informed Mr. Joseph Hagan, Acting General Manager, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, of our decision to dispatch an Augmented InSpection Team (An) to.review and evaluate the circumstanceS and safety significance of the Unit 1 reactor* trip and safety injection that occurred on April 7, 1994. The event.was complex and may have inVOlved personnel error, equipment failure, or a combination of b<>th. The AIT was initiated because of the complexity of the event, the uncertainly of the root causes of some of the* conditions and equipment problems encountered during the event, concerns relative to the proper functioning of engineered

  • safety features, and possible generic implications. The AIT, led by Mr. Robert Summers of our office, is expected to commence their activities at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station on April 8, 1994.

In response to our request, Mr. Hagan agreed to place Salem Unit 1 in a cold shutdown condition and maintain that condition until the AIT acquired all the information needed for their assessment and was r~fied *that any necessary corrective measures have or would be taken; and that your staff would take actions to:

1.

Assure that the AIT Leader is cognizant of, and agrees to, any resumption of activities that involve the operation, testing, maintenance, repair, and surveillance of any equipment, including protection logic or associated components, which failed to properly actuate in response to the reactor trip and $8fety injection(s) of April 7, 1994.

2.

Assemble or otherwise *make available for review by the AIT, all documentation A3-l

CONTROL BOARD' SWITCHES TRAIN 0 PROTECTION SYSTEM ANALOG TRAIN B PROTECTION SYSTEM NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM OR rlELD CONTACTS f::::::====A::::::==:::::::i, PROCESS snlSORS BISTABLES CONTROL BOARD SWITCHES TRAIN A PROTECTION SYSTEM TRAIN A LOGIC MASTER AND SLAVE RELAYS MASTER ANO SLAVE RELAYS INPUT RELAYS SOLID STATE LOGIC ATTACHMENT 2 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM WGIC DIAGRAM ACTUATE TRAIN B SArEGUARDS COMPUTER 0£MUX COMPUTCR MONITORING "OR" CADLE CONTROL BOARD MONITORING CONTROL BOARD OEMUX CABINET ACTUATE TRAIN A SArEGUARDS TO ROD DRIVE MECHANIS ROD CONTROL SYSTEM TRIP BRK B

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ATTACHMENT 3 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER (including analyses, assessments, reports, procedures, drawings, personnel training and qualification records, and correspondence) that have pertinence to the equipment problems leading up to the reactor trip and safety injection(s), and subsequent operator response and recovery actions.

3.

Assemble or otherwise make available for review by the Arr, all equipment, assemblies, and components that were associated with. the problems encountered during the events leading up to, and subsequent to the reaetor trip and safety injection(s).

4.

Make available for interview by the AIT, all personnel that were associated with, or have information or knowledge that pertains to the problems encountered during the events leading up to, and subsequent to the reactor trip and safety injection(s).

S.

Gain my agreement prior to commencing any plant startup.

Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, and 10 CFR 2.204, you are hereby required to:

1.

Notlfy me immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above *

2.

Notify me, if for any reason, you require modification of any of these agreements.

Issuance of this Confirmatory Action* Letter does not preclude issuance of an Order formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part of the licensee, nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action if violations ofNRC regulatory requirements are identified through the actions of the AIT. In addition, failure to take the actions addressed in the Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action.

The responses directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as.required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L.96-511.

In accordance with 10 CPR 2. 790 of the NRC's *Rules of Practice,* a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter..

Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

William F. Kane for:

Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator A3-2

3 ATTACHMENT3 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER cc:

J.J.Hagan, Acting General Manager - Salem Operations C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.

S. LaBruna, Vice President - Engineering R. Hovey, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations F. Thomson, Manager, Licensing m,d Regulation R. Swanson, General Manager - QA and Nuclear Safety Review J. Robb, Director, Joint Owner Affairs A. Tapert, Program Administrator

. R. Fryling, Jr., &quire M. Wetterhahn, &quire P. J. Curham, Manager, Joint Generation Department, -

Atlantic Electric Company 0,:;

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Consumer Advocate, Office of ConSumer Advoeate * * * *

  • William Conklin, Public Safety Consullint, Lower Alloways Crtek Township K. Abraham, PAO (2)

Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident lnspectox-State of New Jersey

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Al>ril 7 I 1994 ATTACHMENT 4 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS DETAILED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Pfe;.transient initial conditions: Unit 1 power at 73%, rod control in manual.

0730 12A circulator out of service for waterbox cleaning.

1016 13B circulating water pump emergency trip on travelling screen differential pressure; 13A, 13B and 12B travelling screens all clog and eventually go out of service.

1027 13A circulating water pump trips on high screen differential pressure.

1032 Unit 1 operating crew initiated a plant power reduction from approximately 650 MWe at 1 % power per minute initi2lly (up to this poini.:piant power had decreased from 800 MWe due to an increase in condenser back pressure). Subsequently, operators increased the reduction rate to as high as 8 % per minute.

1034 Operators attempt to restart 12A circulating water pump; pump immediately trips due to pump circuit breaker not being fully racked in.

1039 P-8 permissive (reactor trip on low coolant flow in a single loop) reset (blocked) at 36%

reactor power.

By this time, all circulating water pumps except 12B have tripped;* 13A and 13B are restarted, but by 10:46 they have tripped again, leaving 12B as the only circulator in service.

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1043 P-10 permissive (power* range low setpoint reactor trip and intermediate range reactor trip and rod stop) reset (reinstalled) at 10% reactor power.

At about this time, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) directs the Re.actor Operator (RO) at the rod control panel to go to the electrical distribution panel to perform group bus transfers.

1044 Turbine load at 80 MWe, RCS temperature at 531 degrees* F. Low-low T... bistable setpoint Tech Spec allowable value~ 541 degrees F, therefore low-low T... bistables trip.

A4-1

ATTACHMENT 4 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 1045 The NSS begins to withdraw rods, and then the RO is directed by the NSS to return to the rod* eontrol panel and withdraws rOds to restore RCS temperature - rods pulled 35 steps, from step 55 to step 90 on control rod bank D.

1047 Reactor power increases from 7% to 25% due to the outward rod motion - reactor trips at 25% power range low setpoint. This is a *reactor startup* nuclear instrument (NI) trip. The NI "intermediate range" 20% power rod stop and 25% power reactor trip did not actuate.

1047 Automatic safety injection (SI) on high steam flow coincident with low-low T_. All ECCS pumps start, ECCS flow paths functioDal, main feedwater regulating valves close.

No "first-out" alarm was received for the SI. SI signal received on SSPS logic channel "A" only.

1049 Operators enter EOP-Trip 1 procedure.

y 1053 Operators manually initiate main feedwater isolation.

1058 Operators manually initiate main steam ~!ation (only 2-of 4m8.in steam isolation valves closed at the time of the auto-initiation of SI)'::*"'.... :-... :. * * * = - *

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Operators manually trip main feed pumps *.

1100 Licensee declared an Unusual Event, based on: "Manual or Auto ECCS actuation with discharge to vessel" 1105 EOP exit-step 36 directs operators-to reset SI; operator notices SI logic channel "B" was already reset (indicated that "B" channel had not auto-initiated) and a flashing light on the RP4 panel (indicated SI logic ~hannel disagreement).

1118 Pressurizer PORVs (PR-1 and _PR-2) subsequently periodically auto open on high pressuriz.cr pressure f indicated pressurizer was filling to solid condition).

A4-2

ATTACHMENT 4 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS During recovery, steam generator atmospheric relief valves open several times to control secondary temperature and pressure.

Number 11 and/or Number 13 steam generator safety valves open, causing RCS cooldown (by this time T_ had increased to about 552 degrees F). This indicated that the steam generator atmospheric relief valves were not p~rly controlling pressure.

1126 Second actual automatic safety injection - initiated by low pressurizer pressure (low pressurizer pressure trip setpoint= > 1765 psig, allowable> = 1755 psig).

Low pressurizer pressure due to RCS co0ldown (due to steam generator code safety valve going open).

Second auto SI received on SSPS logic channel "B" only. Operators initiate a manual SI just after auto SI, in response to the rapidly decreasing RCS pressure.

1141 While resetting the second SI, operator notices that RP4 panel lights indicate SI logic channels in agreement (i.e., light no longer flashing).

Technical Specification Action Statement (!'SAS) 3.0.3 entered due to two blocked auto SI trains.

1149 Pressurizer relief tank (PRT) rupture disk rup~res (pressurizer was either solid or nearly solid after the first auto-initiated SI at 1047, and the second auto-initiated SI resulted in sufficient relief of RCS to the PRT to raise level and pressure until rupture disk blew).

1316 Alert declared. This was done to ensure proper technical staff was available. Licensee staff recognized that TSAS 3.0.3 could not be met for inoperable SI logic channels. The operators were alS() concerned about how to properly restore the pressurizer to normal pressure and level control from solid RCS conditions and wanted sufficient engineering support.

1336 The NRC entered the monitoring phase of the Normal Response Mode of the NRC Incident Response Plan. NRC Region I activated and staffed their Incident Response Center, with support provided by NRC headquarters personnel.

1511 Operators restore pressurizer bubble.

1630 Pressurizer level restored to 50%, level control returned to auto. EOPs exited, IOP-6 A4-3

J (Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown) procedure entered 1715 Plant cooldown initiated.

2020 Alert terminated.

April 8. 1994 0106 Mode 4 (Hot shutdown) entered.

1124 Mode 5 (Cold shutdown) entered.

A4-4

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ATTACHMENT 4 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

.- :. t-AIT CDP CETPS cw DNBR EPRI ESP FSAR GL IPE LOCA MPA NRC NRR PRA PRT PORV PR...

RCP RCS RHR RVLIS RV SCM SER SG SI SIS SSPS SW VCT Augmented Inspection Team core damage frequency core exit thermocouple processing system circulating water departure from nucleate boiling ratio Electric Power Research Institute engineered safety features actuation Final Safety Analysis Report generic letter Individual Plant Evaluation loss of coolant accident multi-plant action Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation probabilistic risk assessment pressurizer relief tank pressure operated relief valve A Tf ACHMENT S LIST OF ACRONYMS PRl, PR2 are pressurizer PORVs; PR3 - PRS are pressurizer safety Valves reactor coolant pump reactor coolant system residual heat removal Reactor Vessel Level Indication System reactor vessel subcooling margin safety evaluation report steam generator safety injection actuation safety injection system solid state prptection system service water volume control tank AS-1

NAME TITLE l

ATTACHMENT 6 EXIT :MEETING ATTENDEES Nuclear Re~ulatozy Commission CNRCl Iqbal Ahmed Stephen Barr M. Wayne Hodges John Kauffman Warren Lyon Larry Scholl Richard Skokowski

1. Scott Stewart Robert Summers Edward Wenzinger Senior Electrical Engineer, NRR Arr Assistant Team Leader, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

Director, DiviSion of Reactor Safety (DRS)

Senior ReactOr Systems Engineer, AEOD Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, NRR Reactor Engineer, DRS Reactor Engineer, DRS Reactor Engineer - Examiner, DRS AIT Team Leader, DRP Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP Public Service Electric and Gas Company (pSE&Gl.

R. Dougherty I. Hagan S. LaBruna S. Miltenberger F. Thomas Senior Vice President

  • Electrical Vice ~esident, Nuclear Operations & General Manager, Salem Operations Vice President, Nuclear Engineering Vice President and Chief Nuclear lJfficer.

Manager, Nuclear Licensiilg A6-l

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FIGURE 1 FIGURE2 FIGURE3 FIGURE4 FIGURES FIGURE 6 PORV Design Drawing RCS Pressure Response Salem and Hope Creek CW and SW Layout Salem CW Drawing Salem SW Drawing Hope Creek SW Drawing A7-1 ATTACHMENT 7 FIGURES

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