ML18100A376

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Insp Repts 50-272/93-11,50-311/93-11 & 50-354/93-07 on 930405-07.Violation & Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: follow-up of Previously Identified fitness-for-duty (FFD) Program Items & Overview of FFD Program Activities
ML18100A376
Person / Time
Site: Salem, Hope Creek  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/1993
From: Albert R, Keimig R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18100A371 List:
References
50-272-93-11, 50-311-93-11, 50-354-93-07, 50-354-93-7, NUDOCS 9305180173
Download: ML18100A376 (6)


See also: IR 05000272/1993011

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272/93-11

50-311/93-11

Report Nos.: 50-354/93-07

50-272

50-311

Docket Nos.: 50-354

DPR-70

DPR-75

License Nos.:

NPF-57

Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

Facility Name:

Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations

Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge. New Jersey

Inspection Conducted:

April 5-7. 1993

Inspector:

Approved By:

Jht!b--C;IHJl!!"J'Saf eguards Section

Safety and Safeguards

0'5-os-?3

Date

~f/.J

ate

Areas Inspected: Follow-up of Previously Identified Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Program Items; and

Overview of FFD Program Activities.

Results: The licensee's FFD program was directed toward public health and safety. However,

an apparent violation was identified in that 20 supervisors with responsibilities for implementing

certain aspects of the FFD program were not trained in a timely fashion. Additionally, an

apparent deviation was cited for failing to meet a commitment made to the NRC with regard to

personnel with infrequent unescorted station access.

-

9305180173 930507

PDR

ADOCK 05000272

G

PDR

DETAILS

1.0

Key Personnel Contacted

2.0

1.1

Licensee

  • R. Binetti, Psychological Services Administrator (Acting)
  • R. Brown, Principal Engineer
  • M. Butz, General Manager - Human Resources/ Administrative Services
  • R. Fisher, Screening and Badging Supervisor
  • J. Fleming, Senior Staff Engineer
  • L. Krajewski, Site Access Administrator
  • S. Mannon, Licensing Engineer
  • R. Mounts, Medical Supervisor (Acting)
  • D. Renwick, Nuclear Security Manager
  • M. Samuels, Medical Administrator (Acting)
  • R. Savage, Lead Auditor

1.2

Contractor

  • J. Rainear, Medical Assistant, Alternative Health Care

1.3

U.S. Nuclear Reeulatory Commission - Region I

  • S. Barr, Resident Inspector
  • S. Pindale, Resident Inspector
  • denotes those present at the exit meeting

The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel who did not attend

the exit meeting.

Follow-up of Previously Identified Fitness-for-Duty <FFDl Proeram Items

During a previous inspection that was conducted on February 1-5, 1993, the inspector

reviewed the licensee's annual security program audit report, no.92-031, and the

licensee's annual FFD program audit report, no.92-035. Based on those reviews, the

inspector determined that the licensee had experienced recurring FFD program problems,

specifically in ensuring that (1) personnel with infrequent unescorted station access meet

required aspects of the FFD program and (2) training for supervisors with responsibilities

for implementing certain aspects of the FFD program was conducted in a timely manner.

Licensee actions to resolve those problem areas were considered unresolved issues

(URis), pending further review during a subsequent NRC inspection.

During this

inspection, licensee actions in regard to those issues were reviewed by the inspector and

found as follows:

--1

3

2.1

Personnel with Infrequent Unescorted Station Access

URI 50-272/93-05-01, 50-311/93-05-01, and 50-354/93-05-01: As identified in

the security program audit report no.92-031 (for the audit conducted June 1-12,

1992), unescorted station access was not being revoked for individuals not

permanently assigned to the nuclear facilities who did not access the protected

area over a 60-day period. During the initial NRC FFD program inspection

conducted on March 12-15, 1990, the NRC determined that the licensee's

approach to random testing for personnel with infrequent unescorted station access

did not meet the spirit and intent of 10 CFR Part 26. In a January 29, 1991,

letter to the NRC, the licensee committed to the following:

"Individuals permanently assigned to nuclear department facilities

are available for random testing. All other individuals granted

unescorted access must either: access the site protected area at

least once every 60 days, QI make themselves available for random

testing. Failure to comply with these requirements will result in

loss of unescorted access. Affected individuals must satisfy all

normal access requirements to regain unescorted access.

Our

policy begins March, 1991.

11

During this inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee's initial

implementation of this commitment was predicated upon the security department

generating a report every 30 days that identified those individuals with unescorted

station access who had not entered the protected area within a 60-day period.

The inspector also determined that between March 1, 1991, and June 19, 1992,

such reports were not generated during 11 separate months. The longest span

without a report was for over 5 months, June 7 through November 26, 1991.

The licensee contended that the reports were not consistently run because it was

a labor intensive, cumbersome process that was overshadowed by back-to-back

outages, which overextended the personnel necessary to generate the report.

By not generating the report, the licensee did not identify those personnel who

should have had their access suspended. As a result, personnel who were not

available for random testing in excess of 60 days were allowed to continue

unescorted access to the station.

However,

the inspector verified that the

licensee had consistently generated the report every 30 days since June 19, 1992,

and revoked unescorted station access for personnel who had not accessed the

protected area within 60-days.

Even though the licensee identified this matter in an audit, it is being cited

because of the length of time the commitment was not met without notification

being made to the NRC.

The licensee's failure to identify personnel with

infrequent unescorted station access is a deviation from a commitment that was

4

made to the NRC (DEV 50-272/93-11-01, 50-311/93-11-01 and 50-354/93-07-

01).

This apparent deviation administratively closes URI 50-272/93-05-01,

50-311/93-05-01, 50-354/93-05-01.

2.2

Supervisory Trainin&

URI 50-272/93-05-02, 50-311/93-05-02, and 50-354/93-05-02: A review of the

annual FFD program audit (report no.92-035), conducted March 2-13, 1992,

resulted in the inspector finding that the licensee had not trained 20 newly

appointed supervisors who were responsible for implementing certain aspects of

the FFD program in a timely manner, i.e., before or within 3 months of

appointment. This finding was also identified in the licensee's previous annual

FFD audit, conducted in March 1991, (report no.91-035), indicating that the

licensee's corrective measures in response to that finding were not effective.

The licensee's corrective measure after the audit finding in 1992 was to train

everyone with unescorted station access to the required supervisory FFD training

level beginning on October 22, 1992, and annually thereafter. All such persons

were to have been trained by October 1993.

However, during the NRC's February 1993 inspection, the inspector pointed out

to the licensee that since the training was being conducted as personnel cycled

through annual requalification, a potential still existed for newly appointed

supervisors not to be trained in a timely manner. Supervisory personnel who

were appointed with more than 3 months remaining before their FFD training

expired would have to be identified and trained, until July 31, 1993. At that time

the requalification cycle would be within 3 months of completion.

Anyone

appointed after that time would automatically receive training at the supervisory

level.

During this inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee, in response to

the concern expressed by the inspector in February, 1993, had implemented an

informal method to identify and track FFD training for newly appointed

supervisors. The licensee provided the inspector with documentation to show that

115 such supervis9rs had been identified since February. The inspector reviewed

the documentation and determined that, as of April 6, 1993, all of those

supervisors had satisfactorily completed training.

As a result of this inspection, the following apparent regulatory issues were

identified with regard to supervisory training:

2.2.1 The licensee did not establish a viable method to identify and track newly

appointed supervisors when they were assigned responsibilities for

implementing certain aspects of the FFD program. Because of the way

5

the program was implemented, the potential for newly appointed

supervisors not to be trained in a timely manner has existed since

implementation of the FFD program.

2.2.2 The licensee did not implement effective corrective measures when

supervisory training issues were first identified during audit no.91-035 in

March 1991.

2.2.3 The licensee did not implement adequate corrective measures when

supervisory FFD training issues were again identified in audit no.92-035,

conducted March 2-13, 1992.

Part 26, Fitness-for-Duty Programs, Section 22, Training of Supervisors and

Escorts, of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires, in part, that

managers and supervisors who are responsible for implementing the Fitness-for-

Duty program must be provided appropriate training to ensure that they

understand: (1) their roles and responsibilities; (2) the roles and responsibilities

of others, such as personnel, medical, and employee assistance program (EAP)

staffs; (3) techniques for recognizing drugs and indications of the use, sale, or

possession of drugs; (4) behavioral observation techniques for detecting

degradation in performance, impairment, or changes in employee behavior; and

(5) procedures for initiating appropriate corrective action to include referral to the

EAP. Initial training in those areas must be completed prior to assignment or

within 3 months of being assigned those duties.

Contrary to the above, in March of 1992, 20 newly appointed supervisors were

identified during a licensee audit who did not receive appropriate training before

or within 3 months of being assigned those duties. This is an apparent violation

(VIO 50-272/93-11-02, 50-311/93-11-02, and 50-354/93-07-02). Although the

licensee identified the apparent violation, it is being cited because of the apparent

regulatory issues identified above. This apparent violation administratively closes

URI 50-272/93-05-02, 50-311/93-05-02, and 50-354/93-05-02.

3.0

Overview of FFD Proeram Activities

During the inspection, the inspector met with key personnel in the FFD program, toured

the collection and testing facilities, and observed various FFD program activities. Based

on interviews and observations, the inspector determined that the licensee continued to

maintain a comprehensive FFD program that was committed to the goals of the NRC's

FFD Rule. Aside from the two apparent problems discussed in Section 2.0 of this

report, other aspects of the FFD program appeared to be well managed.

The licensee continued to maintain an employee assistance program (EAP) to provide

rehabilitation treatment for individuals with alcohol and drug related problems.

In

6

addition, the EAP appeared sensitive to other personnel issues that could impact an

individual's fitness-for-duty.

Since the initial NRC program inspection in March 1990, the licensee made some

personnel changes within the FFD program. Based on interviews with those individuals,

the inspector determined them to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities.

The licensee also continued to maintain an effective auditing program. Audit findings

were reported to appropriate levels of management. However, it was not clear' that

. . management had a full appreciation for audit findings that indicated potential violations

of regulatory requirements or that it was aggressive in pursuing effective corrective

action. Even though the problems discussed in Section 2.0 had been identified in the

semi-annual report of FFD performance data, covering the period January 1 through

June 30, 1992, as programmatic weaknesses, the weaknesses still existed in February

1993.

4.0

Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Section 1.0 at the

conclusion of the inspection on April 7, 1993. At that time, the purpose and scope of

the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented.

The licensee

representatives present acknowledged the findings.