ML18096B238

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Forwards NRC Augmented Insp Team Repts 50-272/92-81 & 50-311/92-81 on 921214-23.Team Reviewed Circumstances Surrounding Loss of Overhead Annunciator Sys in CR on 921213.Team Found No Safety Consequences Due to Loss
ML18096B238
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 02/04/1993
From: Hodges M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Miltenberger S
Public Service Enterprise Group
Shared Package
ML18096B239 List:
References
NUDOCS 9302100012
Download: ML18096B238 (4)


See also: IR 05000272/1992081

Text

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Docket Nos. 50-272

50-311

Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger

FEB 0 4 1993

Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

P. 0. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Dear Mr. Miltenberger:

SUBJECT:

NRC AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) REPORT NOS.

50-272/92-81 AND 50-311/92-81

The enclosed report refers to a special onsite review by an NRC Augmented Inspection Team

(AIT) December 14 through 23, 1992. The team reviewed the circumstances surrounding a

loss of the overhead annunciator system in the Salem Unit 2 control room on

December 13, 1992.

The report discusses areas examined during the inspection. The scope of the inspection

included detailed fact-finding, determination of root causes, and evaluation of operational and

managerial performance. The inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures

and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.

The AIT determined that the loss of the overhead annunciator system was caused by a

member of the operating shift making the wrong key strokes on a computer workstation for

the system. These key strokes, coupled with a panel switch in the wrong position, put the

annunciator system computer in a mode such that it was waiting for additional commands

that never came. This prevented the annunciator system from displaying alarms in the

control room.

The loss of annunciators and failure to recognize that loss for 90 minutes had several root

causes. The overhead annunciator system that you recently installed failed to provide the

necessary human-machine interface. The system design also gave higher priority to other

actions besides providing alarm indications to the operators and did not provide indication of

failure. Finally, your operators were not trained to routinely verify proper system operation.

9302100012 930204

PDR

ADOCK 05000272

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PDR

FEB 0 4 1993

Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger

2

The team found that there were no safety consequences due to the loss of the overhead

annunciators. However, the undetected loss of the overhead annunciator system could delay

operator response or increase the likelihood of errors while responding to abnormal plant

conditions. Further, the team was concerned about the failure of operators to abide by

station operating practices when they tried to use password-protected software.

In the emergency preparedness area, the team found that the plant conditions existed for an

Alert declaration prior to discovery by your staff. We also found that, because the

annunciators were promptly restored upon discovery of their loss, an Alert level activation of

your emergency response organization was not then needed to assure plant or public safety.

It is not the responsibility of an AIT to determine compliance with NRC rules and

regulations or to recommend enforcement actions. These aspects will be reviewed in a

subsequent inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and

the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection .

Sincerely,

Orig:nal Sis;-:s:i ~?y:

Marvin VY. Ledges

Marvin W. Hodges, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure: Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/92-81 and 50-311/92-81

Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger

cc w/encl:

FEB 0 *1 1993

3

S. La.Bruna, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.

C. Vondra, General Manager - Salem Operations

F. Thomson, Manager, Licensing and Regulation

L. Reiter, General Manager - QA and Nuclear Safety Review

J. Robb, Director, Joint Owner Affairs

A. Tapert, Program Administrator

R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire

M. Wetterhahn, Esquire

J. Isabella, Director, Generation Projects Department,

Atlantic Electric Company

Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate

Tom Dwyer, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township

K. Abraham, PAO (2)

Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector

State of New Jersey

bee w/encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

T. Murley, NRR

W. Russell, NRR

T. Martin, RA

W. Kane, DRA

W. Hehl, DRP

D. Holody, BO

J. Stone, NRR

S. Dembek, NRR

DRS/EB SALP Coordinator

v. Mccree, OEDO

P. Boehnert, Chairman, ACRS (AIT Reports Only)

Ken Raglin, Technical Training Center (AIT Reports Only)

W. Lanning, DRS

E. Wenzinger, DRP

J. White, DRP

C. Miller, PDI-2, NRR

T. Johnson, DRP - Salem

J. Joyner, DRSS

Team Members

Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger

RI: DRS

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11/J/93

FEB 0 :1 1993

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPT{

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