ML18096A274
| ML18096A274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1991 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Caphton D, Finkel A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18096A272 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-91-16, 50-311-91-16, NUDOCS 9109240103 | |
| Download: ML18096A274 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000272/1991016
Text
Report Nos.
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Inspection At:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/91-16; 50-311/91-16
50-272; 50-311
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
P. 0. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
Inspection Conducted:
May 20 - 24, 1991
phton, Sr. Technical Reviewer
Approved byL LC?~~ief
-fl* Performance Programs Section
Operations Branch, DRS
Engineer
Date
Date
Date
Inspection Summary:
Inspection May 20 - 24, 1991 (Combined Report Nos.
50-272/91-16 and 50-311/91-16)
Areas Inspected:
Licensee's corrective actions taken in response to the
April 9 - 27, 1990, maintenance team inspection findings including the
August 21, 1990, Notice of Violation for Inspection Nos. 50-272/90-200 and
50-311/90-200, and the licensee's program for surveillance testing of safety-
related equipment.
Results:
Material conditions and housekeeping since the April 1990 MT! were
noticeably improved as observed during walkdown inspections.
The licensee's
corrective action taken to the April 1990 maintenance team inspection (MTI)
violation was found to be inadequate (a violation) in that water tight door
locking dogs were again found to be inoperable, and the licensee's programs for
9109240103 910820
ADOCK 05000272
Q
17
2
deficiency identification again failed to identify the problem.
One unresolved
item was closed relating to the control of a Q-listed ~onsumable; however, a
new unresolved item was opened because the licensee did not assure*that other
Q-listed consumables were being controlled, and a new unresolved item was
opened relating to the Nuclear Services Departments 1 s lack of procedures to
assure control of contractors doing safety-related maintenance work.
Surveil-
lance testing and calibration control programs were inspected and found to be
functioning well.
DETAILS
1.0 Scope (62700)
This inspection assessed the corrective action taken by the licensee to
three violations issued by letter dated August 21, 1990, resulting from a
maintenance team inspection (MTI) conducted during April 9 - 27, 1990.
The inspection included the licensee's response letter to the MT! dated
September 21, 1990.
People were interviewed, hardware and equipment were
in~pected, and docu~ents were reviewed.
Individuals contacted during the course of the inspection and the attendees
at the inspection's exit meeting held on_ May 24, 1991, are identified
on Attachment 1.
Findings
Violation 1 (50-272 and 50-311/90-200)(Closed)
This violation concerned modified hatch covers installed in the service
water rooms of both units that did not meet the water tightness specified
by the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report; no safety evaluation had
been made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspector visually inspected the new permanent hatch installations
and found that the hatches appeared to be tightly sealed.
The inspector
had no further questions regarding the installation of the hatches, the
sealing of the hatches, or the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation performed
for the temporary hatches that since had been replaced with the permanent
hatches.
The licensee's September 21, 1990, response letter to the Notice of
Violation stated that
11 these hatches have been stenciled to identify them
as having to be maintained water tight and to contact the Shift Supervisor
prior to opening.
11
The visual inspection of the accessable hatch areas
did not find the stated stenciling.
The licensee's representative stated
that plastic plates with the subject information had been installed in
lieu of stenciling, but appeared to have been broken off and lost.
At the
end of the inspection, the licensee's representative stated that the
stenciling had now been completed.
The new stenciling of the hatches was
not verified by the NRC inspector.
The licensee's September 21, 1990, response letter stated that a
11 revised
Temporary Modification Program procedure was approved in August 1990.
11
The inspector noted that the procedure was approved in March 2, 1990, not
in August 1990, as stated in the subject letter.
The licensee's
representative stated that the new procedure was actually implemented in
August 1990.
Implementation was phased in because the procedure replaced
two station procedures which were controlling ongoing work.
The inspector
had no further questions except for the lack of specificity of the
response letter.
4
The September 21, 1990, response letter for corrective action stated that,
11A procedure revision has been initiated to incorporate these water tight
hatches into Abnormal Operating Procedure (ADP) Wind 1.
This rev1s1on
will be completed by October 1990.
11
On May 21, 1991, the inspector found
that the current Wind 1 revision was Revision 0, approved September 29, 1987,
and that the last periodic review of the procedure was completed on
May 24, 1990.
Based upon interviews, the inspector determined that SORC
meeting 90-133 on September 19, 1990, had approved fhe commitment to
revise Wind 1 and that there appeared to have been an oversight in the
tracking of the commitment.
Failure to track the commitment was stated by
the licensee's representative to be the cause for not completing the
committed corrective action.
During this inspection, the licensee
initiated revisions to Wind 1 and approved Revision 1 to the procedure for
both units on May 24, 1991.
Based upon the revised Wind 1 procedure, the
inspector had no further questions, except for the lapse in the licensee 1s
management controls that resulted in misstng the corrective action
commitment.
A licensee 1s representative stated that the licensing group
has now initiated an
11Action Tracking
11 computer program to track- corrective
action commitments to the NRC.
The representative stated that this was
not being done at the time of the MTI.
In conclusion, for Notice of Violation No. 1, the new replacement hatches
were found to be adequate.
The licensee failed to maintain stencil signs
on the hatches as tommitted by their response letter.
The issue was
identified by the inspector.
The licensee 1 s_management control for
commitments in their response letter to the NRC was inadequate in that
stencilling was not maintained and a procedure revision was not completed.
Violation 2 (50-272 and 50-311/90-200)(0pen)
This April 1990 MTI vi o 1 at ion was
11Water tight doors between the service
water valve rooms and the surrounding areas of the auxiliary building had
not been adequately maintained in that the door latching dogs required to
be operated to make the door closure water tight were unmovable from their-
undogged position when reasonable force was applied.
This condition had
not been promptly identified and corrected. 11
The licensee's September 21, 1990, response letter stated that
11All water
tight doors specified in the FSAR, including those required by abnormal
operating procedures (ADP) were ins~ected, adjusted, and re-gasketed to
bring them to an acceptable condition.
11
During this current inspection, the inspector interviewed cognizant
maintenance personnel, examined, and verified a sample of the. work orders
(approximately 60 noted) that had been written and completed to fix the
water tight doors during the period of May to August 1990.
Water tight
doors in both units were inspected.
The inspector found (in both units)
that some latching dogs required unreasonable manual force to operate and
several coul-d not be operated due to mechanical interference (with the
latching dog).
No acceptance criteria were identified for a maximum
acceptable force for latching a dog.
The licensee provided no erigineering
analysis or other information to provide a basis for not requiring all
5
door latching dogs to be capable of latching.
The inspector*opined that
the licensee's corrective action taken had not corrected (in total) the
conditions cited in the Notice of Violation.
Alternatively, if the
corrective action previously taken had fixed the latching dogs as indicated
in the licensee's response letter, the conditions identified on
May 21, 1991, had not been promptly identified and corrected to maintain
the doors' latching dogs in an operable condition.
The inspector did note
that all doors sampled would close against their gaskets and that the
gaskets appeared to be in good condition.
The licensee's corrective action response letter stated that
11to increase
awareness of the FSAR requirements in this area, the General Manager of
Salem Operations has issued a letter to all station personnel detailing
this violation and the importance of water tight doors and hatches to the
physical plant.
11
The letter was issued on September 7, 1990.
The letter
stated the importance of the doors to protect against flooding in the
event of a storm as well as to prevent flooding from internal sources in
the event of a high energy water or steam line break.
The letter stated
that
11deficiencies in water tight doors and hatches be identified, work
requests initiated ... doors are significant to plant safety.
11
The
inspector had no further questions regarding the general manager's letter
except for the effectiveness to implement identification of deficiencies
in the water tight doors' latching dogs.
This part of the licensee's
quality assurance efforts appeared inadequate based upon the NRC inspector
identifying problems with latching dogs.
The licensee's corrective action response letter stated that a periodic
PM task request had been initiated.
The inspector interviewed the cognizant
PM person identified to have been assigned responsibility for initiating
the PM procedures.
This person stated that the PM procedures were scheduled
to be issued by September 1991.
Based upon interviews, no interim PM task
was initiated to ensure water tight door operability, including their latching
dog operability, i.e., the only PM action taken was the task to develop
the PM procedures.
The inspector concluded that, based upon finding the
inoperable latching dogs during this inspection, the licensee's PM
corrective action was less than adequate.
In concl~sion, for Violation No. 2, the corrective action planned and
taken to assure and maintain water tight door operability was inadequate.
Findings during this inspection in May 1991 were similar to findings of
the April 1990 MTI.
Evidence exists that maintenance had been performed
on the water tight doors; however, no definitive acceptance criteria for
latching dog operability was established, including any engineering
evaluation that would permit less than all latching dogs being fully
The failure to maintain water tight doors' latching dogs
operable and to identify and promptly correct latching dog deficiencies is
a recurring violation (50-272/91-16-02 and 50-311/91-16-02) .
6
Violation 3 (50-272 and 50-311/90-200)(Closed)
This violation included four examples involving failure to follow procedures
during work performance by contractor individuals.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee had taken reasonable corrective action for
each of the performance violations which included emphasizing that
contractor employees need to follow procedures.
The licensee also verified
that corrective actions had been completed for the items involving
hardware deficiencies.
The inspector had no further questions regarding these specific items.
Conclusion
Violation 1
The replacement hatches were found to be installed adequately, thus closing
the violation.
The licensee did not maintain _an information sign on the
hatch covers as committed in their September 21, 1990, response letter;
during *this inspection, the licensee took corrective action to identify
the hatches.
The licensee's management controls for commitments in their
response letter was inadequate.
Violation 2
The corrective actions planned and taken to assure and maintain water
tight door operability were inadequate.
The licensee's failure to identify
and promptly correct latching dog deficiencies is a recurring violation.
This violation remains open.
Violation 3
The corrective actions taken to specific items involving failure to
follow procedures were adequate.
This violation is closed.
2.0 Scope
This inspection assessed the action taken by the licensee to correct
five MTI weaknesses identified in Appendix B of the August 21, 1990, NRC
letter to the licensee.
The weaknesses were identified during the MT!
conducted during April 9 - 27, 1990.
The licensee responded by letter
dated October 19, 1990.
People were interviewed and records and documents
were inspected.
Findings
Weakness 1
"Management of mainten~nce backlog items and an absence of an effective
backlog reduction program.
11
7
The actual maintenance backlog was stated to be approximately 3100 work
orders at the time of this inspection or slightly higher than at the time
of the MTI.
The licensee
1s representative stated that, currently, more
work orders are being written than are being worked off by the available
resources.
The inspector toured areas of both units and noted a number of material
condition improvements.
The facilities visited were noted to be maintained
clean and well painted, reflecting improvements that have taken place
since the MTI.
The licensee has instituted a maintenance backshift to
more efficiently use resources.
Improvements have been made in planning
and scheduling to improve work effectiveness.
Based upon the continuing large work order backlog, this weakness remains
an open concern until the licensee has demonstrated effectiveness in his
backlog reduction program.
Weakness 2
11 Lack of root cause analysis training for system engineers.
Genera 1 1 ack
of adequate root cause analysis.
11
The licensee 1 s October 19, 1990, response letter stated that four one-week
sessions of root cause analysis training had been scheduled for 1991 and
that
11 ten seats have been res.erved for* system engineers in each session.
The Technical Department will schedule two or more engineers from each
discipline to attend these classes.
Based upon this schedule, all system
engineers will be root cause analysis trained by the end of 1991.
11
The
technical manager stated that, due to imposed budget restraints, the
schedule given in the October 19, 1990, response letter will not be met.
Two of the four 1991 root cause analysis training classes have been
postponed.
To date, eleven system engineers have been trained in root
cause analysis, 12 system engineers are in the course, and 17 are expected
to complete the training in 1992, not
11 by the end of 1991,
11 as stated in
the licensee 1 s October 19, 1990, letter.
The licensee 1 s representative
stated intent to provide this change in commitment information to the NRC
by letter.
The licensee 1 s October 19, 1990, response letter stated a general guidance
procedure on root cause would be issued by January 31, 1991, for use by
. system engineers.
The Technical Department procedure was approved .on
February 14, 1991; however, it was not issued January 31, 1991, as stated
in the licensee 1 s response letter.
The procedure TI-37,
11 Root Cause
Analysis Guidelines,
11 Rev.ision 0, sets down the minimum training requirements
for a root cause investigation team, provides guidance for the analysis
process, data and information collection, methods for event analysis
including corrective actions for root causes .
8
The inspector concluded that the licensee's issued procedure and completed
training of system's engineers has provided a po~itive base upon which to
improve root cause analyses.
This weakness is closed.
Weakness 3
Lack of capability to readily analyze older maintenance data for performance
monitoring and evaluation."
The Maintenance Management Information System (MMIS) data base includes
equipment hi story and records from 1987 forward.
This data base is
improving with time.
Also, NPRDS data is available since 1984.
A new initiative to improve reliability of equipment and components is the
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) program which is doing indepth
reviews of systems and identifying critical components relative to
establishing improved maintenance.
The licensee's October 19, 1990,
response stated that "To date, the RCM has completed the review of 12
systems ... " Based upon interviews and a.review of the May 13, 1991,
Preventive Maintenance Improvement Project Monthly Report - April 1991,
the inspector determined that only 10 systems were complete as of May 1991,
not
11 12 systems" as stated in the licensee's October 19, 1990, response
letter.
The RCM efroup manager stated that 7 systems were completed for
Salem and 3 for Hope Creek.
The RCM group plans to do 4 systems in 1991.
He stated that the RCM budget had been reduced for 1991; h6wever,
efficiencies achieved in their work methods permit meeting their schedule
for 1991.
He stated that, in the original RCM scope, it was planned to do
a total of 60 systems.
The licensee's stated intent is to include the old pre-1987 maintenance
data for critical components with history problems into the RCM database.
The inspector noted the slow progre~s being made in completing the RCM
program.
However, the MMIS database initiated in 1987 is growing with
time and NPRDS and other historical maintenance data are used during RCM
system reviews.
This results in evaluation of older data.
This weakness
is closed.
Weakness 4
"Inadequate technical procedures, absence of formal maintenance procedures
for important and repetitive tasks.
11
Specific procedural concerns identified by the MTI inspection report in
paragraph 4.1.7, "Maintenance Procedures," were addressed by the licensee
through revisions to procedures.
No other concerns were identified
regarding the action taken.
The
licen~ee's procedure upgrade project (PUP) was initiated in
September 1989, PUP is providing a general techn.ical upgrade to approximately
388 (on May 21, 1991) maintenance procedures.
The total PUP project
includes 3949 procedures per the PUP manager.
The total project
was stated to be 32.5% complete.
As of May 5, 1991, 160 maintenance and
9
electrical procedures were upgraded.
Based upon the actions taken to
address the specific MT! findings and the overall_ actions underway in the
PUP, this weakness is closed.
Weakness 5
11 Poor control of contractor maintenance activities. 11
During the MT!, the licensee took immediate and satisfactory corrective
action to specific concerns the team identified relative to contractor
control.
However, the team was concerned that the licensee had not taken
any broad actions to identify, evaluate, and correct potential problems
indicated by the team's findings.
The inspector first determined the PSE&G departments that were controlling
contractors performing safety-related maintenance activities in the plant.
Based on interviews, these departments were Maintenance, Engineering and
Plant Betterment, and the Nuclear Services (site services) Department.
The inspector next assessed contractor controls for each of these
departments.
Maintenance Department
The licensee's October 19, 1990, response letter stated that the
Salem Administrative Procedure, SC.MD-AP.ZZ-0005,
11 Control of Contractor
Work,
11 Revision 1, had been revised.
This is a Maintenance Department
procedure and defines the requirements for control of work performed
by contractors under the direction of the Maintenance Department.
Responsibilities are clearly defined, including requirements for
monitoring of contractor work.
The procedure covers personnel
qualification, procedure requirements, and makes the Salem Handbook
of Standards a qualification requirement for contract personnel.
The
inspector interviewed three maintenance contract administrators.
Based upon the interviews and a review of maintenance monitoring
observation reports of contractors, the inspector concluded that the
Maintenance Department has a program to achieve acceptable control
over their contractors.
Engineering and Plant Betterment (E&PB)
Procedure DE-CS.ZZ-0031(0),
11 E&PB Contractor Site Qualification &
Training,
11 Revision DA, provides a program to assure that E&PB
contractors are knowledgeable of the site procedures and controls for
conducting work.
The procedure includes responsibilities for both
E&PB and contractor personnel.
The procedure also calls for job
specific briefings and training.
E&PB conducts periodic meetings
with contractors and conducts a formalized contractor evaluation
including a weekly published report card.
E&PB maintains a core of
24 contractor staff full time, 12 from Bechtel and 12 from Stone and
Webster.
Each staff is permitted to work* up to 50 craftmen with the
existing core team.
Although the E&PB did not have an overall
10
procedure delineating all of the controls, the inspector concluded,
based on interviews and sampling of documen~ation, that existing
controls over contractors, although somewhat fragmented, appeared
adequate.
-
Nuclear Services
Cognizant Nuclear Services representatives stated that Nuclear Services
Department has no formal department procedures for delineating
qualification and management controls of contractors performing
maintenance work.
They stated that their department did not use the
Maintenance Department 1s procedure for control of contractor work.
Nuclear Services was stated to have conducted the bulk of the
~aintenance work within containment the last outage.
The represen-
tatives stated that, for example, Westinghouse used their own
procedures for performing steam generator work; the procedures were
reviewed by Nuclear Services before the job.
Also, the Nuclear
Services Department qualified contractors to form NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0014-4,
which is from the Nuclear Department 1 s
11Training, Qualification, and
Certification," procedure.
A representative further said that nuclear
services only checks to see if qualifications of contractors are in
order, whereas QA verifies contractor qualification.
It was stated
that Nuclear Services conducted daily meeting with contractor managers,
e.g., Westinghouse* doing steam generator work and that all contractor
supervisors were also briefed regarding the
11Salem Handbook of
Standards.
11
An interview of a cognizant station QA person and review of station QA
surveillance report (91-049) determined that the qualification and work
history of Westinghouse people doing containment work had been verified
by QA.
A review of the
11 IR9 Outage QA critique,
11 dated May 8, 1991,
identified contractor problems relative to steam generator work under the
cognizance of Nuclear Services.
The Nuclear Services Department has not demonstrated that existing
procedures are adequate to control contractors conducting safety-related
maintenance, i.e., they meet Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance
Program Requirements,
11 and ANSI NI8.7-1976,
11Quality Assurance for the
Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants,
11 relative to administrative and
management controls.
This is an unresolved item (50-272/91-16-03, 311/
91-16-03).
In conclusion regarding
11 Poor control of contractor maintenance activities,
11
the Maintenance Department has improved their control over contractors and
this was found to be acceptable; E&PB Department 1 s control was adequate;
However, Nuclear Services Department 1 s management and administrative
controls over contractors performing safety-related maintenance were not
demonstrated and were made an unresolved item .
3.0
L
11
Conclusion of Review of Identified MTI Weaknesses
Three of the five weaknesses (numbers 2, 3, and 4) were closed.
Weakness 1,
11Management of maintenance backlog items and an absence
of an effective backlog reduction program remains open pending the
licensee demonstrating effectiveness in his backlog reduction program.
The backlog has slightly increased (worsened) since the MTI.
Regarding
weakness No. 5,
11 Poor control of contractor maintenance activities.
11
This control has improved and is at an acceptable level in the
Maintenance Department and E&PD Department; however, the Nuclear
Services Department appears to lack management and administrative
procedural control coverage for conducting safety-related maintenance
work using contractors.
This issue is an unresolved item.
During
inspection of Weakness 1, the inspector identified an apparent
inaccurate statement in the licensee's October 19, 1990, response
letter regarding the number of completed RCM analyses.
Technical Specification Surveillance Testing (61700 and 61725)
A technical specification (TS) audit project was established for the S~lem
Generating Station resulting from a series of overdue surveillance
requirement tasks identified in 1987 and 1988.
A TS verification project
was initiated in September 1988 to review the managed maintenance information
system (MMIS).
(Note:
The MMIS is a work order database program the
licensee uses to schedule surveillance requirement tasks with a frequency
of greater than 7 days).
This was subsequently expanded to include:
(1)
a Technical Specification Surveillance Monitoring Program, (2) a Technical
Specification Amendment Implementation Program, and (3) a line-by-line
reverification that all Technical Specification surveillance requirements
were covered by surveillance procedures.
The objective of the audit project was to eliminate noncompliance with TS
surveillance requirements due to improper TS scheduling, amendment
implementation, and surveillance requirement identification.
The TS audit
project included four distinct, but related activities:
(1) the MMIS
database reverification, (2) the TS surveillance monitoring program, (3)
the TS amendment implementation program, and (4) the TS surveillance
reverification project.
The results of the audit project are:
(1) all recurring tasks in the MMIS
database have been verified to reflect the TS requirements they fulfill;
(2) a PC-based database has been developed that cross-references the TS,
the procedures used to meet TS requirements, and the department responsible
for each recurring TS requirement; (3) LERs have been submitted to the NRC
for all cases of noncompliance that this program identified (Attachment 2
to this report contains a listing), and (4) administrative controls have
been established to monitor TS surveillances and insure that the present
program provides controls over TS amendments.
The completion of the audit
project and the controls the licensee has established to maintain their
present TS status should ensure that future changes will be captured by
the system and effect any needed updating.
i
12
The licensee has scheduled audits of the technical specification program
- .for June 24, 1991, and the inservice testing program (IST) for
August 5, 1991 .. These audits are designed to test the function of the
various systems and interfaces developed as a result of the technical
specification audit project.
The inspector had no further questions regarding TS surveillance testing
within the sample taken.
No violations or deviations were found.
4.0 Inservice Test Program (IST) (Module 73756)
The
11 Inservice Testing Program Revision and Request for Interim Approval
of Second Ten Year Interval IST Program Salem Generating Station, Unit
Nos. 1 and 2,
11 dated June 26, 1987, has beeff submitted to the NRC for
approval.
In May 1991, the licensee submitted to the NRC the latest
revision of the Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Salem Unit Nos. 1 and
2.
The inservice inspection and testing programs for the Salem Unit Nos. 1
and 2 i-s described in procedures WPN-PLP-10 and AP27.
These procedures,
both titled
11 Inservice Inspection and Testing Program,
11 are implemented
at the Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2.
The Technical Department Inservice Test-
ing Engineer maintains the status of the IST program and is developing a
system for analyzing test results and issuing trending information based
on test data.
The technical specification (TS) requirements for IST have been incorporated
into procedures. and identified in their second ten year plan.
A
verification to ensure that each TS requirements has been procedurally
covered is completed.
A Quality Assurance Audit of the TS vs. the IST
procedures is scheduled for August 5, 1991.
The Inservice Test Engineer
has completed an inspection to verify that the TS requirements for IST are
in procedures.
Procedures describing TS testing requirement have been written using the
guidance defined in procedure QA-PJ.ZZ-1031(0),
11 Procedure Upgrade Project
Manual,
11 (PUP) issued April 26, 1991.
A sample review of IST procedures
verified that such areas as post-maintenance testing are considered and
included where necessary, TS references are identified, both TS and ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, are referenced, and an
acceptance criteria is required.
No violations or deviations were
identified.
Attachment 2 also provides a listing of surveillance-related documents
reviewed and Attachment 3 provides completed surveillance test work orders
that were reviewed by the inspector during the course of the inspection.
These WOs were inspected to verify that the licensee met TS requirements
and tests were performed in accordance with the test procedure.
The
inspector also verified that when a requirement was not met, the required
documentation was completed and a review of the item was performed and
documented by the responsible supervisor.
13
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.0
Inspection of a Previous Unresolved Item
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272/89-15-01.
Improper mix of boric acid
compounds had been inadvertently used in the batching process and,
subsequently, injected in the reactor coolant system (RCS).
The licensee has revised their boron concentration operations procedures
II-3.3.6, Revision 2, for Unit 2 and procedure II-3.3.6, Revision 11, for
Unit 1 to include a verification test and sign-off by the Chemistry
Supervisor before this type of material can be issued.
A training
procedure change and retraining courses on this subject hav~ also been
given.
Based on the above actions taken by the licensee and the present controls
that have been put in place to control this material, this item is
considered closed.
The inspector found, however, that other licensee programs to control
Q-listed expendable and consumable items had not been addressed by the
licensee.
Reviews and evaluations by the licensee to assure that acceptable
programs exist to control Q-listed expendable and consumable items is
a new unresolved item.
(50-272/91-16-01, 50-311/91-16-01).
6.0
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which additional information is
necessary in order to determine whether they are acceptable or they
constitute a violation.
Unresolved items are discussed in the details
of Sections 2 and 5.
7.0 Management Meetings
Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection
at an entrance meeting conducted on May 20, 1991.
The findings of
the inspection were periodically discussed with licensee personnel during
the course of the inspection.
The inspector met with the licensee
representatives (denoted in Attachment 1) at the conclusion of the inspection
on May 24, 1991.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of
the inspection as described in this report.
Attachments:
1.
List of Individuals Contacted
2.
LERs
3.
Work Order Nos .
14
ATTACHMENT 1
Individuals Contacted
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
- R. Brown
- B. Connor
- R. Donges
- F. Kaminski
- M. Morroni
- A. Orticelle
- L. Pi ott i
- V. Polizzi
- M. Shedlock
W. Schultz
- E. Villar
- C. Vondra
- Principal Engineer, Licensing and Regulation
Technical Staff Engineer
Licensing Engineer
Inservice Testing Coordinator
Technical Department Manager
Manager, Training
Quality Assurance Auditor
Operations Manager
Maintenance Manager
Manager of Station Quality Assurance
Station Licensing Engineer
General Manager, Salem Operations
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- S. Barr
- N. Blumberg
- S. Pindale
Resident Inspector
Chief, Performance Programs Section, DRS
Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on May 24, 1991.
Other plant, technical, and management personnel were contacted during the
course of the inspection .
15
ATTACHMENT 2
1.0 The following LERs were sent to the NRC as a result of the Technical
Specification Audit Project.
LERs applicable to both Units 1 and 2.
Unit 1
- 89-004
RCP Breaker Position Trip not tested.
Unit 1
- 89-015
Mechanical Snubbers not fully tested.
Unit 2
- 89-015
Containment Wide Range Pressure not calibrated wi thi.n
proper time frame.
Unit 1
- 90-020
Setpoint for P-6 for both units.
Unit 1
- 90-024
P-10 and P-12 permissives not fully tested.
Unit 1
- 90-035
PORV secondary indication not tested within proper
time frame.
Unit 2
- 90-035*
Safety Injection Input From SSPS not tested within
proper time frame.
LERs applicable to Unit 1 only.
Unit 1
Unit 1
Unit 1
- 89-022
- 89-028
- 89-029
TS Amendment 91 implementation problems.
TS Amendment 94 implementation problems.
AFW motor driven pumps not tested within
frame.
proper time
LERs applicable to Unit 2 only.
Unit 2
- 89-025
AFW motor driven pumps not tested within proper time
frame.
2.0 The following documents and surveillance test results were reviewed by the
inspectors to establish that Technical Specification (TS) surveillances
were identified, tested, and conducted on schedule.
Documentation
AP-12
AP-27
TI-28
PLP-10
Technical Specification Surveillance Program
Inservice Inspection and Testing Program
Pumps Surveillance Testing Results Analysis
Vice President Nuclear Procedure, Inservice Inspection and
Testing Programs
SP (0) 4.0.5-P (Gen)
SP (0) 4.0.5-P-BA (11)
Operations Department Surveillance Procedure
Inservice Testing - Boric Acid Pumps
Revised 1991 QA Audit Schedule
Audit Plan - Surveillance Testing (TS) Index No. 170
Audit Plan - Inservice Testing, Index No. 012
16
Surveillance No. 91-0094 - Assessment of Procedure Upgrade Project (PUP)
3.0 The following documents were reviewed by the inspector during the inspec-
tion of the sodium intrusion event of June 1989 (URR 50-272/89-15-01)
and the calibration control program for safety-related instrumentation not
specifically controlled by Technical Specifications:
Operating Procedure II-3.3.6, Revision No. 11, Boron Concentration
Control, Unit 1
Operating Procedure II-3.3.6, Revision No. 2, Boron Concentration
Control, Unit 2
Quality Assurance Audit Report No.91-142, Mechanical Maintenance,
April 1 - 26, 1991 .
Work Order Nos.
WO-NO. 910424070 Unit 1
WO-NO. 901010016 Unit 1
WO-NO. 910328082 Unit 2
WO-NO. 910227046 Unit 1
WO-NO. 901211030 Unit 1
WO-NO. 910430042 Unit 2
WO-NO. 910420069 Unit 1
WO-NO. 901021032 Unit 1
WO-NO. 91022034 Unit 2
WO-NO. 920901003 Unit 2
WO-NO. 910423090 Unit 2
17
ATTACHMENT 3
Nuclear Instrumentation System Channel
Calibration Check on Power Range Channel
IN43.
(4/8/91)
IPT457 Pressurizer Pressure Sensor CAL/CH
111 Sensor Calibration.
I&C Procedure
IPT-457 Pressurizer Sensor Calibration.
(3/11/91)
150UDC Reactor Trip Breaker B - SSTS Train
B.
Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0032-4.
Solid
State Protection System Functional Test -
Train B (4/1/91)
Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Functional
IAW Procedure lC-3.9.049 - Containment
Hydrogen Analyzer Channel Functional Check.
(4/3/91)
Rod Control System/Measure Rod Drop Time.
Procedure No. IIC-5.2.001 - Rod Drop Time
Measurement Hot Full Flow (4/22/91)
Radiation - Monitoring System/ Perform
Channel Calibration Procedure No. 2PD
4.5.011 Channel Calibration Check.
(5/1/91)
14A NIS Power Range Drawer.
Procedure No.
IIC-16.4.0.24.
Power Range Channel IN44
Detector Current Adjustment.
(4/28/91)
llSTM Gen Feed and Cond Differential
Pressure TMTR.
Procedure No. IIC-2.5.033.
Sensor Calibration.
(2/21/91)
2TE4131A/B/#23 Loop TAVG/Chan. Func./Ch.
111.
Procedure No. 2TE-431A-B #23 Rx
Coolant Loop Delta-T TAVG Prot. Ch 111.
(2/25/91)
2E11F/460V BKR Maint/21 RCP Mtr Htr.
Procedure No. M94.5 (4/25/91)
STA Batteries.
Perform Weekly TS Surveil-
lance.
Procedure No. SC.MD-ST.ZZ-0003 (Q)
(4/25/91)