ML18095A295
| ML18095A295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1990 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18095A294 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-90-12, 50-311-90-12, EA-90-073, EA-90-73, NUDOCS 9006210147 | |
| Download: ML18095A295 (3) | |
Text
APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Public Service Electric and Gas Company Salem Nuclear Generating Station Docket Nos.
50-272; 50-311 License Nos.
DPR~70; DPR-75 EA 90-073 As a result of the inspettion conducted on April 11-18, 1990, and in accordance with "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement.Actions, 11 10 CFR 2, Appendix C (Enforcement Policy 1989), the following violation was identified:
A.
B.
Technical Specifications 3.5.2 and 4.5.2.h require two independent emergency core cooling subsystems (ECCSs) to be operable during plant operations in Modes 1, 2 and 3, including two operable safety injection pumps with a total flow rate less than or equal to 650 gallons per minute (gpm) per pump.
Contrary to the above, on April 11, 1990, the licensee identified that two ECCSs were not operable during plant operation in Modes 1, 2 and 3 for Unit 1 since December 17, 1987 and for Unit 2 since October 22, 1988.
During these periods one of the two safety injection pumps (12 and 21) for each Unit exceeded the 650 gpm maximum flow requirement by about 0.5 to 3 percent.
JO CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI and the Nuclear Quality Assurance Department Manual require that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to ~uality are promptly identified, correct~d and prevented from recurring.
Contrary to the above, as of Apri1*11, 1990, the licensee 1s measures established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified, corrected and prevented from recurring were not effective, in that; corrective actions regarding the licensee 1 s identification of flow rate test miscalculations which rendered the Unit 2 charging pumps inoperable on January 4, 1990, did not prevent the recurrence of a similar event on April 11, 1990 regarding an inoperable safety injection pump at both Units 1 and 2.
This has been evaluated in the aggregate as a severity level IV problem (Supp 1 ement I).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas Company is hereby required to submit to this office within 30 days of the date of the letter which transmitted this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including: (1) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending this response time.
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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE MEETING
SUMMARY
==
I. Introduction:==
On May 18, 1990, an enforcement conference was held at NRC Region I to discuss the circumstances surrounding the miscalculations in Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) flow verification surveillance tests.
The miscalculations resulted in flow rates for the intermediate-head safety injection pumps being in excess of the maximum value of 650 gpm allowed by Technical Specifications.
The enforcement conference was held to discuss the cause of the event, the licensee's corrective actions, and the safety significance of the miscalculated ECCS flow rates including any potential broader implications.
In addition, the failure to identify these miscalculations by means of the corrective actions for a similar previous event was discussed along with the licensee's review and disposition of a December 4, 1989 Westinghouse letter regarding ECCS flow inconsistencies.
JI. Meeting Attendees:
NRC J. T. Wiggins, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region I A. R. Blough, Projects Branch Chief, Region I P. D.
Swetl~nd, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A W. R. Butler, Project Directorate, PDI-2, NRR J. C. Stone, Project Manager, PDI-2, NRR W. M. Hodges, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region I K. D. Smith, Regional Counsel, Region I D. J. Holody, Jr., Enforcement Officer, Region I R. M. Gallo, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety R. M. Perfetti, Enforcement Specialist, OE T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem/Hope Creek S. M. Pindale, Resident Inspector, ~alem/Hope Creek N. J. Blumberg, Chief, Operational Programs Section; DRS P. D. Kaufman, Project Engineer, Projects Branch No. 2 B. Hughes, Operations Engineer, DRS Public Service Electric and Gas S. LaBruna, Vice President - Nuclear L. K. Miller, General Manager - Salem Operations M. Bandeira, Manager - Nuclear Engineering Standards M. Morroni, Manager -.Salem Technical Department M. R. Danak, Senior Staff Engineer R. D. Binz, IV, Specialist Engineering Supervisor V. Chandra, Technical Consultant F. Thompson, Assistant to General Manager - Salem B. Preston, Manager - Licensing and Regulation
Others E. Krufka, Atlantic Electric On-Site Representative - Salem J. T. Robb, Director, Joint Owner Affairs - PECo K. M. Buddenbohn, Delmarva Power III. Meeting Presentation and Discussion NRC Region I presented the findings of Special Inspection Report 50-272/
90-12; 50-311/90-12 including the details of the potential violation regarding the failure to correctly verify maximum total flow rates for the No. 12 safety injection pump since December 17, 1987 and for the No. 21 safety injection pump since October 22, 1988.
The NRC also presented ~he details of the potential violation regarding the licensee's failure to identify these calculational errors in response to the January 4, 1990 similar event involving miscalulations in the Unit 2 charging pump surveillances.
Additionally, the NRC discussed its concern regarding the licensee's review
.and disposition of the December 4, 1989 Westinghouse letter regarding ECCS flow inconsistencies.
The apparent lack of prompt and aggressive response by,the licensee to this vendor information, as well as the absence of notification to the NRC or reference in the course of the January 4, 1990 Discretionary Enforcement Action Request from the licensee was addressed.
The licensee presented information relative to the event, the safety significance of the miscalculations, the root cause and associated corrective actions, and overall observations.
The presentation and subsequent discussion addressed the following:
The safety significance was minimal based on worst case analysis assumptions.
The root causes of the event were procedure inadequacies, the lack of safety injection pump data trending, and personnel error.
The licensee's presentation materials are attached to this summary.
IV. Conclusions The NRC determined that the licensee identified violation of the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation of safety injection pumps would be cited because the event was not identified/prevented as a result of licensee actions for a previous similar event.
The lack of direction and oversight which resulted in the ineffective corrective action for the January 4, 1990 event was cited as a violation of Quality Assurance program requirements.
Regarding the January 4, 1990 event, the NRC noted that the licensee's corrective actions had been appropriate in concept, but the planning, direction, oversight and verification processes were inadequate to effectively implement the corrective action concept.