ML18095A267

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Supplemental Special Rept 88-3-22:on 880720-900508,fire Barriers Impaired for Greater than 7 Days.Cause of Degraded Fire Penetrations Not Determined.Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until Fire Protection Concerns Resolved
ML18095A267
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/1990
From: Miller L
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
88-3-22, NUDOCS 9006120223
Download: ML18095A267 (13)
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1 PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge. New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station June 6, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-22

  • This supplemental Special Report addresses additional fire barrier penetration seal impairments (for both Salem Unit 1 and Salem Unit
2) which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days. These impairments have been identified by the Penetration Seal Task Force. This report has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

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L. K. Miller General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 9(H).t.12022:3 900606 PDR ADOC~~ 05000272

3 PDC The Energy People 95*2189 (10Ml 12*8!

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORritt8-3-22 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Units 1 & 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancockis Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s): 7/20/88, 8/9/88, 9/7/88, 10/11/88, 11/7/88, 12/7/88, 1/5/89, 2/6/89, 3/7/89, 4/6/89, 5/9/89, 6/7/89, 7/12/89, 8/8/89, 9/7/89, 10/7/89, 11/8/89, 12/8/89, 1/9/90, 2/8/90, 3/14/90, 4/9/90, 5/8/90 Report Date: 6/6/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.88-268, 88-531,88-536, 88-537,88-544, 89-050,89-075, 89-086,89-091, 89-092,89-127, 89-287,89-349, 89-472,90-357, and 90-359.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

As identified in PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 dated March 4, 1988, PSE&G has initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire barrier penetration seals. Due to the additional review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a. This report summarizes the task force findings and Technical Specification 4.7.11 surveillance activity findings associated with inadequate penetration seals for both Unit 1 and Unit

2. The inadequate penetration seals found, to the date of issue of this report, include:

On July 13, 1988 two fire Barrier cable penetration were found degraded. The penetration contained electrical sleeving containing an electrical cable surrounded by foam type fire sealant. The area (approximately 1/8" gap and 1/4" gap respectively) surrounding the electrical sleeves were not sealed thereby constituting an impaired seal. The fire barrier is in*

the east ~all of the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

On July 25, i9ss* three ( 3) degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals were found on the south wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room. Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the floor). The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling. This fire wrap extends over the penetration. There is no foam behind the fire wrap. It provides a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier. The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.

Unit 1 SPECIAL REPOR~8-3-22 DESCRIPTION.OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable penetration seal was found on the north wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room. The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/2" diameter hole.

Between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 Relay Room and 4 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Room. The penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. The nature of the impairments include 6 with no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal (unknown cause), 2 with foreign material irnbedded in the seal (one imbedded with a rag and the other with duct tape) ,

30 with a void in the seal (due to inadequate quantity of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparent degradation (e.g.,

cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure (reierence LER 272/88-013-00) and 32 that are not deep enough into the penetration per design (less than 6 inches).

Between August 31, 1988 and May 30, 1990, 6802 Unit 1 penetration seals and 5262 Unit 2 penetration seals were reviewed. Of these, 2845 penetration seals were determined tc;ebe impaired. The majority of penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. There were 326 penetrations which were larger than 6 inches in diameter. These penetrations ranged from 3"x5" to 169"x25".

Page 3 of this report contains a table of the penetration seals found impaired, between August 2, 1988 and May 30, 1990, in relation to the fire zone where they were *found. The impairment designator terms include:

No Seal NOS Hole in Seal HOL Void in Seal VIS Depth Not Great Enough DPT Color/Cell Structure CEL Seal Degradation DEG Foreign Material Imbedded FMT Planned Impairment PIM An hourly fire watch patrol had been established for the above areas previously due to other fire protection concerns. Therefore, the requirements ~f Tech. Spec. Action Statement 3.7.11.a are met.

Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a

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UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT --3-22 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.l, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status."

NOTE - Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE and "inoperable".

TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS 8102188 - 5/30190 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 Relay Room 15 34 54 72 194 7 3 . 1**

U-1 lA DIG Control Room 2 3 2 21 U-1 lB DIG Control Room 1 1 3 21 2 U-1 lC DIG Control Room 1 1 1 11 11 2 U-1 lA 125 v Battery Room 2 3 2 U-1 lC 125 v Battery Room 20 1 1 U-1 #1 250 v Battery Room 1 1 5 U-1 #3 Stairwell 12 1 5 U-1 64' Elevation, Aisle 3 1 6 17

  1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 84' Elevation, Aisle 6 4 7 7 1
  1. 1 Auxiliary Building
c U-1 122' Elevation, N2. 1 1 Bottle Storage Area U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 & 3 3 2 Common East & West
  • U-1 78' Electrical Penetra. 1 1 1 1 7 Area U-1 100' Boric Acid Transfer 3 4 12 5 Pump Area

f UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT--3-22 e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 5/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 100' El. Mechanical 1 5 2 8 3 1 Penetration Area - Blowdown Tanks U-1 100' El. Corridor 2 3 3 2 1 Service Building U-1 100' Elevation, Aisle 4 4 2 6 14 1

  1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1 & 15 11 8 30 61 1 2 Common East & West
  • U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 & 2 7 14 11 2 1 2 Common North & South U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 & 3 3 2 Common East & West
  • U-1 122' Lobby 2
  • U-1 100' Lobby 1 1 U-1 64' Lobby 1 U-1 11/12 Containment Spray 4 4 6 19 2 Pumps & Spray Add. Tank Area U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1. & 2 4 3 1 185 2 2 Common North & South U-1 100' Elevation Counting 6 1 1 Room U-1 #11 Diesel Oil Tk Room 1 1 3 U-1 #12 Diesel Oil Tk Room 2 5 U-1 84' Elev. Control Area 23 14 1 22 91 1
  1. 1 Transformer Bus Rm.

U:-1 Spent Fuel Pit H.eat: 3 3 6 16 Exchanger & Pump Area--

U-1 lA Diesel Generator Area 5 1 1 U-1 lB Diesel Generator Area 1 1 7 1 7 U-1 lC Diesel Generator Area 4 1 2 3 U-1 Waste Evaporator Room 4 11 4 1 1 U-1 100' Elevation Mechanical 8 4. 10 Penetration Area

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT~-3-22 ~

TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 5/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 UPS Battery Room 2 U-1 Containment Rad Mon Room 4 1 10 10 U-1 #11 Chg. & SI Pump Room 1 4 U-1 #12 Chg. & SI Pump Room 1 U-1 #13 Chg. & SI Pump Room 2 U-1 84' El. Pipe Trench 126 1 1 16 2 U-1 100' El. Baling & Storage 7 1 3 1 1 U-1 110' El. Control Console 1 9 U-1 78' El. Contain. Rad 1 1 Mon. Room

  • U-1 84' El. #11 Comp. Cool. 20 1 3 2 Heat Xgr. & 12 cc Pp Room U-1 100' Elec. Penetra. Area 14 4 17 6 5 U-1 Laundry, Chem Pump Area 5 3 2 19 4 U-1 64' El. Control Area #1 3 4 18 11 1 4KV Bus U-1 #1 Letdown Heat Exch. 1 U-1 84' El. #12 Comp. Cool. 3 3 3 Heat Xgr. & 12 & 13 CC Pp Room U-1 #11 SI Pump Room 1 1 U-1 Pipe Trench 14 3 3 20 16 3 U-1 Rx Coolant Filter Area 9 1 U-1 84' Spent Resin'.. X~er P~ Rm 2 U-1 11 & 12 Mon. Tank Room 8 1* 5 2 U-1 84' Elevator Lobby 1 U-1 Aux Feed Pumps 3 U-1 Valve Alley 3 2 3 U-1 Seal Water Heat XChg 2 3 1 U-1 84' El. Corridor 2 2 1

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT~-3-22 TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 5/30/90 NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 A/C & Boric Acid 5 1 10 81 1 Tank Room U-1 A/C Equipment Rm 1 2 4 U-1 Boric Acid Evap. & 2 1 3 1 Gas Stripper Unit U-1 Water Recirc Heater 3 1 1 2 U-1 #1 Stairwell 6 5 U-1 #1 Cone. Filter Area 1 U-1 Rm Next To #11 Chg Pp 2 2 U-1 Diesel Oil C02 Area 4 1 U-1 Motor Control Center 2 1 1 U-1 Elevator - El 2 1 1 U-1 N2 Bottle Storage 3 U-1 #12 RHR XGR Room 1 U-1 55' El. Walkway 2 U-1 Future Mixed Bed 7 Dem in U-1 #11 Mixed Bed Demin 2 U-1 #1 Cation Bed (NW) 2 U-1 #1 Cation Bed (SW) 8 U-1 #11 Deborating Demin 3 U-1 #12 Deborating Demin 2 1 U-1 Primary Sampling Lab 3 1 U-1 78' Piping Penetration 1 - 4 U-1 Vent Duct Shaft 1 6 U-1 Valve Room 4 U-1 Waste Evaporator Area 1 U-1 #11 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg.. 3  ;

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT --3-22 ...

TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 5/30/90 AREA NOS, HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-2 100' El. Mechanical Pene. 2 6 Area - Slowdown Tanks U-2 100' El. Corridor 2 1 U-2 100' Elevation Mechanical 5 3 5 6 4 3 Penetration Area U-2 AC & Boric Acid Tank Room 9 9 21 4 1 U-2 Relay Room 23 27 4 60 132 1 U-2 22 RHR Xgr Room 3 U'-2 84' Control Area Trans- 17 34 4 39 31 former Bus Room U-2 Rad. Detector Panel 1

  • U-2 Battery Room 2C 125VDC 13 U-2 Battery Room 2B 125VDC 2 3 3 U-2 #2 250V Battery Room 3 U-2 Control Area #7 4KV 4 5 2 3 1 Vital Bus Area U-2 110' El. Control Console 1 3 U-2 78' Electrical Pen. Area 5 4 U-2 100' Electrical Pen. Area 2 1 3 U-2 2A DIG Control Room 1 5 4 1 U-2 2B DIG Control Room 1 2 11 4 U-2 2C DIG Control Room 2 4 3 U-2 #21 Diesel Oil Tarik Area 5 2 1 3 U-2 #22 Diesel Oil Tank Area 1 3 2 4 4 U-2 #21 Diesel Fuel Oil 1 1 Transfer Pump Area U-2 #22 Diesel Fuel Oil 1 Transfer Pump Area U-2 111' Vent. Equip. Area ..19. 4 9

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPOR~8-3-22 ,.

TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 5/30/90 NOS VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-2 100' Vent Duct Shaft 1 1 U-2 64' Storage Area 2 1 19 6 U-2 84' Spent Fuel Pit Heat 4 1 4 XChgr. & Pump Room U-2 Boric Acid XFer Pump Area 9 1 1 2 U-2 Aisle #1 East Section 7 1 1 2 U-2 Aux. Feedwater Pumps 2 4 1 *i U-2 #21 & 22 Monitor Tank 3 1 1 2 Area U-2 21 & 22 Cont. Spray 11 4 1 1 Pumps & Spray Add Tank U-2 .Aisle 2 East & West 1 1 U-2 Counting Room 1 5 U-2 #2 Control Room 13 6 2 1 1 U-2 Pipe Alley 3 U-2 78' Containment Rad 6 5 Monitor Room -

U-2 21 & 22 SI Pump Room 1 U-2 84' Piping Pene Area 5 U-2 Aisle 2 North & South 1 1 U-2 84' Corridor 1 U-2 Calibration Room 1 U-2 #21 Component ('.;Qol_ing 16 1 Heat Exchanger and.Pumps U-2 #22 Component Cooling 5 Heat Exchanger and Pumps U-2 84' SW Piping Room 1 U-2 C02 Fire Equipment Area 1 U-2 Concentrates Holding Tank 1 U-2 Seal Water Heat XChgr 1

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT~-3-22 TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 5/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-2 #2 Rx Coolant Filter Area 7 U-2 #2 Control Equip Room 1 U-2 84' Valve Room 5 U-2 #100 Rad Detector Panel 1 1 U-2 Waste Evaporator Area 1 2 3 U-2 Vent Duct Enclosure Shaft 2 U-2 Motor Control Center 1 U-2 Ref. Water Purifier Room 2 U-2 Data Logging Room 5 6 U-2 A/C Equipment Room 2

  • U-2 84' Pipe Alley 2 1 U-2 N2 Bottle Storage Area 1 1 U-2 #24 Evap. Feed Ion Xchgr 1 U-2 100' Cation Bed Demin. 3
  • - The opposite room for the north and east walls is the Unit 2 Relay Room.
    • - The Relay Room PIM was resealed thirteen days after opening APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the sleeve which hid the gap. The 3.5" south wall penetrations (discovered 7/23/8~) also appeared sealed from the Relay Room side, as described 1n the Description of Occurrence section. Closer inspection, as required by the- Seal Penetration1Review Grbup procedures, revealed the nature of the impairments. Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months via a visual inspection. This inspection would not necessarily identify the non-functional status of the subject penetrations.

The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult to reach location. The gap in the seal may have formed due to shrinkage. It does not app~.ar as though a cable was pulled (forming the gap).

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT41-3-22 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Th~ 3.5" north wall penetration (found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach location. The gap in the seal appears to have formed as a result of a cable pull. It has not been determined when or by whom the cable was pulled.

The penetrations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and May 30, 1990, are similar in configuration (except as noted) to the penetrations identified in the original issue of this Special Report. The cause of their degraded condition also could not positively be determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the 'ire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.

The subject fire area contains detection in addition to the roving fire watch patr~l. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve an adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days_ due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.

Penetration seal repair work has been initiated. The Unit 1 Relay Room was the first area worked. To date, 2933 penetrations have been sealed and accepted by the Penetration Seal Task Force.

The majority of those penetrations in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Relay Rooms (halon discharge areas) which either have no seal .or holes through the seal have been sealed using approved station procedure

.M3Y, "Installation and Repair of Fire Barrier and Flood Protection Seals".

The review and corrective actiqns, conducted by the Penetration Seal Review Program, will be completed in accordance with the March 4, 1988'

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORTtt-3-22 ,.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd)

PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 to the NRC, the August 26, 1988 telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office, and the August 15, 1989 semi-annual management meeting conducted with the NRC.

()tJc/t!LtLf J General Manager -

IL ?l'dt(_/

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.90-065

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