ML18094B230

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Special Rept 88-3-17:on 880304,util Initiated Comprehensive Review/Insp of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals.Cause Unknown.Hourly Fire Watch Established
ML18094B230
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 01/03/1990
From: Miller L
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
88-3-17, NUDOCS 9001110092
Download: ML18094B230 (11)
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Text

PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-17 January 3, 1990 This supplemental Special Report addresses additional fire barrier penetration seal impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days.

These impairments have been identified by the Penetration Seal Task Force.

This report has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

MJP:pc Distribution 9001110092 900103 F'DI~~

ADOCr::: 0:50002'72 S

F'DC Sincerely yours, L. K. Miller General Manager -

Salem Operations

. UNIT. 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-17 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Units 1 & 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impa~red For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s):

7/20/88, 8/09/88, 9/07/88, 10/11/88, 11/07/88, 12/07/88, 1/05/89, 2/06/89, 3/7/89, 4/6/89, 5/9/89 6/7/89, 7/12/89, 8/8/89, 9/7/89, 10/7/89, 11/8/89 12/8/89 Report Date:

1/03/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.88-268, 88-531,88-536 r 88-537 r 88-544 r 89-0*50 r 89-:-075 r 89-086 t 89-091,89-092 I 89-127,89-287, 89-349, and 89-472.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A

. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

As identified in PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 dated March 4, 1988, PSE&G has initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire. barrier penetration seals.

Due to the additional review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

This report*summarizes the task force findings and Technical Specification 4.7.11 surveillance activity findings associated with inadequate penetration seals for both Unit 1 and Unit

2.

The inadequate penetration seals found, to the date of issue of this report, include:

On July 13, 1988 two fire Barrier cable penetration were found degraded.

The penetration contained electrical sleeving containing an electrical cable surrounded by foam type fire sealant.

The area (approximately 1/8" gap and 1/4" gap respectively) surrounding the electrical sleeves were not sealed thereby constituting an impaired seal.

The fire barrier is in the east wall of the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

On July 25, 1988 three (3) degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals were found on the south wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the floor).

The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling.

This fire wrap extends over the penetration.

There is no foam behind the fire wrap.

It provides a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ba~rier.

The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam.

The foam cont~ins an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.

'On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable I

Unit 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-17

  • DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

(cont'd) p*netration seal was found on the north wall in the 1oot Elevation Relay Room.

The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam.

The foam contains an 1/2" diameter hole.

Between August 2, 1988 and August 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 Relay Room and -4 penetrat_ions are located in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Room.

The penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter.

The nature of the impairments include 6 with no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal (unknown cause), 2 with for~ign material imbedded in the seal (one imbedded with a rag and the other with duct tape),_

30 with a void in the seal (due to inadequate quantity of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparen~ degradation (e.g.,

cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure (reference LER 272/88-013-00) and 32 that are not deep enough -

into the penetra~ion per design (less than 6 inches).

Between August 31, 1988 and December 30, 1989, 6763 Unit 1 penetration seals and 2785 Unit 2 penetration seals were reviewed. Of these, 2525 penetration seals were determined to be impaired.

The majority of penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter.

There were 262 penetrations which were larger than 6 inches in diameter.

These penetrations ranged from 3"x5" to 169"x25".

Page 3 of this report contains a table of the penetration seals found impaired, between August 2, 1988 and December 30, 1989, in relation to the fire zone where they were found.

The impairment designator terms include:

~o-Seal

~OS

-~Ole-in Seal HOL V~id in ~eal VIS Depth Not Great Enough DPT Color/Cell Structure CEL Seal Degradation DEG Foreign Material Imbedded FMT Planned Impairment PIM An hourly fire watch patrol had been establ~shed for the above areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.

Therefore, the requirements of Tech. Spec. Actiori Statement 3.7.11.a are met.

Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire p~netrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-17

  • DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

(cont'd)*

least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in.

lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Spe~ification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status."

NOTE -

Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit-2.

The words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE and "inoperable".

TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS 8/02/88 -

12/30/89 AREA U-1 Relay Room U-1 lA D/G Control Room U-1 lB D/G Control Room U-1 lC D/G Control Room U-1 lA 125 V Battery Room U-1 lC 125 V Battery Room U-1 #1 250 V Battery Room U-1 #3 Stairwell U-1 64' Elevation, Aisle

  1. i Auxiliary Building U-1 84' Elevation, Aisle
  1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 122' Elevation, N2 Bottle Storage Area U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 &

2 Common East & West

  • U-1 78' Electrical Penetra.

Area NOS 15 2

1 1

2 20 9

6 U-1 100' Boric Acid Transfer 3

Pump Area HOL 34 3

1 1

1 3

4 1

3 1

4 U-1 lOQ' El. Mechanical 1

5 Penetration Area -

Blowdown Tanks DPT CEL 52 72 194 2

21 3

21 1

11 11 3

1 1

1 5

l 5

1 6

17 7

7 3

1 1

7 12 5

2 8

DEG FMT 7

3 l**

2 2

2 1

1 3

1

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-17

3 3

2 1

Service Building U-1 100' Elevation, Aisle 4

4 2

6 14 1

  1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1 &

15 10 8

30 61 1

2 Common East & West

  • U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 &

2 7

14 11 2

1 2 Common North & South U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 &

3 3

2 Common East & West

  • U-1 122' Lobby.

2

  • U-1 100' Lobby 1

1 U-1 64' Lobby 1

U-1 11/12 Containment Spray 4

4 6

19 2

Pumps & Spray Add. Tank Area U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1 &

2 4

3 1

185 2

2 Common North & South U-1 100' Elevation Counting 6

1 1

Room U-1 #11 Diesel O:i,l Tk Room 1

1 3

.U-1 #12 Diesel Oil Tk Room 2

5 U-"l 84' Elev. Control Area 23 14 1

22 91 1

  1. 1 Transformer Bus Rm.

U-1 Spent Fuel Pit Heat 3

3 6

16 Exchanger & Pump Area U-1 lA Diesel Generator Area 5

1 1

U-1 lB Diesel Generator Area 1

l 7

1 7

U-1 lC Diesel Generator Area 4

1 2

3 U-1 Waste Evaporator Room 4

11 4

1 1

U-1 100' Elevation Mechanical 8 4

10 Penetration Area U-1. UPS Battery Room 2

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-17

12/30/89 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 A/C Equipment Rm 1

2 4

U-1 Bo.ric Acid Evap. &

2 1

3 1

Gas Stripper Unit U-1 Water Recirc Heater 3

1 1

2 U-1 #1 Stairwell 6*

5 U-1 #1 Cone. Filter Area 1

U-1 Rm Next To #11 Chg Pp 2

2 U-1 Diesel Oil C02 Area 4

1 U-1 Motor Control Center 2

1 1

U-1 Elevator -

E1 2

1 1

U-1 N2 Bottle Storage 3

U-1 #12 RHR XGR Room 1

U-1 55'- El. Walkway 2

U-1 Future Mixed Bed 7

Demin U-1 #11 Mixed Bed Dem in 2

U-1 #1 Cation Bed (NW) 2 U-1 #1 Cation Bed (SW) 8 U-1 #11 Debora ting Deroin 3

U-1 #12 Debora ting Dem in 2

1 U-1 Primary Sampling Lab 1

U-1 78' Pipin~ Penetration 1

4 U-1 Vent Duct Shaft 1

6 U-1 Valve Room 4

U-1 waste Evaporator Area 1

U-1 #11 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg.

3 U-1 #12 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg.

2

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT s*-11

4 U-1 #14 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg.

1 1

U-1 100' Aisle #1 N & S 2

U-1 122' Corridor 1

U-1 Ops File & Ref Rm 1

U-1 Watch Engineer Room 3

U-1 #1 Maint, Spare & Test 1

Equipment Room U-1 #2 Maint, Spare & Test 2

Equipment Room U-1 Janitors Closet 1

U-1 #1 Control Equip. Room 15 5

U-1 84' El. Pipe Alley 2

3 1

U-1 Sample R9om 1

U-1 Data Logging Room 2

16 U-1 Work Control Center 2

1 U-1 #11 & #12 RHR Sump Pumps 1

Room U-1 #1 Control Room 4

2 U-1 AC Equip. Room 1

2 U-1 #1 Spent Fuel Pit Filter 1

U-1 Women's Toilet 5

U-:-2 #5 Stairwell 3

1 U-2 #4 Stairwell 3

1 U-2 #2 Stairwell 6

1 1

U-2 100' El. Mechanical Pene.

2 Area -

Blowdown Tanks U-2 100' El. Corridor 1

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-17

12130189 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-2 100' Elevation Mechanical 1 1

3 Penetration Area U-2 AC & Boric Acid Tank Room 2 2

1 U-2 Relay Room 23 22 4

53 132 1

U-2 22 RHR Xgr Room 3

U-2 84' Control Area Trans-16 19 4

30 23 f orm~r Bus Room U-2 Rad. Detector Panel 1

U-2 Battery Room 2C 125VDC 13 U-2 Battery Room 2B 125VDC 2

3 3

U-2 #2 250V Battery Room 3

U-2 Control Area #7 4KV 4

5 2

3 1

Vital Bus Area U-2 110' El. Control Console 1

3 U-2 78' Electrical Pen. Area 5

4 U-2 2A DIG Control Room 1

5 4

1 U-2 2B DIG Control Room 1

2 9

4 U-2 2C DIG Control Room 2

4 3

U-2 #21 Diesel Oil Tank Area 5

2 1

3 U-2 #22 Diesel Oil Tank Area 1

3 2

4 4

U-2 #21 Diesel Fuel Oil 1*

1 Transfer Pump Area U-2 #22 Diesel Fuel Oil 1

Transfer Pump Area U-2 111' Vent. Equip. Area.

11 2

9 U-2 100' Vent Duct Shaft 1

1 U-2 64' Storage Area 2

1 19 6

U-2 84' Spent Fuel Pit Heat 4

4 XChgr. & Pump Room

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8Es.-17

  • U-2 U-2 U-2 U-2 Boric Aisle TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 12/30/89-NOS VIS CEL Acid XFer Pump Area 2 1
fl:l East Section 7

1 1

Aux. Feedwater Pumps 1

121 &: 22 Monitor Tank 2

Area FMT 2

The opposite room for the north and east walls is the Unit 2 Relay Room.

    • - The Relay Room PIM was resealed thirteen days after opening PIM APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The-cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the sleeve which hid the gap.

The 3.5" south wall penetrations (discovered 7/25/88) also appeared sealed from the Relay Ro6rn side, as described in the Description of Occurrence section.

Closer inspection, as required by the Seal Penetration Review Group procedures, revealed the nature of the impairments.

Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months via a visual inspection.

This inspection would not necessarily identify the non-functional status of the subject penetrations.

The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult* to reach location.

The gap in the seal may have formed due to shrinkage.

It does not appear as though a cable was pulled (forming the gap).

'J'hc= 3.5" north wall penetration (found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach locati~n.

The ~ap in the seal appears to have formed as a result of a cable pull. It Las not been determined when or by whom the cable was pulled.

The penetrations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and December 30, 1989, are similar in configuration (except as noted) to the penetrations identified in the original issue of this Special Report.

The cause of their degraded condition also could not positively be determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.

This design feature minimizes the

. UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT ~3-17

  • ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

(cont'd)'

possibility of a single fi°re involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspe~tions.

This report satisfies the reportin~ require~ents of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventuai repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven {7) days.

Appropriate_

actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish _a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire.barriers once the.

impairments were identified.

The subject fire area contains dete~tion in addition to the roving fire watch patrol.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected b~fore ~t could involve an adjacent area.

This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The hourly fire watch, _as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns a~sociated with these areas are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven {7) days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force.

Upon completion -of this review the penetrations will be sealed.

Penetration seal repair work has been initiated.

The Unit i Relay Room was the first area worked~

To date, 2224 penetrations have been sealed and accepted by the Penetration Seal Task Force.

The majority of those penetrations in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Relay Rooms {halon discharge areas) which either have no seal or holes through the seal _have been sealed using approved station procedure M3Y, "Installation and Repair of Fire Barrier and Flood Protection Seals".

The review and corrective actions, conducted by the Penetration Seal Review Program, will be completed in accordance with-the March 4, 1988 PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 to the NRC, the August 26, 1988 telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office, and the August 15, 1989 semi-annual management meeting conducted with the NRC.

MJP:pc SORC Mtg.90-001 General Manager -

Salem Operations

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