ML18092B126
| ML18092B126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1986 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18092B124 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-86-06, 50-272-86-6, NUDOCS 8604230225 | |
| Download: ML18092B126 (15) | |
Text
..
APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Public Service Electric and Gas Company Salem Unit 1 Docket No.
50-272 License No. DPR-70 As a result of the inspection conducted on March 1-31, 1986, and in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C) published in the Federal Register on March 8, 1984 (47 FR 8583), the following violation was identified:
A.
Technical Specifications 6.8.1 states: Written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the activity referenced below:
- a.
The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix 11A 11 of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November, 1972.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, November, 1972, Appendix 11A 11, Part J. states in part "Chemical and radiochemical control procedures should be written to prescribe the nature and frequency of sampling and analysis, instructions maintaining water chemistry within prescribed limits... and that these procedures should specify laboratory instructions and calibration of laboratory equipment.
PSE&G Chemistry Organization Manual, chapter 7, "Chemistry Quality Control", part 4, "Selection and Control of Reagents, 11 states in part "chemicals and reagents should have expiration date stickers on their containers.
The chemicals should not be used after their expiration date.
11 Part 5, 11Selection and control of standards 11 states in part "Shelf 1 ife shal 1 be affixed to standards as well as reagents.
11 Contrary to the above, the inspector identified on March 11, 1986, that chemicals stored on the chemistry laboratory shelves were expired and that these chemicals were subsequently used in the production of standards.
In addition, shelf life expiration dates had not been determined for all standards as well as reagents.
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement 1) applicable to DRP-70.
Pursuant to the prov1s1ons of 10 CFR 2.201, Public Service Electric and Gas Company is hereby required to submit to this office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting tnis Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation: (1) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (2) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 8604230225 860416 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
PD R __
CIR SALEM 86 0003.0.0 04/14/86
Report Nos.
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
Licensee:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 50-272/86-06 50-311/86-06 50-272 50-311 DPR-70 DPR-75 050272-860209 050272-860218 050272-860220 Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
March 1, 1986 - March 31, 1986 Inspectors:
Reviewed Approved by:
Inspection Summary:
(Main Chief, Reactor Projects Projects Brarrch No. 2, DRP Yankee) t2,u(s-G date
\\L//,.--lrc
~
Inspections on March 1, 1986 - March 31, 1986 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/86-06 and 50-311/86-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations including: followup on outstanding inspection items, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, review of special reports, licensee event followup, full power license condition, allegation, and pe~sonnel change announcement.
The inspec-tion involved 53 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector and 85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br /> by region based inspectors.
8604230231 860416 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
I 2
Results: A violation was identified in the area of chemistry control involving the control of reagents and standards with regard to shelf life.
See section*
three for further details.
DETAILS
- 1.
Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of licensee management and staff as necessary to support inspection activity.
- 2.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/84-36-02) During testing Rod 2A4 dropped into the core, but did not drop all the way.
The inspector left the item open to review testing of this rod at a later date.
The inspector has reviewed subsequent testing of the rod and determined that the tests were satisfactory.
The connectors of all the rod drive mechanisms are being replaced during this outage.
The inspector considers this item closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/84-36-04) The inspector desired to review the results of the following tests at a later date.
Hot Rod Drop Functional Tests per lPD 5.2.001 and Work Order No.
84-09-17-008-6 Individual Rod Position Indication Calibration per lIC 8.1.002 and lIC 8.1.003.and Work Order No. 84-08-30-034-2 Resistance Thermocouple Detector Cross Calibration per lIC 2.5.001 with 11 on-the-spot change 11 dated October 12, 1984 The inspector has reviewed the above tests and has determined that the results were satisfactory. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272-84-42-08 and 311/84-42-02) The licensee was to complete their response to Bulletin 84-03 11 Refueling Cavity Seal Failure 11
- This Bulletin was closed in combined report 272/86-04, 311/86-04.
Therefore this item is closed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (272/85-03-01) Operators had not tripped a bistable in the solid state protection system (turbine stop valve 12MS28) within one hour of the switch failure as per Technical Specifications.
The inspector left the item open pending review of licensee actions.
The inspector ha~ reviewed the LER submitted (LER 85-003-01) and revisions to the Technical Specification Interpretations and has determined that operators were informed and retrained on the sensitivity of this issue.
The inspector considers this item closed.
4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/85-12-01) Corrosion of service water pipe supports and hangers.
The inspector reviewed the licensee Safety Evaluation. S-C-M600-MSE-0365 and field directive S-C-19DO~MFD-0340 which addressed the inspector's concerns.
Specifically the hangers and Hilti bolts in question have been cleaned, ultra sonic tested and repainted.
No adverse results were noted.
The inspector also reviewed a program that will periodically inspect hangers in high humidity areas.
The inspector considers this item closed.
- 3.
Operational Safety Verification 3.1 Documents Reviewed Selected Operators' Logs Senior Shift Supervisor 1 s (SSS) Log Jumper Log Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
Selected Radiation Exposure Permits (REP} and Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
Selected Chemistry Logs Selected Tagouts Health Physics Watch Log 3.2 The inspector conducted routine entries into the protected areas of the plants, including the control rooms, Auxiliary Building, fuel buildings, and containments (when access is possible).
During the inspection activities, discussions were held.with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, supervisors, and plant management.
The purpose -0f the inspection was to affirm the licensee 1 s commitments and compTiance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedures.
(1)
On a daily basis, particular attention was directed to the following areas:
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities; Adherence to LCO's directly observable from the control room; Proper control room shift manning and access control; Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm; Proper use of procedures; Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and, Verification of surveillance testing for timely completion.
5 (2)
On a weekly basis, the inspector confirmed the operability of selected ESF trains by:
Verifying that accessible valves in the flow path were in the correct positions; Verifying that power supplies and breakers were in the correct positions; Verifying that de-energized portions of these systems were de-energized as identified by Technical Specifications; Visually inspecting major components for leakage, lubrication, vibration; cooling water supply, and general operating conditions; and, Visually inspecting instrumentation, where possible, for proper operability.
(3)
On a biweekly basis, the inspector:
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system; Observed a shift turnover; Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents; Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established;*
Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; Reviewed licensee-identified problem areas; and, Verified selected portions of containment isolation lineup.
3.3 Inspector Comments/Findings:
The inspector selected phases of the units operation to determine compliance with the NRC 1 s regulations.
The inspector determined that the areas inspected and the licensee's actions did not constitute *a health and safety hazard to the public or plant personnel.
The following are noteworthy areas the inspector researched in depth:
6
- 1.
Unit 1
- a.
Unit 1 began this report period at 97% with #3 governor valve and its i~olation valve shut for overspeed protection.
The unit operated at 97% power until March 21 at 9:58 p.m., when the unit was brought off the line to enter a planned refueling outage.
The outage has been scheduled for 45 days and is intended to accomplish the 6th refueling, replacement of three moisture separator reheaters, upgrade of the condensate pumps, perform 45 design changes, and reduc~
the backlog of outage related maintenance work requests.
The inspector reviewed the following document with regard to the reactor cavity seal.
Procedure FP-PSE-R6 Section 9.2.6 "Placement of Cavity Seal 11 Westinghouse Procedure for Refueling Cycle 6-7 After an inspection with regard to the installation of the cavity seal the inspector determined that:
A new seal with proper certification was placed into the cavity.
Proper QA hold points were used.
An inspection for leakage was performed.
The procedure was SORC approved (Meeting #86-018).
The procedure and installation of the seal satisfied the concerns of Bulletin 84-03, "Refueling Cavity Water Seal.
11 The inspector had no further questions concerning the installation of the cavity seal.
- 2.
Unit 2
- a.
Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout this period except for minor power alterations for testing.
No violations we~e identified.
3.4 7
Plant Tour During a tour of the licensee's Radiochemistry laboratory on March 11, 1986, the inspector identified several discrepancies concerning laboratory quality control practices.
The inspector observed the following:
approximately one-half (nine of a sample of nineteen) of the laboratory chemicals did not have expiration dates entered on the shelf life stickers located on each bottle three stock standards that had expired (according to their shelf life labels) and eight instances where these standards were used past the expiration date to prepare spectrophotometric calibration standards The licensee's chemistry quality control program requires shelf lives be affixed to standards and reagents and expiration dates be assigned to reagents subject to evaporation, contamination, or decomposition.
However, several licensee chemistry personnel stated that either individual analytical procedures, the consultant material safety and shelf life program or an apparently undocumented general shelf life policy (one year for opened bottles, two years for unopened bottles) can be used to determine chemical shelf lives.
The inspector noted to the licensee that the above controls are conflicting and the licensee's chemistry administrative or analytical procedures do not define the policy or program that should be used or takes precedence.
In addition, the licensee's chemistry quality control program states that chemicals should not be used after their expiration dates.
Comparison of lot numbers of expired chemical stock standards'with lot numbers recorded in the laboratory notebook indicated that the expired chemical standard had been used by the licensee to prepare spectrophotometric calibration standards.
Collectively the above is a violation (272/86-06-01).
The licensee's chemistry quality control program requires that a performance check of the conductivity bridge galvanometer be performed quarterly before the cell constant is determined.
The licensee's computer tracking system sends reminder cards to the chemistry section when the checks are due.
The inspector observed two conductivity bridges with calibration stickers indicating past due electrical checks.
Interviews with licensee chemistry and training personnel, and review of the conductivity analytical procedure indicate that the electrical check is incorporated in the analytical procedure and is no longer performed as a separate check as delineated by the quality control program.
The licensee stated that a newer model conductivity bridge permits the check to be performed more simply
and quickly, and results in the check being performed more frequent1y than quarterly.
The expired calibration stickers were left over from the previous method of check control and were removed by the licensee on March 12, 1986.
The licensee plans to update the quality control program and computer tracking system to reflect current practices.
The inspector had no further questions.
The licensee's chemistry quality control program requires that calibration curves be checked quarterly.
The inspector observed a spectrophotometric hydrazine one centimeter cell calibration curve which had an expired calibration date in the licensee's laboratory notebook.
The licensee informed the inspector that normally the current calibration curves are kept in the front of the notebook, while expired curves are retained in the back.for trend evaluation.
The expired curves are usually marked in large letters "Do not use - expired."
The licensee marked the expired curve and put it in the back of the notebook.
The inspector verified that the licensee had a current hydrazine one centimeter cell calibration curve.
The inspector had no further concerns.
One violation was identified.
- 4.
Maintenance Observations During this report period an inspection into the maintenance area was conducted by regional based inspectors.
(Combined Inspection 50-272/86-10 and 311/86-10)
- 5.
Surveillance Observations During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed in-progress surveillance testing as well as completed surveillance packages.
The inspector verified that the surveillances were performed in accordance with licensee approved procedures and NRC regulations.
The inspector also verified that the instruments used were within calibration tolerances and that qualified technicians performed the surveillances.
The following surveillances were reviewed:
Unit 1 SP(0)4.0.5-P-SW (11 & 13) Inservice Testing - Service Water Pumps.
This test verifies operability of Service Water Pumps 11 & 13 in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.5 SP(0)4.0.5-V-RH Inservice Testing - Residual Heat Removal System.
This test strokes and tests valves in the Residual Heat Removal System in accordance with TS 4.0.5
9 SP(0)4.0.5.V - Inservice Testing Refueling - Check Valve Full Stroke Test.
This test strokes and verifies operability of certain check valves in the Residual Heat Removal System and supporting systems such as supply from Refueling Water Storage Tank in accordance with TS 4.0.5 SP(0)4.2.4 Power Distribution - Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
This test determines Quadrant Power Tilt in accordance with TS 3.2.4.
SP(0)4.l.2.l(b) Reactivity Control - Boration.
This test verifies Boric Acid Transfer Tank flow path for Modes 5 and 6 in accordance with TS 4.1.2.2.b.
No violations were identified.
- 6.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports.
The review included the following:
inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information.
The following periodic reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - February 1986 Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - February 1986 In addition, the inspector reviewed Special Report 86-01 (Unit 1).
This is a thirty day report required if a fire barrier has been degraded for more than seven days.
The report identifies a door
- 121-1 which was declared inoperable due to a broken latch mechanism.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the door had to be replaced.
The licensee took appropriate compensatory measures and has ordered a new door.
The engineering department is conducting a review of the differential pressure across this door, due to ventilation differences between two buildings.
The inspector will review the results of this review when issued.
(272/86-06-02)
No violations were identified.
- 7.
Licensee Event Report Followup The inspector reviewed the following LERs to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was taken, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
10 Unit 1 86-04 Plant Vent Sample Not Obtained as Required by the RETS Subsequent to shutdown, startup or thermal power changes greater than 15% in one hour, the Radiological Environmental Technical Specifications (RETS) require plant vent samples be obtained once per twenty-four hours for seven consecutive days.
In this LER the licensee identified that samples were taken on February 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 however, February 9 was missed.
No radioactive iodine or particulates were detected as a result of sampling.
The missed sample has been attributed to operator error as a result of inadequate turnover information.
The licensee has conducted additional training with superviso~s and is in the process of upgrading its training program in this area.
86-05 Diesel Generator Surveillance Performed Late Diesel surveillance testing was performed two hours late.
In accordance with Technical Specifications diesel operable surveillance should be conducted every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> when one diesel is out for maintenance.
The cause for being late on this surveillance has been attributed to inadequate turnover by operations personnel.
The licensee has counseled the personnel involved and has amended the daily shift routine tags to enhance the visibility of surveillances required between shifts and to see they are properly scheduled.
The inspector has no further questions at this time.
86-06 Reactor Trip From 100% Caused by the Closure of 14BF19 This LER was a reactor trip on February 20, 1986 and was discussed in detail in Inspection Report 86-04/86-04.
The inspector has no further questions at this time.
- 8.
Full Power License Conditions (Unit 2)
The full power license for Salem Unit 2 was issued on May 20, 1981, and contains several conditions to be met prior to given dates or events.
The inspector reviewed a number of these items to d~termine status of implementation.
The following comments apply to the areas reviewed (Numbers refer to paragraph references in the full power license and supplements to the license):
Safety Evaluation Report (SER)
Supplement 4 (P 3-11) TS 8.5 4(2)
Requires that Barton Lot 1 trans-mitters be replaced after 2nd outage.
The inspector reviewed Design Changes lEC-0754, lEC-1055, lEC-1423, 2EC-1056, 2EC-1414 AND 2EC-1717 and verified that the Barton transmitters have been
SER Supplement 4 (P 3-15)
TS 8.5(1)
-- 2.C.(15)(A)
-- 2.C.(15)(8)
TS 4.4.11.2 11 replaced by Rosemount transmitters that are environmentally qualified.
(OI # 80-LN-Ol)
Requires that until post-accident monitoring RT0 1 s are replaced with qualified RT0 1 s that each refueling the RT0 1 s will be reviewed.
The inspector reviewed Design Changes 2EC-1677, 2EC-1414, lEC-1676 and lEC-1413 and verified that the post-accident monitoring RTD 1 s have been replaced by qualified RT0 1 s.
(OI # 80-LN-02)
Requires that details of the guide thimble tube wall wear inspection be documented after the first refueling.
The inspector reviewed documentation of testing performed by Westinghouse and the subsequent WCAP report 10002 which was submitted to the NRC.
The test required that burnup on the fuel and rod movements were necessary to get a definitive evaluation so the licensee performed the measurem~nts on Unit 1 which had two cycles of operation.
Additional review of correspondence from NRC indicates that this issue has been resolved.
(OI # 80-LN-05)
Required inspection of the Steam Generator inspection ports after the first outage.
This item was deleted as per Amendment #29 to the station operating license.
(OI # 80-LN-07)
Is a commitment to perform ultrasonic testing of the #21 Steam Generator head to insure no increase in the cracks discovered in the cladding at installation.
Three tests were required, one during each refueling period.
The inspector has reviewed the results of two tests that have been performed and has reviewed procedure M9-1WP-425 which has been
12
- 9.
Allegation scheduled for the next refueling on Unit 2.
The results of the two tests indicate that no propagation of the cracks in the clad has occurred when compared to the initial baseline data.
(OI # 80-LN-08)
On several occassions beginning on March 14, 1986, a worker expressed concern regarding his safety and that of fellow workers during containment entries at power.
The work crew had made several entries to inspect and repair various equipment in the fan cooler system inside containment.
This work was accomplished.with the reactor at power in the three week period preceding the start of a scheduled outage on March 23, 1986.
The specific concerns included the following:
neutron exposures were not properly monitored by the HP technician assigned to job coverage workers felt fatigued and developed skin rashes ALARA considerations should postpone the work until after reactor shutdown records were changed just prior to the outage On March 21, 1986 a region based radiation specialist investigated the workers concerns.
The inspector obtained information from:
Interviews with the Station Superintendent, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager, Nuclear Fire and Safety Manager, Maintenance Manager, and associated staff personnel.
A review of completed radiation work permits, radiation surveys and associated records.
A containment entry at power,tours of all elevations, and comparison of gamma and neutron dose rates with record~d values.
A review of the Nuclear Department Safety Manual requirements in regards to containment entries.
Findings and Conclusions The radiological conditions in the work areas inside containment were properly monitored and assessed.
In general, the gamma and neutron dose rates were in the order of 10 mrem per hour, the airborne and
13 surface contamination were below limits except in isolated areas.
The whole body dose estimated from field readings and entered on the RWP indicated that workers received only a few millrem per entry.
Both TLD and neutron dosimetry were specified on the RWP.
Start of job surveys were performed and continuous HP technician coverage was provided during work.
The licensee's primary safety concern was heat stress of the workers.
The ambient temperature on the 130 1 elevation can exceed 100 degrees F.
The safety department advised that special apparel is available such as vortex coolers and ice vests.
Stay times are limited according to the maximum work area temperature a~ specified in the Safety Manual.
Both workers and line supervisors are ~riefed regarding thes~ precautions.
The licensee advised that this work, part of an Engineering directive and preventative maintenance program for service water, was not postponed until the outage since a thorough management review indicated that no adverse personnel safety condition was present.
The plant maintenance organization was recently directed to perform any preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance or generic replacements at convenient times if not prevented by personnel safety concerns.
During this inspection the licensee was in the process of transferring the radiation work permit system from a manual to a computerized system.
In addition, a new main control point was being implemented with much improved facilities.
There was no attempt to alter records.
The inspector concluded that all aspects of this allegation were unsubstantiated.
As a result of this allegation and after discussions with the resident inspector, the licensee's management has reiterated their open door policy to all PSE&G personnel and contractors and have stated that they are willing to discuss any potential concerns that arise during the course of the work being performed and will correct fhem where necessary.
The management also reiterated that if these concerns cannot be solved there is a resident inspector on site to discuss potential problems.
The resident inspector has polled the principal contractors on site to ascertain that the lines of communication are open between the contractors and licensee management, and that radiological matters are being resolved quickly.
The resident inspector concluded that communication lines are open and that radiological matters are being resolved.
No violations were identified.
6, 14
- 10.
Personnel Change Announcement E. James Ferland, President of Northeast Utilities has been elected President of PSE&G.
Mr. Ferland will succeed Harold W. Sann effective June 1, 1986 who will remain Chairman of the Board until his retirement in July.
At that time Mr. Ferland will assume the C.O.B.
position as well.
At the same time Mr. Everett L. Norris (current Senior Executive V.P.) will also assume chief financial officer functions.
Both men will become members of the Board of Directors.
- 11.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting period.
The licensee did not identify 2.790 material.