ML18087A908
| ML18087A908 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1983 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18087A907 | List: |
| References | |
| DD-83-06, DD-83-6, NUDOCS 8305170085 | |
| Download: ML18087A908 (8) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR In the Matter of
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DD 83-6
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PUBLIC.SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
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(Salem Nuclear Generating.Station, )
Docket Nos.
50-272 and 50-311 Units 1 and 2)
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DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. 2.206 By petition dated April 12, 1983, amended April 18, 1983, the Public Advocate of.the State of New Jersey_~equest~d, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206, that the Nuclear Regulatory_ Cq_rnmissi_on (NRC) order Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) to show cause why it should not be restrained*
from restarting its Salem facilities until it has taken certain actions.
In addition, the Public Advocate requested.that the licensee be required to demonstrate before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in response to the show cause order:
- 1) that it has adequately analyzed the causes of the reactor circuit-trip breaker failures of February 22 and 25, 1983, which required that Unit l be manually shut down;
- 2) that it has proposed and established systems sufficien~ to prevent the recurrence of the trip breaker failures or similar failures of other safety-related devices and systems; and 30 "DRsi68coss 830429- -
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- 3) that its overall program of quality assurance, maintenance, and management are adequate for it to continue to operate Salem consistent with its operating license, and the protection of public health and safety and welfare of the residents of the State of New Jersey.
Discussion On February 25, 1983.a signal that water in one of the steam generators was too low generated a reactor trip signal while the Unit l reactor was at 12% full power during a routine startup following a refueling outage at the Salem Nuclear-Generating Station. The reactor trip circuit breakers failed to open automatically and the operators manually tripped the reactor to _b~in[ it to a stable shutdown condition.
Initial licensee investigation of the event disclosed that the reactor trip breakers failed to open because of mechanical binding of ~he latch mechan{sm in the undervoltage trip attachment on the breakers. During a subsequent review of this event and a previous reactor scram on February 22, 1983, the licensee determined that a trip demand condition without automatic scram had also existed for about.three seconds on February 22, 1983.
The Unit 1 reactor was placed in a cold shutdown condition. pending completion of a review of these events. lf
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Salem Unit 2 is presently shutdown for refueling and is not presently scheduled to resume operation before June 1, 1983.
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- ... On February 26, 1983, an NRC team was onsite to conduct initial followup and to collect preliminary information.
The NRC Staff has
- continued to intensively evaluate these events and the circumstances leading up to them.
In addition, a separate task force has been established to conduct a separate generic study of th~*broader implications.of the.Salem events to detennine if generic actions are needed for other facilities as well as Salem.
During the course of this evaluation the NRC Staff has generated a number of reports which have identified issues arising out of the Salem events and the licensee and/or NRC actions to resolve them.
These-reports set forth the Staff's evaluation and resolution of the is~1:_ies rais_ed by the Salem events as they have evolved and progresseq oye~ time. These reports include:
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SECY-83-98, Salem Restart Status Report, March 10, 1983 (Interim draft report on the current status of evaluation of Salem events).
- 2.
SECY-83-98A, Salem Restart, March 14, 1983 (Report on the current status of the staff evaluation of the failure to automatically scram events *** at Salem *** and the staff action plan for authorizing restart of Units l & 2)
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SECY-83-988, NRC Region I Task Force Report on the Salem Unit ATWS Events, March 17, 1983.
- 4.
SECY-83-98C, Salem Restart Status Report, March 29, 1983 (Updated status report of staff evaluation which superseded the March 14, 1983 Report).
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NUREG-0977, NRC Fact-Finding Task Force Report on the ATWS Events at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, on February 22 and 25, 1983, March 1983.
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SECY-83-980, Salem Restart Evaluation, April 8, 1983.
(Final draft of.. Staff's Safety Evaluation addressing the February events at Sa1e~ which superseded previous status reports)
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SECY-83-98E, Salem R~start Evaluation, April 11, 1983 (Revision of the April 8, 1983 draft Safety Evaluation)
The petitioner relies on item 2 above, the March 14, 1983 Status Report, for much of the basis of its request. y As noted above, the Staff's knowledge and evaluation of the events has evolved significantly since that time. Also, the lic~n~ee_has continued its own evaluation and instituted a number of actions or commitments to actions over the past weeks.
These licensee actions a~e described in its submittals dated March 1, 8, 14, 18, 23, and April 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 22, 27, and 28, 1983.
The April 28, 1983 submittal summarized the licensee's corrective action program and included a list of action items completed or the scheduled date for completion.
y As part of its evaluation and recommended actions at that time, the staff.had concluded that a show cause order should be issued to the licensee *
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~. The Staff 1 s Safety Evaluation Report, dated April 29, 1983, which is attached to this decision, groups the issues which have been identified from the Salem events into three main catagories: A) Equipment and evaluation; B) Operating procedures, operator training and operator response evaluation;_ and C) Management evaluation. *For each sub-issue ~n.
these categories the safety evaluation report describes: (1) the issue raised by the February ev~nts, (2) the licensee 1s response to the question raised, e.g., changes in procedures, review of past work orders, proposed audits; and (3) the reasons why the Staff has concluded that the issue has been sufficiently resolved to provide reasonable assurance that resumption of operations at the Salem facility will not create an undue risk to the public health and safety.
In the first category, the Staff has concluded that the licensee has acceptably revised its maintenance procedures, revised and expanded his surveillance testing programs, provided an adequate verification testing program and will submit proposed Technical Specification changes to provide for notification to NRC for maintenance testing results that exieed acceptance criteria and for measured trip forces that exceed'the recommended upper limit and to provide for additional surveillance requirements for the reactor trip and bypass breakers.
In the second area, the licensee has acceptably identified reliable control room indicators that provide positive indication of automatic reactor trip demand, without operator analysis or verification, and has revised procedures to direct the operators to insert a manual trip
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whenever positive indication of an automatic reactor trip demand is present, without delay to evaluate the plant status. The licensee has also acceptably completed training actions and commitments in the areas of training on procedures, training utilizing the Reactor Protection System, and the administration of this training.
As such, the licensee's ATWS training program for licensed operators and for auxiliary operators is no~ acceptable.
In the third category various management areas have been addressed.
These management areas are Master Equipment List, procurement procedures, work order procedures post trip review, timeliness of event notification, updating vendor supplied information,
- involvement of QA personnel wit~ ?~h~r station departments, post maintenance operability testing, and overall management capability and performance.
The licensee has acceptably revised its procedures and conducted acceptable training to ensure that work orders and procurement documents will be properly classified in the future.
The licensee has conducted an acceptable review of past procurement documents and work orders to verify that the misclassification problem associated with 'the reactor trip breakers was an isolated incident. Additionally, the licensee has developed an acceptable post trip review procedure to ensure a systematic and comprehensive review of reactor trips is conducted prior to returning to operation.
Finally, the licensee has instituted an acceptable program involving both outside consultants and additional corporate safety committees to further evaluate and upgrade the effectiveness and safety of the licensee's nuclear activities.
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- 7 The findings by the Staff encompass the areas of concern identified.
by the petitioner. The licensee has submitted sufficient information and taken or proposed sufficient actions for the staff to adequately review and resolve its concerns arising out of the Salem February 22 and 25, 1983 *events. y _ Consequently, I have determined that an order to require PSE&G to sh6w cause why it should be permitted to restart until these concerns are addressed need not now be issued.
However, I intend to issue an order to PSE&G confirming the commitments made by PSE&G in its April 28, 1983, letter summarizing its Corrective Action Program. 4/
. On the basis of the above-described actions already taken by the Staff regarding the Salem facility ~nd the February 22 and 25, 1983 events, the Public Advocate 1 s request fo_r __ is~uance of an order to show cause is denied.
The NRC Task Force which has been conducting the generic study on the broader implications of the Salem events has been involved in the Staff deliberations on Salem restart. While its focus has been the longer term aspects of the problems revealed by the Salem events, the group has been kept informed of the Staff evaluations.
The generic report relies to a large extent on the restart report as a source of information on what went wrong at Salem and what needs to be examined at other plants. The Task Force has identified nothing during its review or from its generic study which would alter the Staff's conclusions on the adequacy of PSE&G's actions for resumption of operations.
Whether or not any hearing would be held on this order would depend upon whether any person could demonstrate an interest affected within the scope of the order. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, CLI-82-16, NRC July 30, 1982.
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- ... A copy of this decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission 1s review in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations.
As provided in 10 C.F.R. 2.206{c), this decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of is_suance, unless the Commission on its own motion institutes review of this decision within that time.
Dated at Bethesda, Md.
this 29 day of Apri\\ 1983.
Attachments:
(1)
Safety Evaluation Report (2)
Letter from PSE&G, dated Apri 1 28, 1983
' FOR T~CL~GU~Y COMMISSION
~ aro.ld R. Denton,~
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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