ML18087A780

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Slide Presentation Entitled, Commission Briefing,Salem Event of 830225
ML18087A780
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 03/15/1983
From: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML18087A778 List:
References
NUDOCS 8303240175
Download: ML18087A780 (36)
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Text

.

-a3o324oi75--83031 a 1 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR COMMISSION BRIEFING SALEM EVENT OF FEBRUARY 25, 1983 H. R. DENTON, NRR X27691 MARCH 15, 1983

INTRODUCTION SALEM EVENT BRIEFING OUTLINE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF SALEM EVENTS SALEM RESTART STATUS REPORT A.

EQUIPMENT ISSUES B.

OPERATOR PROCEDURESJ TRAINING AND RESPONSE ISSUES C.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES SALEM DRAFT ORJ1JER SALEM STATUS AND STAFF PLAN OF ACTION BACKGROUND

. I j

INTRODUCTION A.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF SALEM EVENTS

DESCRIPTION OF LOSS OF FEEDWATER ATWS REDJCTION IN FEEDWATER FLOW CAUSES LARGE MISMATCH BETWEEN PRIMARY SIDE HEAT GENEPATION AND SECONDARY.SIIE HEAT REMOVAL t

THIS RESULTS IN AN INCREASE IN REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE AND A DECREASE IN COOLANT DENSITY 1

THE DECREASE IN COOLANT DENSITY CAUSES A SURGE OF COOLANT TO THE PRESSURIZER AND THE SYSTEM PRESSURE INCREASES t

PPESSURIZER RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVES OPEN TO LIMIT PlfSSURE BUILDUP 1

STEAM GENERATOR IN/ENTORY CONTINUES TO DECREASE AS THE RESULT OF BOILOFF WITH NO REPLENISHMENT BY FEEDWATER FLOW <AUXlLIARY FEEDWATER FLOW IS EQU !VALENT TO 8% POWER).

e THE SURGE OF WATER TO THE PIESSURIZER CAUSES IT TO FILL AND WATER DISCHARGES THROUGH THE SAFETY AND RELIEF V*ALVES <LESS VOLUMETRIC FLOW THAN WITH STEAM),

PRESSURE INCREASES AT A FASTER RATE 1

THE INCREASE IN COOLANT TEMPEPATURE/DECREASE IN COOLANT DENSITY CAUSES A REilJCJION IN REACTOR POWER.

MAXIMUM SYSTEM PRESSURE

. OCCU.RS WHEN THE DECREASE IN COOLANT DENSITY RESULTS IN A LARGE POWER REDUCTION SUCH THAT THE SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES CAN REMOVE THE ENE RJY GENE RATED 1

FOLLOWING THE PEAK PRESSURE.. A STEAM BUBBLE IS REFORMED IN THE PRESSURIZER. AND PRESSU Ff DECREASES TO PER'iIT HPI

WESTINGHOUSE,PARTIAL LOSS OF FEEDWATER ATWS F ROM 100% POWER ASSUMPTIONS

1) 100% POWER
2)

PARTIAL LOSS OF FEEDWATER Cl OF 2 TRAINS)

3)

FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC REACTOR SC MM

4)

MTC = - 8 x io-5 LlK (95% VALUE)

K-°F

5)

TURBINE TRIP.

(

PEAK PRESSURE CALCULATED FOR SALEM:

2330 PSI 1

CONSEQUENCES

1)

NO FUEL FA! LU RES

2)

NO DAMAGE To* ESSENTIAL SYSTEM

3)

HEALTH AND SAFETY OF PUBLIC PROTECTED 5

WESTINGHOUSE TOTAL LOSS OF.FEEDWATER ATWS F ROM 100% POWER 1

ASSUMPTIONS

1) 100% POWER
2)

COMPLETE LOSS OF FEEDWATER

3) FAILURE OF AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
4)

MTC = - 8 x lo-5 A K {95% VALUE)

K-°F

5)

NO TU PBINE TRIP 1

CALCULATED PEAK P HESSU RE

1)

GENERIC WESTINGHOUSE CALCULATIONS:

3650 PSI @ -8 MTC

2)

COMPAPABLE SALEM CALCULATIONS: 3491 PSI @ -8 MTC 3). SALEM SPECIFIC CALCULATIONS: 3200 PSI @ -10.5 MTC e POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXCEEDING 3200

1)

DAMAGE TO VALVES REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOR HPI

2)

FAILURE OF RCP SEALS

3)

CORE MELT IF HPI rs INOPEMBLE

l SENSITIVITY OF TOTAL lOSS OF FEEDWATER ATWS TO SIGN IF I CANT PARAMETER 1

MANUAL TURBINE TRIP PER PROCEDURES DURING FIRST 90 SECONDS OF TRANS I ENT RESULTS IN PRES SU RE < 3200 PS I o BLOCKAGE OF ONE PORV INCREASES PEAK PRESSURE ABOUT 250 PSI 1

MTC BECOMES MORE NEGATIVE WITH CORE BU RNUP CEXPOSU RE).

100 PSI DECREASE IN PEAK PRESSURE PER 1 x lo-5

~* k CHANGE IN MTC 0

K-F SOON AFTER REACHING FULL POWER, MTC WOULD BE -10 AND DECREASING

3500 3250 3000 2750 c( -

V')

a.. -

LI.I 2500 c::

V')

V')

LI.I 2250 c::

a..

c::

LI.I N

2000 c::

V')

V')

LI.I 1750 c::

a..

l 500 0

0 LO Figure l 0

0 0

0 LO 0

C'\\J TIME (SEC)

Loss of Feedwater - No Turbine Trio (Pressurizer Pressure vs. Time) 0 LO C'\\J

FIGU~E 2

\\ \\

a

\\

-l

\\

PRESSURE TRANSIENT - LOSS:OF ALL MAIN FEEDWATER (300 SECONDS DELAY BEFORE TRIP) 3600 3200

<C Vl

0.

2800 LU 0:::

Vl Vl LU 0:::

2400

  • o.

0:::

. LU N......

0:::

Vl 2000 Vl LU 0:::

0.

1600 0

100 200 300 400 500 600 TIME (SEC)

  • I EQUIPMENT ISSUES

~-

EQUIPMENT ISSUES

1.

SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF BREAKERS

2. I DENT I FI CATI ON OF CAUSE OF FAILURE LICENSEE - LACK OF LUBRICATION NRC - CUMULATIVE CDUSTJ DIRT~ LACK OF LUBRICATION)

WEAR,, FREQUENT OPERATION,, CORROSION)

ADDITIONAL LAB TESTING AND EXAMINATION

3.

VERIFICATION TESTING PRE-INSTALLATION TEST - 25 CYCLES POST-INSTALLATION TEST - 10 CYCLES 2000 CYCLE TEST

4.

MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES

- DEVELOPED AND INCLUDED LATEST VENDOR PROCEDURES

- MONTHLY TESTING J\\

OPERATOR PROCEDURES, TRAINING AND RESPONSE ISSUES Id-

FEBRUARY 22 20% POWER STEADY STATE ELECTRICAL BUS TRANSFER FAILURE

1.

CHECKED EQUIPMENT LOSSES

2.

EVALUATED CONDITIONS MANUALLY TRIPPED* REACTOR

<PROBLEM WITH TRIP SWITCH>

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS INITIAL CONDITIONS TRANSIENT INITIATOR CT = 0)

OPERATOR

RESPONSE

OPERATOR ACTION CT,_ 25 SEC FOR BOTH)

FEBRUARY 25 14% POWER FEEDWATER IN MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LOW-LOW-WATER LEVEL ANNUNCIATOR

<REACTOR TRIP DEMAND>

1.. CHECKED TO VERIFY.JRIP

2.

NOTED REACTOR NOT TRIPPED

3.

EVALUATE CONDITIONS MANUALLY TRIPPED REACTOR

.1

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE IN PLACE FEBRUARY 22 AND 25 3.2.1 IF AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP HAS_ NQl OCCURRED AS INDICATED BY REACTOR POWER REMAINING HIGH AND/OR MULTIPLE CONTROL RODS* FAILING TO INSERT~

THIS IS IDENTIFIED AS AN "ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT A TRIP" EVENT CATWT EVENT).

PROCEED AS FOLLOWS UNTIL THE REACTOR IS SUCCESSFULLY TRIPPED:

1)

INITIATE A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP WITH EITHER HANDLE ON THE CONTROL CONSOLE,

2)

INITIATE A MANUAL TURBINE TRIP WITH THE HANDLE ON THE CONTROL CO.NSOLE,

3)

OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS MANUALLY FROM THE CONTROL CONSOLE BY DEPRESSING OPEN PUSH-BUTTONS ON BOTH REACTOR TRIP BREAKER A & B

BEZELS,

}~

\\S AREA OF HUMAN FACTORS CONCERNS EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES OPERATOR TRAINING CONTROL ROOM ADEQUACY OPERATOR RESPONSE

. (

I~

SHORT TERM ACTIONS I

REVISE PROCEDURES TO TRIP ON POSITIVE INDICATION OF TRIP DEMAND TRAIN OPERATORS ON REVISED PROCEDURES AND BASIS TRAIN OPERATORS ON RPS AND ASSOCIATED INDICATIONS CAUTION OPERATORS ON OPERATIONS OF MAN TRIP SWITCH

~-----------

~ONG TERM ACTIONS REVISE PROCEDURES FoR UNIT 2 UPGRADE TRAINING PROGRAM ON RPS AND ANNUNCIATORS EVALUATE PERMANENT FIX OF TRIP SWITCH EVALUATE DESIGN OF FIRST Our PANEL

11.

MANAGEMENT.

ISSUES

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

1.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY AND PERFORMANCE

2.

MASTER EQUIPMENT LIST

3.

PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES

4.

WORK ORDER PROCEDURES

5.

POST TRIP REVIEW

6.

TIMELINESS OF EVENT NOTIFICATION

7.

UPDATING VENDOR SUPPLIED INFORMATION

8.

INVOLVEMENT OF QA PERSONNEL WITH OTHER STATION DEPARTMENTS

9.

POST MAINTENANCE OPERABILITY TESTING

ISSUE 1 - OVERALL MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY AND PERFORMANCE REVIEW EFFECTIVENESS OF SRGs

- LICENSEE TO DETERMJNE IMPLICATION OF ROOT CAUSE I SS.LIE 2 - I1EL

- VERIFY COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY FOR SAFETY SYSTEM

- ASSURE PROPER FUTURE-USE ISSUE 3 - PROCUREMENT

- ASSURE.PROCEDURES ARE CLEAR AND UNDERSTOOD

- RELATED TO WORK ORDER ISSUE 4 - WORK ORDER PROCEDURES

- REVIEW ALL WORK ORDERS SINCE MEL.TO IDENTIFY AND RESOLVE~ IF ANY~ IMPROPER CLASSIFICATIONS

- ASSURE PROPER FUTURE USE ISSURE 5 - Posr-TRIP REVIEW

- DEVELOP AND ISSUE REVIEW PROCEDURE

- TRAIN PERSONNEL

- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS PRINTOUT; TRAINING AND DOCUMENT RETENTION

ISSUE 6 - TIMELINESS OF EVENT NOTIFICATION

- REVISE PROCEDURES/PRIORITIES ISSUE 7 - UPDATING VENDOR SUPPLIED 'INFORMATION

- PROVIDE PROGRAM TO ASSURE COMPLETE AND CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS ARE USED ISSUE 8 -

lNYOLYEMENT OF QA

- ONGOING INSPECTION

- LICENSEE SUBMITTAL OF 3/14 TO BE REVIEWED ISSUE 9 - PosT-MAINTENANCE OPERABILITY TESTING

- REVISED PROCEDURES TO ASSURE CONSISTENCY

)1

DRAFT ORDER Q

DRAFT ORDER PROVISIONS FOR AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF TURBINE TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER INDEPENDENT OF REACTOR PRO-TECTION SYSTEM DIVERSITY IN TRIPPING REACTOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES CONSISTENT WITH GUIDELINES FOR ATWS-TYPE TRANSIENTS TRAIN OPERATORS IN ATWS PROCEDURES

  • DEVELOP PLANS AND SCHEDULES TO FURTHER IMPROVE MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN IDENTIFYING AND RESOLVING PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SAFETY-RELATED*PROCURE-MENT_. MAINTENANCE,, SURVEILLANCE AND OPERATIONS PROBLEMS

SALEM STATUS AND STAFF PLAN OF ACTION SUMMRY o STATUS REPORT IDENTIFIES ISSUES AND ACTIONS NEEDED,

o LICENSEE RESPONSES:

MARCH lJ 1983 MARCH 8J 1923.

MARCH 14J 1983 o ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS PLANNED o SHOW CAUSE ORDER o PAT INSPECTION

BACKGROUND

\\

IE BULLETIN 83-01:

FAILURE OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS (WESTINGHOUSE DB-50) TO OPEN ON AUTOMATIC TRIP SIGNAL.

APPLICABILITY:

ALL ~ PWR'S WITH DB TYPE BREAKERS USING UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP ATTACHMENT IN RPS REQUESTED ACTION ITEMS

  • REVIEW MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AND CONFORM TO W PROGRAM OR ALTERNATE *
  • NOTIFY ALL LICENSED OPERATORS OF THE SALEM EVENT, Alli1 REVIEW EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR FAILURE-TO-TRIP WITH EACH-OPERATOR ON HIS ARRIVAL ON SHIFT REPORT TO NRC WITHIN 7 DAYS
  • -~)

IEB 83-01:

FAILURE* OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS <WESTINGHOUSE DB-50) TO OPEN ON AUTOMATIC TRIP SIGNAL

SUMMARY

OF RESPONSES:

  • TESTING - ALL AFFECTED UNITS CURRENTLY OPERATING HAVE TESTED.

NO. FAILURES WERE FOUND

- ONLY TWO UNITS DO NOT HAVE ON-LINE TESTABILITY..

CSA~ ONOFRE 1, HADDAM NECK> BOTH UNITS TESTED SAT-ISFACTORILY WHILE SHUTDOWN.

- UNITS SHUTDOWN WILL TEST PRIOR TQ RESUMING POWER OPERATION.

- SAN ONOFRE 2 AND 3 TESTING C.NOT REQUIRED BY BULLE-TIN> WAS PERFORMED AND FAILURES WERE.REPORTED ON GE AK-2 BREAKERS DURING UNDERVOLTAGE TESTING MAINTENANCE - LICENSEES HAVE REVIEWED AND HAVE PROGIW1S IN PLACE AS REQUESTED NOTIFICATIONS

~- LICENSED OPERATORS HAVE,BE~N NOTIFIED OF THE SALEM EVENT AND HAVE REVIEWED PROCEDURES FOR FAILURE. TO TRIP REPORT TO 'NRC - LICENSEES HAVE REPORTED AS REQUESTED

. ~ 3

-~.

IEB 83-04:

FAILURE OF THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP FUNCTION OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS APPLICABILITY:

ALL PWR'S 1EXCEPT THOSE COVERED BY PREVIOUS BULLETIN 83-01 REQUESTED ACTIONS _

Iill UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP FUNCTION WITHIN 5 DAYS IF NOT TESTED WITHIN LAST 10 DAYS REVIEW MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AND CONFORM TO LATEST MANU-

. FACTURER' S PROGRAM OR ALTERNATE NOTIFY ALL LICENSED OPERATORS OF THE SAN ONOFRE AND SALEM EVENTS.. AND-REVIEW EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR FAILURE-TO-TRIP WITH EACH OPERATOR ON HIS ARRIVAL ON SHIFT YERIFY THAT PROCUREMENL TESTING.. AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVI ~

TIES TREAT THE RPS BREAKER AND UV DEVICES AS SAFETY RELATED PROMPTLY REPORT ANY RPS BREAKER FAILURE VIA THE EMERGENCY

. NOTIFICATION SYSTEM I

REPORT IN WRITING TO NRC WITHIN 10 DAYS

NRC TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES RRG MEETINGS HELD ON SALEM EVENT TO DISCUSS GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SALEM EVENT OF FEBRUARY 25., 1983 B&W CE GE

w.

DATE OF MEETINGS MARCH 8., 1983 MARCH 9., 1983 MARCH 10,, 1983 MARCH 11., 1983

I<.

REACTOR TRIP FIRST OUT

.>flURBINE TRIP FIRST OUT>!

l 2

3 4

5 6

37 38 PR

HIGH FLUX OPEN & P-8 HIGH PRESS LEVEL LO LVL&fiLO SI LOW LEVEL REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAG TRIP TURB TRIP TURB TRIP PR RC LO FLOW REACTOR STM GEN 12 STM GEN 12 STM DIFF P TURBINE STM GEN 12 LOW RANGE OR RCP BKR COOLANT LOW-LOW F.EEDWATER LOW P2 BEARING HIGH-HIGH HIGH FLUX OPEN & P-7 LOW PRESS LEVEL LOW LVL&FLC SI LOW OIL LEVEL.

7 REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP TURB TRIP TURB TRIP

. IR 4KV PRESSURIZR STM GEN 13 STM GEN 13 STM DIFF P TURBINE STM GEN 13 HIGH FLUX GRP BUSES HIGH LEVEL LOW-LOW FEEDWATER LOW P3 THRUST INC HIGH-HIGH 13 UNDERFREQ LEVE~

LO LVL&FLO SI BRG FAIL LEVEL REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP TURB TRIP TURB TRIP SR 4KV PRESSURIZR STM GEN 14 STM GEN 14 STM DIFF P TURBINE STM GEN 14 HIGH FLUX LOW PRESS LOW-LOW FEEDWATER LOW P4 OVERSPEED HIGH-HIGH 19 REAC TRIP GRP BUSES

s. I. &

LEVEL LO-LVL &

S. I LEVEL UNDERVOLT.

REAC TRIP REAC TRIP FLOW REAC REAC TRIP TURB TRIP TURB TRIP REAC TRIP TRIP PR CONTAINMT STM HI FLO

  • TURB TRIP E-H REACTOR HI NEUTRON PRESS HIGH

&LO PRESS

&P-7 DC PWR FAI TRIP 25 FLUX RATE.

s. I.

ISOL-S. I.

REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP REAC TRIP TURB TRIP TURB TRIP OVERPOWER OVERTEMP MANUAL MANUAL GENERATOR MANUAL AT AT S:I.

PROTECTION ACTUATION 31 REAC TRIP REAC TRIP..

REAC TRIP REAC TRIP TURB.TRIP TURB TRIP

\\

WS TRIP BlfAKER ISSUE S~N ONOFlf: NUa.EAR GENERATING STATION.1 I.Jiii TS 2.AND 3

\\.

3l W-\\ROI lSJ 1983 CCl'JTACTS :

T. IPPOUTOJ x27415 HI ROODJ

'12?J.f2.7

RPS TRIP BREAKER ISSUE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (SoNGS), UNITS 2 AND 3 BACKGR:lUi ID :

I SONGS 2 AND 3 HAVE GE AK-2-25 BREAKERS, OOT kf_DB-50 I

TRIPPING CIRCUIT IS SERIES-PARALLEL, EIG~IT BREAKERS PER UNIT (SEE FIG. 1)

I PL.ANTS.PROHIBITED FROM OPERATING BY REGION V CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER DATED MARCH lJ., 1983 SURVEIUANCE RESULTS:

I UNIT 3, TESTED MARCH 1, 1983:

ALL SHlJ.JT COILS PRODUCED TRIP 1 OF 8 UNDERVOLTAGE COILS FAILED TO IW£>1ATELY TRIP BREAKER I

  • UNIT 2, TESTED MARCH 8, 1983:

ALL SHUNT COILS PRODLCED TRIP 3 OF 8 UNDERVOLTAGE COILS FAILED TO WMEDIATELY TRIP BREAKER JOINT REGION V - NRR TEAM VISITED PLANT MARCH 12 & 13, 1983 TO INVESTIGATE SlfETY fr1PLI'cATIONS:

  • SHUNT TRI PS ON ALL BREAKERS lN TRIPS ON REMAINING OPERABLE BREAKERS

PRELIMINARY STflfF FINDINGS, MC\\RCH J2 - ll!

I PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF ADDITIONAL TESTS CONDU:TED ON MA.RCH 13 & 14:

11GOOD 11 BREAKER PASSED ALL ADDITIONAL TESTS 11PAD 11 BREAKER UNDERVOLTAGE COIL WAS SOMETIMES SLOW TO TRIP IN 4 OF 9 TRIALS, BREAKER TRIPPED BETWEEN 1 AND '5 SECONDS AFTER COIL WAS DE-ENERGIZED IN 5 OF 9 TRIALS, BREAKER TRIPPED WITJ-DUT APPARENT DELAY BREAKER MAINTENANCE QUESTIONABLE I

UV TRIP MECHANISM AND TRIPPING MECHANISMS REQUIRES CAREFUL AilJUSTMENT TO ~,ORK PROPERLY (UV COIL Hl\\S 15 TO 20 PERCENT FORCE MA.RGIN WHEN OPTIMA.LLY TUNED)

I SHUNT TRIP MECHANISM HAS VERY LARGE FORCE MA.RGIN I A HISTORY OF UV PROBLEMS EXISTS AT SONGS 2 & 3 ON MA.RCH 25, 1932, 3 UNIT 2 BREAKERS WERE SLOW TO TRIP ON lN COIL ON JULY 12, 1982, 2 UNIT 2 BREAKERS FAILED.TO TRIP ON UV COIL I

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS IDENTIFIED DLRING SITE VISIT:

FOLLOW THROLGH ON IEB 79-09 ADEQUACY OF TECH SPECS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND QUALIFICATIONS CONFIGURATION CONTROL 33

  • Q~*JGOUJG ACTIVITIES 9

L.ICENSEE INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAM ll'JI:tRrlAY f

lWO OF FOUR "BAD" BREAKERS lO BE SET ASII:t FOR POSSIBI£ EVALUATION BY:

tr:

NRC/FRflNKLIN INSTl11J1E 0 lESTS TO BE CCNUJCTED O"J 11-IE 011-IER lWO "BAD" BREAKERS :

IN-SITU TESTS BENa-t lESTS CN BREAKER ASSEMBLY lESTS Cr-J BREAKER CQMDCNENTS I

LICENSEE C<l'JDUCTING SEARa-t FOR MAINTENANCE PND TESTING RECORDS I

REGION V IS INSPECTING 11-IE lESTWG AND MAINTENPNCE HISTORY.1 QA/QC

.. ASPECTS,, REPORTING REQUI REJV'ENTS t

1£AD RESPCNSIBILilY FOR EFFORT lO BE.TR#JSFERRED lO ~*!RR I

WHEN INVEST! GATIVE PROGRAM IS C(l\\\\OLETE,, LICENSEE WI LL:

PROVIIE FINDINGS PROPOSE CORRECTIVE ACTION ESTAeLISH.BPSIS FOR RESTART

~-

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