ML18086A605
| ML18086A605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1981 |
| From: | Abraham K, Bores R, Donaldson D, Gallina C, Hill W, Mckenna T, Mojta M, Norrholm L, Rohrer D, Matthew Smith, Terc N, Wojnas E Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION, NRC, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18086A603 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-81-08, 50-272-81-8, 50-311-81-09, 50-311-81-9, NUDOCS 8106030503 | |
| Download: ML18086A605 (6) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-272/81-08 Report No.
50-311/81-09 50-272 Docket No.
50-311
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Li cen se No.
- Priority ----
Category Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 c
82 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS), Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
SNGS, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspect1on Inspectors:
~
E. Do dson, Radiation Specialist, Team
~~
'/¥/17 date signed E. w()jila5,R iati n Spee; a 1 i st, NRC: I 5/y/;z date signed (Intern), NRC:I
.s 1~;?1 date 'signed NRC:HQ tf.<<!~
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,..,,.. 9, Planning date signed date signed s/v/11 date signed
. Observer:
Approved by:
2 ores, Acting Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Operational Support Inspection Summary:
S"&h/
date signed
<f!/91 date signed S--/¥/.fl date signed Inspection on April 6-9, 1981 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/81-08 and 50-311/81-09)
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced emergency preparedness inspection of a licensee emergency exercise.
The inspection involved 320 inspection-hours by a special team of 10 individuals from the Salem NRC Resident Office, NRC Region I, NRC Headquarters and Battelle Northwest Laboratories.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
DETAILS
- 1.
Individuals Contacted
- a.
Licensee Personnel W. Britz, Corporate Health Physicist C. Burge, Lead Engineer R. Burricelli, Manager, Emergency Preparedness G. Daves, Engineer J. Driscoll, Chief Engineer R. Eckert, Senior Vice President S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer M. Metcalf, Quality Assurance Engineer H. Midura, Station Manager L. Miller, Station Performance Engineer P. Moeller, Emergency Planning and Security Engineer R. Salvesen, Manager, Hope Creek Station F. Schneider, Senior Vice President, Production R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager, Salem J. Stillman, Station Quality Assurance Engineer, Salem R. Swetnam, Radiation Protection Engineer R. Uderitz, General Manager, Nuclear Production
- b.
Non-licensee Personnel R. Kelly, INPO, Manager, Emergency Preparedness W. Knox, INPO, Project Manager S. Porter, Consultant, Porter Consultants
- l.
Emergency Exercise
- a.
Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the conduct of the licensee 1 s emergency exercise, the auditors met with licensee representatives to review the nature and scope of the exercise scenario and the extent of the actions expected to be implemented in response to the conditions of the scenario.
During this meeting, the auditors noted that the licensee intended to specifically omit the implementation of certain aspects of the Emergency Plan.
These areas were:
Evacuation of the SNGS and adjoining Hope Creek sites accompanied by monitoring, triage, decontamination and relocation of evacuees; Evacuation/loss of access to. the HP checkpoint; and Extended play of operator actions to bring the plant to cold shutdown under emergency conditions.
4 Based upon the fact that the auditors had performed an appraisal of the licensee's preparedness program during the two week periud just prior to the exercise, it was determined that the exclusion of these areas would not detract from the teams ability to evaluate the licensee's ability to meet the objectives of the Emergency Plan.
The licensee's exercise scenario had been developed in coordination with the various participating offsite agencies.
Specifically, the scenario involved the degradation of the Unit 1 core, accompanied by a leak from the primary system resulting in a release of radioactive material from the plant vent.
The scenario was compounded by a simulated injury and contamination of a participant.
The auditors also attended a pre-exercise briefing of licensee observers to verify that proper instructions were provided and that objectivity of observations were stressed.
Based on the findings in the above area, this portion of the licensee's exercise program appeared to be acceptable.
- b.
Exercise Observation During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, 10 NRC auditors made detailed observations of the following activities:
(1)
Operations staff actions concerning detection, classification and operational assessment of the accident; (2)
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; (3)
Radiological (dose) assessment and protective action decision-making; (4)
Assembly and accountability;
( 5)
Security; (6)
Onsite, offsite and in-plant radiological surveys; (7)
First Aid/Rescue; (8)
NRC response organization interface; (9)
Primary coolant sampling; (10) In-plant radiation protection;
5 (11) Technical support; (12) Public information; and (13) Repair/corrective actions.
The auditors noted that the licensee's organizational response was generally made in accordance with established procedures and that available facilities and equipment were used consistent with the procedures.
The auditors determined, however, that there were procedural, facility and equipment shortcomings that should be evaluated and resolved in order to achieve an effective response.
An evaluation of the nature of the exercise shortcomings noted by the NRC and licensee observers in comparison with the findings of a two week appraisal of the licensee's emergency preparedness program conducted just prior to the exercise (March 23 - April 2, 1981) indicated that the exercise shortcomings and appraisal identified shortcomings were consistent.
(See Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/81-07 and 50-311/81-08).
Specff-ically, although a significant number of procedural, facility and equipment shortcomings existed, the response of the individuals comprising the licensee's emergency organization was, within the scope of the exercise, adequate to result in an effective response inspite of these shortcomings.
Based on the findings in the above area, the auditors determined that the licensee demonstrated the ability to respond within the scope of the scenario, however, improvements would be required to assure that an effective response would result in response to an actual emergency of the magnitude represented by the scenario.
The auditors major findings were as follows:
An alarm response procedure could not be implemented as written due to the lack of I&C personnel on backshift.
Ventilation characteristics of the control room rack room were unknown.
Procedures for making radiological surveys using a helicopter were not available.
Protective action recommendations did not appear to adequately consider plant conditions or to be made based on projected dose.
The flow path and responsibilities for protective action decision-making were not uniformly understood by members of the emergency organization.
6 There was an apparent overreliance on computer-based assessment during times when actual environmental survey data were available.
Public information procedures were cumbersome and were not consistent with the existing Emergency Plan.
The locations of the EDO and Recovery Manager in conjunction with. their documented and perceived roles and responsibilities did not permit timely interface with the NRC response organization.
The responsibility for establishing priority of corrective/
assessment activities appeared to be unclear.
- c.
Exercise Critique The auditors ittended a post-exercise critique, held on April 9, 1981, during which licensee observers discussed the exercise results.
During the critique, the auditors noted that the licensee observer presentations highlighted areas for improvement and that observer~
and participant comments would be evaluated for appropriate corrective action.
The NRC auditors compared their findings with those of the licensee observers and determined that the licensee had identified all major items which exhibited a potential for a degraded response.
Discuss-ions during the critique indicated that licensee personnel possessed an understanding of the items and their causes sufficient to permit timely, effective resolution.
Based on the findings in the above area, the auditors determined, that the licensee's existing exercise audit and critique provisions had been acceptably implemented as described in EP II-1.
- 3.
Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the auditors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1.
The Team Leader summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the inspection findings.
In particular, the Team Leader informed licensee management that the NRC auditors* findings relative to the exercise were consistent with the findings relative to the emergency preparedness appraisal completed the week prior to the exercise.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that evaluation and resolution of all drill identified improvement items would begin immediately.