ML18085B035
| ML18085B035 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/21/2018 |
| From: | Charles Brown Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Brown C | |
| References | |
| NRC-3544 | |
| Download: ML18085B035 (131) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards APR 1400 Subcommittee: Open Session Docket Number:
(n/a)
Location:
Rockville, Maryland Date:
Wednesday, February 21, 2018 Work Order No.:
NRC-3544 Pages 1-131 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 1
1 2
3 DISCLAIMER 4
5 6
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 7
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 8
9 10 The contents of this transcript of the 11 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 12 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 13 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 14 recorded at the meeting.
15 16 This transcript has not been reviewed, 17 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 18 inaccuracies.
19 20 21 22 23
2 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4
(ACRS) 5
+ + + + +
6 APR1400 SUBCOMMITTEE 7
+ + + + +
8 OPEN SESSION 9
+ + + + +
10 WEDNESDAY 11 FEBRUARY 21, 2018 12
+ + + + +
13 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 14
+ + + + +
15 The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear 16 Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B1, 17 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Ronald G. Ballinger, 18 Chairman, presiding.
19 20 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
21 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Chairman 22 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member 23 MICHAEL L. CORRADINI, Member 24 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 25
3 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member 1
JOSE A. MARCH-LEUBA, Member 2
DANA A. POWERS, Member 3
JOY L. REMPE, Member 4
GORDON R. SKILLMAN, Member 5
JOHN W. STETKAR, Member 6
MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member 7
8 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
9 CHRISTOPHER BROWN 10 11 ALSO PRESENT:
12 TONY AHN, KHNP 13 CLINTON ASHLEY, NRO 14 ALEX BURJA, NRO*
15 NAN CHIEN, NRO 16 CHUNG RAE CHO, Doosan 17 GREG CRANSTON, NRO 18 ANTONIO DIAS, NRO 19 ADAKOU FOIL, NRR 20 CHEWUNG HA, KHNP 21 GARY HAYNER, Jensen Hughes 22 RAUL HERNANDEZ, NRO 23 ATA ISTAR, NRO 24
4 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 BHAGWAT JAIN, NRO 1
RANDY JAMES, KHNP 2
DAWNMATHEWS KALATHIVEETTIL, NRO 3
JOO WAN KANG, KHNP 4
SUNG HOON KANG, Doosan 5
REBECCA KARAS, NRO 6
JUNG-HO KIM, KHNP 7
YOUNG MAN KWON, KEPCO E&C 8
OLIVIA LAREYNIE, NRO 9
HIEN LE, NRO 10 HAKRO LEE, KHNP 11 MARVIN LEWIS, Public Participant*
12 CHANG LI, NRO 13 DAE HEON LIM, KEPCO E&C 14 MARK LINTZ, NRO 15 SHANLAI LU, NRO 16 GREG MAKAR, NRO 17 JIHONG MIN, KHNP 18 MATTHEW MITCHELL, NRO 19 RICHARD MORANTE, BNL*
20 ALISSA NEUHAUSEN, NRO 21 RYAN NOLAN, NRO 22 JIYONG OH, KHNP 23 NGOLA OTTO, NRO 24
5 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MARIE POHIDA, NRO 1
SHEILA RAY, NRR 2
ROB SISK, Westinghouse 5
JAMES STECKEL, NRO 6
ANGELO STUBBS, NRO 7
JEONG-KWAN SUH, KHNP 8
MATT THOMAS, NRO 9
VAUGHN THOMAS, NRO 10 ANDREA D. VEIL, Executive Director, ACRS 11 ROBERT VETTORI, NRO 12 DAVE WAGNER, AECOM 13 WILLIAM WARD, NRO 14 GEORGE WUNDER, NRO 15 ANDREW YESHNIK, NRO 16 JINKYOO YOON, KHNP 17 18
- Present via telephone 19 20 21 22 23 24
6 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 1
2 3
T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 4
PAGE 5
Opening Remarks & Objectives 6
By Ronald Ballinger, ACRS....................7 7
Staff Opening Remarks 8
By William Ward, NRO........................10 9
Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems (Open) KHNP 10 By Hakro Lee, Joowan Kang...................11 11 Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems (Open) 12 By NRC: George Wunder, Alex Burja, 13 Andrew Yeshnik, Bhagwat Jain, 14 Dawnmathews Kalathiveettil 15 BNL: Rich Morante..........................28 16 Adjourn...........................................76 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
7 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 P R O C E E D I N G S 1
8:30 a.m.
2 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: The meeting will now 3
come to order. This is a meeting of the APR1400 4
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor 5
Safeguards. I'm Ron Ballinger, Chairman of the APR1400 6
Subcommittee.
7 ACRS members in attendance are Mike 8
Corradini, Dick Skillman, Dana Powers, Matt Sunseri, 9
John Stetkar, Jose March-Leuba, Walt Kirchner, Joy Rempe, 10 and Vesna Dimitrijevic. I think I pronounced that right, 11 a second time. Pretty good. I think Charlie Brown will 12 arrive a little bit late.
13
- First, today's meeting is for the 14 Subcommittee to receive briefings from Korea Electric 15 Power Corporation and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power 16 Company regarding their design certification, excuse 17 me, application, and the NRC staff regarding their safety 18 evaluation report with no open items specific to Chapter 19 9, Auxiliary Systems, 19.3, the undesigned base external 20 vents, 19.4, loss of large area, and 19.5, aircraft 21 impact assessment.
22 The ACRS was established by statute and 23 is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, FACA.
24
8 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 That means that the committee can only speak through 1
its published letter reports. We hold meetings to gather 2
information to support our deliberations. Interested 3
parties who wish to provide comments can contact our 4
offices requesting time after the meeting announcement 5
is published in the Federal Register.
6 That said, we also set aside ten minutes 7
for comments from members of the public attending or 8
listening to our meetings. Written comments are also 9
welcome.
10 The ACRS section of the USNRC public website 11 provides our charter, bylaws, and letter reports, and 12 full transcripts of all full and subcommittee meetings, 13 including slides presented at the meeting. The rules 14 for -- for precipitation -- participation in today's 15 meeting were announced in the Federal Register on Friday, 16 February 21st, 2018 -- not.
17 The meeting was announced as an open and 18 closed to public meeting. This means that the chairman 19 can close the meeting as needed to protect information 20 proprietary to KHNP or its vendors.
21 That means this afternoon's, after the 22 breaks meeting, according to our schedule, they're marked 23 closed. They're closed for the purposes of the staff 24
9 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 wanting to avoid having to open and close things if 1
they make -- if there are discussions related to 2
proprietary information.
3 No requests for making a statement to the 4
Subcommittee has been received from the public. A 5
transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be 6
made available as stated in the Federal Register notice.
7 Therefore, I request that participants in this meeting 8
use the microphones located throughout the meeting room 9
when addressing the Subcommittee. Participants should 10 first identify themselves and speak with sufficient 11 clarity and volume so they can be regularly heard.
12 Not to presenters, there's a small black 13 microphone in front of you. When you speak, please 14 be sure that the green light on the top of the microphone 15 is glowing green. To make this happen, you must press 16 the pad at the base of the microphone.
17 We have a bridge line established for 18 interested members of the public to listen in. The 19 bridge number and password were published in the agenda 20 posted on the NRC public website.
21 To minimize disturbance, the public line 22 will be kept in the listen only mode. And I understand 23 we have two lines open for staff members to participate.
24
10 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 The public will have an opportunity to make a statement 1
or provide comments at the designated time towards the 2
end of the meeting, actually, towards the end of the 3
Chapter 9, or at the end of the Chapter 9 session 4
presentations.
5 NRO staff and contractors are on a separate 6
bridge line for Chapter 9. We ask that the staff place 7
their phone on mute until you are called upon. And 8
we'll do some signaling to make that happen.
9 Now Bill is here, yes. I now invite Bill 10 Ward, NRO project manager, to introduce the presenters 11 and start the briefing. Bill?
12 MR. WARD: Thank you. This meeting is third 13 to the last of the subcommittees. We're really happy 14 that we are making good progress on this, and we hope 15 we can meet the dates of the other two. As they're 16 scheduled, I don't see any problem with that. And we're 17 glad to be here again and hope we answer all your questions.
18 Thank you.
19 This is Rob Sisk, Westinghouse, consulting 20 to KHNP. Just again, appreciate the opportunity to 21 present the APR1400 as we continue through the review 22 process. And without further ado, I'd like to introduce 23 Mr. Hakro Lee to lead us through Chapter 9.
24
11 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. H. LEE: Good morning, ladies and 1
gentlemen. This is Hakro Lee from KHNP. This 2
presentation is for the Chapter 9 which covers auxiliary 3
system for APR1400 design.
4 The contents are provided in this slide.
5 Main contents are overview of Chapter 9, 9.1.2, new 6
and spent fuel storage, summary of main topic in Section 7
9.1.2, summary of open items, response to Phase 3 8
questions, current status, and attachments. Here we 9
can see an overview of the titles and major contents 10 each section in DCD.
11 The following documents have been submitted 12 for addition to Chapter 9. There were five open items 13 in full Committee in last July. These are three of 14 the main topics. Description of issue and resolution 15 for each item will be described in orderly.
16 These items are five open items.
17 Description of issue and resolution for each open item 18 will be described in orderly. From now on, 9.1.2 new 19 and spent fuel storage will be presented by Mr. Kang.
20 MR. KANG: Good morning, ladies and 21 gentlemen, my name is Joowan Kang from Tucson. I am 22 going to start with introducing redesign pictures of 23 fuel racks in DCD Section 9.1.2.
24
12 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 The new spent fuel racks are constructed 1
of stainless steel and designed as a seismic Category 2
1.
For NFSR, two modules are located in the New Fuel 3
Storage Pit. The remaining pieces of NFSR are bolted 4
to the embedment plate at the bottom of the pit to preclude 5
tipping during seismic events.
6 For SFSR, 29 modules are located in the 7
spent fuel pool which consists of over six vents in 8
Region I and 23 vents in Region II. The main features 9
of SFSR modules are free-standing with a pedestal.
10 That's the base plate.
11 Installation of SFSR modules in the spent 12 fuel pool, they are surmounted in borated water with 13 the space between the racks and cell walls at all times, 14 especially to keep the reaction of several material 15 as called METAMIC is used.
16 Next. This slide shows the safety 17 evaluation of event. As the background of this slide, 18 the revision chair or technical report for fuel racks, 19 mechanical analysis was issued on December 2014 at the 20 8:38:25, RAI 8272. The latest technical report was 21 revised as a revision study on August 2017 to reflect 22 resolutions.
23 As of the recent oral evaluation, the seismic 24
13 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 models were proposed 36 cases dynamic simulations to 1
determine the loads and displacement for the racks.
2 The structural evaluation results shows that the new 3
and spent fuel cylinders met the requirement as 4
specified on SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D, and ASME Section 5
III, Subsection NF, Class 3.
6 The postulated mechanical accident analysis 7
are performed based on the impact image and configuration 8
of each rack scenario as well. An evaluation result 9
of each rack scenario, the new and spent fuel racks 10 are just acceptable modules of safety and no effect 11 on the computation to maintain a civil criticality 12 over the fuel.
13 Next. This slide is related to the number 14 time histories and the critical discretion of artificial 15 time histories based on SRP 3.7.1, Option 2. It stated 16 that for nonlineal structural analysis the number of 17 time histories should be greater than four. Therefore, 18 we provide that for the number of time history sets.
19 Five sets of artificial acceleration time 20 histories were developed to match the safe shutdown 21 escape instruction as far as background.
22 MEMBER REMPE: There was a message a few 23 minutes ago that you needed to plug in your computer.
24
14 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 You're about out of power.
1 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: What is it that you 2
can't see?
3 MEMBER REMPE: Someone, ha, ha, ha.
4 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: We're on it.
5 (Off the record comments) 6 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: For those of you who 7
may be listening on the phone, the presentation computer 8
died. And we're resurrecting it. So hold on for a few 9
minutes.
10 MEMBER POWERS: In his testimony before 11 a Senate committee, former Chairman Dick Meserve, when 12 asked what he had discovered about nuclear engineers 13 said, "One of my findings is they cannot talk without 14 view graphs."
15 (Laughter) 16 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: There are exceptions.
17 MEMBER POWERS: They cannot talk well 18 without view graphs.
19 (Laughter) 20 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: There are exceptions.
21 MEMBER STETKAR:
The appropriate 22 characterization ends with a period after the word well.
23 (Laughter) 24
15 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Theron, how long do 1
you think it's going to take?
2 (Off the record comments) 3 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 4
off the record at 8:43 a.m. and resumed at 8:48 a.m.)
5 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay, we're back in 6
session. Thank you for being considerate, or 7
inconsiderate.
8 MR. KANG: This slide is related to the 9
number of time histories and technical justification 10 of artificial time history sets based on SRP 3.7.1, 11 Option 2. It states that for manual rises to the number 12 of time histories should be greater than four.
13 Therefore, we provided that for the number of time history 14 sets.
15 Five sets of artificial acceleration time 16 histories were developed to match the safe shutdown 17 earthquake instruction response criteria. Also we 18 provided technical participation for artificial time 19 history sets to review and provided on Section 3 of 20 technical report. The results showed that the 21 suitability of the time histories was verified, according 22 to SRP 3.7.1.
23 Next. This slide relate to the study of 24
16 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 a seismic analysis of racks. Due to free-standing fuel 1
storage rack modules in the pool, the seismic response 2
are nonlinear and involve a complex combination of 3
emulsions, so just to provide additional information 4
about the structure around the modeling.
5 First, sufficient information of the rack 6
and fuel assembly model and it's parameters. Second, 7
sensitivity analysis results of the impact force and 8
rack response to variation in spring constants. Third, 9
sensitivity analysis results of integration time step 10 used in performing the seismic analyses for SSE.
11 The next slide show what be provided. Next?
12 What we provided for information is a detailed 13 description of the rack and fuel assembly model for 14 seismic analysis. And model element properties are 15 derived from the dynamic characteristics of the detailed 16 3-D shell model of the racks.
17 What we performed is sensitivity analysis 18 for spring constants in the model, such as rack-to-rack, 19 rack-to-floor, and fuel-to-rack. And comparison of 20 a run at one half the fixed time step used for all other 21 runs.
22 What is provided for analysis result is 23 the effect of sensitivities was a change in the predicted 24
17 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 loads within the variation found for different time 1
histories and less than the variation for different 2
function depletion, such as CHERIFON 2, CHERIFON 5, 3
and CHERIFON 8.
4 Next? This slide relates to mechanical 5
accident analysis. First, we had to consider detailed 6
evaluation for drop accident analysis. First, consider 7
finite element model on evaluation of a nonlinear dynamic 8
analysis for the impact effect of drop accidents.
9 Second, consider deep drop locations to maximize the 10 deformation of the rack base plate. Third, consider 11 all other fuel assemblies in place when a fuel assembly 12 drops through an empty cell.
13 Next? This slide is a resolution we gave.
14 All drop accidents analyzed by developing a finite 15 element model of a rack, base plate, a fuel assembly, 16 and the pedestal using ANSYS LSDYNA program to evaluate 17 maximum plate, drops are considered at the two locations 18 that maximize the distance of the point of support.
19 And drop analysis model was considered fully loaded.
20 As a different analysis result, loss of 21 breastplate such as a puncture has not occurred. The 22 breastplate of the new and spent fuel storage racks 23 are calculated per 2.99 inch and 2.72 inch respectively.
24
18 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 These value are less than that the minimum 1
disturbance between the breastplate and the drying 2
surface. Therefore, throughout the simulation, the 3
NFSR base plate to contain the pit flow or the SFSR 4
base plate to protect the fuel liner.
5 Next? From now on, we will present five 6
open items in Phase 3 and a list of them. The staff 7
checked RAI 8191 (Q 09.01.01-13) as an open item. The 8
staff gets to confirm that mechanical accidents do not 9
cause the rack deformation that would affect criticality.
10 The resolution related that -- and the damage 11 of -- any damages to the rack is limited to the portion 12 above the neutron absorber and does not affect their 13 configuration relative to the criticality analysis.
14 The staff's review for the technical report was completed.
15 Next? This slide relates to neutron 16 absorber material. The staff has the RAI 8578 (Q 17 09.01.01-39) as an open item. The purification process 18 of the standard fuel rack may expose the Metamic neutron 19 absorber to evaluate the temperature really in close 20 proximity.
21 So staff concerns regarding the adequacy 22 of utilizing as-fabricated Metamic coupons in the neutron 23 absorber monitoring program The resolution we did is 24
19 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 that purification test exposure to Metamic material 1
to 1900 giga Fahrenheit for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and demonstrates 2
no change in the run obstruction. This item is closed.
3 The next presenter is Mr. Lee again.
4 MR. H. LEE: So from now on I'm going to 5
present again. The staff stressed RAI 8582 (Q 6
09.01.03-4) is an open item. Related to this open item, 7
the staff requested to identify the minimum safety water 8
level and update the DCD accordingly, also requested 9
to revise the thermal-hydraulic calculations using the 10 minimum safety water level.
11 The minimum safety water level was provided 12 in the response to RAI 8582 (Q 09.01.03-4) In addition, 13 thermal-hydraulic analysis report was also revised.
14 Additionally, the staff identified that 15 the normal water level has been identified as elevation 16 154 feet, while in other places it shows as elevation 17 153 feet. These two levels represent different 18 conditions through the response to RAI 8582 (Q 19 09.01.03-5).
20 The staff stressed RAI 8613 (Q 09.05.02-4) 21 as an open item. Related to the requirements of 10 22 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1 through GDC 4, the staff 23 requested to justify why the communication systems are 24
20 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 not considered as risk significant SSCs.
1 The staff issued a follow-up RAI 548-8822, (Q 09.05.02-6) 2 related to this open item.
3 KHNP responded that the communication 4
systems of the APR1400 are designed to meet GDC 1 through 5
GDC 4 and do not interface with any safety-related or 6
risk-significant SSC. The four communication 7
subsystems are designed to assure that any single event 8
does not result in a complete loss of plant communication.
9 The staff stressed RAI 8613 (Q 09.05.02-5) 10 as an open item. The staff requested to provide the 11 detailed description of all ITAAC items along with their 12 acceptance criteria and ITP for the communication systems 13 in Section 14.2.
14 In addition, the staff requested to clarify 15 what the applicant means by functional arrangement of 16 communication systems. Related to this open item, the 17 staff issued a follow-up RAI 8822, (Q 09.05.02-7).
18 KHNP provided the new ITP for plant 19 communication system and the detailed description of 20 all ITAAC items for communication system through the 21 response to the follow-up RAI.
22 And KHNP revised DCD Tier 1, Subsection 23 2.6.9 providing the detailed description of plant 24
21 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 communication systems instead of the term of functional 1
arrangement.
2 So from now on, I will answer the question 3
in ACRS Subcommittee on May 18th, 2017. During KHNP 4
presentation on Section 927 Chilled Water System, ACRS 5
asked about the basis for the non-safety-related plant 6
chilled water system to provide cooling water for the 7
safety-related TDAFW pump room.
8 I will explain the reason why the 9
non-safety-related cubicle cooler is installed in the 10 TDAFW pump room. It is basic principle to use the 11 safety-related HVAC system to cool the area where a 12 safety-related accumulation is located.
13 In case of TDAFW pump room, the non-safety 14 cubicle cooler is installed, and it does not serve any 15 cooling function at accident condition. The reason 16 why non-safety related cubicle cooler is applied for 17 the room is that the room is high energy line break, 18 HELB, area which means the essential chilled water just 19 have temp would be damaging and have accident if the 20 cubicle cooler is safety-related.
21 Because of loss of cooling during accident, 22 the TDAFW pump shall be qualified to be operable at 23 maximum temperature for the operation period.
24
22 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Now I will explain the summary for heat-up 1
calculation of TDAFW pump room. The purpose of the 2
room heat-up calculation is as follows. First, 3
determine the maximum temperature in the TDAFW pump 4
room. Second, demonstrate that the maximum temperature 5
of the room does not exceed the maximum allowable 6
temperature during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> under loss of HVAC system.
7 The GOTHIC program is used to perform heat-up 8
calculation. Maximum allowable temperature, 150 9
Fahrenheit degrees of the room, is decided based on 10 the steady-state temperature of Condition 2 mentioned 11 in NUMARC 87-00. The maximum temperature of TDAFW pump 12 room is about 155 -- 145 Fahrenheit degrees. The TDAFA 13 pump rooms are maintained below 150 Fahrenheit degrees 14 during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and under loss of cooling.
15 MEMBER STETKAR: Does that maximum 16 temperature occur at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />? In other words, is the 17 temperature still increasing at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />?
18 MR. H. LEE: Sorry, would you say again?
19 MEMBER STETKAR: Does the maximum 20 temperature of whatever you cited, 145 degrees, occur 21 at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />? Or, what I'm asking is, is the temperature 22 still increasing at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />?
23 MR. H. LEE: The equivalent temperature 24
23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 condition is 145 during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
1 MEMBER STETKAR: What I'm asking is, what 2
we asked you for was to show us the temperature profile.
3 I have not yet seen that temperature profile.
4 (Off the record comments) 5 MR. SISK: This is Rob Sisk. Just to 6
clarify, the temperature profile, it increases up to 7
145.
It is more asymptotic. It does not continue up 8
at a continual rate. But it asymptotically reaches 9
145 and stays.
10 MEMBER STETKAR: Could you tell me when 11 it reaches 120 degrees?
12 (Off the record comments) 13 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: So to be clear, we 14 do not have the exact profile here. But the approximate 15 value, it hits 120 in about 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.
16 MEMBER STETKAR: Sixteen hours, okay, 17 that's interesting. Do the turbine-driven auxiliary 18 feedwater pumps have electronic speed control? And 19 is there any instrumentation located in the 20 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room that 21 controls either turbine operation, or auxiliary 22 feedwater flow, or steam generator level, or information 23 in the main control room?
24
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 24 MR. SISK: We do not have that information 1
available.
2 MEMBER STETKAR: The reason I ask these 3
questions ---
4 (Off the record comments) 5 MR. YOON: I am Mr. Yoon from KHNP, 6
Administrative Office. The equipment related to 7
turbine-driven aux feedwater pump, and something like 8
that, that equipment is located in another room, not 9
installed in that room, of course, to prevent damages 10 in the event of high energy line break.
11 MEMBER STETKAR: To me, that doesn't make 12 much sense. Because if the steam line breaks, I don't 13 have the turbine-driven pump. So I don't understand 14 why I have to install the equipment in another room.
15 But if you say that on the record, you are now on the 16 record that any electronic equipment for the 17 turbine-driven pump and instrumention is not located 18 in the turbine-driven pump room. Is that correct?
19 MR. YOON: Yes.
20 MEMBER STETKAR: Hum? You are now on the 21 public record in a meeting saying that is part of your 22 design? I was not aware of that. That's an important 23 piece of information.
24
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. YOON: As I'm -- to my knowledge, the 1
pressure transmitter is located in the containment.
2 So turbine-driven fuel pump is located in the aux 3
building.
4 MEMBER STETKAR: I understand that. But 5
I'm asking -- I didn't ask about a pressure transmitter.
6 I asked whether there was any -- the reason I -- let 7
me cut to the chase. The reason I'm asking this is 8
that I have read documents that indicate that the maximum 9
allowable temperature in several locations in the plant 10 that contain, I'll just call it electrical and INC 11 equipment, is 120 degrees Fahrenheit, the maximum 12 allowable temperature. And that's a fairly typical 13 temperature for qualification of that type of equipment.
14 However, you state that the maximum 15 allowable temperature, in the turbine-driven auxiliary 16 feedwater pump rooms in particular, is 150 degrees 17 Fahrenheit, 30 degrees higher.
18 That to me says, well, you either have to 19 have electronic equipment that is qualified to be better 20 than all of the other electronic equipment in your plant, 21 or you don't have any electronic equipment in that room, 22 or it's qualified to 120 degrees. And that's why I 23 was interested in when you had reached 120 degrees in 24
26 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 your room heat-up calculation.
1 So if there's no electronic equipment in 2
that room, which we just heard on the public record, 3
the official record of our meeting, then I don't have 4
a problem. But that is now our understanding of your 5
design.
6 MEMBER REMPE: Further, can we ask if that's 7
the way Shin Kori is designed and built?
8 MEMBER STETKAR: I'll just note they can 9
design this one differently than Shin Kori.
10 MEMBER REMPE: They can, but I just am 11 curious if they've changed it from Shin Kori.
12 MR. H. LEE: From my colleague, I received 13 some kind of related information about your question.
14 He mentioned that when we decided the maximum temperature 15 in each room, it incorporated to our purchased 16 specification later. So I'm not sure that electrical 17 panel or some kind of equipment shall be located in 18 some rooms. We're not --
19 MEMBER STETKAR: We have it on the record.
20 The staff has our question.
21 MR. SISK: We don't have the information 22 at this point for Shin Kori. Andy?
23 MR. OH: At this point in Shin Kori, this 24
27 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 is Andy Oh, KHNP Washington Office, at this point we 1
don't have the information for Shin Kori.
2 MR. H. LEE: I will continue on my 3
presentation. Chapter 9 is complete. KHNP continues 4
to monitor Chapter 9 to assure any confirming changes 5
that are addressed. Five open items that were identified 6
in Phase 2 and 3 have been resolved with adequate and 7
sufficient discussion with the staff.
8 Changes in Chapter 9 as reviewed and marked 9
up in response to the RAIs will be incorporated into 10 the next revision of the DCD. Thank you for listening.
11 MR. SISK: And that concludes the Chapter 12 9 presentation. We want to leave time for questions 13 if there were any.
14 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Any additional 15 questions from the members? Thank you. And we get ---
16 no? Ready for the staff's presentation?
17 MALE PARTICIPANT: Is it closed?
18 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: No, Chapter 9 is not 19 closed.
20 There are two staff members who are on the 21 phone, we think. Can you identify yourselves just so 22 that we're sure that you're there please?
23 MR. MORANTE: This is Rich Morante from 24
28 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Brookhaven National Laboratory on the phone.
1 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you.
2 MS. BURJA: And this is Alex Burja from 3
the Reactor Systems Branch.
4 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you. I'm not 5
sure what the order is, who's doing what when.
6 (Off the record comments) 7 MR. WUNDER: Okay, good morning, Mr.
8 Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen of the Committee. I'm 9
George Wunder, and I'm the project manager for Chapter 10 9 of the APR 1400 design certification review.
11 Last month we presented Chapter 4 to you.
12 And at that time I told you that the team had put that 13 together, that chapter together. It was like the 1927 14 Yankees of review teams. Well, the team that I'm going 15 to introduce to you today, they're more like the 1969 16 Mets. And I say that because --
17 (Laughter) 18 MR. WUNDER: -- I say that because --
19 MALE PARTICIPANT: Nobody is sure about 20 the Mets.
21 MR. WUNDER: I say that because I think 22 it's -- sometimes I think it's a miracle that we got 23 this thing done. Thank you. As you can see at a glance, 24
29 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 there are multiple contributors. I think there are 1
19 of them plus our consultant makes 20.
2 And when you have that many contributors, 3
it makes for some unique problems for the project manager 4
to coordinate and integrate it all into a unified chapter.
5 And it would have been nigh impossible had not everyone 6
on the technical staff done such a wonderful and 7
professional job.
8 So it's a real pleasure to introduce the 9
team. From the Plant Systems Branch, we have Raul 10 Hernandez, Hien Le, Chang Li, Angelo Stubbs. And this 11 is my favorite part, whereas the 1969 Mets had Nolan 12 Ryan, we've got Ryan Nolan -- can't make this stuff 13 up -- also Bob Vettori, Dennis Andrukat, and Thinh Dinh 14 from the Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch.
15 Sir?
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Where are Sever and 17 Darling?
18 MR. WUNDER: Sever's right there.
19 (Laughter) 20 MR. WUNDER: From the Material and Chemical 21 Engineering Branch we have Andrew Yeshnik, John 22 Honcharik, Greg Makar, from the Containment and 23 Ventilation Branch, Danny Chien. From Structural 24
30 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Engineering we have Vaughn Thomas, Pravin Patel, and 1
B.P. Jain. We have Dawnmathews Kalathiveettil from 2
the Instrumentation and Control Branch, Alexandra Burja 3
who is joining us on the phone from Reactor Systems, 4
and Adakou Foil, and Sheila Ray from way over in NRR 5
in the Electrical Engineering Group.
6 We also have our outstanding consultant 7
from Brookhaven National Lab, Rich Morante, who's also 8
joining us on the phone. And I would be remiss if I 9
did not mention the incredibly valuable contribution 10 of two of our project managers, Carolyn Lauron and Brian 11 Hughes, who stepped in when I was called out of town 12 on an emergency. And they put in many, many very long 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> to make sure that we got this thing done by our 14 deadline. And finally, in the roll of Gil Hodges, we 15 have our extremely able lead project manager, Bill Ward.
16 We have not presented Section 9.1.2 to the 17 Subcommittee prior to this. So I thought we'd start 18 off with that section, and then we can move on and go 19 over the open items in the remaining sections.
20 So I am joined by B.P. Jain, and Rich Morante 21 is on the phone. And I'm going to turn you over to 22 B.P for Section 9.1.2. Thank you. B.P., take it away 23 when you're ready.
24
31 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. JAIN: Good morning. This is B.P. Jain.
1 I'd like to acknowledge my team who have contributed 2
to the review of this complex section, Vaughn Thomas, 3
Pravin Patel, and Rich Morante at BNL.
4 So here I am basically going over the work 5
this team did and reviewing the fuel racks, spent fuel 6
pool racks. So the primary objective under this review 7
is to view the structural design and mechanical design 8
of the fuel storage racks to make sure that they can 9
withstand effects of outbreaks and mechanical accident 10 loads resulting from the fuel assembly drops.
11 The other complements with this fuel pool 12 and the liner have been presented before, so I will 13 not address those. And they were covered under Section 14 38346. And the same thing goes with criticality 15 evaluation, I would not address that. It's been 16 addressed by the staff in the SER Section, 911.
17 So overall, we will be addressing more --
18 just to give you an overview of what I'm going to be 19 talking about and what the staff did to review this 20 new fuel and the spent fuel pool structure --
21 MEMBER REMPE: B.P., just be very careful.
22 Your papers were hitting the microphone. And that makes 23 the poor little guy that's the reporter --
24
32 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. JAIN: I'll be careful.
1 MEMBER REMPE: -- literally going deaf.
2 MR. JAIN: I'll be careful. So overall, 3
the high level overview, to give you the presentation, 4
the staff reviewed the KHNP's technical report and the 5
mechanical analysis for new and spent fuel pool racks.
6 It was around three in August 17. And the review basis 7
for the staff is guidance in Appendix B of the SRP 3.8.4 8
with the appropriate title, Guidance in Spent Fuel Pool 9
Racks.
10 The staff reviewed the seismic input 11 analysis to the mathematical model of the racks and 12 the non-linear analysis which the KHNP performed. The 13 staff also reviewed the mechanical accident scenarios, 14 especially resulting stresses and what scenarios they 15 have considered.
16 Staff looked at the computer codes they 17 used and see if they are reasonable for the kind of 18 problem they are trying to solve.
19 Staff reviewed the analysis methodology 20 including the design parameters which went into making 21 the model, such as the hydrodynamic loads, the gap springs 22 for rattling, and so on and so forth.
23 Overall, we sat back and looked at the ---
24
33 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 it's a very complex problem, a lot of input goes into 1
it. It's a non-linear problem. So staff looked at the 2
reasonableness of the results. Do the results make 3
sense, and not really going micro, analyzing each and 4
every parameter.
5 Staff also looked at the COL item that the 6
KHNP identified. During this process, staff had 39 7
RAIs. And KHNP did an excellent job in responding to 8
all of them. And there are no open RAIs remaining.
9 So the staff basically concludes at a high 10 level that these racks and these complements meet the 11 applicable ASME code allowable stresses. And the 12 seismic displacements of these racks, because spent 13 fuel pool rack is free-standing, are small compared 14 to the physical dimensions of the design. And they 15 would not invalidate the criticality analysis which 16 has been performed under a different section, 9.11.
17 And the other concern with these 18 free-standing racks is would they impact the pool wall.
19 And the staff assured itself that they would not.
20 Displacements are small. So that's overall the real 21 strategy, what the staff looked at.
22 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Let me ask this question, 23 please. From your overall strategy, to what extent 24
34 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 are the results that you are communicating dependent 1
upon a precision of installation of the racks?
2 MR. JAIN: They are not related to the 3
precision of installation of the rack, I can say after 4
the fact. Because the displacements are, even if they 5
were uncertain -- there are uncertainties, obviously, 6
in any of these analyses -- the fact of safety or additional 7
margins, what we find will, in our judgement, more than 8
compensate for some of those things.
9 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Can you cite an 10 approximate dimension that is allowable between the 11 installed racks? Is it a centimeter, half a centimeter, 12 half an inch, three-quarters of an inch?
13 MR. JAIN: The way these -- they are 14 installed, the base plates are pretty close to each 15 other. And I believe the, if I recall the dimensions, 16 like, one inch between the base plate and one class 17 of racks. Another class of racks, it's a couple of 18 inches. And the displacement, just to give you an order 19 of magnitude, is like quarter inch due to seismic.
20 So even if it was, you know, you double the displacements, 21 it still would not close the gap.
22 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you.
23 MR. JAIN: So just to focus, what the focus 24
35 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 area -- what the staff looked at, and again this was 1
guided more by the staff guidance in SRP 3.8.4., so 2
we looked at the physical description of the racks and 3
the arrangements, then striations. Staff also looked 4
at what are the applicable design codes, standards, 5
and specifications for manufacturing these racks.
6 Obviously, seismic and impact loads are 7
the big part of it, because they are free standing racks.
8 Again, we wanted to make sure that we considered all 9
the loads, the load combinations for various scenarios 10 of allowable stresses.
11 We looked at them with analogy first, just 12 to analyze the design, and what the acceptance criteria, 13 when you say they have met the allowables, and things 14 like materials, appropriate quality control programs, 15 things of that nature, we also looked at.
16 The physical descriptions, and I would not 17 go over that. I think KHNP has covered, but at a high 18 level, there were a few figures which have been pulled 19 out with production, where a pictorial view of the plant, 20 how these racks are sitting in the pool.
21 But basically, the new fuel racks, they 22 are sitting in a pit. And the highlight of that is 23 it's bolted to the floor. So it's not free-standing.
24
36 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 So it's less critical during seismic movement. They 1
are constructed with the same stainless steel material 2
as the spent fuel pool racks. And they are spaced at 3
14 inches fuel assemblies for criticality, of 4
sub-criticality maintainment.
5 Next? The spent fuel pool racks are 6
different in the sense that they are free-standing, 7
and there is a gap between the racks and between the 8
racks and the pool wall. By the way, just a gap between 9
the racks and the pool wall is about 33 inches. So 10 it's quite substantial. It's not sitting right next 11 to it.
12 Again, the pool is divided, for talking 13 purposes, two type of racks, Region I, Region II. They 14 have a different configuration. Pitch is different, 15 but nothing else. And from a structural point of view, 16 it does not make much difference whether call it Region 17 I rack or Region II racks.
18 So the staff looked at their physical 19 descriptions and the level of detail they provided in 20 their DCD and the tech report and determined that the 21 guidance in SRP is fully complied with. So it's 22 consistent with the guidance, the physical description, 23 and the staff finds it acceptable. This shows just 24
37 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the isometric view of the typical rack.
1 The staff reviewed KHNP's design core 2
standards and specifications, what they indicated in 3
their tech report. And for material, they used some 4
ASME code Section 2 and ASME Section 3 for designing 5
core section and Appendix F. And they used -- Reg Guide 6
1.61 they cited and Reg Guide 1.29. These are the key 7
documents there.
8 There are other materials they have 9
referenced, but that's all, again, consistent with what 10 the SRP guidance 384 calls out for in terms of the codes, 11 and specifications, and the reg guides. So staff finds 12 that they are all consistent, and therefore the codes 13 and standard they have used are acceptable to the staff.
14 So the seismic analysis makes a big chunk 15 of staff's review of these racks and primarily because 16 of the complex, free-standing structure. It's 17 non-linear in nature. So staff had a lot of questions 18 and understood, at the end of the day, staff ensured 19 that they meet all the applicable requirements of the 20 SRP guidance and analysis methodology.
21 Just to go in a little more detail, staff 22 looked at the information, what they had computed.
23 And basically, the envelope, the spectra at the base 24
38 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 of the rack, and the pool wall. And that was their 1
target spectra, this one spectrum of that place.
2 They completed synthetic time histories 3
consistent with that spectra and followed the 4
requirements of Reg Guide 3.71 which basically tells 5
you what certain parameters you need to meet in order 6
to qualify to be able to use those time histories.
7 And it requires more than four-time history to be used.
8 KHNP used five. So staff finds it acceptable.
9 And I'll pick a model, so KHNP used the 10 3-D model of the racks and extracted the equivalent 11 B properties to simulate the rack structure dynamically.
12 Same thing they did with the fuel. They had PWR fuel, 13 P7, and based on the test results, they computed a 14 frequency and the stiffnesses. And they simulated as 15 a beam element out of that. So staff is pretty comfortable 16 with the way they've approached to compute the properties 17 of equivalent beam model.
18 With regard to the rattling and the impact 19 between the fuel and the rack, or the rack to rack, 20 or the rack to floor, the Applicant used the gap element.
21 Basically they're active and they're under compression.
22 And they used the appropriate properties of the springs' 23 stiffnesses to simulate the gap.
24
39 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Staff asked again where ability is there, 1
I mean, how sure are you about those stiffness values?
2 So staff asked them to do the uncertainty analysis 3
to vary those stiffnesses by 20 percent, pluses and 4
minuses, and make sure that what you are doing is bounded.
5 So that was the regarding of the gap stiffnesses.
6 Hydrodynamic
- effects, there's a
7 hydrodynamic mass between the fuel and the rack, then 8
the plate and the floor, and then the pool wall and 9
the rack. And they are pretty much, I would say, standard 10 approaches, formulas to compute the hydrodynamic mass.
11 Some people do it 3-D, hydrodynamic elements 12 and so on. But KHNP chose to use sort of hand calculations 13 which are pretty accurate, have been tested out. So 14 that was their approach. And staff points those tested 15 out approaches were acceptable and then that's it.
16 To simulate or to check or to confirm the 17 fuel integrity, the two components of the colliding 18 and rate of the fuel is balanced or held together.
19 And then the spacer grid would be in the fuel bundles.
20 So they, I mean KHNP, based on their test 21 results of the buckling capacity of the spacer grid, 22 the model that's spring in the model, to get the responses 23 during the citation so they assure the fuel integrity 24
40 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 will be maintained. So they have simulated the impact, 1
fuel impact with the rack in that manner.
2 And staff looked at their results, the fuel 3
test results, and they are consistent with what they 4
have used in their bigger analysis. So the fuel is 5
represented pretty accurately.
6 As I said before, they have also used the 7
radiation in the fuel properties, the new fuel versus 8
end of life fuel. Because your stiffnesses change, 9
the fuel stiffnesses. So what effect that has, we wanted 10 to study that to make sure that you do analysis only 11 once, but there's bounding analysis in terms of the 12 rack stresses.
13 Seismic analysis methodology, overall we 14 find it's consistent with what's being done in other 15 applications and what the reg guide requires that.
16 So they applied the three dimensional to a three 17 dimensional model with three dimensional time histories 18 in two horizontal and one vertical direction. They 19 found, in nonlinear time it's the analysis for five 20 sacrificed time histories. So there are five analyses 21 for one condition or one variation.
22 As these are free-standing racks, the focus 23 and the selection plays an important role, so they have 24
41 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 used the lower bound, upper bound, and the mean values, 1
the lower bound being 0.2 coefficient reflection, upper 2
bound is 0.8, the mean is 0.5. So for each of the time 3
histories, they used three separate coefficient 4
reflections to get the results of the responses during 5
6 Their design basis analyses consists of 7
the fully loaded racks. But the staff was not sure 8
if that really balanced the response during seismic, 9
because being a non-lineal response. So they also 10 studied the various patterns of the fuel loading, like, 11 50 percent loaded, 25 percent loaded, or the checkered 12 load, some empty racks, and enveloped the results of 13 all those analyses. So that uncertainty regarding the 14 fuel loading was very well covered.
15 Numerical solutions is all highly nonlinear 16 analyses. So staff wanted to make sure that your direct 17 integration time stamp is fine enough so that the results 18 are converging. And they demonstrated that the time 19 integration was small. By changing it 20 percent, they 20 found the results are changed.
21 So overall, they performed 20 such analyses.
22 Like, you have a five-time histories, and you have 23 three different sets of coefficient reflection. So 24
42 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 it gives you 15. That's for spent fuel. And then new 1
fuel racks, you don't need friction or radiation, because 2
it's bolted. So five cases there. So altogether, it's 3
20 cases they analyzed.
4 And then there are about 16 cases where 5
they studied the barometric variation group I talked 6
about, like varying the different masses, the 7
stiffnesses. So that total is about 36 simulations.
8 And the results, the stress analysis they performed 9
there's the bounding of all of this work. So staff 10 considered that they have covered or attempted to cover 11 the uncertainties to the extent reasonable.
12 They have also, related to the computer 13 program ANSYS where they used for this analysis, staff 14 wanted to make sure that for this class of problem, 15 meaning free-standing, highly nonlinear analysis, this 16 model computed the record they're using, is converging, 17 or is reasonable.
18 So they demonstrated that by, well, a 19 combination of a few things. ANSYS has been used, its 20 staff has used and approved ESBWR, so staff feels pretty 21 comfortable.
22 But in addition to that, we asked them 23 to sort of analyze the same problem or simplified problem, 24
43 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 so everything remaining same. You change the codes.
1 And the results, and again, mostly we are looking for 2
displacement. And we found them pretty reasonable.
3 They will not match, will not be a match. Because the 4
approach to solve the problem is different but fully 5
reasonable.
6 So based on this seismic analysis review, 7
we find that their input, the model, and the parameters, 8
the methodology they have used, and validated computer 9
code they've used, they all meet the guidance in SRP 10 3.8.4, 3.7.1, 3.8.1, and Reg Guide 161. And therefore 11 we find it acceptable.
12 The second part of the assessment is the 13 mechanical analysis due to accident. The full scenarios 14 are postulated in the SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D. Basically, 15 one of them is a straight, shallow drop. The fuel assembly 16 drops at, well, it can drop, what is it, a straight 17 drop away from the pedestal. And one is on the pedestal.
18 Away from the pedestal, you're trying to 19 maximize the deflection of the base plate where the 20 fuel is supported to make sure that it does not -- it's 21 not that excessive that it touches the floor below, 22 impacts the floor below.
23 Then the other scenario is you drop it on 24
44 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the pedestal. And by that, you're trying to maximize 1
whether it's going to penetrate the concrete and go 2
downward. So that's purpose of doing that scenario.
3 Third one is you just accidentally drop, 4
and you want to make sure that you're not hurting the 5
rack cell to the point that you come close to the neutron 6
absorber. Because then the sub-criticality becomes 7
an issue. So that's, like, just a drop on the corner 8
of the fuel bay.
9 And the last one is the stuck fuel assembly.
10 You're trying to pull the assembly, it gets stuck, 11 you know, against the wall of the shell. And again, 12 you want to see that stresses in the racks are within 13 the code allowables.
14 So all these four scenarios, KHNP analyzed 15 it, used the detail, two dimensional, finite element 16 model and used ANSYS LSDYNA code which is validated 17 code. And the rack, when it drops, the fuel assembly 18 is dropped back. It's considered fully loaded. So it's 19 not empty, so maximize. Because the plate deflection 20 will be more when the pool is loaded, and then you drop 21 more. So that's one of the rationales.
22 So with all these analyses, what they 23 performed, they showed two things. One, the minimum 24
45 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 factor of safety, meaning the margin, if you want to 1
call it, really it's not a factor of safety. That isn't 2
the right term. It is 1.4. And that occurs for the 3
drop. It's right on the pedestal.
4 So there's the concrete compressive 5
strength, the impact load on the concrete and allowable 6
compressive strength. That's where the margin of 1.4.
7 The margin at other places, for other three scenarios, 8
is much greater than 1.4. It's, like, of the other 9
two or three. We just mention only the lowest one.
10 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Excuse me.
11 MR. JAIN: Yes?
12 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: When you say a margin 13 of 1.4, 1.4 against what?
14 MR. JAIN: Against allowables --- computed 15 allowables.
16 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay. And what's the 17
-- you're talking about destruction of the concrete, 18 penetration of the concrete?
19 MR. JAIN: No. No, no. These are, like, 20 not within code allowables. You don't go into those 21 penetration or spalling, or any of that, no. When a 22 load acts on the concrete, it causes compression, regular 23 compression. And code gives you allowables to what 24
46 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 that compression stress should be.
1 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay.
2 MR. JAIN: So it's, again, design basis, 3
code allowables. So it's not like we covered an aircraft 4
impact when things are penetrating and --- no. They 5
are not there.
6 And, in fact, the SRP guidance does not 7
allow that either. So we --- although it's called 8
accident, but is it a scenario? Really, it's a mechanical 9
accident, unplanned, unanticipated accident.
10 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Let me ask this question 11 on the next to the last carrot under analysis, the slide 12 reads as follows, "Demonstrated that the impact of the 13 straight, deep drop of the fuel assembly on a specific 14 location does not cause any significant deformation 15 to the base plate."
16 MR. JAIN: Right.
17 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Does that mean that there 18 are other locations that are not specified that can 19 be?
20 MR. JAIN: Okay, let me just ---
21 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Areas where the base plate 22 is deformed?
23 MR. JAIN: I understand your question. Let 24
47 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 me clarify what is meant here. So they --- when the 1
plate is fully loaded with the fuel, the base plate, 2
you would expect, right, kinetics. The maximum 3
deflection will be at the center, simply supported here.
4 And if you drop the fuel assembly at the center of 5
the plate, in the cell, you will increase that deflection.
6 And that's what we are watching, that the 7
floor is still cleared when it deflects. So that is 8
a critical location for dropping the fuel for that 9
particular scenario.
10 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Well, how about the 11 scenario, as you mentioned a few minutes ago, the edge 12 of the rack is about 33 inches away from the wall of 13 the pool.
14 MR. JAIN: Uh-huh.
15 MEMBER SKILLMAN: It's 780 millimeters or 16 800 millimeters. If a fuel assembly is dropped between 17 the rack and the wall, does that impact load exceed 18 what you have just described?
19 MR. JAIN: Well, first of all, it's not 20 postulated, so I cannot really straight away address 21 it to you, number one. Number two, so this is really 22 non-required scenario, Scenario Number 5, if you will.
23 Because all the fuel that's supposed to drop, we are 24
48 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 testing the rack. Our focus is the rear of the racks, 1
whether the racks meet all the stress requirements during 2
postulated scenarios. So if the fuel drops between 3
the pool wall and the rack, probably it will fall on 4
the floor.
5 MEMBER SKILLMAN: I would expect it to.
6 MR. JAIN: Right. And if it falls on the 7
floor, that should not be a problem at all, because 8
we have covered --- that is covered under when it drops 9
right on the pedestal.
10 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Except that you have an 11 impact load that is the, if you will, the full face 12 of the lower end fitting that could have a higher local 13 penetration impact load than if it were spread more 14 widely as would be the base of the fuel rack.
15 MR. JAIN: Yes.
16 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Like a bullet.
17 MR. JAIN: Right. I could not answer the 18 question simply because that case would have been covered 19 under the design of the spent fuel pool.
20 MEMBER SKILLMAN: So your focus today is 21 simply only the racks.
22 MR. JAIN: Yes. My focus is just the racks.
23 And the design of the spent fuel pool is covered under 24
49 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 384-something, which I mentioned at the beginning, 1
383.4.6.
2 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you.
3 MR. JAIN: That's in the SEO.
4 MR. JAIN: The next, this slide shows a 5
couple of cartoons for various accidents we talked about.
6 Now we talk about the load to load 7
combination. So we spent time and looked, talking about 8
the seismic and the mechanical accident. Those are 9
the two primary loads which really control the design 10 of the racks. Nevertheless, there are other loads for 11 completeness, that load, five loads, safe shutdown, 12 thermal loads, mechanical accident loads.
13 And then there are combination of these 14 loads can occur. And what are the corresponding service 15 levels for those combinations. And that's all specified 16 in our regulatory SRP. And the KHNP's design is 17 consistent with the requirement, what's in Appendix 18 D.
19 As you can see, they are all -- seismic 20 and mechanical accident loads never get combined. So 21 each one is treated separately. And there is no live 22 load for these racks. It's just a dead load.
23 Okay, and thermal loads, I'm going to talk 24
50 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 about. They're secondary loads, according to ASME code, 1
so they are looked at, they're evaluated. But then 2
they are evaluated by themselves and shown to be within 3
the code allowables.
4 This is the general procedure that KHNP 5
has followed. And this is really a no-brainer. This 6
is what you would do to design anything, any structure.
7 So some other design considerations would go into the 8
analyzing and designing these various elements. There 9
are wells between the cell to base plate, base plate 10 to pedestal, and cell to cell.
11 Then obviously, these local stresses caused 12 by the impact loads, the rattling loads, the cell wall 13 may buckle, because of the heavy fuel load on the base 14 plate. Secondary stresses as I said, they are also 15 looked at.
16 And then the compute, you need to compute 17 the stress in the fuel assembly to make sure the integrity 18 of the fuel assembly is maintained. And that is done 19 by checking the stress in the cladding which holds the 20 fuel palate together, and the structural integrity of 21 the fuel stressor grates.
22 So how you go about doing your analysis 23 and design, you calculate the forces, what you get from 24
51 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 knowing your seismic analysis of these racks, and 1
mechanical accident load. Then you combine those 2
responses of the forces and the given element, for 3
example, well design or rack wall design, and combine 4
them according to a load combination which was shown 5
before. And then you calculate the maximum stress.
6 You compare that maximum stress with the 7
acceptance limits that I specified in Section 3 of the 8
ASME code, subsection NF. That provides the limits 9
for various service levels, A, B, and D. And you compute 10 the safety factor or margin, if you will, the ratio 11 of the allowable to the calculated stresses. Now, in 12 all cases, the staff finds that the ratio is always 13 greater than one. And that's a requirement.
14 MEMBER STETKAR: B.P.? In your response 15 to Dick, you mentioned some section that would analyze 16 the load on the spent fuel pool liner, if I were to 17 drop the fuel assembly into the spent fuel pool. I 18 can't seem to find that in the DCD, at least the section 19 that you mentioned.
20 MALE PARTICIPANT: And neither can I.
21 MEMBER STETKAR: Could you confirm that 22 indeed the design certification evaluates that load 23 and where it is?
24
52 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. JAIN: Well, like I said, we were going 1
to make it an action item. I'm not familiar. I did 2
not --
3 MEMBER STETKAR: I'm trying to do it real 4
time here, and I'm not coming up quickly with anything.
5 MR. JAIN: Well, I was thinking more like 6
the staff's SER would address that.
7 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Well, it ---
8 MR. JAIN: And again ---
9 MEMBER STETKAR: -- should be addressed 10 in the DCD someplace.
11 MR. JAIN: I can only ---
12 MEMBER STETKAR: Anyway, just take it away 13 and if you can get ---
14 MR. JAIN: Yes, yes. Sure. I'm just going 15 by my experience with other designs. So am not familiar 16 with this particular design spent fuel pool. So I could 17 not be certain.
18 So these are the acceptance limits, what 19 the stresses, computer stresses are checked against, 20 some other things we talked about already. These 21 stresses are from subsection NF, ASME code Section 3.
22 Material properties, we'll use that 200 degrees to 23 maximize the thermal load and get the lower allowables.
24
53 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 And the -- I guess Service Level 8, they 1
are all consistent but specify the code, NF, Section 2
3320. And then for service level D, that was used mostly 3
for seismic and mechanical accident loading. They used 4
that too in Appendix F of that section, 1334. And it's 5
all consistent.
6 Since we've got free-standing racks, the 7
sliding and overturning is a concern. And the 8
requirement is that the fact of safety against sliding 9
or overturning should be at least 1.5.
10 We find these acceptance criteria, what 11 KHNP used, they're consistent with Appendix D in SRP 12 Section 3.8.4 and 3.8.5. And 3.8.5 talks about the 13 fact of safety against sliding and overturning. And 14 therefore, we find the acceptance criteria used for 15 the design of these racks acceptable.
16 Material, quality control programs, and 17 inspections, the rack material is reviewed by staff 18 under Section 9.1.2, so same material, SA type 240.
19 That's been used for all racks, not only for this one 20 but other designs. So material is consistent.
21 Fuel assembly data is from PWR PLUS7 22 assembly. Design and fabrication inspection is per 23 NF requirements, Section 3 code. Quality control, QA 24
54 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 program, QC program, they commit to Appendix B for quality 1
control program. And then 10 CFR 5065 regarding 2
monitoring to ensure that the racks are capable of 3
fulfilling their intended functions during operation 4
and after.
5 So the staff finds these codes and their 6
commitment to the QA programs and inspections consistent 7
with the SRP requirements. And they find it acceptable.
8 KHNP identified a few small items, four 9
to be more specific. First one is periodic condition 10 monitoring, the need to continue to remain valid. It's 11 one of the things that you mentioned about the way they 12 fabricate and put it in place. Is that important? Well, 13 that's how they maintain the check, by periodic condition 14 monitoring, that they are not drifting apart or they 15 continue to maintain the geometry which was analyzed 16 for it.
17 They need to perform the confirmatory 18 dynamic analysis to make sure that, at a given site, 19 their design stresses still remain valid. They also 20 need to develop plant procedure and admin control for 21 handling the fuel over the pool, the specific admin 22 controls.
23 And for seismic, they need to do inspection 24
55 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 to see if the racks have drifted apart. And if they 1
have, then they need to bring them back in analyzed 2
condition or demonstrate why they're still adequate, 3
if they don't take any corrective action. So that's 4
one of the core items. So staff finds those acceptable 5
and reasonable.
6 For the conclusion, the staff has reached 7
that, based on its review, that the structural design 8
of the fuel racks meets the ASME code, Section 3, 9
Subsection NF, design requirements. Minimum factor 10 of safety for the fuel racks seismic event, including 11 a mechanical accident scenario, is 1.19.
12 The spent fuel rack displacement to the 13 design basis seismic events is small and do not close 14 the large gap of 33 inches between the wall and the 15 spent fuel pool racks. The relative displacements of 16 the spent fuel pool racks is about quarter inch, 0.28 17 inches, due to design basis size. And the rack to rack 18 separation is 1.18 inch. So that gives you a margin 19 against impact of four.
20 For the other variety of racks, which is 21 in Region I, the margin is a little greater. It's better 22 than six, simply because they're separated to begin 23 with, so the gap between them is larger. So it gives 24
56 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 you a larger factor of safety.
1 Free standing racks, they do not overturn 2
during seismic events. And factor of safety is much, 3
much better than 1.5 against sliding and overturning.
4 It's on the order of, I believe, it's 15, if I'm not 5
mistaken. Because the displacement is so small, and 6
the rack is very heavy, it doesn't go --- it cannot 7
tip. It's not able to tip.
8 So due to small seismic movements, 9
criticality analysis, which has been performed for normal 10 conditions, still remains valid. And they continue 11 to provide the function, what they're designed for.
12 That's what the staff's conclusion is.
13 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: I had a question --
14 I got it. I was trying to go back and look at my notes, 15 but I couldn't find it. The SA-564, grade 630, steel 16 for the bolts, that's a precipitation hardened stainless 17 steel. And it's offered in multiple heat treatments 18 to vary the strength.
19 Can you tell me which heat treatment is 20 going to be used? There are at least three aging 21 treatments. The very high strength one is the lowest 22 temperature age, but it is susceptible to hydrogen 23 embrittlement.
24
57 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. JAIN: I would pass that question to 1
KHNP. I'm not knowledgeable in that area. I could not 2
answer the question. We can take it back to KHNP and 3
get you a specific answer.
4 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Yes. This material 5
is otherwise known as, I think, 17-4 PH which is a more 6
common name for it. But the very high strength version 7
is ---
8 MR. YESHNIK: I'm not exactly --
9 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: -- be careful.
10 MR. YESHNIK: I'm not exactly sure if I 11 have that off the top of my head. I want to say it's 12 the 1100 degrees Fahrenheit heat treatment.
13 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay. The 1100 one 14 is the better one.
15 MR. YESHNIK: Okay. And also this material 16 is in compression, so hydrogen embrittlement really 17 isn't going to affect --
18 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Well, except for 19 during seismic loading and things like that.
20 MR. YESHNIK: I mean, maybe.
21 (Simultaneous speaking) 22 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: We're all into maybe.
23 MR. YESHNIK: Yes.
24
58 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. JAIN: The staff will get back to you 1
more specifically.
2 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: It's the 900 F aging 3
treatment that's usually the most problematic. And 4
they use this material for bolts at the bottom of the 5
Macondo Oil Platform which failed.
6 MR. JAIN: Well, this concludes my 7
presentation with the new spent fuel and spent fuel 8
pools storage racks. They will maintain a coolable 9
geometry preventing criticality and protect the fuel 10 assembly from seismic and mechanical loading factors.
11 That's what the staff's review indicates.
12 MEMBER KIRCHNER: B.P., just out of 13 curiosity, when in another section, wherever it is, 14 when you look at the actual pool design, do they use 15 the same -- do you use a consistent set of assumptions, 16 in terms of seismic loading, and history, and such, 17 that's compatible with how the racks are loaded?
18 MR. JAIN: They need to be, yes.
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, okay.
20 MR. JAIN: They need to be.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Where would we find that 22 other analysis. I'm trying to think, that's ---
23 MR. JAIN: Again, it should all be addressed 24
59 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 or should be addressed in that SER for spent fuel pools 1
and the liner.
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And they will look at 3
things like hydrodynamic loading on these racks there.
4 MR. JAIN: Well, there would need to get 5
the factor --
6 (Simultaneous speaking) 7 MR. JAIN: -- yes, the factor of the racks 8
in the pool.
9 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes. Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: And I have one more.
11 I think you may have addressed this in an earlier 12 presentation. But you said that when you do the drop 13 analysis, you assume that the fuel racks are fully loaded.
14 15 MR. JAIN: Correct.
16 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: So have you looked 17 at the situation where you have an open cell, and you 18 get a drop on an adjacent fuel assembly? Does that 19 do anything to change the configuration, crush the open 20 cell area?
21 MR. JAIN: No. I don't believe that 22 scenario has been considered, simply because we do not 23 believe that that's -- the parameter we are trying 24
60 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 to view, in looking at, will really affect that parameter, 1
meaning would it increase the deflection of the base 2
plate of the fully loaded racks. It will not.
3 Number two, would it increase the load on 4
the pedestal? It's not going to do that either. So 5
from the postulated mechanical accident, what you're 6
viewing here and what the possible effect of the parameter 7
we are trying to maximize, we believe that, if that 8
were the case, that would need to be covered.
9 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you.
10 MR. JAIN: Just to add that, there's 11 sufficient margin on top of it. So if there were 12 uncertainties, the minimum margin is 1.4. That's 13 against the concrete. But if you talk about the racks 14 and the base plate, that structure, the margin there 15 is even much larger, like two to three. So, you know 16 17 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Is that it for your 18 presentation?
19 MR. JAIN: Yes, I'm done.
20 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay. We're going to 21 have a transition between the open session and the closed 22 23 MEMBER POWERS: No, you're ---
24
61 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Pardon?
1 MEMBER POWERS: No, you're not. You're 2
going to ask for public comment.
3 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: I was about to get 4
there. That's why I was making the comment.
5 MEMBER POWERS: You're slow. You're very 6
slow.
7 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Yes, I am slow, okay.
8 So that means we'll need public comments now for this 9
presentation. So while we're getting the --
10 MR. BROWN: Professor Ballinger, they're 11 not done their presentation.
12 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: They're not?
13 (Off microphone comments.)
14 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: That's part of my 15 slowness. Okay. Continue.
16 MR. WUNDER: Andrew?
17 MR. YESHNIK: Okay. Well, good morning, 18 everyone. My name is Andrew Yeshnik and I am the reviewer 19 for the materials and chemical engineering issues with 20 the spent and new fuel rack. My slide is going to be 21 pretty brief because you've already seen this information 22 today.
23 So, the spent and new fuel racks are designed 24
62 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 with normal materials that we would expect to see in 1
these applications. We have type 304Ls, authentic 2
stainless steel, and type 630, the PH grade which we 3
already talked about. And I did take a look at the 4
DCD, and it is the 1100 degrees Fahrenheit heat treatment 5
on those.
6 The spent fuel racks also have the metamic 7
neutron absorber which is not credited for any structural 8
capacity. The spent fuel liner is type 304 stainless 9
steel. The spent fuel racks are designed, fabricated, 10 and inspected to the requirements of Section 3NF and 11 the liner is ASTM grade, but the quality assurance is 12 upgraded with ASME NQA1 in Appendix B QA program.
13 The new fuel is stored in dry storage, so 14 there's no expectation of any degradation mechanisms 15 for that. The spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel 16 pool. The water chemistry is in conformance with the 17 EPRY primary water chemistry guidelines which is 18 described in SR Section 9.1.3 and evaluated in Staff's 19 SVRN Section 9.1.3.
20 And the coupon monitoring program for the 21 metamic material is described in Section 9.1.1 and in 22 Staff's SVRN, and we found that to be acceptable. So 23 for the racks themselves, the authentic stainless steel 24
63 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 has sensitive controls and delta ferrite content controls 1
that are consistent with Staff guidance. And the 2
cleanness of the new spent fuel racks are consistent 3
with NQA1 subpart 2.1.
4 So in general, Staff finds that the approach 5
that the Applicant had is consistent with the SRP, and 6
we found it to be acceptable. I think that concludes 7
all of my comments for this. So if there's any questions, 8
if not we'll pass it on to Raul.
9 MR. HERNANDEZ: Well, good morning. My 10 name is Raul Hernandez. I'm the reviewer for our plant 11 systems branch. And I looked at the fuel storage as 12 a system.
13 The new fuel storage feed and the spent 14 fuel pool were looked into making sure that they maintain 15 their safety function which is that the assemblies are 16 maintaining a safe and sub-critical array during all 17 credible storage conditions and to provide a safe means 18 to load the spent fuel into shipping casks, like, making 19 sure that as a system overall, all the different 20 components that have been presented, that the fuel is 21 going to remain safe.
22 The Staff reviewed the design of storage 23 systems and the new fuel storage PID and the spent fuel 24
64 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 in accordance with the guidance in SRP 912. Particular, 1
we looked into the configuration and the design of, 2
seismic design of the different components that are 3
credited to maintain the pool level and the safe location, 4
making sure that all of them be properly identified 5
as required.
6 When a system is required to be seismic 7
one, it's included in Chapter 3, and that's already 8
been presented to the Commission here. The Staff issued 9
several RAIs, and the Applicant has addressed all the 10 RAIs satisfactorily. There's no open items in this 11 section.
12 The Staff determined that the fuel source 13 system is designed in accordance with the SRP guidelines 14 and meets all the applicable regulations including GDCs 15 2, 4, 5, 61, 63, the ALARA concerns, and 20.1406.
16 This is going to be brief. There's no major 17 issue here. Is there any question in the overall design 18 of the pool?
19 (No audible response.)
20 MR. HERNANDEZ: That's the last of my items.
21 Then we go to the --
22 MR. WUNDER: Okay, now we're -- that 23 concludes the Staff presentation of Section 9.1.2.
24
65 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 So now all we have to do is go through the few open 1
items we have. And if I could change out BP Jane for 2
DK. Thank you.
3 And the first item I believe belongs to 4
Alex Burja who is on the phone. So if we can get her 5
unmuted.
6 MEMBER STETKAR: Alex, if you're out there, 7
just say something. You should be unmuted.
8 MS. BURJA: Can you hear me now?
9 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
10 MS. BURJA: Okay. I'm not sure what 11 happened, but I'm here now. So, is my slide up?
12 MR. WUNDER: It is.
13 MS. BURJA: Okay, great. So at the time 14 of our last presentation, the two items that remained 15 open associated with DCD Section 9.1.1, criticality 16 safety of new and spent fuel storage, were mainly 17 associated with ongoing work or resolution of disuse 18 and other review areas that might have potential impact 19 on Section 9.1.1.
20 The first issue involved the effect of 21 thermal conductivity degradation. In particular, the 22 Staff had asked in an RAI un Section 9.1.1 how the maximum 23 fuel temperature assumed for the depletion calculation 24
66 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 in the burn up credit criticality analysis accounted 1
for GPD.
2 This issue was resolved because in the 3
response to RAI 7954 which was related to the plus seven 4
fuel design topical report, the Applicant showed that 5
the assumed maximum fuel temperature and the criticality 6
analysis found the accepted maximum fuel temperature 7
for this design plus the Staff approved CPD penalty.
8 So therefore, it is acceptable to the Staff.
9 The second open item which related to the 10 mechanical analysis review. So as a Phase II and Phase 11 III Staff's review of the storage rack mechanical analysis 12 technical report was incomplete, and there were several 13 technical issues that remain to be resolved.
14 So due to these issues, the Staff was unable 15 to determine whether any mechanical accidents could 16 have impact on criticality. But as you just heard, 17 this issue was resolved because the Staff an Applicant 18 worked to resolve the technical issues related to the 19 storage rack mechanical analysis technical report, and 20 the Staff has completed its review of the report.
21 The Staff concludes that the criticality 22 analyses found any criticality related effects of the 23 analyzed mechanical accident. Are there any questions?
24
67 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Fifteen second rule 1
is applied. No questions.
2 MS. BURJA: Thank you.
3 MR. WUNDER: Eighty-five seventy-eight is 4
yours, isn't it?
5 MR. YESHNIK: Yes.
6 MR. WUNDER: Okay.
7 MR. YESHNIK: I thought that there was 8
another party --
9 MR. WUNDER: No, that's it.
10 MR. YESHNIK: Okay. So, my open item is 11 Question 9.1.1-37, and it involved a question on the 12 exposure of the metamic material to elevate temperatures 13 during fabrication, and whether the neutron absorber 14 coupons needed to be heat treated to reflect that 15 condition.
16 And the Applicant stated that the 17 qualification testing has already demonstrated that 18 there is no effect on neutron absorbing properties.
19 The Staff re-looked at the qualification testing that's 20 at the bottom of the slide and agreed that the 900 degree 21 tests for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> demonstrating that there is no change 22 is sufficient.
23 And the Staff also reviewed generic 24
68 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 literature and concluded that the welding temperatures 1
are bounded by normal manufacturing temperatures so 2
that there is no predicted issue. And that's it.
3 MR. HERNANDEZ: Section 9.1.3 contained, 4
at the time of the presentation of Section 9.1.3 to 5
the Subcommittee, Section 9.1.3 contained an open item.
6 And this open item was related to the assumptions used 7
on the spent fuel pool, thermal hydraulic analysis.
8 The Staff had identified some apparent 9
inconsistencies between the information on the DCD and 10 the assumptions used on the thermal analysis, the 11 Applicant responded to the Staff's RAI by revising the 12 thermal hydraulic calculation and making this 13 calculation available for the Staff to audit.
14 They provided clarification of the 15 assumptions used under thermal analysis and proposed 16 DCD markups that have already been incorporated into 17 the DCD. The Staff reviewed the information that was 18 provided in the RAI, the DCD, and the technical report 19 that summarized the thermal hydraulic analysis and 20 confirmed that the revised thermal hydraulic analysis 21 used conservative assumptions that are consistent with 22 the SRP guidance, and therefore meets the applicable 23 GDC in this case, GDC 61.
24
69 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MEMBER STETKAR: Raul, I'm just going to 1
bring this up when we discuss Section 19.3. But since 2
you're here and I'm not sure that you'll be here for 3
that section, let me just ask you about it.
4 If I look at the differences in those times 5
that you mentioned, I understood I would say in my opinion 6
a rather substantial difference that the time to heat 7
up and boil off water for example to within ten feet 8
of the top of the fuel assemblies went from about 25 9
hours down to about a little over 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.
10 That to me, these are numbers that are in 11 section 19.3, but they're related to heat up and boil 12 off of spent fuel pool inventory, which is not directly 13 related to the design of the spent fuel pool cooling 14 system.
15 But I'm curious about what did they do in 16 the revised analyses that would result in such differences 17 in heating up and boiling water?
18 MR. HERNANDEZ: You are looking at two 19 different thermal analysis.
20 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, I'm looking at one 21 pool that heats up.
22 MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. But the difference 23 is this. In Section 9.1.3, we're looking at the thermal 24
70 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 analysis of the performance of the safety related cooling 1
system.
2 And the initial conditions are different.
3 This is a design basis event. So you have less water 4
and a different set of initial conditions. When you're 5
looking at Chapter 19, accident scenarios, the guidance 6
for Chapter 19 is from -- your initial set of conditions 7
are different.
8 You're not on the design basis event.
9 You're already, you start from normal conditions and 10 then you have this beyond design event. So those two 11 are not exactly comparable events. You have different 12 water
- levels, different heat
- loads, different 13 conditions.
14 MEMBER STETKAR: All right. I'll wait 15 until this afternoon, then. Thank you.
16 MR.
KALATHIVEETTIL:
Good
- morning, 17 everyone. My name is Don Matthews Kalathiveettil, and 18 I will be presenting the closure of two open items with 19 respect to Section 9.5.2, communication systems.
20 First open item was RAI 548 Question 9.5.2-6.
21 The issue was that the Applicant had classified all 22 the communication systems as non-safety related. And 23 the DCD stated that the communication systems did not 24
71 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 require compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix GDC's 1
1, 2, 3, and 4.
2 Since compliance with these GDCs is part 3
of the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 952 and the 4
availability of these communication systems is important 5
for programs that has emergency planning, the Staff 6
did not agree with the Applicant's stance and requested 7
through the RAI to demonstrate how the communication 8
systems would meet the applicable GDCs.
9 The Applicant's response to the RAI included 10 a commitment that the design of the communication systems 11 will comply with GDCs 1, 2, 3, and 4. It also included 12 detailed markups of the DCD that explained how the 13 communication systems would meet all the applicable 14 GDCs.
15 Subsequently, the Staff reviewed the 16 information we just provided by the Applicant and 17 determined that the design information and commitment 18 given by the Applicant was sufficient to meet the intent 19 of DCDs 1, 2, 3, and 4.
20 The second open item was RAI 548 Question 21 9.5.2-7. The issue was that the DCD lacked sufficient 22 information in APRIL 1400 FSR Tier 1 Table 2.6.9-1.
23 This table contains the various ITAAC related to the 24
72 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 communication systems. 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1) requires that 1
it is answered in certification application contains 2
the necessary and sufficient ITAAC.
3 Hence, the Staff requested additional 4
information through the RAI. The Applicant's response 5
to the RAI included detailed markups in which it was 6
explained which procedures are needed to ensure that 7
each communication subsystem would be able to perform 8
its required function.
9 It also included the necessary and 10 sufficient information about each subsystem in the ITAAC 11 and acceptance criteria sections of Table 2.6.9-1.
12 Subsequently, the Staff reviewed the information 13 provided by the Applicant and determined that sufficient 14 detail was now provided in Tier 1 to meet the intent 15 of 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1).
16 This basically concludes my presentation 17 for this section. Any questions?
18 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Once again, we now 19 can -- well, we're transitioning.
20 MEMBER STETKAR: Will there be a closed 21 session?
22 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: There will be a closed 23 session. So we would like public comments now for what 24
73 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 has been presented so far. Is there anybody in the 1
room that would like to make a comment?
2 MR. OH: This is Andy Oh, KHNP Washington 3
Office. Before finishing this session, the KHNP would 4
like to correct something regarding tub and tubing aux 5
feedwater room heater calculations. First thing is 6
that for members that is the temperature profile.
7 So our temperature profile indicated that 8
about the 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br /> in room, the temperature is at 140 9
Fahrenheit and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> it increased to 145.
10 MEMBER STETKAR: Andy, let me make sure 11 I have that. At what time is 140?
12 MR. OH: Fifty-two hours, 140.
13 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
14 MR. OH: Seventy-two hours, 145.
15 MEMBER STETKAR: So, okay.
16 MR. OH: It is in an increasing slope. It 17 is approximately 2.25 Fahrenheit per hour. That's the 18 first question, your first answer from the member.
19 Second is one of our, the technical staff had mentioned 20 that there's no electrical the INC equipment inside 21 the tub and tubing aux feedwater room.
22 But when we checked our design document, 23 we identified the control panel is located inside tub 24
74 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 driven aux feedwater room.
1 MEMBER STETKAR: All right, thank you.
2 MR. OH: We corrected that fact. And second 3
thing is -- third thing is that staff member indicated 4
there is two different criteria is used in the room 5
heater calculation. One is 120 Fahrenheit, the other 6
is 150 Fahrenheit.
7 KHMP is using the criteria from the NUMARC 8
87-00. That says condition one is equipment located 9
in the condition one room are considered to be a low 10 constant with respective elevated temperature effect, 11 and will likely require no special action to assure 12 operability for our station blackout.
13 That is category one. NUMARC 87-00 14 recommend to use that 120 Fahrenheit, and specifically 15 there's some example for that is for -- example is they 16 specified that exempt means electrical equipment 17 instrumentation how they did category one.
18 And also, it indicated that there is category 19 two room is equipment located in condition two rooms 20 generally requires not force the cooling in order to 21 ensure operability for a four hour station blackout.
22 And also they make some specific example for that room 23 is for either is RCIC and feedwater room is steam driven 24
75 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 aux feedwater pump room.
1 That is our basis to using what that criteria 2
for the room feeder calculation. In conclusion that 3
we used the 150 Fahrenheit as a criteria, and we also 4
notify with that that we have some control panel inside 5
it that aux feedwater, the temperature in the aux 6
feedwater room.
7 So in order to protect that equipment, the 8
KHMP 1400 design and the equipment spec is that some 9
that equipment have to survive over 160 Fahrenheit.
10 That is also very consistent with the single core design.
11 MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you. That 12 clarifies at least my understanding of what is in that 13 room. And it does clarify the fact that the electrical 14 and INC equipment inside that room must be qualified 15 to a substantially higher temperature than other 16 electrical and INC equipment throughout the plant.
17 So we have that on record now. Thank you.
18 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay, back to the, 19 are there any comments from the public in the room?
20 (No audible response.)
21 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Hearing none, are 22 there any members of the public on the bridge line that 23 would like to make a comment?
24
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 1
public.
2 76 MR. LEWIS: Marvin Lewis, member of the CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Yes, Marvin?
3 MR.
LEWIS: Wonderful, thank you.
4 Appreciate it greatly. Look, I listened to this, and 5
as you well know, I listen to other ACRS meetings and 6
what have you. And one of the things that has been 7
bothering me for a long time, but I think especially 8
here, is when you start talking about things that are 9
not easily traced, this often falls under category of 10 warehouse.
11 In other words, suppose you need a bolt 12 or a nut to finish a shipment, what do you do? You 13 grab a bolt and a nut that looks like it and throw it 14 into the bin and ship it. That's called warehouse.
15 And I just was wondering, it may not be 16 here, but how do you assure that the right materials 17 come through and are just not picked up to finish a 18 shipment? Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you. Are there 20 any other members of the public that would like to make 21 a comment?
22 (No audible response.)
23 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Hearing none, we'll 24
77 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 close the bridge line. And we're now going to make 1
a transition, so it's time to make a break. We'll break 2
until about 20 minutes 'til. And at that time, we'll 3
have a closed session.
4 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 5
off the record at 10:25 a.m.)
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP APR1400 DCA Chapter 9: Auxiliary Systems KEPCO/KHNP February 21, 2018
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 1 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Contents Overview of Chapter 9 Section Overview List of Submitted Documents and Summary of RAIs List of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 List of Open Items 9.1.2 New and Spent Fuel Storage Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Summary of Open Items Response to Phase 3 Questions Current Status Attachments:
Acronyms List of COL Items related to Open Items
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 2 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Section Title Major Contents 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling
- Criticality Safety of New and Spent Fuel Storage
- New and Spent Fuel Storage
- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
- Light Load Handling System (Related to Refueling)
- Overhead Heavy Load Handling System 9.2 Water Systems
- Essential Service Water System
- Component Cooling Water System
- Domestic Water and Sanitary Systems
- Condensate Storage Facilities
- Chilled Water System
- Turbine Generator Building Closed Cooling Water System
- Turbine Generator Building Open Cooling Water System 9.3 Process Auxiliaries
- Compressed Air and Gas Systems
- Process and Post-Accident Sampling System
- Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems
- Chemical and Volume Control System Overview of Chapter 9 Section Overview
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 3 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Section Title Major Contents 9.4 Fuel Storage and Handling
- Control Room HVAC System
- Fuel Handling Area HVAC System
- Auxiliary Building Clean Area HVAC System
- Turbine Generator Building HVAC System
- Engineered Safety Features Ventilation System
- Reactor Containment Building HVAC System and Purge System
- Compound Building HVAC System
- Design Features for Minimization of Contamination 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems
- Communication Systems
- Lighting Systems
- Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil System
- Emergency Diesel Engine Cooling Water System
- Emergency Diesel Engine Starting Air System
- Emergency Diesel Engine Lubrication System
- Emergency Diesel Engine Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System
- Gas Turbine Generator Facility Overview of Chapter 9
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 4 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP List of Submitted Documents for Chapter 9 Summary of RAIs Overview of Chapter 9 Document No.
Title Revision Type ADAMS Accession No.
APR1400-K-X-FS-14002
-P & NP APR1400 Design Control Document Tier 2: Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems 0
DCD APR1400-K-X-IT-14001
-P & NP APR1400 Design Control Document Tier 1 0
DCD APR1400-Z-A-NR-14011 Criticality Analysis of New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks 1
TeR ML17094A138 APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P/NP Mechanical Analysis for New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks 3
TeR ML17242A310 No. of Questions No. of Responses No. of OI 277 277 5
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 5 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP List of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Overview of Chapter 9 No.
Related RAI Topic ADAMS Accession #
1 287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-15)
Seismic Load ML17243A348 2
287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-20)
Seismic Analysis of Racks ML17244A512 3
287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-23 & 24)
Mechanical Accident Analysis ML17244A512
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 6 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP List of Open Items Overview of Chapter 9 No.
Related RAI Topic ADAMS Accession #
1 RAI 167-8191 (Q 09.01.01-13)
Abnormal Conditions ML15344A144 2
RAI 469-8578 (Q 09.01.01-39)
Neutron Absorber Material ML16169A030 3
RAI 473-8582 (Q 09.01.03-4)
Minimum safety water level of SFP ML16123A040 4
RAI 491-8613 (Q 09.05.02-4) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4 in communication system ML16222A952 5
RAI 491-8613 (Q 09.05.02-5)
- 2. Meaning of functional arrangement in communication system ML16211A158
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 7 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP 9.1.2 New and Spent Fuel Storage Key Design Features New Fuel Storage Rack (NFSR)
Two modules (Total 112 cells) of NFSRs are constructed of stainless steel, and are designed as seismic Category I.
NFSRs are located in the NFP, and are bolted to embedment plates at the bottom of the pit to preclude tipping.
Spent Fuel Storage Rack (SFSR)
SFSRs are constructed of stainless steel, and are designed as seismic Category I.
SFSRs are located in the SFP, and are freestanding with pedestal resting on embedment plates. SFSRs are made up of Region I (Total 352 cells) and Region II (Total 1,440 cells) and provide total 29 rack modules.
(Total 1,792 cells)
METAMICTM is used as a neutron absorber.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 8 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP 9.1.2 New and Spent Fuel Storage Safety Evaluation Dynamic simulations for total of 36 cases runs (including sensitivity runs) are performed to determine the loads and displacements for each rack.
NFSRs and SFSRs under the postulated mechanical accident possess acceptable margins of safety.
NFSRs and SFSRs are designed to meet the requirements which are specified on SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D and ASME Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 component supports.
In response to NRC feedback on both the TeR and RAI No. 8272 responses, APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P was completed (as Rev. 3) on August, 2017.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 9 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Seismic Load
Related RAIs : 287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-15)
Description of issue :
Staff requested to clarify and confirm that it used at least the five sets (greater than required four) of time histories for the nonlinear structural analysis of the NFSR and SFSR.
Technical adequacy justification for artificial time history sets.
Resolution:
KHNP developed five sets of artificial acceleration time histories for three orthogonal directions specific to the NFSR and SFSR.
The suitability of the time histories was verified in accordance with SRP 3.7.1, Option 2, criteria for multiple sets of time histories.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 10 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Seismic Analysis of Racks
Related RAIs : 287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-20)
Description of issue : Staff requested to provide the followings:
Sufficient information of the rack and FA model and its parameters (e.g., spring elements, hydrodynamic mass, time history integration time step) considered for the seismic evaluation of NFSR and SFSR Sensitivity analysis results of the impact forces and rack responses to variation in spring constants considered in the nonlinear seismic analyses Sensitivity analysis results of the integration time step used in performing the nonlinear time history analyses for SSE.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 11 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2
Resolution:
KHNP provided a detailed description of the Rack and FA model. NFSR and SFSR models are composed of 3-D elastic beam elements and lumped mass elements with properties derived from the dynamic characteristics of the detailed 3-D shell model of the racks.
Sensitivity analyses were performed for spring constants (i.e., stiffness) in the model; rack-to-floor, rack-to-rack and fuel-to-rack stiffness's at +/-20% of the nominal value. The effect of the sensitivities was a change in predicted loads within the variation found for different time histories and less than the variation for different COFs.
Comparison of a run at one half the fixed time step used for all other runs showed small changes in calculated results comparable to the run to run variation with different time histories.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 12 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Mechanical Accident Analysis
Related RAIs : 287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-23 & 24)
Description of issue : Staff requested to provide the followings:
A nonlinear dynamic analysis for the impact effects of drop accidents, considering a finite element model Location of the drop on the rack base plate that were considered to maximize the deformation of the rack base plate and whether it also considered a deep drop into a cell along the perimeter and half way between the supports Consider all other fuel assemblies in place when a fuel assembly drops through an empty cell
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 13 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2
Resolution:
KHNP responded that all drop accidents are analyzed by developing a finite element model of the rack, rack base plate, a fuel assembly and the pedestal support using appropriate shell, beam, and solid body elements of ANSYS LS-DYNA program.
Drops as far away from the support provided by a pedestal are considered at two locations (a central cell and a peripheral cell at the midpoint of a side) that maximize the distance to the points of support.
The effects of all of the stored fuel assemblies in the rack is considered by modifying the density of the baseplate to simulate the loading effects of the other fuel assemblies.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 14 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Open Items Open Item: Abnormal Conditions
Related RAIs RAI 167-8191 (Q 09.01.01-13)
Description of issue The staff is unable to confirm the applicants statement that the mechanical accidents do not cause rack deformation that would affect criticality, until the seismic and structural review of the new and spent fuel storage racks (APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P) is complete.
Resolution:
KHNP provided that any damage to the racks is limited to portions above the neutron absorber and does not affect their configuration relative to the criticality analysis. The staffs review for APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P, Mechanical Analysis for New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks was completed.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 15 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Open Items Open Item: Neutron Absorber Material
Related RAIs RAI 469-8578 (Q 09.01.01-39)
Description of issue The staff concerns regarding the adequacy of utilizing as-fabricated Metamic' coupons in the neutron absorber monitoring program because the Metamic' material will be heated during fabrication (due to welding).
Resolution:
KHNP provided that welding near the neutron absorber would not have an effect on corrosion resistance or neutron absorption of the material. The Metamic' material qualification included exposing Metamic' to a 900oF environment for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and examining the cooled material for changes in material properties. The qualification test demonstrated that the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in a 900oF environment resulted in no change in areal density, product weight, or dimensions.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 16 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Open Items Open Item: Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
Related RAIs : 473-8582 (Q 09.01.03-4)
Description of issue Staff request to identify the minimum safety water level of SFP and update the DCD accordingly.
Staff request to revise the thermal-hydraulic calculations using the revised minimum safety water level and update the DCD accordingly.
Additionally, the staff identified that the normal water level has been identified as elevation 154, while in other places it shows as elevation 153.
Resolution:
The minimum safety water level for SFP was provided through the response to RAI 473-8582, Q 09.01.03-4.
Thermal-hydraulic calculation has been revised based on minimum water level (EL. 146).
KHNP proposed DCD changes in order to indicate clearly that these two levels (EL. 153 in Technical Specifications and EL. 154 as normal water level) represent different conditions through the response to RAI 473-8582, Q 09.01.03-5.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 17 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Open Items Open Item: Communication System
Related RAIs : 491-8613 (Q 09.05.02-4)
Description of issue Staff requested to justify why the communication systems are not considered as risk significant SSCs, related to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4.
Staff issued a follow-up RAI 548-8822, Q 09.05.02-6.
Resolution:
KHNP responded that the communication systems of the APR1400 are designed to meet GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4 and do not interface with any safety-related or risk-significant SSC.
The four communication subsystems are designed to assure that any single event does not result in a complete loss of plant communication.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 18 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Summary of Open Items Open Item: ITAAC and ITP for communication system
Related RAIs : 491-8613 (Q 09.05.02-5)
Description of issue Staff requested to provide the detailed description of all ITAAC items along with their acceptance criteria and ITP for the communication systems in Section 14.2.
Staff requested to clarify what the applicant means by functional arrangement of communication systems.
Staff issued a follow-up RAI 548-8822, Q 09.05.02-7.
Resolution:
KHNP provided the new ITP for plant communication system and the detailed description of all ITAAC items for communication system through the response to RAI 548-8822, Q 09.05.02-7.
KHNP revised DCD Tier 1, Subsection 2.6.9 providing the detailed description of plant communication systems instead of the term of functional arrangement.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 19 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Response to Phase 3 Questions The Question in ACRS APR1400 Subcommittee on May 18, 2017
9.2.7 Chilled Water System Question: The basis for the non-safety-related plant chilled water system to provide cooling for the safety related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump room
Response
In order to avoid damage caused by HELB accident to safety-related system (ECW), non-safety-related cubicle cooler is installed in the TDAFW pump room.
The heat-up calculation is performed to determine the maximum temperatures in the TDAFW pump room under the loss of cooling.
TDAFW pump shall be qualified to be operable at maximum temperature for the operation period.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 20 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Response to Phase 3 Questions The Question in ACRS APR1400 Subcommittee on May 18, 2017
Summary for Heat-up calculation of turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room
Purpose:
1)
To determine the maximum temperatures in the TDAFW pump room 2)
To demonstrate that the maximum temperature of the room does not exceed the maximum allowable temperature during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> under loss of HVAC system Calculation Program: GOTHIC (Generation of Thermal-Hydraulic Information for Containments) program Maximum Allowable Temperature: Maximum allowable temperature, 150 °F of the room is decided based on the steady-state temperature of Condition 2 mentioned in NUMARC 87-00 Result : The TDAFW pump rooms are maintained below 150 °F during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> under loss of cooling.
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 21 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Current Status Chapter 9 is complete
KHNP continues to monitor Chapter 9 to assure any conforming changes are addressed.
5 open items, that were identified in Phase 2 and 3, have been resolved with adequate and sufficient discussion with the staff.
Changes in Chapter 9 as reviewed and marked-up in response to the RAIs will be incorporated into the next revision (Rev.2) of the DCD
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 22 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
Attachment:
Acronyms COF Coefficient of Friction COL Combined License DCD Design Control Document ECW Essential Chilled Water System FA Fuel Assembly GOTHIC Generation of Thermal-Hydraulic Information for Containments HELB High Energy Line Break ITAAC Inspection, Test and Acceptance Criteria KHNP Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co.
NFP New Fuel Storage Pit NFSR New Fuel Storage Rack RAI Request for Additional Information SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SFSR Spent Fuel Storage Rack SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake TDAFW Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
15th Pre-application Meeting ACRS SC Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 23 NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP Attachment : List of COL Item related to OIs COL Identifier Description COL 14.2(17)
The COL applicant is to prepare the site-specific preoperational and startup test specificatio n and test procedure and/or guideline for offsite communication system.
Presentation to the ACRS Subcommittee Korea Hydro Nuclear Power Co., Ltd (KHNP) APR1400 Design Certification Application Review Safety Evaluation with No Open Items:
Chapter 9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS February 21, 2018
NRO/SPSB NRO/MCB NRO/ICE Raul Hernandez Andrew Yeshnik Dawnmatthews Kalaliveettil Hien Le John Honcharik Chang Li Greg Makar NRO/SRSB Angelo Stubbs Alexandra Burja Ryan Nolan NRO/SCVB Bob Vettori Danny Chien NRR/EENB Dennis Andrukat Adakou Foli Thinh Dinh NRO/SEB Sheila Ray Vaughn Thomas Pravin Patel BP Jain Special Thanks Rich Morante, Carolyn Lauron, and Brian Hughes 2
Project Managers Bill Ward - Lead Project Manager George Wunder - Chapter 9 Project Manager February 21, 2018 Chapter 4: Reactor Staff Review Team
Introduction February 21, 2018 Section 9.1.2, New and Spent Fuelstorage 3
New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks Function
New and spent fuel storage racks provide safe storage for fuel assemblies and maintain a coolable geometry, preventing criticality, and protect the fuel assemblies from seismic and mechanical load effects Safety Review Scope in Section 9.1.2
Structural design of new and spent fuel storage racks to withstand effects of natural phenomena (seismic) and mechanical accident scenarios involving fuel assembly Spent fuel pool and pool liner design Staffs safety evaluation of the spent fuel pool and the pool liner provided in SER Section 3.8.3.4.6 Criticality Evaluation Staffs safety evaluation of the racks criticality in provided in SER Section 9.1.1
New and Spent Fuel Storage February 21,2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 4
Overview Review Highlights
Reviewed TR Mechanical Analysis for New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks, APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P, Rev. 3, August 2017
Review basis Appendix D to SRP Section 3.8.4,Guidance on Spent Fuel Racks
Seismic input and finite element models used for nonlinear seismic analysis
Mechanical accident scenarios involving dropped and stuck fuel assembly
Computer codes and validation
Analysis methodology including design parameters, and assumptions made in finite element analyses
Review results for reasonableness
Applicable COL information items Request for Additional Information (RAIs)
Staff issued 39 RAIs and all questions were resolved Staff concludes that stresses induced in the racks and its components meet the applicable ASME Code allowable stresses, rack seismic displacement are small and do not impact each other or the pool wall and its sub-critical configuration is unaffected.
New and Spent Fuel Storage February 21,2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 5
- Areas of Review Physical description Applicable design codes, standards, and specifications Seismic and impact loads Loads and load combinations Structural design and analysis Structural acceptance criteria Materials, quality control programs, and Inspection
Physical Description February 21,2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 6
New Fuel Storage Racks (NFSRs)
Located in the new fuel storage pit in Fuel Handling Building Two identical racks, each with a 7 x 8 array of storage cells Total of 112 fuel storage locations NFSRs are bolted to embedment plates at the bottom of the pit and do not slide The NFSRs are constructed of stainless steel The center-to center spacing between adjacent fuel assemblies is designed to be 14 inches to maintain sub-criticality
Physical Description February 21,2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 7
Spent Fuel Racks (SFRs) 23 SFSRs located in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) with gaps between the adjacent racks and the surrounding fuel pool walls SFSRs are freestanding, with pedestals resting on embedment plates in the reinforced concrete floor of the SFP The SPF is divided into two regions, region I and region II.
Region I contains four 8 x 8 array racks and two 6 x 8 array racks; The center-to center spacing between adjacent fuel assemblies is designed to be 10.83 inches to maintain sub-criticality Region II contains nineteen 8 x 8 array racks and four 8 x 7 array racks; The center-to center spacing between adjacent fuel assemblies is designed to be 8.86 inches to maintain sub-criticality
Physical Description Figure 2-8 Isometric Schematic of the SFSR (Region II)
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 10
Design Codes, Standards, and Specification February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 9
Applicant identified the following industry codes and regulatory guides that are applicable to the design, fabrication, construction, materials, testing, and inspections of the new and spent fuel storage racks for the APR1400 plant:
ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF and Appendix F, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda ASME Code,Section II, Materials, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda RG 1.29 RG 1.61 The staff found the use of these codes, standards, and specifications to be consistent with the guidance given in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D and therefore acceptable
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 10 Nonlinear Seismic Analysis Input Motion
Target input response spectra - envelope of rack base and the SFP wall
Input Time histories -Five time histories developed enveloping the target spectra with the guidance in SRP 3.7.1 for multiple time histories.
Analytical Model
A 3-D coupled Rack-Fuel beam model for each rack and whole pool multi-rack model
Hydrodynamic effects: Rack-to-rack, rack-to-pool wall, rack baseplate-to-pool floor, fuel assembly-to-cell wall
Mass and stiffness of fuel assembly and fuel spacer grid for impact
New and end of life (EOL) fuel properties Gap and contact spring and sensitivity analysis of spring parameters Seismic analysis Methodology
Three directional orthogonal time histories applied simultaneously
Nonlinear seismic time history analysis performed for 5 sets of acceleration time histories
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 11 Seismic and Impact Loads
Nonlinear seismic analyses performed for three values of the coefficient of friction: 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8
Considered the configurations of the SFSR at full, 25-percent full, 50-percent full, and empty mixed loadings and the NFSR fully loaded
The numerical solution was obtained by direct integration of the nonlinear equations of motion
Considered sensitivity analysis for Integration time step
Considered 20 Dynamic simulation
Considered additional 16 simulations for the sensitivities of various seismic model parameters (e.g., gap springs stiffness)
Validated and verified (V&V) ANSYS Computer code for nonlinear fuel rack analysis The staff found the applicants seismic nonlinear analysis including the seismic input, seismic model parameters and the analysis methodology and validation of the computer Code ANSYS to be reasonable and consistent with the regulatory guidance in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D, Section 3.7.1, Section 3.8.1,Section II.4.F (guidance for the use of validated computer programs) and Regulatory Guide 1.61, and therefore are acceptable.
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads Mechanical Accidents Analysis involving Fuel Assembly February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 12 Four mechanical accident scenarios considered
Straight shallow drop on SFSR (NFSR has no neutron absorber to damage)
Straight Deep Drop Away from NFSR and SFSR rack pedestal
Straight Deep Drop Over a SFSR Pedestal
Stuck Fuel assembly Analyses
Accident scenarios analyzed by a detailed 3-D finite element model using LS-DYNA computer code
Rack is considered fully loaded in the drop analysis
Drop locations are appropriate to evaluate maximum plate deflection
Demonstrated that the impact of the straight deep drop of a fuel assembly on specific locations on the baseplate does not cause any significant deformation to the baseplate
Minimum safety factor for all four accident scenarios is greater than 1.4 The staff found that the applicant used a detailed 3-D finite element model to analyze the mechanical accident scenario and deformation acceptance limit are consistent with the guidance in SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D and therefore acceptable.
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads (Accident Scenario)
Figure 4-1 Straight Shallow Drop February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 13
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads (Accident Scenario)
Fig. 4-2 Deep Drop Away from a Pedestal February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 14
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads (Accident Scenario)
Figure 4-3 Deep Drop Over a Pedestal February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 15
Loads and Load Combinations February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 16 Loads
Dead Load including fuel assembly weight (D)
Live Load (L)
Thermal loads (To, Ta)
Mechanical accident loads involving Fuel assembly (Fd, Pf))
Load Combinations for ASME Code Service level limits A, B, and D
D + L
D + L + To
D + L + To + Pf (stuck fuel assembly)
D + L + Ta + E'
D + L + Fd (Fuel load drop)
Service Level A Service Level A Service Level B Service Level D Rack Functional Capability The staff found the loads and load combinations considered for applicable ASME Code Service level limits to be consistent with the information in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D and therefore acceptable.
Structural Design and Analysis Procedures February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 17 Design Considerations
Applicant described the structural design of various elements of the rack structure
Stresses in welds between cell-to-baseplate, baseplate-to-pedestal, and cell-to-
- cell,
Local stresses caused by cell wall impact, cell wall buckling,
Secondary stress due to thermal effects
Stresses in Fuel Assembly Design Forces and stresses
Forces from the nonlinear seismic analysis or mechanical accident analysis
Combined with appropriate loads in the load combination
Calculated design stresses Stress Acceptance Limit
ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, Level A, B, and D service limits for Class 3 Safety Factor
Ratio of Allowable stress to calculated stress
Structural Acceptance Criteria (Limit)
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 18 Acceptance limits of the rack structures are defined in ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, as applicable for Class 3 components support.
Material Properties at 200 degrees Fahrenheit (F)) used to develop the stress limits for various service level conditions Service Level A limits consistent with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF-3320. The applicant conservatively used service level A stress limits to evaluate service level B loading The Increase factor for Service level D stress limits consistent with the criteria in ASME Code Section III, Appendix F, Section F-1334 Minimum factor of safety against overturning is required to be equal to or greater than 1.5 The staff found the structural acceptance criteria consistent with the information in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D and SRP Section 3.8.5 and therefore acceptable
Material, Quality Control Programs & Inspections February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 19 Material SA-240 type 304 L for cells and plates SA-564 Grade 630 for support studs Neutron absorber material (METAMIC) attached to SFSRs Fuel assembly material data from PWR Plus7 fuel assembly Design, Fabrication, and Inspection ASME Code Section III Subsection NF requirements Quality Control Program Racks are designated seismic Category I structures and treated as safety-related components Committed to 10CFR Part 50 Appendix B for Quality control program and 10CFR 50.65 for periodic monitoring The staff found the material, design, fabrication and inspection and QA program consistent with Appendix D to SRP 3.8.4 and therefore acceptable.
COL Information Items February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 20 Four COL Items Periodic condition monitoring program - confirm material and geometric assumptions remain valid during operating life of the plant Perform confirmatory dynamic and stress analysis considering site specific conditions Develop plant procedures and admin controls for fuel handling activities over the spent fuel pool Develop post-seismic event inspection procedure to measure gaps between fuel storage racks The staff found COL items to be acceptable because it adequately describes actions necessary for the COLapplicant.
Conclusion February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 21 Structural design of the fuel racks meets the ASME Code Section III Subsection NF design requirements Minimum safety factor for the fuel racks during seismic event and postulated mechanical accident scenarios is 1.19 (> minimum required 1.0)
Spent fuel rack displacements due to design basis seismic event are small and do not close the large gap of 33 between the SFSRs and the SFP wall Spent fuel rack maximum relative displacement (0.28, Region II racks) due to design basis seismic event is smaller than the rack-to-rack separation (1.18, Region II racks); margin against impact is 1.18/0.28= 4; Larger margin for Region I racks (>6)
Free standing spent fuel rack do not overturn due to the design basis seismic event and the safety factor against overturning is significantly greater than the required minimum safety factor of 1.5 Due to small seismic movements, criticality analysis for the rack configuration is bounded by the SFP Criticality analysis for normal conditions included in SER subsection 9.1.1
Summary Conclusion February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 22 New and spent fuel storage racks provide safe storage for fuel assemblies and maintain a coolable geometry, preventing criticality, and protect the fuel assemblies from seismic and mechanical load effects
Materials o Applicant uses typical materials for fuel storage New fuel racks: Type 304L and Type 630 stainlesssteel Spent fuel racks: Type 304L and Type 630 stainless steel, Metamic neutron absorber(not credited for structural capacity)
Spent fuel pool liner: Type 304 stainlesssteel o Fuel racks are designed, fabricated, and inspected to ASME Code SectionIII-NF requirements o Spent fuel pool liner ASTM grade material with ASME NQA-1 andAppendix B Quality Assurance.
o New fuel is in dry storage - degradation will not occur.
o Spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool. The applicant has selected materials with good resistance to corrosion in spent fuel pool environments. The spent fuel pool water is controlled as described in FSAR Section 9.1.3 and is consistent with the EPRI Primary Water Chemistry guidelines. The neutron absorber coupon monitoring program is evaluated in SER Section 9.1.1 and was found to beacceptable.
o Sensitization controls, delta ferrite content, and cleanness controls are consistent with staff guidance (RG 1.31, RG 1.44, and NQA-1 Subpart 2.1).
The staff found the approach consistent with SRP Section 9.1.2 and acceptable.
26
May 18, 2017 Chapter 9: Auxiliary Systems 27 Cooling and Cleanup System Review Objective New fuel storage pit (NFSP) and spent fuel pool (SFP) safety functions: maintain the fuel assemblies in a safe and subcritical array during all credible storage conditions and to provide a safe means of loading the spent fuel assemblies into shipping or storage casks.
Items of major interest Staff reviewed NFSP and the SFP in accordance with the guidance in SRP 9.1.2 The staff evaluated system configuration and seismic design of SSCs to ensure adequate water inventory in the SFP.
All RAI responses found acceptable and proposed changes to DCD have been incorporated, there are no remaining Open Items.
Technical Topics Section 9.1.1 - Criticality Safety of New and Spent Fuel Storage Open Item - Effects of Thermal Conductivity Degradation (TCD)
Issue: Staff asked in RAI 8191, Question 09.01.01-8, how the maximum fuel temperature assumed for the depletion calculation in the burnup credit criticality analysis accounted for TCD.
Resolution: In the response to RAI 7954, Question 11 (related to the PLUS7 Fuel Design Topical Report), the applicant showed that the assumed maximum fuel temperature bounds the expected maximum fuel temperature plus the staff-approved TCD penalty.
Open Item - Mechanical Analysis Review Issue: The staffs review of APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P, Mechanical Analysis of New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks, was incomplete as of Phase 2, so the staff was unable to determine whether any mechanical accidents could have impacts oncriticality.
Resolution: The staff completed its review of APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P and concludes that the criticality analyses bound any criticality-related effects of the analyzed mechanical accidents.
28
Technical Topics 29 Section 9.1.1 - Criticality Safety of Fresh and Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Open Item - RAI 469-8578, Question 09.01.01-39 Issue: The fabrication process of the spent fuel rack may expose the Metamic neutron absorber to elevated temperatures (welding in close proximity). The staff questioned if the neutron absorber coupons needed an additional heat treatment to reflect the final condition of the Metamic neutron absorber.
Resolution: The applicant stated that the as-manufactured coupons were sufficient.
Open Item Closure: The staff re-examined the qualification testing of Metamic[1] that has been previously submitted and accepted by the NRC. One qualification test exposed Metamic material to 900 °F for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and demonstrated no change in neutron absorption. The staff also reviewed generic literature on aluminum-boron carbide neutron absorbers and concluded that temperatures above 1000 °F are expected during fabrication (solidus temperature around 1100 °F for aluminum alloys). The staff agrees that the as-fabricated neutron absorber coupons are sufficient and this item is closed.
- 1. Use of Metamic in Fuel Pool Applications, HI-2022871 [ML022280353] and Qualification of Metamic for Spent-Fuel Storage Application
[EPRI Report 1003137]
Technical Topics 27 Section 9.1.3 - SFP Cooling and Cleanup System Open Item - RAI 473-8582 Issue: the staff evaluated the applicants SFP thermal-hydraulic analysis and identified inconsistencies between the assumptions used for the analysis and the system description in the DCD.
Resolution: A response to RAI 473-8582 was provided and included:
Revised thermal-hydraulic calculation (available via audit),
clarification of assumptions used in revised thermal-hydraulic analysis; DCD markups to eliminate the inconsistency in assumptions; Open Item Closure: The staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant in the RAI response, the DCD, and the technical report summarizing the thermal-hydraulic analysis and confirmed that the revised thermal-hydraulic analysis uses conservative assumptions that are consistent with the SRP guidance and therefore meet the requirements of GDC 61.
Technical Topics Section 9.5.2 - Communication Systems 28 Open Item - RAI 548-8822, Question 09.05.02-6 Issue: Applicant had classified all communication systems as non-safety related. Hence DCD stated that the communication systems did not require compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4 Resolution: A response to RAI 548-8822 was provided and included:
Commitment that the design of the communication systems will comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4 Detailed mark-ups of the DCD which explained how the communication systems would meet all of the applicable GDCs Open Item Closure: The staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant and determined that the design information and commitment given by the applicant was sufficient to meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4.
Technical Topics Section 9.5.2 - Communication Systems 29 Open Item - RAI 548-8822, Question 09.05.02-7 Issue: DCD lacked sufficient information in APR1400 FSAR Tier 1, Table 2.6.9-1. Additional detail was needed to ensure that each communication subsystem is capable of performing its intended function.
Resolution: A response to RAI 548-8822 was provided and included:
Detailed mark-ups which explained the procedures needed to ensure that each communication subsystem is capable of performing its intended function.
Necessary and sufficient information about each communication subsystem in the ITAAC and Acceptance Criteria of Table 2.6.9-1.
Open Item Closure: 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1) requires that a design certification application contain the necessary and sufficient ITAAC. The staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant and determined that sufficient detail was provided in APR1400 FSAR Tier 1 to meet the intent of 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1).