ML18085B035
| ML18085B035 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/21/2018 |
| From: | Charles Brown Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Brown C | |
| References | |
| NRC-3544 | |
| Download: ML18085B035 (131) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards APR 1400 Subcommittee: Open Session Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: Rockville, Maryland Date: Wednesday, February 21, 2018 Work Order No.: NRC-3544 Pages 1-131 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1
2 3
4 DISCLAIMER 5
6 7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 9
10 11 The contents of this transcript of the 12 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 14 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 15 recorded at the meeting.
16 17 This transcript has not been reviewed, 18 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 19 inaccuracies.
20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) 6 + + + + +
7 APR1400 SUBCOMMITTEE 8 + + + + +
9 OPEN SESSION 10 + + + + +
11 WEDNESDAY 12 FEBRUARY 21, 2018 13 + + + + +
14 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 15 + + + + +
16 The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B1, 18 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Ronald G. Ballinger, 19 Chairman, presiding.
20 21 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
22 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Chairman 23 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member 24 MICHAEL L. CORRADINI, Member 25 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 1 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member 2 JOSE A. MARCH-LEUBA, Member 3 DANA A. POWERS, Member 4 JOY L. REMPE, Member 5 GORDON R. SKILLMAN, Member 6 JOHN W. STETKAR, Member 7 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member 8
9 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
10 CHRISTOPHER BROWN 11 12 ALSO PRESENT:
13 TONY AHN, KHNP 14 CLINTON ASHLEY, NRO 15 ALEX BURJA, NRO*
16 NAN CHIEN, NRO 17 CHUNG RAE CHO, Doosan 18 GREG CRANSTON, NRO 19 ANTONIO DIAS, NRO 20 ADAKOU FOIL, NRR 21 CHEWUNG HA, KHNP 22 GARY HAYNER, Jensen Hughes 23 RAUL HERNANDEZ, NRO 24 ATA ISTAR, NRO NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 1 BHAGWAT JAIN, NRO 2 RANDY JAMES, KHNP 3 DAWNMATHEWS KALATHIVEETTIL, NRO 4 JOO WAN KANG, KHNP 5 SUNG HOON KANG, Doosan 6 REBECCA KARAS, NRO 7 JUNG-HO KIM, KHNP 8 YOUNG MAN KWON, KEPCO E&C 9 OLIVIA LAREYNIE, NRO 10 HIEN LE, NRO 11 HAKRO LEE, KHNP 12 MARVIN LEWIS, Public Participant*
13 CHANG LI, NRO 14 DAE HEON LIM, KEPCO E&C 15 MARK LINTZ, NRO 16 SHANLAI LU, NRO 17 GREG MAKAR, NRO 18 JIHONG MIN, KHNP 19 MATTHEW MITCHELL, NRO 20 RICHARD MORANTE, BNL*
21 ALISSA NEUHAUSEN, NRO 22 RYAN NOLAN, NRO 23 JIYONG OH, KHNP 24 NGOLA OTTO, NRO NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 1 MARIE POHIDA, NRO 2 SHEILA RAY, NRR 3 CAYETANO SANTOS, NRO 4 THOMAS SCARBROUGH, NRO 5 ROB SISK, Westinghouse 6 JAMES STECKEL, NRO 7 ANGELO STUBBS, NRO 8 JEONG-KWAN SUH, KHNP 9 MATT THOMAS, NRO 10 VAUGHN THOMAS, NRO 11 ANDREA D. VEIL, Executive Director, ACRS 12 ROBERT VETTORI, NRO 13 DAVE WAGNER, AECOM 14 WILLIAM WARD, NRO 15 GEORGE WUNDER, NRO 16 ANDREW YESHNIK, NRO 17 JINKYOO YOON, KHNP 18 19 *Present via telephone 20 21 22 23 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1
2 3
4 T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 5 PAGE 6 Opening Remarks & Objectives 7 By Ronald Ballinger, ACRS....................7 8 Staff Opening Remarks 9 By William Ward, NRO........................10 10 Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems (Open) KHNP 11 By Hakro Lee, Joowan Kang...................11 12 Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems (Open) 13 By NRC: George Wunder, Alex Burja, 14 Andrew Yeshnik, Bhagwat Jain, 15 Dawnmathews Kalathiveettil 16 BNL: Rich Morante ..........................28 17 Adjourn...........................................76 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 8:30 a.m.
3 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: The meeting will now 4 come to order. This is a meeting of the APR1400 5 Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor 6 Safeguards. I'm Ron Ballinger, Chairman of the APR1400 7 Subcommittee.
8 ACRS members in attendance are Mike 9 Corradini, Dick Skillman, Dana Powers, Matt Sunseri, 10 John Stetkar, Jose March-Leuba, Walt Kirchner, Joy Rempe, 11 and Vesna Dimitrijevic. I think I pronounced that right, 12 a second time. Pretty good. I think Charlie Brown will 13 arrive a little bit late.
14 First, today's meeting is for the 15 Subcommittee to receive briefings from Korea Electric 16 Power Corporation and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power 17 Company regarding their design certification, excuse 18 me, application, and the NRC staff regarding their safety 19 evaluation report with no open items specific to Chapter 20 9, Auxiliary Systems, 19.3, the undesigned base external 21 vents, 19.4, loss of large area, and 19.5, aircraft 22 impact assessment.
23 The ACRS was established by statute and 24 is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, FACA.
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8 1 That means that the committee can only speak through 2 its published letter reports. We hold meetings to gather 3 information to support our deliberations. Interested 4 parties who wish to provide comments can contact our 5 offices requesting time after the meeting announcement 6 is published in the Federal Register.
7 That said, we also set aside ten minutes 8 for comments from members of the public attending or 9 listening to our meetings. Written comments are also 10 welcome.
11 The ACRS section of the USNRC public website 12 provides our charter, bylaws, and letter reports, and 13 full transcripts of all full and subcommittee meetings, 14 including slides presented at the meeting. The rules 15 for -- for precipitation -- participation in today's 16 meeting were announced in the Federal Register on Friday, 17 February 21st, 2018 -- not.
18 The meeting was announced as an open and 19 closed to public meeting. This means that the chairman 20 can close the meeting as needed to protect information 21 proprietary to KHNP or its vendors.
22 That means this afternoon's, after the 23 breaks meeting, according to our schedule, they're marked 24 closed. They're closed for the purposes of the staff NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 wanting to avoid having to open and close things if 2 they make -- if there are discussions related to 3 proprietary information.
4 No requests for making a statement to the 5 Subcommittee has been received from the public. A 6 transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be 7 made available as stated in the Federal Register notice.
8 Therefore, I request that participants in this meeting 9 use the microphones located throughout the meeting room 10 when addressing the Subcommittee. Participants should 11 first identify themselves and speak with sufficient 12 clarity and volume so they can be regularly heard.
13 Not to presenters, there's a small black 14 microphone in front of you. When you speak, please 15 be sure that the green light on the top of the microphone 16 is glowing green. To make this happen, you must press 17 the pad at the base of the microphone.
18 We have a bridge line established for 19 interested members of the public to listen in. The 20 bridge number and password were published in the agenda 21 posted on the NRC public website.
22 To minimize disturbance, the public line 23 will be kept in the listen only mode. And I understand 24 we have two lines open for staff members to participate.
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10 1 The public will have an opportunity to make a statement 2 or provide comments at the designated time towards the 3 end of the meeting, actually, towards the end of the 4 Chapter 9, or at the end of the Chapter 9 session 5 presentations.
6 NRO staff and contractors are on a separate 7 bridge line for Chapter 9. We ask that the staff place 8 their phone on mute until you are called upon. And 9 we'll do some signaling to make that happen.
10 Now Bill is here, yes. I now invite Bill 11 Ward, NRO project manager, to introduce the presenters 12 and start the briefing. Bill?
13 MR. WARD: Thank you. This meeting is third 14 to the last of the subcommittees. We're really happy 15 that we are making good progress on this, and we hope 16 we can meet the dates of the other two. As they're 17 scheduled, I don't see any problem with that. And we're 18 glad to be here again and hope we answer all your questions.
19 Thank you.
20 This is Rob Sisk, Westinghouse, consulting 21 to KHNP. Just again, appreciate the opportunity to 22 present the APR1400 as we continue through the review 23 process. And without further ado, I'd like to introduce 24 Mr. Hakro Lee to lead us through Chapter 9.
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11 1 MR. H. LEE: Good morning, ladies and 2 gentlemen. This is Hakro Lee from KHNP. This 3 presentation is for the Chapter 9 which covers auxiliary 4 system for APR1400 design.
5 The contents are provided in this slide.
6 Main contents are overview of Chapter 9, 9.1.2, new 7 and spent fuel storage, summary of main topic in Section 8 9.1.2, summary of open items, response to Phase 3 9 questions, current status, and attachments. Here we 10 can see an overview of the titles and major contents 11 each section in DCD.
12 The following documents have been submitted 13 for addition to Chapter 9. There were five open items 14 in full Committee in last July. These are three of 15 the main topics. Description of issue and resolution 16 for each item will be described in orderly.
17 These items are five open items.
18 Description of issue and resolution for each open item 19 will be described in orderly. From now on, 9.1.2 new 20 and spent fuel storage will be presented by Mr. Kang.
21 MR. KANG: Good morning, ladies and 22 gentlemen, my name is Joowan Kang from Tucson. I am 23 going to start with introducing redesign pictures of 24 fuel racks in DCD Section 9.1.2.
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12 1 The new spent fuel racks are constructed 2 of stainless steel and designed as a seismic Category 3 1. For NFSR, two modules are located in the New Fuel 4 Storage Pit. The remaining pieces of NFSR are bolted 5 to the embedment plate at the bottom of the pit to preclude 6 tipping during seismic events.
7 For SFSR, 29 modules are located in the 8 spent fuel pool which consists of over six vents in 9 Region I and 23 vents in Region II. The main features 10 of SFSR modules are free-standing with a pedestal.
11 That's the base plate.
12 Installation of SFSR modules in the spent 13 fuel pool, they are surmounted in borated water with 14 the space between the racks and cell walls at all times, 15 especially to keep the reaction of several material 16 as called METAMIC is used.
17 Next. This slide shows the safety 18 evaluation of event. As the background of this slide, 19 the revision chair or technical report for fuel racks, 20 mechanical analysis was issued on December 2014 at the 21 8:38:25, RAI 8272. The latest technical report was 22 revised as a revision study on August 2017 to reflect 23 resolutions.
24 As of the recent oral evaluation, the seismic NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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13 1 models were proposed 36 cases dynamic simulations to 2 determine the loads and displacement for the racks.
3 The structural evaluation results shows that the new 4 and spent fuel cylinders met the requirement as 5 specified on SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D, and ASME Section 6 III, Subsection NF, Class 3.
7 The postulated mechanical accident analysis 8 are performed based on the impact image and configuration 9 of each rack scenario as well. An evaluation result 10 of each rack scenario, the new and spent fuel racks 11 are just acceptable modules of safety and no effect 12 on the computation to maintain a civil criticality 13 over the fuel.
14 Next. This slide is related to the number 15 time histories and the critical discretion of artificial 16 time histories based on SRP 3.7.1, Option 2. It stated 17 that for nonlineal structural analysis the number of 18 time histories should be greater than four. Therefore, 19 we provide that for the number of time history sets.
20 Five sets of artificial acceleration time 21 histories were developed to match the safe shutdown 22 escape instruction as far as background.
23 MEMBER REMPE: There was a message a few 24 minutes ago that you needed to plug in your computer.
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14 1 You're about out of power.
2 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: What is it that you 3 can't see?
4 MEMBER REMPE: Someone, ha, ha, ha.
5 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: We're on it.
6 (Off the record comments) 7 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: For those of you who 8 may be listening on the phone, the presentation computer 9 died. And we're resurrecting it. So hold on for a few 10 minutes.
11 MEMBER POWERS: In his testimony before 12 a Senate committee, former Chairman Dick Meserve, when 13 asked what he had discovered about nuclear engineers 14 said, "One of my findings is they cannot talk without 15 view graphs."
16 (Laughter) 17 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: There are exceptions.
18 MEMBER POWERS: They cannot talk well 19 without view graphs.
20 (Laughter) 21 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: There are exceptions.
22 MEMBER STETKAR: The appropriate 23 characterization ends with a period after the word well.
24 (Laughter)
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15 1 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Theron, how long do 2 you think it's going to take?
3 (Off the record comments) 4 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 5 off the record at 8:43 a.m. and resumed at 8:48 a.m.)
6 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay, we're back in 7 session. Thank you for being considerate, or 8 inconsiderate.
9 MR. KANG: This slide is related to the 10 number of time histories and technical justification 11 of artificial time history sets based on SRP 3.7.1, 12 Option 2. It states that for manual rises to the number 13 of time histories should be greater than four.
14 Therefore, we provided that for the number of time history 15 sets.
16 Five sets of artificial acceleration time 17 histories were developed to match the safe shutdown 18 earthquake instruction response criteria. Also we 19 provided technical participation for artificial time 20 history sets to review and provided on Section 3 of 21 technical report. The results showed that the 22 suitability of the time histories was verified, according 23 to SRP 3.7.1.
24 Next. This slide relate to the study of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 a seismic analysis of racks. Due to free-standing fuel 2 storage rack modules in the pool, the seismic response 3 are nonlinear and involve a complex combination of 4 emulsions, so just to provide additional information 5 about the structure around the modeling.
6 First, sufficient information of the rack 7 and fuel assembly model and it's parameters. Second, 8 sensitivity analysis results of the impact force and 9 rack response to variation in spring constants. Third, 10 sensitivity analysis results of integration time step 11 used in performing the seismic analyses for SSE.
12 The next slide show what be provided. Next?
13 What we provided for information is a detailed 14 description of the rack and fuel assembly model for 15 seismic analysis. And model element properties are 16 derived from the dynamic characteristics of the detailed 17 3-D shell model of the racks.
18 What we performed is sensitivity analysis 19 for spring constants in the model, such as rack-to-rack, 20 rack-to-floor, and fuel-to-rack. And comparison of 21 a run at one half the fixed time step used for all other 22 runs.
23 What is provided for analysis result is 24 the effect of sensitivities was a change in the predicted NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 1 loads within the variation found for different time 2 histories and less than the variation for different 3 function depletion, such as CHERIFON 2, CHERIFON 5, 4 and CHERIFON 8.
5 Next? This slide relates to mechanical 6 accident analysis. First, we had to consider detailed 7 evaluation for drop accident analysis. First, consider 8 finite element model on evaluation of a nonlinear dynamic 9 analysis for the impact effect of drop accidents.
10 Second, consider deep drop locations to maximize the 11 deformation of the rack base plate. Third, consider 12 all other fuel assemblies in place when a fuel assembly 13 drops through an empty cell.
14 Next? This slide is a resolution we gave.
15 All drop accidents analyzed by developing a finite 16 element model of a rack, base plate, a fuel assembly, 17 and the pedestal using ANSYS LSDYNA program to evaluate 18 maximum plate, drops are considered at the two locations 19 that maximize the distance of the point of support.
20 And drop analysis model was considered fully loaded.
21 As a different analysis result, loss of 22 breastplate such as a puncture has not occurred. The 23 breastplate of the new and spent fuel storage racks 24 are calculated per 2.99 inch and 2.72 inch respectively.
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18 1 These value are less than that the minimum 2 disturbance between the breastplate and the drying 3 surface. Therefore, throughout the simulation, the 4 NFSR base plate to contain the pit flow or the SFSR 5 base plate to protect the fuel liner.
6 Next? From now on, we will present five 7 open items in Phase 3 and a list of them. The staff 8 checked RAI 8191 (Q 09.01.01-13) as an open item. The 9 staff gets to confirm that mechanical accidents do not 10 cause the rack deformation that would affect criticality.
11 The resolution related that -- and the damage 12 of -- any damages to the rack is limited to the portion 13 above the neutron absorber and does not affect their 14 configuration relative to the criticality analysis.
15 The staff's review for the technical report was completed.
16 Next? This slide relates to neutron 17 absorber material. The staff has the RAI 8578 (Q 18 09.01.01-39) as an open item. The purification process 19 of the standard fuel rack may expose the Metamic neutron 20 absorber to evaluate the temperature really in close 21 proximity.
22 So staff concerns regarding the adequacy 23 of utilizing as-fabricated Metamic coupons in the neutron 24 absorber monitoring program The resolution we did is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 1 that purification test exposure to Metamic material 2 to 1900 giga Fahrenheit for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and demonstrates 3 no change in the run obstruction. This item is closed.
4 The next presenter is Mr. Lee again.
5 MR. H. LEE: So from now on I'm going to 6 present again. The staff stressed RAI 8582 (Q 7 09.01.03-4) is an open item. Related to this open item, 8 the staff requested to identify the minimum safety water 9 level and update the DCD accordingly, also requested 10 to revise the thermal-hydraulic calculations using the 11 minimum safety water level.
12 The minimum safety water level was provided 13 in the response to RAI 8582 (Q 09.01.03-4) In addition, 14 thermal-hydraulic analysis report was also revised.
15 Additionally, the staff identified that 16 the normal water level has been identified as elevation 17 154 feet, while in other places it shows as elevation 18 153 feet. These two levels represent different 19 conditions through the response to RAI 8582 (Q 20 09.01.03-5).
21 The staff stressed RAI 8613 (Q 09.05.02-4) 22 as an open item. Related to the requirements of 10 23 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1 through GDC 4, the staff 24 requested to justify why the communication systems are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 1 not considered as risk significant SSCs.
2 The staff issued a follow-up RAI 548-8822, (Q 09.05.02-6) 3 related to this open item.
4 KHNP responded that the communication 5 systems of the APR1400 are designed to meet GDC 1 through 6 GDC 4 and do not interface with any safety-related or 7 risk-significant SSC. The four communication 8 subsystems are designed to assure that any single event 9 does not result in a complete loss of plant communication.
10 The staff stressed RAI 8613 (Q 09.05.02-5) 11 as an open item. The staff requested to provide the 12 detailed description of all ITAAC items along with their 13 acceptance criteria and ITP for the communication systems 14 in Section 14.2.
15 In addition, the staff requested to clarify 16 what the applicant means by functional arrangement of 17 communication systems. Related to this open item, the 18 staff issued a follow-up RAI 8822, (Q 09.05.02-7).
19 KHNP provided the new ITP for plant 20 communication system and the detailed description of 21 all ITAAC items for communication system through the 22 response to the follow-up RAI.
23 And KHNP revised DCD Tier 1, Subsection 24 2.6.9 providing the detailed description of plant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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21 1 communication systems instead of the term of functional 2 arrangement.
3 So from now on, I will answer the question 4 in ACRS Subcommittee on May 18th, 2017. During KHNP 5 presentation on Section 927 Chilled Water System, ACRS 6 asked about the basis for the non-safety-related plant 7 chilled water system to provide cooling water for the 8 safety-related TDAFW pump room.
9 I will explain the reason why the 10 non-safety-related cubicle cooler is installed in the 11 TDAFW pump room. It is basic principle to use the 12 safety-related HVAC system to cool the area where a 13 safety-related accumulation is located.
14 In case of TDAFW pump room, the non-safety 15 cubicle cooler is installed, and it does not serve any 16 cooling function at accident condition. The reason 17 why non-safety related cubicle cooler is applied for 18 the room is that the room is high energy line break, 19 HELB, area which means the essential chilled water just 20 have temp would be damaging and have accident if the 21 cubicle cooler is safety-related.
22 Because of loss of cooling during accident, 23 the TDAFW pump shall be qualified to be operable at 24 maximum temperature for the operation period.
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22 1 Now I will explain the summary for heat-up 2 calculation of TDAFW pump room. The purpose of the 3 room heat-up calculation is as follows. First, 4 determine the maximum temperature in the TDAFW pump 5 room. Second, demonstrate that the maximum temperature 6 of the room does not exceed the maximum allowable 7 temperature during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> under loss of HVAC system.
8 The GOTHIC program is used to perform heat-up 9 calculation. Maximum allowable temperature, 150 10 Fahrenheit degrees of the room, is decided based on 11 the steady-state temperature of Condition 2 mentioned 12 in NUMARC 87-00. The maximum temperature of TDAFW pump 13 room is about 155 -- 145 Fahrenheit degrees. The TDAFA 14 pump rooms are maintained below 150 Fahrenheit degrees 15 during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and under loss of cooling.
16 MEMBER STETKAR: Does that maximum 17 temperature occur at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />? In other words, is the 18 temperature still increasing at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />?
19 MR. H. LEE: Sorry, would you say again?
20 MEMBER STETKAR: Does the maximum 21 temperature of whatever you cited, 145 degrees, occur 22 at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />? Or, what I'm asking is, is the temperature 23 still increasing at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />?
24 MR. H. LEE: The equivalent temperature NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1 condition is 145 during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
2 MEMBER STETKAR: What I'm asking is, what 3 we asked you for was to show us the temperature profile.
4 I have not yet seen that temperature profile.
5 (Off the record comments) 6 MR. SISK: This is Rob Sisk. Just to 7 clarify, the temperature profile, it increases up to 8 145. It is more asymptotic. It does not continue up 9 at a continual rate. But it asymptotically reaches 10 145 and stays.
11 MEMBER STETKAR: Could you tell me when 12 it reaches 120 degrees?
13 (Off the record comments) 14 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: So to be clear, we 15 do not have the exact profile here. But the approximate 16 value, it hits 120 in about 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.
17 MEMBER STETKAR: Sixteen hours, okay, 18 that's interesting. Do the turbine-driven auxiliary 19 feedwater pumps have electronic speed control? And 20 is there any instrumentation located in the 21 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room that 22 controls either turbine operation, or auxiliary 23 feedwater flow, or steam generator level, or information 24 in the main control room?
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24 1 MR. SISK: We do not have that information 2 available.
3 MEMBER STETKAR: The reason I ask these 4 questions ---
5 (Off the record comments) 6 MR. YOON: I am Mr. Yoon from KHNP, 7 Administrative Office. The equipment related to 8 turbine-driven aux feedwater pump, and something like 9 that, that equipment is located in another room, not 10 installed in that room, of course, to prevent damages 11 in the event of high energy line break.
12 MEMBER STETKAR: To me, that doesn't make 13 much sense. Because if the steam line breaks, I don't 14 have the turbine-driven pump. So I don't understand 15 why I have to install the equipment in another room.
16 But if you say that on the record, you are now on the 17 record that any electronic equipment for the 18 turbine-driven pump and instrumention is not located 19 in the turbine-driven pump room. Is that correct?
20 MR. YOON: Yes.
21 MEMBER STETKAR: Hum? You are now on the 22 public record in a meeting saying that is part of your 23 design? I was not aware of that. That's an important 24 piece of information.
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25 1 MR. YOON: As I'm -- to my knowledge, the 2 pressure transmitter is located in the containment.
3 So turbine-driven fuel pump is located in the aux 4 building.
5 MEMBER STETKAR: I understand that. But 6 I'm asking -- I didn't ask about a pressure transmitter.
7 I asked whether there was any -- the reason I -- let 8 me cut to the chase. The reason I'm asking this is 9 that I have read documents that indicate that the maximum 10 allowable temperature in several locations in the plant 11 that contain, I'll just call it electrical and INC 12 equipment, is 120 degrees Fahrenheit, the maximum 13 allowable temperature. And that's a fairly typical 14 temperature for qualification of that type of equipment.
15 However, you state that the maximum 16 allowable temperature, in the turbine-driven auxiliary 17 feedwater pump rooms in particular, is 150 degrees 18 Fahrenheit, 30 degrees higher.
19 That to me says, well, you either have to 20 have electronic equipment that is qualified to be better 21 than all of the other electronic equipment in your plant, 22 or you don't have any electronic equipment in that room, 23 or it's qualified to 120 degrees. And that's why I 24 was interested in when you had reached 120 degrees in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 your room heat-up calculation.
2 So if there's no electronic equipment in 3 that room, which we just heard on the public record, 4 the official record of our meeting, then I don't have 5 a problem. But that is now our understanding of your 6 design.
7 MEMBER REMPE: Further, can we ask if that's 8 the way Shin Kori is designed and built?
9 MEMBER STETKAR: I'll just note they can 10 design this one differently than Shin Kori.
11 MEMBER REMPE: They can, but I just am 12 curious if they've changed it from Shin Kori.
13 MR. H. LEE: From my colleague, I received 14 some kind of related information about your question.
15 He mentioned that when we decided the maximum temperature 16 in each room, it incorporated to our purchased 17 specification later. So I'm not sure that electrical 18 panel or some kind of equipment shall be located in 19 some rooms. We're not --
20 MEMBER STETKAR: We have it on the record.
21 The staff has our question.
22 MR. SISK: We don't have the information 23 at this point for Shin Kori. Andy?
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27 1 is Andy Oh, KHNP Washington Office, at this point we 2 don't have the information for Shin Kori.
3 MR. H. LEE: I will continue on my 4 presentation. Chapter 9 is complete. KHNP continues 5 to monitor Chapter 9 to assure any confirming changes 6 that are addressed. Five open items that were identified 7 in Phase 2 and 3 have been resolved with adequate and 8 sufficient discussion with the staff.
9 Changes in Chapter 9 as reviewed and marked 10 up in response to the RAIs will be incorporated into 11 the next revision of the DCD. Thank you for listening.
12 MR. SISK: And that concludes the Chapter 13 9 presentation. We want to leave time for questions 14 if there were any.
15 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Any additional 16 questions from the members? Thank you. And we get ---
17 no? Ready for the staff's presentation?
18 MALE PARTICIPANT: Is it closed?
19 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: No, Chapter 9 is not 20 closed.
21 There are two staff members who are on the 22 phone, we think. Can you identify yourselves just so 23 that we're sure that you're there please?
24 MR. MORANTE: This is Rich Morante from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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28 1 Brookhaven National Laboratory on the phone.
2 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you.
3 MS. BURJA: And this is Alex Burja from 4 the Reactor Systems Branch.
5 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you. I'm not 6 sure what the order is, who's doing what when.
7 (Off the record comments) 8 MR. WUNDER: Okay, good morning, Mr.
9 Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen of the Committee. I'm 10 George Wunder, and I'm the project manager for Chapter 11 9 of the APR 1400 design certification review.
12 Last month we presented Chapter 4 to you.
13 And at that time I told you that the team had put that 14 together, that chapter together. It was like the 1927 15 Yankees of review teams. Well, the team that I'm going 16 to introduce to you today, they're more like the 1969 17 Mets. And I say that because --
18 (Laughter) 19 MR. WUNDER: -- I say that because --
20 MALE PARTICIPANT: Nobody is sure about 21 the Mets.
22 MR. WUNDER: I say that because I think 23 it's -- sometimes I think it's a miracle that we got 24 this thing done. Thank you. As you can see at a glance, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 1 there are multiple contributors. I think there are 2 19 of them plus our consultant makes 20.
3 And when you have that many contributors, 4 it makes for some unique problems for the project manager 5 to coordinate and integrate it all into a unified chapter.
6 And it would have been nigh impossible had not everyone 7 on the technical staff done such a wonderful and 8 professional job.
9 So it's a real pleasure to introduce the 10 team. From the Plant Systems Branch, we have Raul 11 Hernandez, Hien Le, Chang Li, Angelo Stubbs. And this 12 is my favorite part, whereas the 1969 Mets had Nolan 13 Ryan, we've got Ryan Nolan -- can't make this stuff 14 up -- also Bob Vettori, Dennis Andrukat, and Thinh Dinh 15 from the Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch.
16 Sir?
17 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Where are Sever and 18 Darling?
19 MR. WUNDER: Sever's right there.
20 (Laughter) 21 MR. WUNDER: From the Material and Chemical 22 Engineering Branch we have Andrew Yeshnik, John 23 Honcharik, Greg Makar, from the Containment and 24 Ventilation Branch, Danny Chien. From Structural NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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30 1 Engineering we have Vaughn Thomas, Pravin Patel, and 2 B.P. Jain. We have Dawnmathews Kalathiveettil from 3 the Instrumentation and Control Branch, Alexandra Burja 4 who is joining us on the phone from Reactor Systems, 5 and Adakou Foil, and Sheila Ray from way over in NRR 6 in the Electrical Engineering Group.
7 We also have our outstanding consultant 8 from Brookhaven National Lab, Rich Morante, who's also 9 joining us on the phone. And I would be remiss if I 10 did not mention the incredibly valuable contribution 11 of two of our project managers, Carolyn Lauron and Brian 12 Hughes, who stepped in when I was called out of town 13 on an emergency. And they put in many, many very long 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> to make sure that we got this thing done by our 15 deadline. And finally, in the roll of Gil Hodges, we 16 have our extremely able lead project manager, Bill Ward.
17 We have not presented Section 9.1.2 to the 18 Subcommittee prior to this. So I thought we'd start 19 off with that section, and then we can move on and go 20 over the open items in the remaining sections.
21 So I am joined by B.P. Jain, and Rich Morante 22 is on the phone. And I'm going to turn you over to 23 B.P for Section 9.1.2. Thank you. B.P., take it away 24 when you're ready.
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31 1 MR. JAIN: Good morning. This is B.P. Jain.
2 I'd like to acknowledge my team who have contributed 3 to the review of this complex section, Vaughn Thomas, 4 Pravin Patel, and Rich Morante at BNL.
5 So here I am basically going over the work 6 this team did and reviewing the fuel racks, spent fuel 7 pool racks. So the primary objective under this review 8 is to view the structural design and mechanical design 9 of the fuel storage racks to make sure that they can 10 withstand effects of outbreaks and mechanical accident 11 loads resulting from the fuel assembly drops.
12 The other complements with this fuel pool 13 and the liner have been presented before, so I will 14 not address those. And they were covered under Section 15 38346. And the same thing goes with criticality 16 evaluation, I would not address that. It's been 17 addressed by the staff in the SER Section, 911.
18 So overall, we will be addressing more --
19 just to give you an overview of what I'm going to be 20 talking about and what the staff did to review this 21 new fuel and the spent fuel pool structure --
22 MEMBER REMPE: B.P., just be very careful.
23 Your papers were hitting the microphone. And that makes 24 the poor little guy that's the reporter --
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32 1 MR. JAIN: I'll be careful.
2 MEMBER REMPE: -- literally going deaf.
3 MR. JAIN: I'll be careful. So overall, 4 the high level overview, to give you the presentation, 5 the staff reviewed the KHNP's technical report and the 6 mechanical analysis for new and spent fuel pool racks.
7 It was around three in August 17. And the review basis 8 for the staff is guidance in Appendix B of the SRP 3.8.4 9 with the appropriate title, Guidance in Spent Fuel Pool 10 Racks.
11 The staff reviewed the seismic input 12 analysis to the mathematical model of the racks and 13 the non-linear analysis which the KHNP performed. The 14 staff also reviewed the mechanical accident scenarios, 15 especially resulting stresses and what scenarios they 16 have considered.
17 Staff looked at the computer codes they 18 used and see if they are reasonable for the kind of 19 problem they are trying to solve.
20 Staff reviewed the analysis methodology 21 including the design parameters which went into making 22 the model, such as the hydrodynamic loads, the gap springs 23 for rattling, and so on and so forth.
24 Overall, we sat back and looked at the ---
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33 1 it's a very complex problem, a lot of input goes into 2 it. It's a non-linear problem. So staff looked at the 3 reasonableness of the results. Do the results make 4 sense, and not really going micro, analyzing each and 5 every parameter.
6 Staff also looked at the COL item that the 7 KHNP identified. During this process, staff had 39 8 RAIs. And KHNP did an excellent job in responding to 9 all of them. And there are no open RAIs remaining.
10 So the staff basically concludes at a high 11 level that these racks and these complements meet the 12 applicable ASME code allowable stresses. And the 13 seismic displacements of these racks, because spent 14 fuel pool rack is free-standing, are small compared 15 to the physical dimensions of the design. And they 16 would not invalidate the criticality analysis which 17 has been performed under a different section, 9.11.
18 And the other concern with these 19 free-standing racks is would they impact the pool wall.
20 And the staff assured itself that they would not.
21 Displacements are small. So that's overall the real 22 strategy, what the staff looked at.
23 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Let me ask this question, 24 please. From your overall strategy, to what extent NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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34 1 are the results that you are communicating dependent 2 upon a precision of installation of the racks?
3 MR. JAIN: They are not related to the 4 precision of installation of the rack, I can say after 5 the fact. Because the displacements are, even if they 6 were uncertain -- there are uncertainties, obviously, 7 in any of these analyses -- the fact of safety or additional 8 margins, what we find will, in our judgement, more than 9 compensate for some of those things.
10 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Can you cite an 11 approximate dimension that is allowable between the 12 installed racks? Is it a centimeter, half a centimeter, 13 half an inch, three-quarters of an inch?
14 MR. JAIN: The way these -- they are 15 installed, the base plates are pretty close to each 16 other. And I believe the, if I recall the dimensions, 17 like, one inch between the base plate and one class 18 of racks. Another class of racks, it's a couple of 19 inches. And the displacement, just to give you an order 20 of magnitude, is like quarter inch due to seismic.
21 So even if it was, you know, you double the displacements, 22 it still would not close the gap.
23 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you.
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35 1 area -- what the staff looked at, and again this was 2 guided more by the staff guidance in SRP 3.8.4., so 3 we looked at the physical description of the racks and 4 the arrangements, then striations. Staff also looked 5 at what are the applicable design codes, standards, 6 and specifications for manufacturing these racks.
7 Obviously, seismic and impact loads are 8 the big part of it, because they are free standing racks.
9 Again, we wanted to make sure that we considered all 10 the loads, the load combinations for various scenarios 11 of allowable stresses.
12 We looked at them with analogy first, just 13 to analyze the design, and what the acceptance criteria, 14 when you say they have met the allowables, and things 15 like materials, appropriate quality control programs, 16 things of that nature, we also looked at.
17 The physical descriptions, and I would not 18 go over that. I think KHNP has covered, but at a high 19 level, there were a few figures which have been pulled 20 out with production, where a pictorial view of the plant, 21 how these racks are sitting in the pool.
22 But basically, the new fuel racks, they 23 are sitting in a pit. And the highlight of that is 24 it's bolted to the floor. So it's not free-standing.
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36 1 So it's less critical during seismic movement. They 2 are constructed with the same stainless steel material 3 as the spent fuel pool racks. And they are spaced at 4 14 inches fuel assemblies for criticality, of 5 sub-criticality maintainment.
6 Next? The spent fuel pool racks are 7 different in the sense that they are free-standing, 8 and there is a gap between the racks and between the 9 racks and the pool wall. By the way, just a gap between 10 the racks and the pool wall is about 33 inches. So 11 it's quite substantial. It's not sitting right next 12 to it.
13 Again, the pool is divided, for talking 14 purposes, two type of racks, Region I, Region II. They 15 have a different configuration. Pitch is different, 16 but nothing else. And from a structural point of view, 17 it does not make much difference whether call it Region 18 I rack or Region II racks.
19 So the staff looked at their physical 20 descriptions and the level of detail they provided in 21 their DCD and the tech report and determined that the 22 guidance in SRP is fully complied with. So it's 23 consistent with the guidance, the physical description, 24 and the staff finds it acceptable. This shows just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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37 1 the isometric view of the typical rack.
2 The staff reviewed KHNP's design core 3 standards and specifications, what they indicated in 4 their tech report. And for material, they used some 5 ASME code Section 2 and ASME Section 3 for designing 6 core section and Appendix F. And they used -- Reg Guide 7 1.61 they cited and Reg Guide 1.29. These are the key 8 documents there.
9 There are other materials they have 10 referenced, but that's all, again, consistent with what 11 the SRP guidance 384 calls out for in terms of the codes, 12 and specifications, and the reg guides. So staff finds 13 that they are all consistent, and therefore the codes 14 and standard they have used are acceptable to the staff.
15 So the seismic analysis makes a big chunk 16 of staff's review of these racks and primarily because 17 of the complex, free-standing structure. It's 18 non-linear in nature. So staff had a lot of questions 19 and understood, at the end of the day, staff ensured 20 that they meet all the applicable requirements of the 21 SRP guidance and analysis methodology.
22 Just to go in a little more detail, staff 23 looked at the information, what they had computed.
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38 1 of the rack, and the pool wall. And that was their 2 target spectra, this one spectrum of that place.
3 They completed synthetic time histories 4 consistent with that spectra and followed the 5 requirements of Reg Guide 3.71 which basically tells 6 you what certain parameters you need to meet in order 7 to qualify to be able to use those time histories.
8 And it requires more than four-time history to be used.
9 KHNP used five. So staff finds it acceptable.
10 And I'll pick a model, so KHNP used the 11 3-D model of the racks and extracted the equivalent 12 B properties to simulate the rack structure dynamically.
13 Same thing they did with the fuel. They had PWR fuel, 14 P7, and based on the test results, they computed a 15 frequency and the stiffnesses. And they simulated as 16 a beam element out of that. So staff is pretty comfortable 17 with the way they've approached to compute the properties 18 of equivalent beam model.
19 With regard to the rattling and the impact 20 between the fuel and the rack, or the rack to rack, 21 or the rack to floor, the Applicant used the gap element.
22 Basically they're active and they're under compression.
23 And they used the appropriate properties of the springs' 24 stiffnesses to simulate the gap.
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39 1 Staff asked again where ability is there, 2 I mean, how sure are you about those stiffness values?
3 So staff asked them to do the uncertainty analysis 4 to vary those stiffnesses by 20 percent, pluses and 5 minuses, and make sure that what you are doing is bounded.
6 So that was the regarding of the gap stiffnesses.
7 Hydrodynamic effects, there's a 8 hydrodynamic mass between the fuel and the rack, then 9 the plate and the floor, and then the pool wall and 10 the rack. And they are pretty much, I would say, standard 11 approaches, formulas to compute the hydrodynamic mass.
12 Some people do it 3-D, hydrodynamic elements 13 and so on. But KHNP chose to use sort of hand calculations 14 which are pretty accurate, have been tested out. So 15 that was their approach. And staff points those tested 16 out approaches were acceptable and then that's it.
17 To simulate or to check or to confirm the 18 fuel integrity, the two components of the colliding 19 and rate of the fuel is balanced or held together.
20 And then the spacer grid would be in the fuel bundles.
21 So they, I mean KHNP, based on their test 22 results of the buckling capacity of the spacer grid, 23 the model that's spring in the model, to get the responses 24 during the citation so they assure the fuel integrity NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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40 1 will be maintained. So they have simulated the impact, 2 fuel impact with the rack in that manner.
3 And staff looked at their results, the fuel 4 test results, and they are consistent with what they 5 have used in their bigger analysis. So the fuel is 6 represented pretty accurately.
7 As I said before, they have also used the 8 radiation in the fuel properties, the new fuel versus 9 end of life fuel. Because your stiffnesses change, 10 the fuel stiffnesses. So what effect that has, we wanted 11 to study that to make sure that you do analysis only 12 once, but there's bounding analysis in terms of the 13 rack stresses.
14 Seismic analysis methodology, overall we 15 find it's consistent with what's being done in other 16 applications and what the reg guide requires that.
17 So they applied the three dimensional to a three 18 dimensional model with three dimensional time histories 19 in two horizontal and one vertical direction. They 20 found, in nonlinear time it's the analysis for five 21 sacrificed time histories. So there are five analyses 22 for one condition or one variation.
23 As these are free-standing racks, the focus 24 and the selection plays an important role, so they have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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41 1 used the lower bound, upper bound, and the mean values, 2 the lower bound being 0.2 coefficient reflection, upper 3 bound is 0.8, the mean is 0.5. So for each of the time 4 histories, they used three separate coefficient 5 reflections to get the results of the responses during 6 earthquake.
7 Their design basis analyses consists of 8 the fully loaded racks. But the staff was not sure 9 if that really balanced the response during seismic, 10 because being a non-lineal response. So they also 11 studied the various patterns of the fuel loading, like, 12 50 percent loaded, 25 percent loaded, or the checkered 13 load, some empty racks, and enveloped the results of 14 all those analyses. So that uncertainty regarding the 15 fuel loading was very well covered.
16 Numerical solutions is all highly nonlinear 17 analyses. So staff wanted to make sure that your direct 18 integration time stamp is fine enough so that the results 19 are converging. And they demonstrated that the time 20 integration was small. By changing it 20 percent, they 21 found the results are changed.
22 So overall, they performed 20 such analyses.
23 Like, you have a five-time histories, and you have 24 three different sets of coefficient reflection. So NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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42 1 it gives you 15. That's for spent fuel. And then new 2 fuel racks, you don't need friction or radiation, because 3 it's bolted. So five cases there. So altogether, it's 4 20 cases they analyzed.
5 And then there are about 16 cases where 6 they studied the barometric variation group I talked 7 about, like varying the different masses, the 8 stiffnesses. So that total is about 36 simulations.
9 And the results, the stress analysis they performed 10 there's the bounding of all of this work. So staff 11 considered that they have covered or attempted to cover 12 the uncertainties to the extent reasonable.
13 They have also, related to the computer 14 program ANSYS where they used for this analysis, staff 15 wanted to make sure that for this class of problem, 16 meaning free-standing, highly nonlinear analysis, this 17 model computed the record they're using, is converging, 18 or is reasonable.
19 So they demonstrated that by, well, a 20 combination of a few things. ANSYS has been used, its 21 staff has used and approved ESBWR, so staff feels pretty 22 comfortable.
23 But in addition to that, we asked them 24 to sort of analyze the same problem or simplified problem, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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43 1 so everything remaining same. You change the codes.
2 And the results, and again, mostly we are looking for 3 displacement. And we found them pretty reasonable.
4 They will not match, will not be a match. Because the 5 approach to solve the problem is different but fully 6 reasonable.
7 So based on this seismic analysis review, 8 we find that their input, the model, and the parameters, 9 the methodology they have used, and validated computer 10 code they've used, they all meet the guidance in SRP 11 3.8.4, 3.7.1, 3.8.1, and Reg Guide 161. And therefore 12 we find it acceptable.
13 The second part of the assessment is the 14 mechanical analysis due to accident. The full scenarios 15 are postulated in the SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D. Basically, 16 one of them is a straight, shallow drop. The fuel assembly 17 drops at, well, it can drop, what is it, a straight 18 drop away from the pedestal. And one is on the pedestal.
19 Away from the pedestal, you're trying to 20 maximize the deflection of the base plate where the 21 fuel is supported to make sure that it does not -- it's 22 not that excessive that it touches the floor below, 23 impacts the floor below.
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44 1 the pedestal. And by that, you're trying to maximize 2 whether it's going to penetrate the concrete and go 3 downward. So that's purpose of doing that scenario.
4 Third one is you just accidentally drop, 5 and you want to make sure that you're not hurting the 6 rack cell to the point that you come close to the neutron 7 absorber. Because then the sub-criticality becomes 8 an issue. So that's, like, just a drop on the corner 9 of the fuel bay.
10 And the last one is the stuck fuel assembly.
11 You're trying to pull the assembly, it gets stuck, 12 you know, against the wall of the shell. And again, 13 you want to see that stresses in the racks are within 14 the code allowables.
15 So all these four scenarios, KHNP analyzed 16 it, used the detail, two dimensional, finite element 17 model and used ANSYS LSDYNA code which is validated 18 code. And the rack, when it drops, the fuel assembly 19 is dropped back. It's considered fully loaded. So it's 20 not empty, so maximize. Because the plate deflection 21 will be more when the pool is loaded, and then you drop 22 more. So that's one of the rationales.
23 So with all these analyses, what they 24 performed, they showed two things. One, the minimum NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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45 1 factor of safety, meaning the margin, if you want to 2 call it, really it's not a factor of safety. That isn't 3 the right term. It is 1.4. And that occurs for the 4 drop. It's right on the pedestal.
5 So there's the concrete compressive 6 strength, the impact load on the concrete and allowable 7 compressive strength. That's where the margin of 1.4.
8 The margin at other places, for other three scenarios, 9 is much greater than 1.4. It's, like, of the other 10 two or three. We just mention only the lowest one.
11 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Excuse me.
12 MR. JAIN: Yes?
13 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: When you say a margin 14 of 1.4, 1.4 against what?
15 MR. JAIN: Against allowables --- computed 16 allowables.
17 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay. And what's the 18 -- you're talking about destruction of the concrete, 19 penetration of the concrete?
20 MR. JAIN: No. No, no. These are, like, 21 not within code allowables. You don't go into those 22 penetration or spalling, or any of that, no. When a 23 load acts on the concrete, it causes compression, regular 24 compression. And code gives you allowables to what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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46 1 that compression stress should be.
2 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay.
3 MR. JAIN: So it's, again, design basis, 4 code allowables. So it's not like we covered an aircraft 5 impact when things are penetrating and --- no. They 6 are not there.
7 And, in fact, the SRP guidance does not 8 allow that either. So we --- although it's called 9 accident, but is it a scenario? Really, it's a mechanical 10 accident, unplanned, unanticipated accident.
11 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Let me ask this question 12 on the next to the last carrot under analysis, the slide 13 reads as follows, "Demonstrated that the impact of the 14 straight, deep drop of the fuel assembly on a specific 15 location does not cause any significant deformation 16 to the base plate."
17 MR. JAIN: Right.
18 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Does that mean that there 19 are other locations that are not specified that can 20 be?
21 MR. JAIN: Okay, let me just ---
22 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Areas where the base plate 23 is deformed?
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47 1 me clarify what is meant here. So they --- when the 2 plate is fully loaded with the fuel, the base plate, 3 you would expect, right, kinetics. The maximum 4 deflection will be at the center, simply supported here.
5 And if you drop the fuel assembly at the center of 6 the plate, in the cell, you will increase that deflection.
7 And that's what we are watching, that the 8 floor is still cleared when it deflects. So that is 9 a critical location for dropping the fuel for that 10 particular scenario.
11 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Well, how about the 12 scenario, as you mentioned a few minutes ago, the edge 13 of the rack is about 33 inches away from the wall of 14 the pool.
15 MR. JAIN: Uh-huh.
16 MEMBER SKILLMAN: It's 780 millimeters or 17 800 millimeters. If a fuel assembly is dropped between 18 the rack and the wall, does that impact load exceed 19 what you have just described?
20 MR. JAIN: Well, first of all, it's not 21 postulated, so I cannot really straight away address 22 it to you, number one. Number two, so this is really 23 non-required scenario, Scenario Number 5, if you will.
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48 1 testing the rack. Our focus is the rear of the racks, 2 whether the racks meet all the stress requirements during 3 postulated scenarios. So if the fuel drops between 4 the pool wall and the rack, probably it will fall on 5 the floor.
6 MEMBER SKILLMAN: I would expect it to.
7 MR. JAIN: Right. And if it falls on the 8 floor, that should not be a problem at all, because 9 we have covered --- that is covered under when it drops 10 right on the pedestal.
11 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Except that you have an 12 impact load that is the, if you will, the full face 13 of the lower end fitting that could have a higher local 14 penetration impact load than if it were spread more 15 widely as would be the base of the fuel rack.
16 MR. JAIN: Yes.
17 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Like a bullet.
18 MR. JAIN: Right. I could not answer the 19 question simply because that case would have been covered 20 under the design of the spent fuel pool.
21 MEMBER SKILLMAN: So your focus today is 22 simply only the racks.
23 MR. JAIN: Yes. My focus is just the racks.
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49 1 384-something, which I mentioned at the beginning, 2 383.4.6.
3 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you.
4 MR. JAIN: That's in the SEO.
5 MR. JAIN: The next, this slide shows a 6 couple of cartoons for various accidents we talked about.
7 Now we talk about the load to load 8 combination. So we spent time and looked, talking about 9 the seismic and the mechanical accident. Those are 10 the two primary loads which really control the design 11 of the racks. Nevertheless, there are other loads for 12 completeness, that load, five loads, safe shutdown, 13 thermal loads, mechanical accident loads.
14 And then there are combination of these 15 loads can occur. And what are the corresponding service 16 levels for those combinations. And that's all specified 17 in our regulatory SRP. And the KHNP's design is 18 consistent with the requirement, what's in Appendix 19 D.
20 As you can see, they are all -- seismic 21 and mechanical accident loads never get combined. So 22 each one is treated separately. And there is no live 23 load for these racks. It's just a dead load.
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50 1 about. They're secondary loads, according to ASME code, 2 so they are looked at, they're evaluated. But then 3 they are evaluated by themselves and shown to be within 4 the code allowables.
5 This is the general procedure that KHNP 6 has followed. And this is really a no-brainer. This 7 is what you would do to design anything, any structure.
8 So some other design considerations would go into the 9 analyzing and designing these various elements. There 10 are wells between the cell to base plate, base plate 11 to pedestal, and cell to cell.
12 Then obviously, these local stresses caused 13 by the impact loads, the rattling loads, the cell wall 14 may buckle, because of the heavy fuel load on the base 15 plate. Secondary stresses as I said, they are also 16 looked at.
17 And then the compute, you need to compute 18 the stress in the fuel assembly to make sure the integrity 19 of the fuel assembly is maintained. And that is done 20 by checking the stress in the cladding which holds the 21 fuel palate together, and the structural integrity of 22 the fuel stressor grates.
23 So how you go about doing your analysis 24 and design, you calculate the forces, what you get from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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51 1 knowing your seismic analysis of these racks, and 2 mechanical accident load. Then you combine those 3 responses of the forces and the given element, for 4 example, well design or rack wall design, and combine 5 them according to a load combination which was shown 6 before. And then you calculate the maximum stress.
7 You compare that maximum stress with the 8 acceptance limits that I specified in Section 3 of the 9 ASME code, subsection NF. That provides the limits 10 for various service levels, A, B, and D. And you compute 11 the safety factor or margin, if you will, the ratio 12 of the allowable to the calculated stresses. Now, in 13 all cases, the staff finds that the ratio is always 14 greater than one. And that's a requirement.
15 MEMBER STETKAR: B.P.? In your response 16 to Dick, you mentioned some section that would analyze 17 the load on the spent fuel pool liner, if I were to 18 drop the fuel assembly into the spent fuel pool. I 19 can't seem to find that in the DCD, at least the section 20 that you mentioned.
21 MALE PARTICIPANT: And neither can I.
22 MEMBER STETKAR: Could you confirm that 23 indeed the design certification evaluates that load 24 and where it is?
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52 1 MR. JAIN: Well, like I said, we were going 2 to make it an action item. I'm not familiar. I did 3 not --
4 MEMBER STETKAR: I'm trying to do it real 5 time here, and I'm not coming up quickly with anything.
6 MR. JAIN: Well, I was thinking more like 7 the staff's SER would address that.
8 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Well, it ---
9 MR. JAIN: And again ---
10 MEMBER STETKAR: -- should be addressed 11 in the DCD someplace.
12 MR. JAIN: I can only ---
13 MEMBER STETKAR: Anyway, just take it away 14 and if you can get ---
15 MR. JAIN: Yes, yes. Sure. I'm just going 16 by my experience with other designs. So am not familiar 17 with this particular design spent fuel pool. So I could 18 not be certain.
19 So these are the acceptance limits, what 20 the stresses, computer stresses are checked against, 21 some other things we talked about already. These 22 stresses are from subsection NF, ASME code Section 3.
23 Material properties, we'll use that 200 degrees to 24 maximize the thermal load and get the lower allowables.
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53 1 And the -- I guess Service Level 8, they 2 are all consistent but specify the code, NF, Section 3 3320. And then for service level D, that was used mostly 4 for seismic and mechanical accident loading. They used 5 that too in Appendix F of that section, 1334. And it's 6 all consistent.
7 Since we've got free-standing racks, the 8 sliding and overturning is a concern. And the 9 requirement is that the fact of safety against sliding 10 or overturning should be at least 1.5.
11 We find these acceptance criteria, what 12 KHNP used, they're consistent with Appendix D in SRP 13 Section 3.8.4 and 3.8.5. And 3.8.5 talks about the 14 fact of safety against sliding and overturning. And 15 therefore, we find the acceptance criteria used for 16 the design of these racks acceptable.
17 Material, quality control programs, and 18 inspections, the rack material is reviewed by staff 19 under Section 9.1.2, so same material, SA type 240.
20 That's been used for all racks, not only for this one 21 but other designs. So material is consistent.
22 Fuel assembly data is from PWR PLUS7 23 assembly. Design and fabrication inspection is per 24 NF requirements, Section 3 code. Quality control, QA NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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54 1 program, QC program, they commit to Appendix B for quality 2 control program. And then 10 CFR 5065 regarding 3 monitoring to ensure that the racks are capable of 4 fulfilling their intended functions during operation 5 and after.
6 So the staff finds these codes and their 7 commitment to the QA programs and inspections consistent 8 with the SRP requirements. And they find it acceptable.
9 KHNP identified a few small items, four 10 to be more specific. First one is periodic condition 11 monitoring, the need to continue to remain valid. It's 12 one of the things that you mentioned about the way they 13 fabricate and put it in place. Is that important? Well, 14 that's how they maintain the check, by periodic condition 15 monitoring, that they are not drifting apart or they 16 continue to maintain the geometry which was analyzed 17 for it.
18 They need to perform the confirmatory 19 dynamic analysis to make sure that, at a given site, 20 their design stresses still remain valid. They also 21 need to develop plant procedure and admin control for 22 handling the fuel over the pool, the specific admin 23 controls.
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55 1 to see if the racks have drifted apart. And if they 2 have, then they need to bring them back in analyzed 3 condition or demonstrate why they're still adequate, 4 if they don't take any corrective action. So that's 5 one of the core items. So staff finds those acceptable 6 and reasonable.
7 For the conclusion, the staff has reached 8 that, based on its review, that the structural design 9 of the fuel racks meets the ASME code, Section 3, 10 Subsection NF, design requirements. Minimum factor 11 of safety for the fuel racks seismic event, including 12 a mechanical accident scenario, is 1.19.
13 The spent fuel rack displacement to the 14 design basis seismic events is small and do not close 15 the large gap of 33 inches between the wall and the 16 spent fuel pool racks. The relative displacements of 17 the spent fuel pool racks is about quarter inch, 0.28 18 inches, due to design basis size. And the rack to rack 19 separation is 1.18 inch. So that gives you a margin 20 against impact of four.
21 For the other variety of racks, which is 22 in Region I, the margin is a little greater. It's better 23 than six, simply because they're separated to begin 24 with, so the gap between them is larger. So it gives NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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56 1 you a larger factor of safety.
2 Free standing racks, they do not overturn 3 during seismic events. And factor of safety is much, 4 much better than 1.5 against sliding and overturning.
5 It's on the order of, I believe, it's 15, if I'm not 6 mistaken. Because the displacement is so small, and 7 the rack is very heavy, it doesn't go --- it cannot 8 tip. It's not able to tip.
9 So due to small seismic movements, 10 criticality analysis, which has been performed for normal 11 conditions, still remains valid. And they continue 12 to provide the function, what they're designed for.
13 That's what the staff's conclusion is.
14 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: I had a question --
15 I got it. I was trying to go back and look at my notes, 16 but I couldn't find it. The SA-564, grade 630, steel 17 for the bolts, that's a precipitation hardened stainless 18 steel. And it's offered in multiple heat treatments 19 to vary the strength.
20 Can you tell me which heat treatment is 21 going to be used? There are at least three aging 22 treatments. The very high strength one is the lowest 23 temperature age, but it is susceptible to hydrogen 24 embrittlement.
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57 1 MR. JAIN: I would pass that question to 2 KHNP. I'm not knowledgeable in that area. I could not 3 answer the question. We can take it back to KHNP and 4 get you a specific answer.
5 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Yes. This material 6 is otherwise known as, I think, 17-4 PH which is a more 7 common name for it. But the very high strength version 8 is ---
9 MR. YESHNIK: I'm not exactly --
10 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: -- be careful.
11 MR. YESHNIK: I'm not exactly sure if I 12 have that off the top of my head. I want to say it's 13 the 1100 degrees Fahrenheit heat treatment.
14 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay. The 1100 one 15 is the better one.
16 MR. YESHNIK: Okay. And also this material 17 is in compression, so hydrogen embrittlement really 18 isn't going to affect --
19 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Well, except for 20 during seismic loading and things like that.
21 MR. YESHNIK: I mean, maybe.
22 (Simultaneous speaking) 23 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: We're all into maybe.
24 MR. YESHNIK: Yes.
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58 1 MR. JAIN: The staff will get back to you 2 more specifically.
3 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: It's the 900 F aging 4 treatment that's usually the most problematic. And 5 they use this material for bolts at the bottom of the 6 Macondo Oil Platform which failed.
7 MR. JAIN: Well, this concludes my 8 presentation with the new spent fuel and spent fuel 9 pools storage racks. They will maintain a coolable 10 geometry preventing criticality and protect the fuel 11 assembly from seismic and mechanical loading factors.
12 That's what the staff's review indicates.
13 MEMBER KIRCHNER: B.P., just out of 14 curiosity, when in another section, wherever it is, 15 when you look at the actual pool design, do they use 16 the same -- do you use a consistent set of assumptions, 17 in terms of seismic loading, and history, and such, 18 that's compatible with how the racks are loaded?
19 MR. JAIN: They need to be, yes.
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, okay.
21 MR. JAIN: They need to be.
22 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Where would we find that 23 other analysis. I'm trying to think, that's ---
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59 1 or should be addressed in that SER for spent fuel pools 2 and the liner.
3 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And they will look at 4 things like hydrodynamic loading on these racks there.
5 MR. JAIN: Well, there would need to get 6 the factor --
7 (Simultaneous speaking) 8 MR. JAIN: -- yes, the factor of the racks 9 in the pool.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes. Thank you.
11 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: And I have one more.
12 I think you may have addressed this in an earlier 13 presentation. But you said that when you do the drop 14 analysis, you assume that the fuel racks are fully loaded.
15 16 MR. JAIN: Correct.
17 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: So have you looked 18 at the situation where you have an open cell, and you 19 get a drop on an adjacent fuel assembly? Does that 20 do anything to change the configuration, crush the open 21 cell area?
22 MR. JAIN: No. I don't believe that 23 scenario has been considered, simply because we do not 24 believe that that's -- the parameter we are trying NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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60 1 to view, in looking at, will really affect that parameter, 2 meaning would it increase the deflection of the base 3 plate of the fully loaded racks. It will not.
4 Number two, would it increase the load on 5 the pedestal? It's not going to do that either. So 6 from the postulated mechanical accident, what you're 7 viewing here and what the possible effect of the parameter 8 we are trying to maximize, we believe that, if that 9 were the case, that would need to be covered.
10 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you.
11 MR. JAIN: Just to add that, there's 12 sufficient margin on top of it. So if there were 13 uncertainties, the minimum margin is 1.4. That's 14 against the concrete. But if you talk about the racks 15 and the base plate, that structure, the margin there 16 is even much larger, like two to three. So, you know 17 ---
18 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Is that it for your 19 presentation?
20 MR. JAIN: Yes, I'm done.
21 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay. We're going to 22 have a transition between the open session and the closed 23 --
24 MEMBER POWERS: No, you're ---
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61 1 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Pardon?
2 MEMBER POWERS: No, you're not. You're 3 going to ask for public comment.
4 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: I was about to get 5 there. That's why I was making the comment.
6 MEMBER POWERS: You're slow. You're very 7 slow.
8 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Yes, I am slow, okay.
9 So that means we'll need public comments now for this 10 presentation. So while we're getting the --
11 MR. BROWN: Professor Ballinger, they're 12 not done their presentation.
13 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: They're not?
14 (Off microphone comments.)
15 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: That's part of my 16 slowness. Okay. Continue.
17 MR. WUNDER: Andrew?
18 MR. YESHNIK: Okay. Well, good morning, 19 everyone. My name is Andrew Yeshnik and I am the reviewer 20 for the materials and chemical engineering issues with 21 the spent and new fuel rack. My slide is going to be 22 pretty brief because you've already seen this information 23 today.
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62 1 with normal materials that we would expect to see in 2 these applications. We have type 304Ls, authentic 3 stainless steel, and type 630, the PH grade which we 4 already talked about. And I did take a look at the 5 DCD, and it is the 1100 degrees Fahrenheit heat treatment 6 on those.
7 The spent fuel racks also have the metamic 8 neutron absorber which is not credited for any structural 9 capacity. The spent fuel liner is type 304 stainless 10 steel. The spent fuel racks are designed, fabricated, 11 and inspected to the requirements of Section 3NF and 12 the liner is ASTM grade, but the quality assurance is 13 upgraded with ASME NQA1 in Appendix B QA program.
14 The new fuel is stored in dry storage, so 15 there's no expectation of any degradation mechanisms 16 for that. The spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel 17 pool. The water chemistry is in conformance with the 18 EPRY primary water chemistry guidelines which is 19 described in SR Section 9.1.3 and evaluated in Staff's 20 SVRN Section 9.1.3.
21 And the coupon monitoring program for the 22 metamic material is described in Section 9.1.1 and in 23 Staff's SVRN, and we found that to be acceptable. So 24 for the racks themselves, the authentic stainless steel NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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63 1 has sensitive controls and delta ferrite content controls 2 that are consistent with Staff guidance. And the 3 cleanness of the new spent fuel racks are consistent 4 with NQA1 subpart 2.1.
5 So in general, Staff finds that the approach 6 that the Applicant had is consistent with the SRP, and 7 we found it to be acceptable. I think that concludes 8 all of my comments for this. So if there's any questions, 9 if not we'll pass it on to Raul.
10 MR. HERNANDEZ: Well, good morning. My 11 name is Raul Hernandez. I'm the reviewer for our plant 12 systems branch. And I looked at the fuel storage as 13 a system.
14 The new fuel storage feed and the spent 15 fuel pool were looked into making sure that they maintain 16 their safety function which is that the assemblies are 17 maintaining a safe and sub-critical array during all 18 credible storage conditions and to provide a safe means 19 to load the spent fuel into shipping casks, like, making 20 sure that as a system overall, all the different 21 components that have been presented, that the fuel is 22 going to remain safe.
23 The Staff reviewed the design of storage 24 systems and the new fuel storage PID and the spent fuel NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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64 1 in accordance with the guidance in SRP 912. Particular, 2 we looked into the configuration and the design of, 3 seismic design of the different components that are 4 credited to maintain the pool level and the safe location, 5 making sure that all of them be properly identified 6 as required.
7 When a system is required to be seismic 8 one, it's included in Chapter 3, and that's already 9 been presented to the Commission here. The Staff issued 10 several RAIs, and the Applicant has addressed all the 11 RAIs satisfactorily. There's no open items in this 12 section.
13 The Staff determined that the fuel source 14 system is designed in accordance with the SRP guidelines 15 and meets all the applicable regulations including GDCs 16 2, 4, 5, 61, 63, the ALARA concerns, and 20.1406.
17 This is going to be brief. There's no major 18 issue here. Is there any question in the overall design 19 of the pool?
20 (No audible response.)
21 MR. HERNANDEZ: That's the last of my items.
22 Then we go to the --
23 MR. WUNDER: Okay, now we're -- that 24 concludes the Staff presentation of Section 9.1.2.
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65 1 So now all we have to do is go through the few open 2 items we have. And if I could change out BP Jane for 3 DK. Thank you.
4 And the first item I believe belongs to 5 Alex Burja who is on the phone. So if we can get her 6 unmuted.
7 MEMBER STETKAR: Alex, if you're out there, 8 just say something. You should be unmuted.
9 MS. BURJA: Can you hear me now?
10 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
11 MS. BURJA: Okay. I'm not sure what 12 happened, but I'm here now. So, is my slide up?
13 MR. WUNDER: It is.
14 MS. BURJA: Okay, great. So at the time 15 of our last presentation, the two items that remained 16 open associated with DCD Section 9.1.1, criticality 17 safety of new and spent fuel storage, were mainly 18 associated with ongoing work or resolution of disuse 19 and other review areas that might have potential impact 20 on Section 9.1.1.
21 The first issue involved the effect of 22 thermal conductivity degradation. In particular, the 23 Staff had asked in an RAI un Section 9.1.1 how the maximum 24 fuel temperature assumed for the depletion calculation NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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66 1 in the burn up credit criticality analysis accounted 2 for GPD.
3 This issue was resolved because in the 4 response to RAI 7954 which was related to the plus seven 5 fuel design topical report, the Applicant showed that 6 the assumed maximum fuel temperature and the criticality 7 analysis found the accepted maximum fuel temperature 8 for this design plus the Staff approved CPD penalty.
9 So therefore, it is acceptable to the Staff.
10 The second open item which related to the 11 mechanical analysis review. So as a Phase II and Phase 12 III Staff's review of the storage rack mechanical analysis 13 technical report was incomplete, and there were several 14 technical issues that remain to be resolved.
15 So due to these issues, the Staff was unable 16 to determine whether any mechanical accidents could 17 have impact on criticality. But as you just heard, 18 this issue was resolved because the Staff an Applicant 19 worked to resolve the technical issues related to the 20 storage rack mechanical analysis technical report, and 21 the Staff has completed its review of the report.
22 The Staff concludes that the criticality 23 analyses found any criticality related effects of the 24 analyzed mechanical accident. Are there any questions?
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67 1 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Fifteen second rule 2 is applied. No questions.
3 MS. BURJA: Thank you.
4 MR. WUNDER: Eighty-five seventy-eight is 5 yours, isn't it?
6 MR. YESHNIK: Yes.
7 MR. WUNDER: Okay.
8 MR. YESHNIK: I thought that there was 9 another party --
10 MR. WUNDER: No, that's it.
11 MR. YESHNIK: Okay. So, my open item is 12 Question 9.1.1-37, and it involved a question on the 13 exposure of the metamic material to elevate temperatures 14 during fabrication, and whether the neutron absorber 15 coupons needed to be heat treated to reflect that 16 condition.
17 And the Applicant stated that the 18 qualification testing has already demonstrated that 19 there is no effect on neutron absorbing properties.
20 The Staff re-looked at the qualification testing that's 21 at the bottom of the slide and agreed that the 900 degree 22 tests for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> demonstrating that there is no change 23 is sufficient.
24 And the Staff also reviewed generic NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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68 1 literature and concluded that the welding temperatures 2 are bounded by normal manufacturing temperatures so 3 that there is no predicted issue. And that's it.
4 MR. HERNANDEZ: Section 9.1.3 contained, 5 at the time of the presentation of Section 9.1.3 to 6 the Subcommittee, Section 9.1.3 contained an open item.
7 And this open item was related to the assumptions used 8 on the spent fuel pool, thermal hydraulic analysis.
9 The Staff had identified some apparent 10 inconsistencies between the information on the DCD and 11 the assumptions used on the thermal analysis, the 12 Applicant responded to the Staff's RAI by revising the 13 thermal hydraulic calculation and making this 14 calculation available for the Staff to audit.
15 They provided clarification of the 16 assumptions used under thermal analysis and proposed 17 DCD markups that have already been incorporated into 18 the DCD. The Staff reviewed the information that was 19 provided in the RAI, the DCD, and the technical report 20 that summarized the thermal hydraulic analysis and 21 confirmed that the revised thermal hydraulic analysis 22 used conservative assumptions that are consistent with 23 the SRP guidance, and therefore meets the applicable 24 GDC in this case, GDC 61.
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69 1 MEMBER STETKAR: Raul, I'm just going to 2 bring this up when we discuss Section 19.3. But since 3 you're here and I'm not sure that you'll be here for 4 that section, let me just ask you about it.
5 If I look at the differences in those times 6 that you mentioned, I understood I would say in my opinion 7 a rather substantial difference that the time to heat 8 up and boil off water for example to within ten feet 9 of the top of the fuel assemblies went from about 25 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> down to about a little over 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.
11 That to me, these are numbers that are in 12 section 19.3, but they're related to heat up and boil 13 off of spent fuel pool inventory, which is not directly 14 related to the design of the spent fuel pool cooling 15 system.
16 But I'm curious about what did they do in 17 the revised analyses that would result in such differences 18 in heating up and boiling water?
19 MR. HERNANDEZ: You are looking at two 20 different thermal analysis.
21 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, I'm looking at one 22 pool that heats up.
23 MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. But the difference 24 is this. In Section 9.1.3, we're looking at the thermal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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70 1 analysis of the performance of the safety related cooling 2 system.
3 And the initial conditions are different.
4 This is a design basis event. So you have less water 5 and a different set of initial conditions. When you're 6 looking at Chapter 19, accident scenarios, the guidance 7 for Chapter 19 is from -- your initial set of conditions 8 are different.
9 You're not on the design basis event.
10 You're already, you start from normal conditions and 11 then you have this beyond design event. So those two 12 are not exactly comparable events. You have different 13 water levels, different heat loads, different 14 conditions.
15 MEMBER STETKAR: All right. I'll wait 16 until this afternoon, then. Thank you.
17 MR. KALATHIVEETTIL: Good morning, 18 everyone. My name is Don Matthews Kalathiveettil, and 19 I will be presenting the closure of two open items with 20 respect to Section 9.5.2, communication systems.
21 First open item was RAI 548 Question 9.5.2-6.
22 The issue was that the Applicant had classified all 23 the communication systems as non-safety related. And 24 the DCD stated that the communication systems did not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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71 1 require compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix GDC's 2 1, 2, 3, and 4.
3 Since compliance with these GDCs is part 4 of the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 952 and the 5 availability of these communication systems is important 6 for programs that has emergency planning, the Staff 7 did not agree with the Applicant's stance and requested 8 through the RAI to demonstrate how the communication 9 systems would meet the applicable GDCs.
10 The Applicant's response to the RAI included 11 a commitment that the design of the communication systems 12 will comply with GDCs 1, 2, 3, and 4. It also included 13 detailed markups of the DCD that explained how the 14 communication systems would meet all the applicable 15 GDCs.
16 Subsequently, the Staff reviewed the 17 information we just provided by the Applicant and 18 determined that the design information and commitment 19 given by the Applicant was sufficient to meet the intent 20 of DCDs 1, 2, 3, and 4.
21 The second open item was RAI 548 Question 22 9.5.2-7. The issue was that the DCD lacked sufficient 23 information in APRIL 1400 FSR Tier 1 Table 2.6.9-1.
24 This table contains the various ITAAC related to the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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72 1 communication systems. 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1) requires that 2 it is answered in certification application contains 3 the necessary and sufficient ITAAC.
4 Hence, the Staff requested additional 5 information through the RAI. The Applicant's response 6 to the RAI included detailed markups in which it was 7 explained which procedures are needed to ensure that 8 each communication subsystem would be able to perform 9 its required function.
10 It also included the necessary and 11 sufficient information about each subsystem in the ITAAC 12 and acceptance criteria sections of Table 2.6.9-1.
13 Subsequently, the Staff reviewed the information 14 provided by the Applicant and determined that sufficient 15 detail was now provided in Tier 1 to meet the intent 16 of 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1).
17 This basically concludes my presentation 18 for this section. Any questions?
19 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Once again, we now 20 can -- well, we're transitioning.
21 MEMBER STETKAR: Will there be a closed 22 session?
23 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: There will be a closed 24 session. So we would like public comments now for what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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73 1 has been presented so far. Is there anybody in the 2 room that would like to make a comment?
3 MR. OH: This is Andy Oh, KHNP Washington 4 Office. Before finishing this session, the KHNP would 5 like to correct something regarding tub and tubing aux 6 feedwater room heater calculations. First thing is 7 that for members that is the temperature profile.
8 So our temperature profile indicated that 9 about the 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br /> in room, the temperature is at 140 10 Fahrenheit and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> it increased to 145.
11 MEMBER STETKAR: Andy, let me make sure 12 I have that. At what time is 140?
13 MR. OH: Fifty-two hours, 140.
14 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
15 MR. OH: Seventy-two hours, 145.
16 MEMBER STETKAR: So, okay.
17 MR. OH: It is in an increasing slope. It 18 is approximately 2.25 Fahrenheit per hour. That's the 19 first question, your first answer from the member.
20 Second is one of our, the technical staff had mentioned 21 that there's no electrical the INC equipment inside 22 the tub and tubing aux feedwater room.
23 But when we checked our design document, 24 we identified the control panel is located inside tub NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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74 1 driven aux feedwater room.
2 MEMBER STETKAR: All right, thank you.
3 MR. OH: We corrected that fact. And second 4 thing is -- third thing is that staff member indicated 5 there is two different criteria is used in the room 6 heater calculation. One is 120 Fahrenheit, the other 7 is 150 Fahrenheit.
8 KHMP is using the criteria from the NUMARC 9 87-00. That says condition one is equipment located 10 in the condition one room are considered to be a low 11 constant with respective elevated temperature effect, 12 and will likely require no special action to assure 13 operability for our station blackout.
14 That is category one. NUMARC 87-00 15 recommend to use that 120 Fahrenheit, and specifically 16 there's some example for that is for -- example is they 17 specified that exempt means electrical equipment 18 instrumentation how they did category one.
19 And also, it indicated that there is category 20 two room is equipment located in condition two rooms 21 generally requires not force the cooling in order to 22 ensure operability for a four hour station blackout.
23 And also they make some specific example for that room 24 is for either is RCIC and feedwater room is steam driven NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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75 1 aux feedwater pump room.
2 That is our basis to using what that criteria 3 for the room feeder calculation. In conclusion that 4 we used the 150 Fahrenheit as a criteria, and we also 5 notify with that that we have some control panel inside 6 it that aux feedwater, the temperature in the aux 7 feedwater room.
8 So in order to protect that equipment, the 9 KHMP 1400 design and the equipment spec is that some 10 that equipment have to survive over 160 Fahrenheit.
11 That is also very consistent with the single core design.
12 MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you. That 13 clarifies at least my understanding of what is in that 14 room. And it does clarify the fact that the electrical 15 and INC equipment inside that room must be qualified 16 to a substantially higher temperature than other 17 electrical and INC equipment throughout the plant.
18 So we have that on record now. Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay, back to the, 20 are there any comments from the public in the room?
21 (No audible response.)
22 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Hearing none, are 23 there any members of the public on the bridge line that 24 would like to make a comment?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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76 1 MR. LEWIS: Marvin Lewis, member of the 2 public.
3 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Yes, Marvin?
4 MR. LEWIS: Wonderful, thank you.
5 Appreciate it greatly. Look, I listened to this, and 6 as you well know, I listen to other ACRS meetings and 7 what have you. And one of the things that has been 8 bothering me for a long time, but I think especially 9 here, is when you start talking about things that are 10 not easily traced, this often falls under category of 11 warehouse.
12 In other words, suppose you need a bolt 13 or a nut to finish a shipment, what do you do? You 14 grab a bolt and a nut that looks like it and throw it 15 into the bin and ship it. That's called warehouse.
16 And I just was wondering, it may not be 17 here, but how do you assure that the right materials 18 come through and are just not picked up to finish a 19 shipment? Thank you.
20 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Thank you. Are there 21 any other members of the public that would like to make 22 a comment?
23 (No audible response.)
24 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Hearing none, we'll NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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77 1 close the bridge line. And we're now going to make 2 a transition, so it's time to make a break. We'll break 3 until about 20 minutes 'til. And at that time, we'll 4 have a closed session.
5 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 6 off the record at 10:25 a.m.)
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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NON-PROPRIETARY APR1400 DCA Chapter 9: Auxiliary Systems ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
KEPCO/KHNP February 21, 2018 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Contents Overview of Chapter 9 Section Overview List of Submitted Documents and Summary of RAIs List of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 List of Open Items 9.1.2 New and Spent Fuel Storage Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Summary of Open Items ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Response to Phase 3 Questions Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
Current Status Attachments:
Acronyms List of COL Items related to Open Items 1 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Overview of Chapter 9 Section Overview Section Title Major Contents
- Criticality Safety of New and Spent Fuel Storage
- New and Spent Fuel Storage 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling
- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
- Light Load Handling System (Related to Refueling)
- Overhead Heavy Load Handling System
- Essential Service Water System
- Component Cooling Water System
- Domestic Water and Sanitary Systems
- Ultimate Heat Sink ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th 9.2 Water Systems
- Condensate Storage Facilities
- Chilled Water System Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
Turbine Generator Building Closed Cooling Water System
- Turbine Generator Building Open Cooling Water System
- Compressed Air and Gas Systems
- Process and Post-Accident Sampling System 9.3 Process Auxiliaries
- Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems
- Chemical and Volume Control System 2 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Overview of Chapter 9 Section Title Major Contents
- Control Room HVAC System
- Fuel Handling Area HVAC System
- Auxiliary Building Clean Area HVAC System
- Turbine Generator Building HVAC System 9.4 Fuel Storage and Handling
- Engineered Safety Features Ventilation System
- Reactor Containment Building HVAC System and Purge System
- Compound Building HVAC System
- Design Features for Minimization of Contamination ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th
- Communication Systems Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
- Lighting Systems
- Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil System 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems
- Emergency Diesel Engine Cooling Water System
- Emergency Diesel Engine Starting Air System
- Emergency Diesel Engine Lubrication System
- Emergency Diesel Engine Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System
- Gas Turbine Generator Facility 3 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Overview of Chapter 9 List of Submitted Documents for Chapter 9 ADAMS Document No. Title Revision Type Accession No.
APR1400-K-X-FS-14002 APR1400 Design Control Document 0 DCD ML15006A048
-P & NP Tier 2: Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems 1 DCD -
APR1400-K-X-IT-14001 APR1400 Design Control Document 0 DCD ML15006A039
-P & NP Tier 1 1 DCD -
Criticality Analysis of New and Spent Fuel APR1400-Z-A-NR-14011 1 TeR ML17094A138 Storage Racks ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting Mechanical Analysis for New and Spent th APR1400-H-N-NR-3 TeR ML17242A310 14012-P/NP Fuel Storage Racks Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
Summary of RAIs No. of Questions No. of Responses No. of OI 277 277 5 4 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Overview of Chapter 9 List of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 No. Related RAI Topic ADAMS Accession #
287-8272 1 Seismic Load ML17243A348 (Q 09.01.02-15) 287-8272 2 Seismic Analysis of Racks ML17244A512 (Q 09.01.02-20) 287-8272 3 Mechanical Accident Analysis ML17244A512 (Q 09.01.02-23 & 24)
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 5 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Overview of Chapter 9 List of Open Items No. Related RAI Topic ADAMS Accession #
RAI 167-8191 1 Abnormal Conditions ML15344A144 (Q 09.01.01-13)
RAI 469-8578 2 Neutron Absorber Material ML16169A030 (Q 09.01.01-39)
RAI 473-8582 3 Minimum safety water level of SFP ML16123A040 (Q 09.01.03-4) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC RAI 491-8613 4 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4 in communication ML16222A952 (Q 09.05.02-4)
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th system
- 1. ITAAC and ITP for communication RAI 491-8613 system Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 5 ML16211A158 (Q 09.05.02-5) 2. Meaning of functional arrangement in communication system 6 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY 9.1.2 New and Spent Fuel Storage Key Design Features New Fuel Storage Rack (NFSR)
- Two modules (Total 112 cells) of NFSRs are constructed of stainless steel, and are designed as seismic Category I.
- NFSRs are located in the NFP, and are bolted to embedment plates at the bottom of the pit to preclude tipping.
Spent Fuel Storage Rack (SFSR)
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th
- SFSRs are constructed of stainless steel, and are designed as seismic Category I.
Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
- SFSRs are located in the SFP, and are freestanding with pedestal resting on embedment plates. SFSRs are made up of Region I (Total 352 cells) and Region II (Total 1,440 cells) and provide total 29 rack modules.
(Total 1,792 cells)
- METAMICTM is used as a neutron absorber.
7 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY 9.1.2 New and Spent Fuel Storage Safety Evaluation Dynamic simulations for total of 36 cases runs (including sensitivity runs) are performed to determine the loads and displacements for each rack.
NFSRs and SFSRs under the postulated mechanical accident possess acceptable margins of safety.
NFSRs and SFSRs are designed to meet the requirements which are specified ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) on SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D and ASME Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 component supports.
In response to NRC feedback on both the TeR and RAI No. 8272 responses, APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P was completed (as Rev. 3) on August, 2017.
8 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Seismic Load Related RAIs : 287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-15)
Description of issue :
- Staff requested to clarify and confirm that it used at least the five sets (greater than required four) of time histories for the nonlinear structural analysis of the NFSR and SFSR.
- Technical adequacy justification for artificial time history sets.
Resolution:
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
- KHNP developed five sets of artificial acceleration time histories for three orthogonal directions specific to the NFSR and SFSR.
- The suitability of the time histories was verified in accordance with SRP 3.7.1, Option 2, criteria for multiple sets of time histories.
9 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Seismic Analysis of Racks Related RAIs : 287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-20)
Description of issue : Staff requested to provide the followings:
- Sufficient information of the rack and FA model and its parameters (e.g., spring elements, hydrodynamic mass, time history integration time step) considered for the seismic evaluation of NFSR and SFSR
- Sensitivity analysis results of the impact forces and rack responses to variation in spring constants considered in the nonlinear seismic analyses ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th
- Sensitivity analysis results of the integration time step used in performing the nonlinear time history analyses for SSE.
Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 10 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Resolution:
- KHNP provided a detailed description of the Rack and FA model. NFSR and SFSR models are composed of 3-D elastic beam elements and lumped mass elements with properties derived from the dynamic characteristics of the detailed 3-D shell model of the racks.
- Sensitivity analyses were performed for spring constants (i.e., stiffness) in the model; rack-to-floor, rack-to-rack and fuel-to-rack stiffness's at +/-20% of the nominal value. The effect of the sensitivities was a change in predicted loads within the variation found for different time histories and less than the ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th variation for different COFs.
Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
- Comparison of a run at one half the fixed time step used for all other runs showed small changes in calculated results comparable to the run to run variation with different time histories.
11 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Mechanical Accident Analysis Related RAIs : 287-8272 (Q 09.01.02-23 & 24)
Description of issue : Staff requested to provide the followings:
- A nonlinear dynamic analysis for the impact effects of drop accidents, considering a finite element model
- Location of the drop on the rack base plate that were considered to maximize the deformation of the rack base plate and whether it also considered a deep drop into a cell along the perimeter and half way between the supports ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th
- Consider all other fuel assemblies in place when a fuel assembly drops through an empty cell Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 12 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Main Topic in Section 9.1.2 Resolution:
- KHNP responded that all drop accidents are analyzed by developing a finite element model of the rack, rack base plate, a fuel assembly and the pedestal support using appropriate shell, beam, and solid body elements of ANSYS LS-DYNA program.
- Drops as far away from the support provided by a pedestal are considered at two locations (a central cell and a peripheral cell at the midpoint of a side) that maximize the distance to the points of support.
- The effects of all of the stored fuel assemblies in the rack is considered by ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th modifying the density of the baseplate to simulate the loading effects of the Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) other fuel assemblies.
13 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Open Items Open Item: Abnormal Conditions Related RAIs
- RAI 167-8191 (Q 09.01.01-13)
Description of issue
- The staff is unable to confirm the applicants statement that the mechanical accidents do not cause rack deformation that would affect criticality, until the seismic and structural review of the new and spent fuel storage racks ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th (APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P) is complete.
Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
Resolution:
- KHNP provided that any damage to the racks is limited to portions above the neutron absorber and does not affect their configuration relative to the criticality analysis. The staffs review for APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P, Mechanical Analysis for New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks was completed.
14 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Open Items Open Item: Neutron Absorber Material Related RAIs
- RAI 469-8578 (Q 09.01.01-39)
Description of issue
- The staff concerns regarding the adequacy of utilizing as-fabricated Metamic' coupons in the neutron absorber monitoring program because the Metamic' material will be heated during fabrication (due to welding).
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Resolution:
Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
- KHNP provided that welding near the neutron absorber would not have an effect on corrosion resistance or neutron absorption of the material. The Metamic' material qualification included exposing Metamic' to a 900oF environment for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and examining the cooled material for changes in material properties. The qualification test demonstrated that the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in a 900oF environment resulted in no change in areal density, product weight, or dimensions.
15 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Open Items Open Item: Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Related RAIs : 473-8582 (Q 09.01.03-4)
Description of issue
- Staff request to revise the thermal-hydraulic calculations using the revised minimum safety water level and update the DCD accordingly.
- Additionally, the staff identified that the normal water level has been identified as elevation 154, while in other places it shows as elevation 153.
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Resolution:
Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
- The minimum safety water level for SFP was provided through the response to RAI 473-8582, Q 09.01.03-4.
- Thermal-hydraulic calculation has been revised based on minimum water level (EL. 146).
- KHNP proposed DCD changes in order to indicate clearly that these two levels (EL. 153 in Technical Specifications and EL. 154 as normal water level) represent different conditions through the response to RAI 473-8582, Q 09.01.03-5.
16 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Open Items Open Item: Communication System Related RAIs : 491-8613 (Q 09.05.02-4)
Description of issue
- Staff requested to justify why the communication systems are not considered as risk significant SSCs, related to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4.
- Staff issued a follow-up RAI 548-8822, Q 09.05.02-6.
Resolution:
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th
- KHNP responded that the communication systems of the APR1400 are designed Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) to meet GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4 and do not interface with any safety-related or risk-significant SSC.
- The four communication subsystems are designed to assure that any single event does not result in a complete loss of plant communication.
17 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Summary of Open Items Open Item: ITAAC and ITP for communication system Related RAIs : 491-8613 (Q 09.05.02-5)
Description of issue
- Staff requested to provide the detailed description of all ITAAC items along with their acceptance criteria and ITP for the communication systems in Section 14.2.
- Staff requested to clarify what the applicant means by functional arrangement of communication systems.
- Staff issued a follow-up RAI 548-8822, Q 09.05.02-7.
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Resolution:
Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
- KHNP provided the new ITP for plant communication system and the detailed description of all ITAAC items for communication system through the response to RAI 548-8822, Q 09.05.02-7.
- KHNP revised DCD Tier 1, Subsection 2.6.9 providing the detailed description of plant communication systems instead of the term of functional arrangement.
18 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Response to Phase 3 Questions The Question in ACRS APR1400 Subcommittee on May 18, 2017 9.2.7 Chilled Water System
- Question: The basis for the non-safety-related plant chilled water system to provide cooling for the safety related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump room
- Response:
- In order to avoid damage caused by HELB accident to safety-related system (ECW), non-safety-related cubicle cooler is installed in the TDAFW pump room.
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th
- The heat-up calculation is performed to determine the maximum Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) temperatures in the TDAFW pump room under the loss of cooling.
19 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Response to Phase 3 Questions The Question in ACRS APR1400 Subcommittee on May 18, 2017 Summary for Heat-up calculation of turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room
Purpose:
- 1) To determine the maximum temperatures in the TDAFW pump room
- 2) To demonstrate that the maximum temperature of the room does not exceed the maximum allowable temperature during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> under loss of HVAC system
- Calculation Program: GOTHIC (Generation of Thermal-Hydraulic Information for ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Containments) program
- Maximum Allowable Temperature: Maximum allowable temperature, 150 °F of the Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) room is decided based on the steady-state temperature of Condition 2 mentioned in NUMARC 87-00
- Result : The TDAFW pump rooms are maintained below 150 °F during 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> under loss of cooling.
20 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Current Status Chapter 9 is complete KHNP continues to monitor Chapter 9 to assure any conforming changes are addressed.
5 open items, that were identified in Phase 2 and 3, have been resolved with adequate and sufficient discussion with the staff.
Changes in Chapter 9 as reviewed and marked-up in response to ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th the RAIs will be incorporated into the next revision (Rev.2) of the Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
DCD 21 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY
Attachment:
Acronyms COF Coefficient of Friction COL Combined License DCD Design Control Document ECW Essential Chilled Water System FA Fuel Assembly GOTHIC Generation of Thermal-Hydraulic Information for Containments HELB High Energy Line Break ITAAC Inspection, Test and Acceptance Criteria KHNP Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co.
NFP New Fuel Storage Pit ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th NFSR New Fuel Storage Rack Meeting (Feb.21, 2018)
RAI Request for Additional Information SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SFSR Spent Fuel Storage Rack SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake TDAFW Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater 22 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
NON-PROPRIETARY Attachment : List of COL Item related to OIs COL Description Identifier COL 14.2(17) The COL applicant is to prepare the site-specific preoperational and startup test specificatio n and test procedure and/or guideline for offsite communication system.
ACRS15SCPre-application Meeting th Meeting (Feb.21, 2018) 23 APR1400-E-M-EC-18001-NP
Presentation to the ACRS Subcommittee Korea Hydro Nuclear Power Co., Ltd (KHNP) APR1400 Design Certification Application Review Safety Evaluation with No Open Items:
Chapter 9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS February 21, 2018
Staff Review Team NRO/SPSB NRO/MCB NRO/ICE Raul Hernandez Andrew Yeshnik Dawnmatthews Kalaliveettil Hien Le John Honcharik Chang Li Greg Makar NRO/SRSB Angelo Stubbs Alexandra Burja Ryan Nolan NRO/SCVB Bob Vettori Danny Chien NRR/EENB Dennis Andrukat Adakou Foli Thinh Dinh NRO/SEB Sheila Ray Vaughn Thomas Pravin Patel BP Jain Special Thanks Rich Morante, Carolyn Lauron, and Brian Hughes Project Managers Bill Ward - Lead Project Manager George Wunder - Chapter 9 Project Manager February 21, 2018 Chapter 4: Reactor 2
Introduction New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks
- Function New and spent fuel storage racks provide safe storage for fuel assemblies and maintain a coolable geometry, preventing criticality, and protect the fuel assemblies from seismic and mechanical load effects
- Safety Review Scope in Section 9.1.2 Structural design of new and spent fuel storage racks to withstand effects of natural phenomena (seismic) and mechanical accident scenarios involving fuel assembly
- Spent fuel pool and pool liner design
- Staffs safety evaluation of the spent fuel pool and the pool liner provided in SER Section 3.8.3.4.6
- Criticality Evaluation
- Staffs safety evaluation of the racks criticality in provided in SER Section 9.1.1 February 21, 2018 Section 9.1.2, New and Spent Fuel storage 3
New and Spent Fuel Storage Overview
- Review Highlights Reviewed TR Mechanical Analysis for New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks, APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P, Rev. 3, August 2017 Review basis Appendix D to SRP Section 3.8.4,Guidance on Spent Fuel Racks Seismic input and finite element models used for nonlinear seismic analysis Mechanical accident scenarios involving dropped and stuck fuel assembly Computer codes and validation Analysis methodology including design parameters, and assumptions made in finite element analyses Review results for reasonableness Applicable COL information items
- Request for Additional Information (RAIs)
- Staff issued 39 RAIs and all questions were resolved Staff concludes that stresses induced in the racks and its components meet the applicable ASME Code allowable stresses, rack seismic displacement are small and do not impact each other or the pool wall and its sub-critical configuration is unaffected.
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 4
New and Spent Fuel Storage
- Areas of Review Physical description Applicable design codes, standards, and specifications Seismic and impact loads Loads and load combinations Structural design and analysis Structural acceptance criteria Materials, quality control programs, and Inspection February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 5
Physical Description New Fuel Storage Racks (NFSRs)
Located in the new fuel storage pit in Fuel Handling Building Two identical racks, each with a 7 x 8 array of storage cells Total of 112 fuel storage locations NFSRs are bolted to embedment plates at the bottom of the pit and do not slide The NFSRs are constructed of stainless steel The center-to center spacing between adjacent fuel assemblies is designed to be 14 inches to maintain sub-criticality February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 6
Physical Description Spent Fuel Racks (SFRs) 23 SFSRs located in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) with gaps between the adjacent racks and the surrounding fuel pool walls SFSRs are freestanding, with pedestals resting on embedment plates in the reinforced concrete floor of the SFP The SPF is divided into two regions, region I and region II.
Region I contains four 8 x 8 array racks and two 6 x 8 array racks; The center-to center spacing between adjacent fuel assemblies is designed to be 10.83 inches to maintain sub-criticality Region II contains nineteen 8 x 8 array racks and four 8 x 7 array racks; The center-to center spacing between adjacent fuel assemblies is designed to be 8.86 inches to maintain sub-criticality February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent FuelStorage 7
Physical Description Figure 2-8 Isometric Schematic of the SFSR (Region II)
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 10
Design Codes, Standards, and Specification
- Applicant identified the following industry codes and regulatory guides that are applicable to the design, fabrication, construction, materials, testing, and inspections of the new and spent fuel storage racks for the APR1400 plant:
ASME Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF and Appendix F, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda ASME Code,Section II, Materials, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda RG 1.29 RG 1.61
- The staff found the use of these codes, standards, and specifications to be consistent with the guidance given in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D and therefore acceptable February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 9
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads Nonlinear Seismic Analysis Input Motion Target input response spectra - envelope of rack base and the SFP wall Input Time histories -Five time histories developed enveloping the target spectra with the guidance in SRP 3.7.1 for multiple time histories.
Analytical Model A 3-D coupled Rack-Fuel beam model for each rack and whole pool multi-rack model Hydrodynamic effects: Rack-to-rack, rack-to-pool wall, rack baseplate-to-pool floor, fuel assembly-to-cell wall Mass and stiffness of fuel assembly and fuel spacer grid for impact New and end of life (EOL) fuel properties Gap and contact spring and sensitivity analysis of spring parameters Seismic analysis Methodology Three directional orthogonal time histories applied simultaneously Nonlinear seismic time history analysis performed for 5 sets of acceleration time histories February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 10
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads Seismic and Impact Loads Nonlinear seismic analyses performed for three values of the coefficient of friction: 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 Considered the configurations of the SFSR at full, 25-percent full, 50-percent full, and empty mixed loadings and the NFSR fully loaded The numerical solution was obtained by direct integration of the nonlinear equations of motion Considered sensitivity analysis for Integration time step Considered 20 Dynamic simulation Considered additional 16 simulations for the sensitivities of various seismic model parameters (e.g., gap springs stiffness)
Validated and verified (V&V) ANSYS Computer code for nonlinear fuel rack analysis The staff found the applicants seismic nonlinear analysis including the seismic input, seismic model parameters and the analysis methodology and validation of the computer Code ANSYS to be reasonable and consistent with the regulatory guidance in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D, Section 3.7.1, Section 3.8.1,Section II.4.F (guidance for the use of validated computer programs) and Regulatory Guide 1.61, and therefore are acceptable.
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 11
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads Mechanical Accidents Analysis involving Fuel Assembly
- Four mechanical accident scenarios considered Straight shallow drop on SFSR (NFSR has no neutron absorber to damage)
Straight Deep Drop Away from NFSR and SFSR rack pedestal Straight Deep Drop Over a SFSR Pedestal Stuck Fuel assembly
- Analyses Accident scenarios analyzed by a detailed 3-D finite element model using LS-DYNA computer code Rack is considered fully loaded in the drop analysis Drop locations are appropriate to evaluate maximum plate deflection Demonstrated that the impact of the straight deep drop of a fuel assembly on specific locations on the baseplate does not cause any significant deformation to the baseplate Minimum safety factor for all four accident scenarios is greater than 1.4 The staff found that the applicant used a detailed 3-D finite element model to analyze the mechanical accident scenario and deformation acceptance limit are consistent with the guidance in SRP 3.8.4, Appendix D and therefore acceptable.
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 12
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads (Accident Scenario)
Figure 4-1 Straight Shallow Drop February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 13
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads (Accident Scenario)
Fig. 4-2 Deep Drop Away from a Pedestal February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 14
Analysis for Seismic and Impact Loads (Accident Scenario)
Figure 4-3 Deep Drop Over a Pedestal February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 15
Loads and Load Combinations
- Loads Dead Load including fuel assembly weight (D)
Live Load (L)
Thermal loads (To, Ta)
Mechanical accident loads involving Fuel assembly (Fd, Pf))
- Load Combinations for ASME Code Service level limits A, B, and D D+L Service Level A D + L + To Service Level A D + L + To + Pf (stuck fuel assembly) Service Level B D + L + Ta + E' Service Level D D + L + Fd (Fuel load drop) Rack Functional Capability The staff found the loads and load combinations considered for applicable ASME Code Service level limits to be consistent with the information in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D and therefore acceptable.
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 16
Structural Design and Analysis Procedures
- Design Considerations Applicant described the structural design of various elements of the rack structure Stresses in welds between cell-to-baseplate, baseplate-to-pedestal, and cell-to-cell, Local stresses caused by cell wall impact, cell wall buckling, Secondary stress due to thermal effects Stresses in Fuel Assembly
- Design Forces and stresses Forces from the nonlinear seismic analysis or mechanical accident analysis Combined with appropriate loads in the load combination Calculated design stresses
- Stress Acceptance Limit ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, Level A, B, and D service limits for Class 3
- Safety Factor Ratio of Allowable stress to calculated stress February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 17
Structural Acceptance Criteria (Limit)
- Acceptance limits of the rack structures are defined in ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, as applicable for Class 3 components support.
- Material Properties at 200 degrees Fahrenheit (F)) used to develop the stress limits for various service level conditions
- Service Level A limits consistent with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF-3320. The applicant conservatively used service level A stress limits to evaluate service level B loading
- The Increase factor for Service level D stress limits consistent with the criteria in ASME Code Section III, Appendix F, Section F-1334
- Minimum factor of safety against overturning is required to be equal to or greater than 1.5 The staff found the structural acceptance criteria consistent with the information in SRP Section 3.8.4, Appendix D and SRP Section 3.8.5 and therefore acceptable February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 18
Material, Quality Control Programs & Inspections
- Material SA-240 type 304 L for cells and plates SA-564 Grade 630 for support studs Neutron absorber material (METAMIC) attached to SFSRs Fuel assembly material data from PWR Plus7 fuel assembly
- Design, Fabrication, and Inspection ASME Code Section III Subsection NF requirements
- Quality Control Program Racks are designated seismic Category I structures and treated as safety-related components Committed to 10CFR Part 50 Appendix B for Quality control program and 10CFR 50.65 for periodic monitoring The staff found the material, design, fabrication and inspection and QA program consistent with Appendix D to SRP 3.8.4 and therefore acceptable.
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 19
COL Information Items Four COL Items Periodic condition monitoring program - confirm material and geometric assumptions remain valid during operating life of the plant Perform confirmatory dynamic and stress analysis considering site specific conditions Develop plant procedures and admin controls for fuel handling activities over the spent fuel pool Develop post-seismic event inspection procedure to measure gaps between fuel storage racks The staff found COL items to be acceptable because it adequately describes actions necessary for the COL applicant.
February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 20
Conclusion
- Structural design of the fuel racks meets the ASME Code Section III Subsection NF design requirements
- Minimum safety factor for the fuel racks during seismic event and postulated mechanical accident scenarios is 1.19 (> minimum required 1.0)
- Spent fuel rack displacements due to design basis seismic event are small and do not close the large gap of 33 between the SFSRs and the SFP wall
- Spent fuel rack maximum relative displacement (0.28, Region II racks) due to design basis seismic event is smaller than the rack-to-rack separation (1.18, Region II racks); margin against impact is 1.18/0.28= 4; Larger margin for Region I racks (>6)
- Free standing spent fuel rack do not overturn due to the design basis seismic event and the safety factor against overturning is significantly greater than the required minimum safety factor of 1.5
- Due to small seismic movements, criticality analysis for the rack configuration is bounded by the SFP Criticality analysis for normal conditions included in SER subsection 9.1.1 February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 21
Summary Conclusion New and spent fuel storage racks provide safe storage for fuel assemblies and maintain a coolable geometry, preventing criticality, and protect the fuel assemblies from seismic and mechanical load effects February 21, 2018 9.1.2, New and spent Fuel Storage 22
Materials o Applicant uses typical materials for fuel storage
- New fuel racks: Type 304L and Type 630 stainlesssteel
- Spent fuel racks: Type 304L and Type 630 stainless steel, Metamic neutron absorber(not credited for structural capacity)
- Spent fuel pool liner: Type 304 stainless steel o Fuel racks are designed, fabricated, and inspected to ASME Code SectionIII-NF requirements o Spent fuel pool liner ASTM grade material with ASME NQA-1 and Appendix B Quality Assurance.
o New fuel is in dry storage - degradation will not occur.
o Spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool. The applicant has selected materials with good resistance to corrosion in spent fuel pool environments. The spent fuel pool water is controlled as described in FSAR Section 9.1.3 and is consistent with the EPRI Primary Water Chemistry guidelines. The neutron absorber coupon monitoring program is evaluated in SER Section 9.1.1 and was found to be acceptable.
o Sensitization controls, delta ferrite content, and cleanness controls are consistent with staff guidance (RG 1.31, RG 1.44, and NQA-1 Subpart 2.1).
The staff found the approach consistent with SRP Section 9.1.2 and acceptable.
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Cooling and Cleanup System Review Objective New fuel storage pit (NFSP) and spent fuel pool (SFP) safety functions: maintain the fuel assemblies in a safe and subcritical array during all credible storage conditions and to provide a safe means of loading the spent fuel assemblies into shipping or storage casks.
Items of major interest Staff reviewed NFSP and the SFP in accordance with the guidance in SRP 9.1.2 The staff evaluated system configuration and seismic design of SSCs to ensure adequate water inventory in the SFP.
All RAI responses found acceptable and proposed changes to DCD have been incorporated, there are no remaining Open Items.
May 18, 2017 Chapter 9: Auxiliary Systems 27
Technical Topics Section 9.1.1 - Criticality Safety of New and Spent Fuel Storage Open Item - Effects of Thermal Conductivity Degradation (TCD)
Issue: Staff asked in RAI 8191, Question 09.01.01-8, how the maximum fuel temperature assumed for the depletion calculation in the burnup credit criticality analysis accounted for TCD.
Resolution: In the response to RAI 7954, Question 11 (related to the PLUS7 Fuel Design Topical Report), the applicant showed that the assumed maximum fuel temperature bounds the expected maximum fuel temperature plus the staff-approved TCD penalty.
Open Item - Mechanical Analysis Review Issue: The staffs review of APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P, Mechanical Analysis of New and Spent Fuel Storage Racks, was incomplete as of Phase 2, so the staff was unable to determine whether any mechanical accidents could have impacts on criticality.
Resolution: The staff completed its review of APR1400-H-N-NR-14012-P and concludes that the criticality analyses bound any criticality-related effects of the analyzed mechanical accidents.
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Technical Topics Section 9.1.1 - Criticality Safety of Fresh and Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Open Item - RAI 469-8578, Question 09.01.01-39 Issue: The fabrication process of the spent fuel rack may expose the Metamic neutron absorber to elevated temperatures (welding in close proximity). The staff questioned if the neutron absorber coupons needed an additional heat treatment to reflect the final condition of the Metamic neutron absorber.
Resolution: The applicant stated that the as-manufactured coupons were sufficient.
Open Item Closure: The staff re-examined the qualification testing of Metamic[1] that has been previously submitted and accepted by the NRC. One qualification test exposed Metamic material to 900 °F for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and demonstrated no change in neutron absorption. The staff also reviewed generic literature on aluminum-boron carbide neutron absorbers and concluded that temperatures above 1000 °F are expected during fabrication (solidus temperature around 1100 °F for aluminum alloys). The staff agrees that the as-fabricated neutron absorber coupons are sufficient and this item is closed.
- 1. Use of Metamic in Fuel Pool Applications, HI-2022871 [ML022280353] and Qualification of Metamic for Spent-Fuel Storage Application 29
[EPRI Report 1003137]
Technical Topics Section 9.1.3 - SFP Cooling and Cleanup System Open Item - RAI 473-8582 Issue: the staff evaluated the applicants SFP thermal-hydraulic analysis and identified inconsistencies between the assumptions used for the analysis and the system description in the DCD.
Resolution: A response to RAI 473-8582 was provided and included:
- Revised thermal-hydraulic calculation (available via audit),
- clarification of assumptions used in revised thermal-hydraulic analysis;
- DCD markups to eliminate the inconsistency in assumptions; Open Item Closure: The staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant in the RAI response, the DCD, and the technical report summarizing the thermal-hydraulic analysis and confirmed that the revised thermal-hydraulic analysis uses conservative assumptions that are consistent with the SRP guidance and therefore meet the requirements of GDC 61.
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Technical Topics Section 9.5.2 - Communication Systems Open Item - RAI 548-8822, Question 09.05.02-6 Issue: Applicant had classified all communication systems as non-safety related. Hence DCD stated that the communication systems did not require compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4 Resolution: A response to RAI 548-8822 was provided and included:
- Commitment that the design of the communication systems will comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4
- Detailed mark-ups of the DCD which explained how the communication systems would meet all of the applicable GDCs Open Item Closure: The staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant and determined that the design information and commitment given by the applicant was sufficient to meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, GDC 2, GDC 3, and GDC 4.
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Technical Topics Section 9.5.2 - Communication Systems Open Item - RAI 548-8822, Question 09.05.02-7 Issue: DCD lacked sufficient information in APR1400 FSAR Tier 1, Table 2.6.9-1. Additional detail was needed to ensure that each communication subsystem is capable of performing its intended function.
Resolution: A response to RAI 548-8822 was provided and included:
- Detailed mark-ups which explained the procedures needed to ensure that each communication subsystem is capable of performing its intended function.
- Necessary and sufficient information about each communication subsystem in the ITAAC and Acceptance Criteria of Table 2.6.9-1.
Open Item Closure: 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1) requires that a design certification application contain the necessary and sufficient ITAAC. The staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant and determined that sufficient detail was provided in APR1400 FSAR Tier 1 to meet the intent of 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1).
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