05000311/LER-1980-005, Forwards LER 80-005/03L-0

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Forwards LER 80-005/03L-0
ML18082A788
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/21/1980
From: Librizzi F
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML18082A789 List:
References
NUDOCS 8007280624
Download: ML18082A788 (3)


LER-1980-005, Forwards LER 80-005/03L-0
Event date:
Report date:
3111980005R00 - NRC Website

text

e PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark. N.J. 07101 Phone 201 430-7000 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-05/03L July 21, 1980 Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 80-05/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, F.?.~~v-General Manager -

Electric Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control

( 3 copies)

~ Report Number:

80-05/03L Report Date:

7/21/80 Occurrence Date:

6/22/80 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) Inoperable CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 Initial Fuel Load DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

From June 22, 1980 through July 4, 1980, there were intermittent periods of time when one or both channels of POPS were inoperable.

When required, the required Technical Specification Action Statements were entered.

With one POPS inoperable, Technical Specification 3.4.9.3(a) requires to either restore the inoperable channel to operable status within seven days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent within the next eight hours; main-taining the RCS in a vented condition until both POPS have been restored to operable status.

With both POPS inoperable, Technical Specification 3.4.9.3(b) requires a depressurization and venting of the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent within eight hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both POPS have been restored to operable status.

On June 22, 1980, at 1147 hours0.0133 days <br />0.319 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.364335e-4 months <br />, due to erratic POPS operation POPS valve 2PR48 cycled.

Following the valve actuation, the Pressurizer Relief Tank temperature and pressure, as well as the relief line tailpipe temperatures, failed to decrease.

Further investigation indicated 2PR48 was leaking through.

It was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.4.9.3(a) was entered.

The valve was disassembled, repaired and reassembled.

The Action Statement was terminated at 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> on June 27, 1980 On June 28, 1980, at 0415 hours0.0048 days <br />0.115 hours <br />6.861772e-4 weeks <br />1.579075e-4 months <br />, PR47 failed to indicate it had reseated after operation and it was declared inoperable causing the entry into Action Statement 3.4.9.3(a).

Investigation revealed a problem with the valve and repairs were started.

During the repairs, 2PR48 failed to indicate proper operation and was declared inoperable at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> on July 1, 1980 resulting in the entry into Action Statement 3.4.9.3(b).

2PR47 was repaired and the limit switch was replaced on 2PR48 with the Action Statement being terminated at 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br /> on July 2, 1980.

LER 80-05/03L 2 -

On July 4, 1980, at 0430 hours0.00498 days <br />0.119 hours <br />7.109788e-4 weeks <br />1.63615e-4 months <br />, 2PR48 failed to indicate open by both the console and the overhead annunciator.

Action 3.4.9.3(a) was entered and an investigation begun.

It was determined the problem existed in the limit switch.

The limit switch was repaired and the Action.Statement terminated at 2220 hours0.0257 days <br />0.617 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.4471e-4 months <br /> on July 4, 1980.

At 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> on July 4, 1980, 2PR48 failed to indicate closed.

PR7 was shut and Action Statement 3.4.9.3(a) was entered.

No apparent problem could be determined and PR7 was opened at 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br /> on July 5, 1980.

The Action Statement was terminated at that time, 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br />.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Equipment failure.

A combination of limit switch problems and the internal scoring of valve parts.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The problems encountered with the limit switches are related to proper valve position indication and do not affect the safe operation of the plant.

The limit switch problems are mentioned only to provide some continuity throughout this period of time.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The valves were disassembled, inspected and repaired.

2PR47 was inspected and galling was found on the valve body and the main valve piston in the vicinity of the piston rings.

The manufac-turer was consulted.

He attributed the galling to foreign materials that could have lodged in the valve body and/or the dry stroking of the valve when setting the limit switches since steam is used as a lubricant.

The piston and piston rings were replaced and the valve body was cleaned and honed. 2PR48 was inspected and similar galling was noted as on 2PR47, apparently for the same reasons, though not as bad.

The mechanical parts were cleaned and honed and reassembled.

Both valves tested satisfactorily.

An improved type limit switch is being evaluated and is expected to replace the existing switches.

FAILURE DATA:

Marotta Scientific Controls Valve Model MV-225C Prepared By M. J. Murphy SORC Meeting No.

50-80 Manager -

S lem Genera ing Station