ML18081B231
| ML18081B231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003260168 | |
| Download: ML18081B231 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket No. 50-272 Public Service Electric and.Gas Company ATTN:
Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Production 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
March 13, 1980 The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-06, "Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset
- Controls, 11 is forwarded to you for action. A written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
~~-
~
Boyce H. Grier
(/--* Director
Enclosures:
- 1.
- 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins CONTACT:
D.. L. Caphton (215-337-5266) cc w/encls:
F. P. Librizzi, General Manager - Electric Production E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance R. L. Mittl, General Manager - Lfcensing and Environment H. J. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station
1-ENCLOSURE 1 l.JNITED STATES SSINS: 6820 Accession No.:
8002280639 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Bulletin No. 80-06 Date:
March 13, 1980 Page 1 of 3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATU~E (ESF) RESET CONTROLS De~cription of Circumstances:
On November 7, 1979, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) reported that following initiation of Safety Injection (SI) at North Anna Power Station Unit 1, the use of the SI Reset pushbuttons alone resulted in certain ventila-tion dampers changing position from their safety or emergency mode to their normal mode.
Further investigation by VEPCO and the architect-engineer resulted in discovery of circuitry which similarly affected components actuated by a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA, activated on Hi-Hi Containment Pressure).
The circuits in question are listed below:
Component/System Outside/Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Motors Pressurized. Control Room Ventilation Isolation Dampers Safeguards Area Filter Dampers Containment Recirculation Cooler Fans Service Water Supply* and Discharge Valves to Containment Service Water Radiation Monitoring Sample Pumps Problem Pump motors will not start after actuation if CDA Reset is depressed prior to starting timer running out (approx. 3 minutes}
Dampers will open on SI Reset Dampers reposition to bypass filters when CDA Reset is depressed Fans will restart when CDA Reset is depressed If service water is being used as the cooling medi u.m prior to CDA actuation, valves will reopen upon depressing CDA reset Pumps will not start after actuation if CDA reset is depressed prior ta motor starting timers running out Main Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust Isolation Valves to the Contiinment IE Bulletin 80-06 Date:
March 13, 1980 Page 2 of 3 After receiving a high radiation monitor alarm on the air ejector exhaust, SI actuation would shut these valves and depressing SI Reset would reopen them Review of circuitry for ventilation dampers, motors, and valves reported by VEPCO resulted in discovery of similar designs in ESF-actuated components at Surry Unit 1 and Beaver Valley; where it has been found that certain equipment would return *to its normal mode following the reset of an ESF signal; thus, protective actions of the affected systems could be compromised once the associated actuation signal is reset.
These two plants had Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation for the architect-engineer as did the North Anna Units.
The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation and VEPCO are preparing design changes to preclude safety-related equipment from moving out of its emergency mode upon reset of an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS).
This corrective action has been found acceptable by the NRC, in that, upon reset of.ESFAS, all affected equipment remains in its emergency mode.
The NRC has performed reviews of selected areas of ESFAS reset action on PWR facilities and, in some cases, this review was limited to examination of logic diagrams and procedures. It has been determined that logic diagrams may not adequately reflect as-built conditions; therefore, the requested review o.f drawings must be done at the schematic/elementary diagram level.
There have been several communications to liceHsees from the NRC on ESF reset actions.
For example, some of these communications have been in the form of Generic Letters issued in November, 1978 and October, 1979 on containment venting and purging during normal operation.
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins Nos. 79-05, OSA, 05B, 06A, 068 and 08 that addressed the events at TMI-2 and NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations.
However, each of these communications has addressed only a limited area of the ESF 1s.
We are requesting that the reviews undertaken for this Bulletin address all of the ESF 1s.
Actions To Be Taken By Licensees:
For all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses:
- 1.
Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its
. emergency mode.
I*-.
\\._,-*
. Date:
March 13, 1980 Page 3 of 3 2,
Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals.
Prov1de a schedule for the performance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.
- 3.
If any safety-related equipment does not remain fn its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.
- 4.
Report in writing within 90 days, the results of your review and include a list of all devices which respond as discussed in item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action.
This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time period specified above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation.
Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C.
20555.
For all power reactor facilities with a construction permit, this Bulletin is for information only and no written response is required.
Approved by GAO, 8180225 {R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Bulletin No.
79-27 79-28 79-018 80-01 80-02 80-03 80-04 79-018 80-05 ENCLOSURE 2 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Subject Date Issued Loss of Non-Class-1-E 11/30/79 Instrumentation and Con-trol Power System Bus During Operation Possible Malfunction 12/7/79 of NAMCO Model EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures Environmental Quali-1/14/80 fication of Class IE Equipment Operability of ADS Valve 1/14/80 Pneumatic Supply Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Supplied Equipment 1/21/80 Loss of Charcoal From 2/6/80 Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Tray Adsorber Cells Analysis of a PWR Main 2/8/80 Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Ad-dition Environmental Quali-2/29/80 fication of Class IE Equipment Vacuum Conditions 3/10/80 Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks IE Bulletin No. 80-06 Date: March 13, 1980 Page 1 of 1 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL)I and those nearing Licensing (for Action)
All Power Reactor Facilities with ~
Construction Permit (CP) (for Informa-tion).
All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactors with an OL except SEP Plants All BWRs with an OL All BWRs with an OL or CP A 11 Power Reactor
All Power Reactors with an OL except SEP Plants All PWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP