ML18081A464

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IE Insp Repts 50-272/79-22 & 50-311/79-33 on 790701-0804.No Noncompliance Noted.Areas Inspected:Logs & Records,Licensee Response to Previous Insp Items & Operator Training
ML18081A464
Person / Time
Site: Salem  
Issue date: 09/13/1979
From: Keimig R, Norrholm L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18081A463 List:
References
50-272-79-22, 50-311-79-33, NUDOCS 7911020218
Download: ML18081A464 (11)


See also: IR 05000272/1979022

Text

{

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

50'-272/79-22

Report No. 50-311/79-33

50-272

Docket No . _5;;..,;0;,_-...;;.3...:...11~--

DPR-70

Region I

c

L fcense* No *.

C:...:PP_.R._-=53~--

Priority _ __;;_;.;;; ____ _

Category _B;;....l:...__ ___ _....;.

Li c~ns*ee :.

Pub 1 i c Service Electric. ~nd Gas Company

  • 80 Park Pl ace *

Newark; New Jersey

Facility Name:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2

Inspection at:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

Inspe.ction conduct~ . July 1 -

Aug~st 4, 1979

Inspectors:, L.s~t-~ If.

~J. Norrholm, Resident Reactor Inspector

Approved by: ~~~jects

Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch

Inspection.summary:

date signed.

date signed

date signed

ef.fl?4ned

Inspections on July'l ~ Au~Ost 4~ 1979 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-

272/79-22 and .. 50-3lt/79-33

Unit 1 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations including:

tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of licensee events;

operator trainfog; IE Bu.lletiris; licensfog meetings; and followup on previous

inspection items.

The* inspections involved 43 inspector-hours by the NRC

resident inspectbrr~* ..

  • .

Unit 2 Areas Iri~p~cted: Routine inspections of plant preoperational testing

includfog: tours of the fa~ility; preoperational quality assurance; staff

trainj_~g_; __ !es.t program implementation; followup on previous inspection items;

and preparednei~ for issuance of an operating license.

The inspections involved

.fospector-.hours* by the NRC resident insp.ector.

'

sults: *one item of noncompliance was identified in one area linfraction Unit

- fai ure to post radiation areas in.accordance with 10 CFR 20.203 -Paragraph

3dl.

.

.

Region I Form*12

(Rev. April 77)

79110-20 2.t-4?

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  • '

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

S. Laaruna, Maintenance Engineer

A .. * Meyer, Site QA Engi.neer

E. MeyE!r; Project QA Engineer

H. Midura, Manager ~ Salem Generating Statiori

  • P. Moell~r~ Associate Engi~~er

W. *Reuther, Site QAD

  • ,

F: Schnarr, Station O~erating Engineer

R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager

J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer

J. Zupko, Chief Engineer

The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel

during the course of the inspections including management, clerical,

maintenance, operations, performance, quality assurance, and construc-

tion personnel.

Unit l

2.

Shift Logs and Operatin_g Records

a.

The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine

the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation

for a review of selected logs and records.

AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 9, April 23, 1979;

AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revision 6, February 22, 1979;

AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 3,

February 22, 1979;

Operations Directive Manual; and,

AP-15, Tagging Rules, Revision 0, April 13, 1979.

The inspector had no questions in this area.

b.

Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:

Control room log sheet entries are filled out and initialed;

3

Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialed;

Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient

detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status,

correction and restoration;

Log book reviews .are being conducted by the staff;

Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specifica-

tion requirements;

Incident reports detail no violation of Technical Specifica-

tion LCD or reporting requirements; and,

Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical

Specifications and the. procedures in 3.a above.

c.

The review included the following plant shift logs and operating

records as indicated and discussions with licensee personnel:

Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, July 11, 14, 15, 17, 21,

22, 25, 27-31, August 1-2;

. Log No. 3 - Control Console Reading Sheet, July 11, 14, 15,

17, 21~ 22, 25, 27-31, August 1-2;

Incident Reports #287 (4/25/79) - 326 (5/30/79), 328 (6/6/79).;

and, *

Night Orders, June 21 - July 27, 1979.

d.

During the review of plant Incident Reports, the inspector ques-

tioned several that had been evalu~ted as not reportable pursuant

to facility Technical Specifications.

Subsequent review by the

inspector of details not included in the incident reports confirmed

that the events were not considered reportable with the exception

of Incident Report No. 313.

This incident report describes a

loss of the lA Vital Bus on May 8, 1979 due to relay work.

This

resulted in loss of the only operating Residual Heat Removal Pump

for a brief period.

Technical Specification 3.9.8 requires at

least one residual heat removal loop to be in operation in Mode

6.

Action Statement 3.9.8 permits removal from service for one

hour out of every eight to perform core alterations near the

vessel hot legs.

Despite the fact that such core alterations

were not in progess, this statement was used as the basis for


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4

non-reportability.

Based on subsequent review, a licensee represen-

tative stated that the event will be reported as required.

The i-nspector had no further questions in this area.

3.

Plant lour

a.

During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observa~

tions and conducted multiple tours of: -

-(1) Contra 1. Room

(2) Relay Room

(3) . Containment

(4) Auxiliary Building

(5) Vital Switchgear Rooms

(6) Service Water Structure

(7) Turbine Building

(8) Yard Areas

(9)

Rad Waste Building

(iO) Electrical Penetration Area

(ll)* Circulating Water Structure

(12) Control Point

b.

The following determi.nations were made:

(1) Monitoring instrumentation.

The inspector verified that

selected instruments were functional and demonstrated para-

meters within Technical Specification limits.

(2) Valve Positions. The inspector verified that selected

valves were in the position or condition required by the

Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mode.

.5

(3) Radiation controls.

The inspector verified by observation

that control point procedures and posting requirements were

being followed.

(4)* Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to

plant housekeeping and fire hazards identified no notable

conditions.

  • (5) Fluid leaks.

No fluid leaks were observed which had not

been identified by station personnel with corrective action

initiated, as necessary.

(6) Piping vibration.

No excessive piping vibration was noted

during the plant tours.

(7) Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed

and no adverse conditions were noted.

(8) Equipment tag information.

The inspector selected ten items

  • designated to have red DO NOT OPERATE blocking tags attached

based on effective Tagging Requests filed in. the control

room.

The presence of legible tags and the corresponding

valve or breaker position were verified by the inspector

during plant tours.

(9) Control Room annunciators. Selected lit annunicators were

discussed with control room operators. to verify that the

reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if

required, was being taken.

(10)

By frequent observation through *the inspection, the inspector

verifi.ed that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR

50.54(k) and the Technical Specifications were being met.

In addition, the inspector observed that frequent tours were

made by shift supervision.

c.

The following acceptance criteria were used for the above items.

(1) Technical Specificati.ons

(2) Operations Directives Manual

(3) Inspector Judgement

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d.

The following specific observations were made by the inspector and

identified promptly to station management ..

(l) .During the course of inspection tours, the inspector noted.

several instances of failure to post radiation radiation areas

in accordance with 10 CFR 20.203.

The existence of radiation

levels to the whole body in the areas described was confirmed

by use of a calibrated NRC detector and verified by reference

to *existing licensee*. surveys.

The following conditions were

  • noted:

On July 10, 1979, the piping in front of the Spent Fuel

Deminerali.zer (Auxiliary Building, elevation 100 1 ) was

posted as a High Radiation Area.

No posting was provided

to. delineate the surrounding.Radiation *Area.

On July 10, 1979, the vicinity of a hose carrying radioactive

waste located on elevation 64 1 in the Auxiliary Building

was posted from both directions as a Radiation Area.

However, entry to the level from the stai.rwell placed a

person inside the area with no posted sign to so indicate .

  • On August 1, 1979, a spot in the safety injection suction

piping to valves lSJl and 1SJ2 was recorded at 8R/hr on

co-ntact and 55 mrem/hr at waist level *standing under it.

The area was not posted as a Radiation Area to persons

approaching the area from the Auxiliary Building hallway

(the normal access to the area).

In aggregate, the above items constitute noncompliance with lO

CFR Part 20.203 (272/79-22-01).

(2)

On July 23, 1979, the inspector observed that RM-14 Frisker No.

PD-1068 was in use at a containment exit step-off pad.

The

instrument carried a label indiGating calibration on January

12, 1979 and due on July 12, 1979.

The unit was immediately

removed from service. Subsequent review failed to show that

the instrument had been included in the Inspection Order system

which would have provided a recall reminder to calibrate the

device.

This item is unresolved pending further review to

assess the completeness of the Inspection Order file relative

to portable radiation instruments (272/79-22-02).

e.

On June .27, 1979, high radiation levels were experienced in the

Auxiliary Building due to foreign material in the Refueling Water

Storage Tank suction piping.

It was later determined that the

material consisted of mixed bed resin with .high specific activity .

The most likely source of the resin was identified as the Spent Fuel

,*

Unit 2

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Demineralizer.

Initial -attempts to remove the resin from the 20 11

line by recirculating via vent and drain connections to a portable

demineralizer were ineffective in significantly reducing radiation

levels.

Toward the end of July, operations commenced to place a

diver in the.RWST to insert a reverse-thrusting hydrolaser lance

into the ~ipe to wash the resin back to a suction hose which then

circulated to the portable demineralizer.

This operation removed

essentially all the resin by July 30, 1979.

During the course of

this cleanup, a diver was slightly injured when he lost control of

the nozzle while in the tank.

The injury resulted only in minor.

abrasions and no contamination.

Radiation dose to the divers involved

were minimal, amounting to approximately 20 mrem per dive.

\\

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The inspector had no further questions relative to the above.

4.

Plant Tour

a.

The inspector conducted periodic tours of all accessible areas in

the plant.

During these tours, the following specific items were

evaluated:

(1) Hot Work.

Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures

used.

(2)

Fi re Equ-i pment.

Operabi 1 i ty and evidence of periodic i nspec-

t ion of fire suppression equipment.

(3) Housekeeping.

Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance

of required cleanness levels in systems under or following

testing.

(4) Equipment Preservation.

Maintenance of special preservative

measures for installed equipment as applicable.

(5) Component Tagging.

Implementation and observance_ of equipment

tagging for safety or equipment protection.

(6) Maintenance.

Corrective maintenance in accordance with esta-

blished procedures.

(7) Instrumentation. Adequate protection for installed instrumen-

tation.

(8) Cable Pulling.

Adequate measures taken to protect cable from

damage while being pulled .

-.*

(9) . Communication.

Effectiveness of public address system in all

(10)

(11)

areas of the site.

Equ,ipment Controls.

Effectiveness of juri sdicational controls

in precluding unauthorized work on systems in test or which

have been tested.

Logs.

Completeness of logs maintained and resolution of identified

problems.

  • *

{12} Foreign Material Exclusion. Maintenance of controls to assure

systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not re-opened

to admit. foreign material.

(13) Se_curity.

Implementation of security provisions.

Particular

attention to maintenance of the Unit l protected area boundary.

(14) Testing. Spot-checks of testing in progress were made.

b.

During plant tours, the inspector noted continuing problems with the

continuity of monthly fire extinguisher and hose station inspections.

Discussions with licensee personnel indicate that responsibility has

been clearly defined to rest with the Operating Department for these

inspections and timely inspection program was being established.

This area will be reviewed during the next inspection period to

ensure that effective corrective action has been taken to provide

adequate and timely surveillance of fire suppression equipment.

5.

Peroperational Testing Qualit>' Assurance

The unit is substantially ready for core load, with most systems turned

over and preoperational testing essentially complete.

Quality activities

are primarily focused on verification of construction open item resolution,

completion of Engineering Change Notices with attendant retests, and,

general field surveillance to verify the integrity of tested and turned

over systems.

No additional Quality Control or Quality Assurance personnel have been

assigned since the previous inspection ~f this area.

The inspector reviewed the following field surveillance reports:

80653 (1/11/79) through 80659 (7/17/79)

80661 (7/26/79)

Identified deficiencies are resolved immediately or documented in.Deficiency

Reports to be tracked to resolution .

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

9

6.

Preoperational Test Program Implementation Controls

To review the implementation of preoperations testing controls, the

inspector reviewed jurisdictional controls maintained in systems which

had undergone turnover, including field observations of jurisdictional

tagging and verification that all parties at the site respected juris-

dicatfonal boundaries such that post-turnover and post-test status remained*

valid.

.

.

.

.

'

.

.

Additional inspection was made *to verify that a schedule of preopera-

tional testing was maintained, and that preventive maintenance of turned-over

  • systems is specified and accomplished, and that corrective maintenance is

accomplished by qualified persons using approved procedures.

Startup Manual Implementation Instruction No. 22 (SMII.-22), Post Preopera-

tional Testing Turnover (POTT) System Maintenance, Rev. 1, outlines

procedures for preventive maintenance on tested equipment.

Production

Department Special Directive #7, dated June 12, 1979, established an

equipment log to record maintenance of rotating equipment.

The inspector

reviewed data for June 1979 and had no questions.

Effective July 2, 1979, maintenance of rotating equipment in Unit 2 was

transferred to UE&C by agreement between the Production and Engineering

and Construction Departments. *Data to verify that maintenance had been

accomplished during July were not available prior to the conclusion of

this inspection period. This area will be reviewed by the inspector

during a subsequent inspection (311/79-33-01).

7.

Operating Staff Training

Personnel currently assigned to the performance, maintenance, and operating

departments in Unit l will assume parallel responsibilities in Unit 2

when the plant becomes operational.

To confirm preparation for operation of Unit 2, the inspector attended

training sessions conducted in the areas of radiation protection and

emergency plan implementation.

Since the operating and maintenance

staffs for Unit 2 will include the personnel currently employed at Unit l

in the Electric Production Department, the training consists principally

of refresher training.

The sessions observed by the inspector included a requalification in the

basic radiation protection orientation (RP-1) and a general employee

  • training review of emergency plan implementation procedures, as well as

plant simulator training for station operating personnel.

The latter

training was conducted at the Indian Point simulator .

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The inspector had no questions relative to the quality for content of the

training.

Lesson plan goals were achieved and a representative examination

given at the conclusion of the RP-1 and emergency plan training.

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.

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Administrative Procedure 24 (AP-24), Revision 2 was issued on November

14, 1978 and modified the RP-1 requalification requirement to be conducted

annually instead of every two years. The inspector noted that a number

of persons had not completed this training within one year but were still

provided access to the controlled area and issued TLD's.

A licensee

representative stated that all persons who hold activl:! TLD's will have

received RP-1 requalification within one year as of November 30, 1979.

This item is* unresolVed (272/79-22-03).

8.

Operational Readiness

10 CFR 50.57 states that the issuance of an operating license is, in

part, contingent upon a finding that construction of the facility has

been substantially completed, in conformity with the construction permit

and the application, as amended, the provisfon*of the Act, and the rules

and regulations or the Commission.

In order to provide a basis for this finding, the inspector is conducting

a continuing review of licensee readiness to operate the facility.

This

review includes, but is not limited to, the following areas:

Completion of the NRC inspection program to assess construction,

testing and operational preparedness. *

Status of facility operating procedures and personnel training.

Status of all enforcement items and unresolved matters.

Status of the preoperational test program.

Status of construction activities.

Proposed facility Technical Specifications.

Review of licensee outstanding items, particularly those identifi~d

for completion or resolution after core load.

Implementation of corrective measures for Unit 2 as a result of

items identified in Unit 1 from Reportable Occurrences, inspection

findings, and IE Bulletin and Circulars.

Operational safety concerns arising from the above reviews will be promptly

identified to facility management for resolution prior to the inspector

reaching a finding of operational readiness.

No specific safety concerns

have been identified to date.

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Site

9.

IE Bulletin and Circular Followup

a.

The IE Bulletin discussed below was reviewed to verify that:

Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the

blj] let.j n to appropriate ons i te management repres.entat i ves.

.

.

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.

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.

-- * Information discussed in the licensee's reply was supported by

facility records or by visual examination of the facility.

Corrective action taken was effected as described in the reply.

The licensee's reply was prompt and within the time period

described in the bulletin.

The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation

and review of items discussed in the details below.

b.

By correspondence dated May 3, 1979, the licensee responded to lE

Bulletin 79-07, Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping.

NRC review of the proposed sampling recalculation to validate the

stress_es concluded in the original calculations is continuing.

Ourin~ the course of this i~spection, the inspector conducted a

walk-through of selected portions of the safety injection and residual

heat removal systems inside Unit l containment to verify that the

inputs to the recalculation model represented the

11as-built

11 config-

uration fo the piping systems being re-evaluated.

No discrepancies relative to piping orientation or support type and

location were identified in the systems reviewed.

This inspection

will continue on other selected piping systems.

The inspector noted that in some cases, involving vertical branch

piping, insulation weight was not considered in the calculation.

This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection to evaluate

the impact on the vilidity of the calculation (272/79-22-04).

10.

Unresolved Items

Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability

are considered unresolved.

Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs

3 and 7 of this report.

11.

Exit Interview

At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were

held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and

findings.