ML18078A515
| ML18078A515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1978 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812200072 | |
| Download: ML18078A515 (11) | |
Text
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- ,._, P'ublic Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 2011430-7000 December 18, 1978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. Olan D. Parr, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch 3 Division of Project Management Gentlemen:
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO. 2 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING DOCKET NO.
50-311 STATION Public Service Electric and Gas Company hereby transmits 40 copies of its responses to your requests for additional in-formation numbered 1.48, 5.96, 5.110 and 14.28.
The information contained herein will be ~ncorporated into the Salem FSAR in an amendment to our application.
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to con-tact us.
Enclosure The Energy Peopi'e General Manager -
Licensing and Environment Engineering and Construction 95-2001 (400M) 9-77
..a. *.*
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 December 18, 1978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. c.
20555 Attention:
Gentlemen:
Mr. Olan D. Parr, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch 3 Division of Project Management RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO. 2 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO~
50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company hereby transmits 40 copies of its responses to your requests for additional in-formation numbered 1.48, 5.96, 5.110 and 14.28.
The information contained herein will be incorporated into the Salem FSAR in an amendment to our application.
Should you have... any questions, please do not hesitate to con-tact us.
Enclosure The Energy People r1;;;;r*
R. L. Mittl General Manager -
Licensing and Environment Engineering and Construction 95-2001 (400M) 9-77
QOESTION 1.48 Since Appendix C of the FSAR addresses those structures, sys-tems, and components that are seismic category I. per Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Class I of FSAR) and therefore under the control of The QA program, it is requested that reference to this Appendix C be provided in the operational QA program, Section D.5.2.
However, we note that the listing of Appendix C does not clearly identify all items which we believe will be within the scope of your QA program.
Thus, consideration should be given to iden-tify and include the following items under the control of the QA program:
Sampling systems piping to outermost containment isolation valve.
Main Steam Systems to isolation valve.
Turbine control system.
Feedwater system to outermost containment isolation valve.
Leak detection system.
Combustible gas control system.
Spent fuel handling system.
Service water system.
Diesel generator fuel oil, lubricating oil, starting, and
'a~u~xi 1 i a_r_y_ s_y_s_tems. ______ ------------------ --- - ------- -.--- -
Instrumentation and control system required for safe shut-down including safety-related instrumentation.
Control and diesel generator buildings.
Electrical cable tunnels (Class lE system).
Diesel fuel storage and day tanks.
ANSWER The program described in FSAR S~ction D.5.2 includes ~11 safety related aspects of the plant design, which were generally cate-gorized in Appendix C of the FSAR.
Although Appendix C does not detail all specific safety related systems and components, other Ql.48-1 P78 62 42
y documents exist which have been prepared for use in the OPQA program.
The items listed in this question have been incorporated in FSAR Appendix c, with the following exceptions:
- 1.
Turbine Control System
- 2.
Leak Detection System These systems are not related to the safe shutdown of the unit and, therefore, are not under the control of the QA program.
Ql.48-2 P78 62 27
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I
- e.
- f.
- g.
- h.
i.
J *
- k.
- 1.
Engineered Safety Features Emergency Core Cooling System (including Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal Pumps, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Accumulators, Boron Injection Tank, Residual Heat Exchangers, connecting piping and valving)
Containment Spray System (including Spray Pumps, Spray Headers, Spray Additive Tank and connecting piping and valving)
Containment Ventilation System (including fan coolers, distribution ducts, dampers, HEPA filters and moisture separators Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (supply and exhaust units)
Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System (exhaust units)
Auxiliary Feed Water Storage Tanks Residual Heat Removal System Component Cooling System Fuel Transfer Tube Emergency Power Supply Systems Diesel Generators and associated fuel oil lubricating oil, starting auxiliary systems, fuel storage and day tanks Diesel Generator Area Ventilation System DC Power Supply System Power distribution lines to equipment required for emergency transformers and switchgear supplying the Engineered Safety Features Control Boards Motor Control Centers SNGS-FSAR Units 1 & 2 C.2-2 Amendment P78 62 45
_)
m; Control equipment, facilities and lines as required for the above items
- n.
Waste Disposal Systems Gas Decay Tanks Compressors
- o.
Containment Polar Crane
- p.
Auxiliary Feedwater and Service Water Systems (portions)
- q.
Sampling System Piping (to outermost containment isolation valve
- r.
Main Steam System (to isolation valve)
- s.
Feedwater System (to outermost containment isolation valve)
- t.
Combustible Gas Control System (partial)
- u.
Fuel Handling System
- v.
Intrumentation and Control Systems required for safe shutdown, including safety-related instrumentation
- w.
Electrical cable tunnels The above Class I systems, structures and components are within the scope of the QA program as identified in Section D.5.2.
SNGS-FSAR Units 1 & 2 C.2-2a Amendment P78 62 46
QUESTION 5.96 Provide the criteria used for the selection of the number of lumped masses.
ANSWER Refer to the response to Question 5.25.
The containment structures at the Salem station used a finite element model for the seismic analysis.
A total of 190 elements were used in discretizing the structure.
The Auxiliary Building and Fuel Handling Building used the lumped mass models for the seismic analysis.
The points of mass concentration of these buildings are most apparently at the roof, floor and foundations.
Heavy equipment and sub-systems in the buildings are rigidly attached to the floors.
Therefore, the masses of the analytical models were logically lumped at these levels.
The mass ratios of subsystems to the supporting structures are less than 0.1 and, therefore, the subsystems are not included in the structural model.
Based on the above, the Salem design is in compliance with the modeling criteria defined in Section 3.12 of the SRP.
Q5.96-l P78 72 59
J
.QUESTION 5.110 In request for additional information 5.100 we asked that you state if the fundamental frequencies of the key subsystems are controlled to be either greater than twice or less than one-half the dominant frequencies of their supporting system.
Your response stated that the fundamental frequencies of the key subsystems were considered in relation to the dominant f requen-c ies of their supporting systems.
However, you did not state if the above criteria were used to accomplish the adequate design of the key subsystems or some-other criteria that may be proven to be just as adequate.
Provide a more detailed response to this concern.
ANSWER The fundamental frequencies of key subsystems were considered in relation to the dominant frequencies of their supporting systems.
Elimination of resonance was one of the principles of design.
Various methods for seismic qualification were employed for key subsystems.
In most cases, the key subsystems were considered to be very flexible and were analyzed/tested as a decoupled system from the supporting system.
Refer also to the response to Question 5.38 which addresses the approach to avoid the predominant input frequencies of components to earthquake inputs.
Refer also to the responses to Questions 4.12, 5.35, 5.37, 7.18 and 7.29.
The Reactor Coolant System Primary Loop Model, which includes the reactor vessel, a steam generator, a reactor coolant pump, connected piping and the pressurizer model and supports, was analyzed by using time-dependent accelerations and displace-ments which were obtained from the time-history analysis of the containment structure (Conrad Associates -
"Containment Seis-mic Analysis -
Volume I).
These appropriate accelerations and Q5.110-l P78 138 25
J c~riesponding displacements were applied as a function of time to the seven support points of the primary loop model and to the three support points of the pressurizer model.
The above analysis was performed by Conrad Associates and was submitted under the title "Seismic Analysis of Reactor Coolant System -
Volume II."
All other subsystems, with the exception of the above, were analyzed/tested as a decoupled system from the supporting system, because the mass ratio of the subsystem to that of the support-ing system is less than 1%.
QS.110-2 P78 138 26
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QUESTION l4.28 You state in Section l4.5.l.6 that "In order to preclude unde-sirable effects due to steam flooding.
.", as a result of a steam line break backdraft-type dampers are used to prevent steam flow into adjacent vital areas either through supply or exhaust ducting.
Provide the following information:
- a.
Provide a detailed description including drawings on how the backdraft-type dampers operate to prevent steam from entering vital areas.
- b.
Assuming a steam line break and a failure of any one of the backdraft-type dampers to close, show that the vital equipment and systems that were being protected can operate in the steam environment so that the plant can be brought to a safe cold shutdown condition.
- c.
Assuming a steam line break such that the steam flow is insufficient to shut the backdraft-type dampers, show that the vital equipment and systems in all the protected areas can operate in the steam environment so that the plant can be brought to a safe cold shutdown.
ANSWER A.
The backdraft dampers, which isolate and/or direct the postulated steam flow to an acceptable area, are of the hinged parallel blade design with interconnecting linkage to enable the blades to operate in unison.
Gasketing is provided along the blade edges to limit blade leakage to the design limits.
The attached drawing shows the typical design detail and control logic for the backdraft damper operation.
Normal operation essentially consists of a differential pressure transmitter actuating a solenoid valve that provides an air supply to operate the damper mechanism.
Fail-safe logic is designed into the components by means of an internal spring in the damper's drive mechanism which makes the damper go to the fail-safe position should there be a loss of air supply.
B.
The backdraft dampers are considered an integral part of the equipment and hardware provided to protect against the unlikely consequences of the postulated Ql4. 28-l P78 65 ll
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- .~
break in the piping systems.
As such, the dampers are designed to the existing Seismic Class I criteria for all the plant ventilation dampers which included actual prototype shake table testing.
In addition to the dampers, equipment such as pipe encapsulation sleeves, pipe restraints, and impingement baffles were also employed where the preferred physical separation approach was not feasible in implementing regulatory criteria.
For the dampers in question and because there is no additional space available to install a third level of protection against the postulated event(s), a periodic inspection testing program will be developed and used to assure continuous functionality of the dampers.
C.
Pressure differential transmitters have been provided with trip points to assure a safe minimum trip point.
Steam leakage causing conditions below the trip points is within the ventilation system capacity so as to provide conditions for a safe cold shutdown should it be required*
in the event of a small steam leak.
Ql4. 28-2 P78 65 ll