Text

FEMA - After Action Report/Improvement Plan Exercise Date December 5-6, 2017, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program for Waterford, Unit 3
	ML18078A333
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	03/06/2018
From:	; US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML18078A333 (46)
	v • d • e

-

~

1*

I I

I 11 I

After Action Report/

I Improvement Plan I I Exercise Date - December 5-6, 201 7 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program I

EMA Published March 6, 2018 I

I I

I After Action Report/Improvement Plan Published March 6, 2018 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

..*.......*.....*....*.....*.....................*.................*...*............*....**........*..... 13 SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW..*.....*.*.*....*..........*.....*......................*....*............*..*..*..*...*. 14 1.1 Exercise Details..................................................................................................................... 14 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership..................................................................................... 14 1.3 Participating Organizations.................................................................................................. 15 SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN

SUMMARY

............................................................................. 17 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design................................................................................................. 17 2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities..................................................................... 17 2.3 Scenario Summary................................................................................................................ 17 SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES................................................................................. 18 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results............................................................................................ 18 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.............................................................................. 18 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries............................................................................................. 20 3.3.1 State Jurisdictions....................................................................................................................... 20 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions....................................................................................................................... 21 3.3.3 Private Jurisdictions................................................................................................................... 21 SECTION 4: CONCLUSION..................................................................................................... 22 APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE.......................................................................................... 23 APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS................................................... 24 APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................................................................... 26 APPENDIX E: EXERCISE PLAN................................................................................................ 29 11

I I

I This page is intentionally blank.

I I

I Ii I

I I

1.

I I

I 12

I I

'I

,I I

I I

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On December 5 - 6, 2017, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plume Phase and Ingestion Pathway Exercise was conducted at the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (Waterford

3) located near Taft, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) Region VI Office evaluated the exercise. The purpose was to assess the level of preparedness of state and local responders to react to a radiological emergency at Waterford 3. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the implementation of state and local REP plans and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was a Hostile Action Based Exercise conducted on June 24, 2015. The first qualifying exercise to satisfy FEMA rule 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 350 requirements for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing to operate the facility was conducted on February 8, 1984. There have been seventeen evaluated exercises plus numerous drills conducted since 1984.

FEMA Region VI wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the State of Louisiana, St. Charles Parish, St. John the Baptist Parish, and surrounding jurisdictions who participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants was evident during this exercise.

This report includes the identification of any exercise findings and recommendations for corrective action where appropriate. All state and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the emergency response plans and procedures and properly implemented them. As a result of the exercise, there were no Level 1 Findings or Level 2 Findings observed. One Plan Issue (Issue Number: 70-17-1 cl-P-1) was identified during the exercise and has been resolved.

13

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Type of Exercise Plume and Ingestion Pathway Exercise Date December 5-6, 201 7 Program Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Scenario Type Radiological Emergency 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership Nan Williams RAC Chair FEMA Region VI 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, TX 76266 (940) 898-5398 nan.calhoun@fema.dhs.gov Denise Bordelon Technological Hazards Branch Chief FEMA Region VI 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, TX 76209 (940) 383-7387 denise. bordelon@fema.dhs.gov Linda Gee Federal Planning Team Lead FEMA Region VI 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, TX 76266 14 I

I I

I

1 I

I I

(972) 948-1840 linda.gee@fema.dhs.gov Toni Booker State Planning Team Lead Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 602 N. Fifth Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802 (225) 219-3627 toni.booker@la.gov John Signorelli Manager, Emergency Preparedness Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station 172265 River Road Killona, LA 70057 (504) 739-6032 jsigno l @entergy.com 1.3 Participating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the exercise:

State Jurisdictions State of Louisiana \\ Governor's Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness State of Louisiana I Army National Guard State of Louisiana \\ Department of Agriculture and Forestry State of Louisiana I Department of Children & Family Services State of Louisiana I Department of Corrections State of Louisiana I Department of Environmental Quality State of Louisiana I Department of Health State of Louisiana \\ Department of Transportation & Development State of Louisiana \\ Department of Veteran Affairs State of Louisiana \\ Department of Wildlife & Fisheries State of Louisiana I Office of State Fire Marshall State of Louisiana I State Police State of Louisiana\\ Louisiana State University\\ College of Agriculture Risk Jurisdictions St. Charles Parish St. Charles Parish I Emergency Medical Services St. Charles Parish \\ Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness St. Charles Parish \\ Fire Services St. Charles Parish \\ Hospital St. Charles Parish\\ Department of Planning and Zoning 15

St. Charles Parish I President St. Charles Parish I School Board St. Charles Parish I Public Works and Waste Water St. Charles Parish I Sheriffs Office St. John Parish St. John Parish I 9-1-1 Communications Center St. John Parish I Chief Administrative Assistant St. John Parish I Office of Fire Services St. John Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness St. John Parish I Public Works & Utilities St. John Parish I School Board St. John Parish I Sheriffs Office St. John Parish I Transportation Department St. John Parish I Utilities Department Support Jurisdictions Ascension Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness Assumption Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness City of New Orleans I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness East Baton Rouge Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness Lafourche Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness St. Bernard Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness St. Helena Parish I Police Jury St. James Parish I Office of Emergency Preparedness St. John Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness Tangipahoa Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness Terrebonne Parish I Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness Private Organizations American Nuclear Insurers American Radiation Services International, LLC Entergy MYU Helicopters Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station WWL 870AM Radio Station Federal Organizations Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Radiological Monitoring & Assessment Center U. S. Army Reserves U. S. Department of Agriculture U. S. Department of Energy I Radiological Assistance Program U. S. Department of Homeland Security I Federal Emergency Management Agency U. S. Environmental Protection Agency U. S. Food and Drug Administration U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 16 I

I I

I

I I

I SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN

SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design FEMA Region VI Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) staff evaluated an exercise on December 5 - 6, 2017 to assess the capabilities of state and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations during a simulated radiological emergency.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities Exercise objectives and identified Capabilities/REP Criteria selected to be exercised are discussed in the Exercise Plan, Appendix E.

2.3 Scenario Summary The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of participants to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of state and local governments in the 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) and the 50 mile ingestion planning zone (IPZ) surrounding the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station. The exercise scenario provided for the evaluation of St. John the Baptist Parish, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to make protective action decisions for the public and emergency workers.

17

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the December 5 - 6, 2017 exercise evaluation to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of local governments within the 10-mile emergency planning zone and post plume response within the 50 mile ingestion planning zone (IPZ) surrounding the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on its demonstration of criteria delineated in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the Federal Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual (January 2016). Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the extent of play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix E of this report.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 3.1, on the following page, presents the status of all exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (no Level 1 or Level 2 Findings assessed and no unresolved Findings from prior exercises) 1 - Level 1 Finding 2 - Level 2 Finding P - Plan Issue N - Not Demonstrated 18 I

I I

1 I

I

I I

I Tables 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation Table 3.lc - Exercise Evaluation - Criteria Met Evaluation Areas Demonstrated Criteria ARS Lab le i, 3al, 4c l

!a l, lei, Id !, le i GOHSEP EOC 2a l, 2bl, 2b2 GOHSEP JIC Ja l, Id!, lei, Sb!

LDEQ HQ

!a l, lei, !di, le i LDEQ EOF Ja l, lei, ld l, le i 2a l, 2bl, 2dl, 2el 3a l, 3el, 3e2 4a2 LDEQ Field Monitoring Team # 1 Id!, lei, 3a l, 4a2, 4a3, 4bl LDEQ Field Monitoring Team #2

!di, lei, 3al, 4a2, 4a3, 4b l St. Charles Parish School Board 3a l 3c2 St. John Parish School Board 3al, 3c2 St. Charles Parish EOC & Tl ACP Ja l, le i, ld l, lei 2a l, 2b2, 2cl, 2el 3a l,3bl, 3cl, 3d l, 3d2, 3fl Sa l, Sa3, Sb !

St. John Parish EOC & T/ACP Ja l, lei, ld l, lei 2al, 2b2, 2c l, 2el 3a l,3bl, 3c l, 3dl, 3d2, 3fl Sa l, Sa3, Sa4, Sbl WWL Sal Note: This table does not include findings or plans issues. Findings and Plan Issues are addressed in the narrative for each location.

19

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 3.3.1 State Jurisdictions In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the State jurisdiction is as follows:

a.

LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

b. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

c.

PLAN ISSUES:

Location:

Issue Number:

Condition:

Possible Cause:

Reference:

Effect:

Resolution:

State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 70-17-lcl-P-1 Checklists were not updated to account for the use of the Inform system for the Communications Group. In addition, revisions to Protective Action Recommendations (P ARs) from Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ),

provided separately from the Utility, were delayed in being provided to the Parishes due to lack of instruction in procedures/checklists on how to handle the communication of separate PAR.

Plans and procedures do not account for the process of communicating PARs from LDEQ that are different from the PAR provided by the utility.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a,b;A.3; C.4, 6; State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan Delay in providing key information for consideration in making a Protective Action Decision by the risk Parishes could lead to untimely protective actions decisions.

Operations Section checklists and procedures have been updated to verify the P ARs from LDEQ and the utility. Once LDEQ provides their recommendation, this will be disseminated to the parishes utilizing WebEOC. After the Parishes have received the recommended P ARs, a conference call will be initiated between the Parishes and the State EOC for concurrence by the Parishes.

20 I

I I

II I

' ii I

I I

GOHSEP provided an update to the State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan and procedures for Waterford 3, River Bend Station, and Grand Gulf Nuclear Station to resolve and close out Plan Issue: 70-16-lcl-P-1.

d. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Risk jurisdiction is as follows:

a. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

b. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

c.

PLAN ISSUES: NONE

d. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE 3.3.3 Private Jurisdictions In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for the Private jurisdiction is as follows:

a. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

b. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

c.

PLAN ISSUES: NONE

d. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: NONE 21

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION Based on the results of the exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Louisiana and the affected local jurisdiction are deemed adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, 44 CFR Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Louisiana site-specific to Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station will remain in effect.

22 I

I I

11 I

I I

I APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE DATE: 2017-12-05, SITE: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, LA

~

u <

Emergency Classification Level or

]

~

Event o<l 8

u u

Ci 0

0 Ul g

Ul Ci 0

~

a)

.c

c:

Ul

)

I.LI c,i Ci Ci

..c::

a) 5 Ul Ul u

u E

Ci Ci

~

f,':

c.:,

....J

....J cii Unusual Event NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Alert 0809 0816 08 16 0825 0817 08 16 Site Area Emergency 0948 0957 0957 0957 0958 0957 General Emergency 1037 1050 1050 1055 1052 1050 Simulated Rad. Release Started NIA 1050 1050 1055 1000 1050 Simulated Rad. Release Terminated Facility Declared Operational 0834 0955 0952 0844 Declaration of State of Emergency 1025 1025 1025 1044 Exercise Terminated 1335 1335 1312 1025 K)844 Early Precautionary Actions:

NIA NIA IN/A 1052 INone I st Protective Action Decision:

Evac. PRAs: Al, Bl,Cl,Dl,Al, Cl; 1130/1137 1121 /

Expanded PRAs: A3, A4 11 37 I st Siren Activation 11 36 1136 I st EAS or EBS Message 11 42 1142 2nd Protective Action Decision:

1221 SJB Expanded PRA: Bl, Dl 2nd Siren Activation 1333 1333 2nd EAS or EBS Message 1338 1338 3rd Protective Action Decision:

3rd Siren Activation 3rd EAS or EBS Message 4th Protective Action Decision:

4th Siren Activation 4th EAS or EBS Message 5th Protective Action Decision:

5th Siren Activation 5th EAS or EBS Message Kl Administration Decision:

1338 1222 23 u

C:

0 0

Ul

.E

<J) f/)

.c 0

0..

a co

~

a)

.9 c,i <

C:

..c::

~

0

....J u5

~

IN/A NIA Kl818 1000 1054 11 37 1054 0839 1020 0918 1023 1121 /

1137 1136 11 37 1142 1142 NIA 1333 1338 1221

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS DATE: 2017-12-05, SITE: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station LA LOCATION TEAM LEADER AGENCY American Radiation Service, International John Fill FEMA Headquarters EAS Radio Station WWL Christopher Bellone FEMA Headquarters Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality EOF Nan Williams FEMA Region VI Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Field Korkean Dulgerian FEMA Region II Monitoring Team One Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Field Paul Ward FEMA Headquarters Monitoring Team Two Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Scott Flowerday FEMA Region VI Headquarters Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center Brad DeKorte FEMA Region VI St Charles Parish School Board Taneeka Hollins FEMA Region I St. Charles Parish Emergency Operations Center Elsa Lopez FEMA Region VI St. John the Baptist Parish Emergency Operations David Ortman FEMA Region V Center St. John the Baptist Parish School Board Taneeka Hollins FEMA Region I GOHSEP Joint Information Center John Rice FEMA Region l 24 I

I I

I

I I

EXERCISE EVALUATION TEAM DATE: 2017-12-05, SITE: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station LA LOCATION EVALUATOR AGENCY American Radiation Services, International John Fill FEMA Headquarters EAS Radio Station WWL Christopher Bellone FEMA Headquarters Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Nan Calhoun FEMA Region VI EOF Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Timothy Pflieger FEMA Region VI EOF Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Korkean Dulgerian FEMA Region II Field Monitoring Team One Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Paul Ward FEMA Headquarters Field Monitoring Team Two Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Scott Flowerday FEMA Region VI Headquarters Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center Brad DeKorte FEMA Region VI St Charles Parish School Board Taneeka Hollins FEMA Region I St. Charles Parish Emergency Operations Center Lisa Rink FEMA Headquarters St. Charles Parish Emergency Operations Center Brian Hasemann FEMA Region II St. Charles Parish Emergency Operations Center Elsa Lopez FEMA Region VI St. Charles Parish Emergency Operations Center Jimmy Wortham USDA St. John the Baptist Parish Emergency Operations David Ortman FEMA Region V Center St. John the Baptist Parish Emergency Operations Barbara Thomas FEMA Region I Center St. John the Baptist Parish Emergency Operations Linda Gee FEMA Region VI Center St. John the Baptist Parish Emergency Operations Timothy Pflieger FEMA Region VI Center St. John the Baptist Parish Emergency Operations Scott Hallett FEMA Headquarters Center St. John the Baptist Parish School Board Taneeka Hollins FEMA Region 1 Waterford 3 Joint Information Center John Rice FEMA Region 1 Waterford 3 Joint Information Center Taneeka Hollins FEMA Region 1 25

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Description AAC Accident Assessment Coordinator AAC Accident Assessment Coordinator ADAC Assistant Dose Assessment Coordinator ANI American Nuclear Insurers ARCA Areas Requiring Corrective Action A-Team Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health cc Communications Center CDE Committed Dose Equivalent DAC Dose Assessment Coordinator DEQ Department of Environmental Quality DIL derived intervention level DOE RAP United States Department of Energy RAP Team 2 DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter DRL derived response level EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMD Emergency Management Director EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency EPD Electronic Personal Dosimeter EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ESF Emergency Support Functions EW Emergency Worker FDA United States Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FMT Field Monitoring Team FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center FST Field Sampling Team FTC Field Team Coordinator GE General Emergency GOHSEP Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security &

Emergency Preparedness GPS Global Positioning System RAB Hostile Action Based HOO LDEQ Headquarters Operations Officer RPG High Purity Germanium ICP Incident Command Post IPZ Ingestion Pathway Zone JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide LDAF Louisiana Department of Agriculture & Forestry LDEQ Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality LDH Louisiana Department of Health 26 I

I I

Acronym LDOTD LDWF LSP LSU LWIN MDA mg MHz mR mRem NIST NRC ORO OSL PAD PAG PAR PCi PCi/g PDAFN PIO PPE PRD PRA R

RACES REP RO SAE SCP SEOFL SEL SEOC SHO SJB SRD sv T/ACP TEDE TLD UCG UMR uRem URI Description Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Louisiana State Police Louisiana State University I Agricultural Extension Services Louisiana Wireless Information Network Minimum Detectable Activity milligrams Megahertz milliroentgen/millirem millirem National Institute of Standards Technology Nuclear Regulatory Commission Off-site Response Organizations Optically Stimulated Luminescent Protective Action Decision Protective Action Guide Protective Action Recommendation Pico curies Picocuries Per Gram Persons with Disabilities & Access/Functional Needs Public Information Officer Personal Protective Equipment permandent reading dosimeters Protective Response Areas roentgen Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Officer Site Area Emergency St. Charles Parish LDEQ Senior Operations Facility Liaison Senior EOF Liaison State Emergency Operations Center Louisiana State Health Official St. John the Baptist Parish Self Reading Dosimeter Sievert Traffic/ Access Control Points Total Effective Dose Equivalent Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Unified Command Group Unit Manning Roster One Millionth of a Roentgen Unified RASCAL Interface 27

Acronym USDA VHF Waterford 3 Description United States Department of Agriculture Very High Frequency Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station 28 I

I I

I 1

I I

11 I

I I

I APPENDIX E: EXERCISE PLAN As submitted by the State of Louisiana (on following pages) the Exercise Plan consists of the Approved Exercise Extent of Play Agreement and the exercise narrative summary. These documents are as submitted by the state (edited only for formatting).

Waterford 3 Extent of Play 2017 Revision 5 11/2017 29

Overview of Ingestion Pathway Exercise The beginning of the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Ingestion Pathway Exercise (IPX) will consist of the Plume or Emergency Phase of the exercise conducted on December, 5, 2017, Day 1. The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality teams will pre-stage on the 8111 floor of headquarters. Emergency personnel will pre-stage for Day 2 activities on December 6, 2017. This will be referred to as the Ingestion Phase or Post-Plume Phase. During the Ingestion Phase, decision-making activities will be demonstrated during a tabletop discussion held at the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) Galvez Conference Center, located at 602 N. Fifth Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802.

Parishes affected by the Ingestion Phase of the exercise will be represented, and other parishes from the 50 mile radius of Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station will be encouraged to participate. These parishes will be referenced as "local OROs (with IP authority)" and may include: Ascension, Assumption, East Baton Rouge, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and West Baton Rouge.

Some federal agencies will participate in the tabletop as part of the National Response Plan. State agencies will coordinate their activities with the federal agencies to the extent needed. However, the interplay between the State and the federal agencies will not be evaluated.

The sampling plan development portion of the accident assessment activities will be demonstrated separately from the main tabletop activities. The demonstration will occur at the same time as the tabletop demonstration but will be located in a separate room. At least one Accident Assessment Coordinator, one Field Team Coordinator, and one Senior Technical Advisor will be involved in this process. A Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) representative may be present as a resource to provide advice, if necessary. Coordination with FRMAC will not be evaluated. Sampling plans developed during this demonstration will not be used for the tabletop discussions. A separate pre-written sampling plan will be injected to players at an appropriate time during the tabletop discussions. Accident assessment is an essential part of the State's response function at the tabletop, and is integrated in the technical decision-making aspect of the demonstration.

Out-of-Sequence Helicopter, Laboratory Mobilization, and School Board/ Bus Driver demonstrations will occur out - of -

sequence on December 4, 2017. In addition, Backup Alert and Notification will be demonstrated out - of

- sequence on December 5, 2017, Day 1.

Day 1 - December 5, 2017 On Day 1, Mobilization of Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) will occur and Dose Assessment activities will be demonstrated and discussed with the evaluator. Laboratory and field data will be injected to the Dose Assessment Coordinator(s) as needed, to perform the dose calculations.

30 I

I I

I

I I

I 11 11 I

I I

Day 2 - December 6, 2017 The data produced during this demonstration will not be used for making recommendations and decisions during the tabletop.

A separate pre-developed set of data will be injected by controllers for the demonstration of sampling plan development and the development of recommendations and decisions during Day 2 activities.

Day 3 - December 7, 2017 There will be an event on Day 3 focusing on Recovery. This will be a no-fault workshop.

I. EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT A.

Sub-element 1.a - Mobilization B.

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3,4; C.1,4,6; D.4; E.1, 2; G.3.a; H.3,4)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Headquarters (LDEQ HQ), LDEQ at EOF (LDEQ EOF),

Joint Information Center (JIC), St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play

a.

Participation at the State EOC will include the Governor' s Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP), LDEQ, and the Louisiana Department of Health (LDH).

b.

The JIC emergency response team will mobilize and activate the facility at the Alert ECL.

c.

The LDEQ Teams will pre-stage on the LDEQ HQ 8 111 floor.

ARCAs -None Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a,b;A.3; C.4, 6)

1.

Locations 31

C.

D.

State EOC, LDEQ HQ, LDEQ EOF, St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC

2.

Extent of Play

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment Criterion l.d. l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communication capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, F.1, 2)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

State EOC, LDEQ HQ, LDEQ EOF, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Field Monitoring Team 1 (LDEQ FMT 1), LDEQ FMT 2, JIC, St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC, American Radiation Services (ARS)

Extent of Play

a.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller. Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted. Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e.,

emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms).

Note: Communications may be made with the ARS for the purpose of meeting the communication needs of other players. However, ARS will be evaluated out-of-sequence.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)

1.

Locations

2.

State EOC, LDEQ HQ, LDEQ EOF, LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2, JIC, ARS Lab St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play

a.

One field team member will demonstrate the donning and doffing of an anti-contamination suit prior to mobilization.

32 I

1 I

I I

I 1

I I

I

I I

I

3.

b.

C.

Charcoal cartridges will be utilized instead of silver zeolite cartridges for air sampling. Dosimetry and KI are not applicable at the JIC. Simulated TLDs may be used, and some locations may use area dosimeters in accordance with RPM guidance.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms).

ARCAs - None II. EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING A.

B.

Sub-element 2.a-Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-Rep-1, C.6; f; K.3.a; K.4)

1.

2.

Locations State EOC, LDEQ EOF, St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play

a.

If the scenario does not warrant a discussion on either the authorization to administer KI or emergency worker (EW) exposure exceeding administrative limits, then the criteria shall be accomplished through an interview with the evaluator.

Note:

Parish decision-makers receive recommendations for KI and EW exposure from the State EOC.

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment, Protective Action Recommendations and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP 1, 1.10 and Supplement 3) 33

C.

1.

Locations State EOC, LDEQ EOF

2.

Extent of Play

a. The controller inject may be used to simulate field monitoring data to the Dose Assessment Coordinator for the purpose of dose projection validation and verification through back calculations.

3.

ARCAs - None Criterion 2.b.2: A decision making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make precautionary and/or protective action decisions for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.e, f, m)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

State EOC, St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play

a.

If the scenario does not warrant a discussion on protective action decisions then the criteria shall be accomplished through an interview with the evaluator.

b.

According to the State of Louisiana's policy, KI is not considered for the general public.

ARCAs-None Sub-element 2.c - Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/ Functional Needs Criterion 2.c.1: Precautionary and/or Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)

1.

Locations St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC

2.

Extent of Play

a.

If the scenario does not warrant a discussion on protective action decisions for the protection of special populations, then the criteria shall be accomplished through an interview with the evaluator.

34 I

I I

I D.

E.

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 2.d - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)

1.

Locations

2.

State Operations, Local OROs (with IP authority)

Extent of Play

a.

OROs will not consider any areas outside the 50-mile EPZ.

b.

This will be demonstrated via tabletop format on December 6, 2017, Day 2.

Tabletop format will include parish authorities within the affected area of the incident and /or the 50 mile radius of the plant.

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 2.e - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Criterion 2.e.1: Timely post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654FEMA-REP-1, L.10; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)

1.

2.

3.

Locations State Operations, LDEQ EOF; Local OROs (with IP Authority)

Extent of Play

a.

OROs will not consider any areas outside the 50-mile EPZ

b.

This will be demonstrated via tabletop format on December 6, 2017, Day 2.

ARCAs - None 35

III. EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION A.

B.

Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans

/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

OR Os maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, K.3.a, b; K.4)

1.

Locations LDEQ EOF, LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2, St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC, ARS Lab

2.

Extent of Play

3.

a.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms).

b.

Simulated dosimetry may be used.

ARCAs-None Sub-element 3.b. - Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b.1 - KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f)

1.

Locations

2.

LDEQ EOF, LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2; St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play

a.

If the scenario does not warrant a discussion on KI, then the criteria shall be accomplished through an interview with the evaluator.

b.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

36 I

I I

I C.

D.

E.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms).

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 3.c. - Implementation of Precautionary and/or Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs Criterion 3.c.1: Precautionary and/or Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

1.

Locations St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC

2.

Extent of Play

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement precautionary and/or protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J-10.c, d, e, g)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play

a.

Implementation of Protective actions will be demonstrated by school simulation. Procedures that would be followed will be provided to evaluators.

b.

This may be demonstrated out-of-sequence on December 4, 2017 for St.

Charles Parish and St. John the Baptist School Districts.

ARCAs-None Sub-element 3.d.- Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3;C.1, 4; J.10.g, j) 37

F.

1.

2.

Locations St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play

a.

This may be demonstrated out-of-sequence. One traffic and access control staff person will demonstrate knowledge of their roles and responsibility by discussion with the evaluator. The discussion will be at or near the EOC.

Travel to the traffic and access control point will not be demonstrated. If the scenario does not warrant this discussion at a location, the controller will

b.

inject data to stimulate a discussion Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms).

3.

ARCAs-None Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1; J.10.k)

1.

Locations

2.

St. Charles Parish EOC, St. Charles Parish T/ACP, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish T/ACP Extent of Play

a.

b.

Transfer of information to JIC is demonstrated to evaluator at EOC.

A controller inject will be used to initiate the demonstration for this criterion. The inject will occur during the evaluation and it will be on an evacuation route. It will trigger the re-routing of traffic and the parishes will coordinate this re-routing with the JIC in order to communicate the alternate route to evacuees that are leaving the area. No implementation will actually occur; the situation and solution will be discussed in the appropriate EOCs.

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 3.e. - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 38 I

I I

G.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food, supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.11)

1.

Locations State Operations; LDEQ EOF

2.

Extent of Play

a.

OROs will not consider any areas outside the 50-mile EPZ.

b.

This will be demonstrated via tabletop format on December 6, 2017, Day 2.

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 3.e. - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.1; J.9, 11)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

State Operations; LDEQ EOF Extent of Play

a.

OROs will not consider any areas outside the 50-mile EPZ.

b.

This will be demonstrated via tabletop format on December 6, 2017, Day 2.

ARCAs-None Sub-element 3.f. - Implementation of Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled reentry, relocation and return of individuals during the post-plume phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654FEMA-REP-1.E.7;J.10.j; J.12;k.5.b; M.1, 3)

1.

Locations State Operations; Local OROs (with IP Authority)

2.

Extent of Play 39

3.

a.

b.

C.

OROs will not consider any areas outside the 50-mile EPZ.

This will be demonstrated via tabletop format on December 6, 2017, Day 2.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms)

ARCAs - None IV. EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASURMENT AND ANALYSES A.

Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; 1.7, 8, 9)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

LDEQEOF Extent of Play

a.

One member ofFMT will demonstrate sample transfer with Sample Courier.

b.

One member of FMT will demonstrate donning and doffing of Anti-Contamination Suit at the discretion of the evaluator, before or after demonstration.

c.

FMT members will only use boot covers and gloves.

d.

Charcoal cartridges will be used instead of silver zeolite.

e.

Sample courier delivery of samples to the lab will be simulated.

f.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms)

ARCAs -None 40 I

I I

I B.

Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H12; 1.8, 9; J.10.a)

1.

Locations

2.

LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2 Extent of Play

a.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms).

b.

Charcoal cartridges will be used instead of silver zeolite

3.

ARCAs - None Sub-element 4.b - Post-Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g. food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654? FEMA-REP-1, C.1; 1.8, J.11)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2 Extent of Play

a.

b.

C.

This will be demonstrated out-of-sequence on Day 2.

This will be demonstrated separately from the main tabletop activities.

Best means available will be used to demonstrate sampling. Locations will be simulated.

ARCAs-None 41

C.

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)

1.

Locations

2.

3.

ARS Laboratory Extent of Play

a.

This may be demonstrated out-of-sequence. A site assisted visit to the ARS laboratory will be performed on December 4, 2017.

b.

A variety ofrepresentative samples that would be collected from the areas designated for field sampling will be presented during the demonstration.

c.

An actual sample analysis will not be performed. One water sample will be carried through the process of preparation to the point of analysis.

d.

Receiving, safe handling, and storage of samples will be demonstrated.

e.

Correction-on-the-spot will be considered at these locations at the discretion of and concurrence between the evaluator and the controller.

Caution should be exercised to insure that exercise play is not interrupted.

Correction-on-the-spot at Parish EOC's are limited to areas outside the EOC operations area (i.e., emergency worker briefings and issue of dosimetry in other rooms)

ARCAs-None V. EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION A.

Sub-element 5.a -Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)

1.

2.

Locations St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC, EAS Radio Station WWL Extent of Play 42 I

I I

11 11 I

I I

3.

a.

b.

C.

d.

e.

The alert and notification system, activation procedure will be demonstrated up to the point of activation. The siren activation will be simulated.

Simulation of the siren activation will be in real time sequence with the transmission of the Emergency Alert Systems EAS message.

The sirens will be sounded at the appropriate time in the exercise in accordance with the decision and the EAS message will follow the siren sounding.

EAS message content will be determined and communicated to the EAS stations; however, broadcasts will be simulated.

The address for WWL is 400 Poydras Street, Suite 800, New Orleans, LA 70130 ARCAs-None Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

1.

Locations St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC

2.

Extent of Play

a.

b.

One route will be selected to demonstrate for the evaluator. The alert and notification will be read but not broadcasted.

Actual testing of the system and alert and notification activities will be conducted out-of-sequence. This will take place on December 5, 2017, after the termination of the Day 1 portion of the exercise.

3.

ARCAs - None Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c.

1.

2.

Locations St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC Extent of Play 43

B.

3.

a.

b.

St. John the Baptist Parish exception area A will be demonstrated. The alerting along this route will be simulated. The alert message will be demonstrated to the evaluator's satisfaction prior to the actual demonstration of the alert route. This will be demonstrated out-of-sequence on December 4, 2017.

The helicopter will be hovering for the evaluator at the altitude required for the the announcement. The demonstration of flight pattern will follow.

ARCAs-None Sub-element 5.b - Subsequent Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media.

Criterion 5.b.1: OR Os provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

1.

2.

Locations JIC, St. Charles Parish EOC, St. John the Baptist Parish EOC, Extent of Play

a.

Utility, State and Parish representatives will demonstrate the ability to provide emergency information and instructions to the public consistent with the scenario.

b.

The State EOC does not disseminate subsequent messages to the public. All messages should come through the JIC.

c.

News media will not be present. Selected personnel will simulate the role of reporters asking questions during briefings.

d.

Controllers will inject public phone team messages, media phone team messages and news briefing messages.

e.

On Day 2, December 6, 2017, information and instructions to the public will be limited to press releases.

Mock media/press briefings will not be conducted.

3.

ARCAs-None 44 I

I I

I GENERAL EXTENT OF PLAY {EOP):

1. With regard to last minute additions or changes to any previously approved Extent-of-Play, all suggested changes must be forwarded to the RAC Chair for approval.

2. The goal of all offsite response organizations (ORO) is to protect the health and safety of the public. This goal is achieved through the execution of appropriate plans and procedures. It is recognized that situations may arise that could limit the organizations in the exact execution of these plans and procedures.

3. In the event of an unanticipated situation, OROs are permitted to exercise flexibility in the implementation of their plans and procedures in order to successfully achieve the objective of protection of public health and safety and protection of the environment.

4. As a statement of fact, no ORO will deliberately deviate from its plans and procedures with the intent of avoiding responsibility.

References:

REP Manual, Part III 45

A.

Initial Conditions SCENARIO NARRATIVE The plant is operating at 100% power toward the middle of core life. Two fuel bundles have been identified as leaking. Emergency Diesel Generator "A" is out of service for maintenance. It is scheduled to be returned to service at 15:00 today. The "NB" electrical bus is aligned to the "B" side.

Chemistry conditions indicate two bundles have a small amount offuel leakage. Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEi) has been trending up for the last three days. Chemistry is sampling the RCS for DEi every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The last sample taken on 12/05/2017 at 06:00 read 0.2 uCi/cc DEi. The next sample is due 12/6/17 by 06:00.

At 07:55, the drill will commence.

At 08:02, the control room receives a report from a mechanical maintenance technician operating a forklift moving material in the vicinity of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB). The report states that the forklift driver ran into the North side of the FHB which resulted in a six foot section of the concrete structure on the side of the FHB being removed from the impact. The damage is cosmetic. The FHB wall was not breeched. No injuries are reported at this time. The SM/ED declares an ALERT based on EP-001-001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Initiating Condition (IC) HA6, EAL

5, Vehicle crash resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to Fuel Handling Building. EP-001 -020, Alert is implemented. The emergency condition is announced to station personnel.

The Onsite (TSC & OSC), Nearsite (EOF), and Offsite (JIC} Emergency Organizations are mobilized.

State and local government agencies, Waterford 1 & 2 and the NRC are notified. There are no Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) required at this time. There is no offsite radiological release at this time.

At 08:16, RCS Hot Leg Safety instrument, RC-ITl-102HB, fails low. The crew will have to evaluate tech specs and enter TS 3.3.3.5.

At 08:29, the Control Room receives indication of a dropped rod. CEA #5 has dropped into the core.

The Control Room should enter OP-901-102 and attempt to recover the dropped rod At 09:04 the "A" Turbine Building Component Cooling Water (TCCW) Pump will trip, and the "B" pump will receive an auto start signal and pump will start. A NAO will be dispatched to investigate the problem.

Electrical and/or Mechanical Maintenance may be requested to investigate the pump trip problem.

At 09:22, an instrument air leak occurs on the supply line to CS-125A. This was caused by a worker erecting scaffolding near the valve operator and a piece of scaffolding fell breaking the line. CS-125A fails open. The instrument air to station air cross connect should open, but does not due to a failed pneumatic relay in the valve controller. The Control Room enters OP-901-511, Instrument Air Malfunction. Mechanical maintenance should be dispatched to repair the header leakage and l&C maintenance should be dispatched to repair the cross connect valve. Both failures must be fixed to restore instrument air to normal operation. Operations may elect to open the bypass (SA-127) to supply instrument air.

46 I

I I

I

I I

II At 09:36, CEA #47 drops in a different quadrant and the reactor does not trip, but a trip signal is received.

The automatic Reactor Trip fails and a manual trip is unsuccessful. The Control Room opens 3A32 and 3B32 feeder breakers to shutdown the reactor. The Control Room implements OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. The failure of the reactor automatic trip function results in damage to the fuel cladding and an increase in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) activity as indicated by Containment High Range radiation monitor.

The Control Room should request Chemistry to draw an RCS sample. When Chemistry places the primary sample panel on recirculation, radiation levels of 132 mR/hr will indicate that fuel cladding damage has occurred.

The Emergency Director declares a Site Area Emergency based on Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction EP-001-001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions, Initiating Condition SS3, Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken from the reactor control console are not successful in shutting down the reactor.

At 09:59 a 227 gpm tube leak develops on Steam Generator #2. Radiation monitor alarms are received on the Slowdown and Condenser vacuum exhaust. The No. 2 Steam Generator Main Steam Radiation Monitor increases. The Chemistry Department is directed to begin SIG activity sampling. Due to the RCS leakage and the shrinkage of the RCS associated with the cooldown, RCS level may decrease faster than the Charging Pumps can supply makeup water. The Control Room may enter OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery.

A release is occurring below federally approved operating limits. The Emergency Director should note this on the next follow up notification form to the offsite agencies.

At 10:14 Charging Pump "A" trips due to broken connecting rod. A repair team is dispatched from the OSC to investigate the problems with the charging pump. Mechanical maintenance finds the plunger separated from the connecting rod.

At 10:30, steam rupture in the MSIV area occurs. Indications of SG steam leakage are identified in the Control Room. This will be indicated by excess steam demand. Due to the tube rupture and fuel failure, radioactivity is being released through the Main Steam Lines to the environment. If Mechanical Maintenance is dispatched to assess repair of the leak, they will be unable to enter the area without taking special precautions due to radiation levels at the location. A General Emergency is declared on FG1 EALs: CNB4, RCB3 or RCB4 and FCB2 or FCB5 Loss of ANY two barriers AND loss or potential loss of the third barrier. Initial Protective Action Recommendations of evacuation of Protective Response Areas: A1, B1, C1, D1 (0-2 mile radius) and A2, C2 (2-5 miles downwind). Recommend monitor &

prepare for the remainder of the Protective Response Areas in the 10-mile EPZ are made.

The leak is determined to be unisolable. The Exercise will be terminated with a release in progress to formulate a scenario for the purposes of the Ingestion Pathway Exercise.

When in the opinion of the Lead Controller, the drill objectives have been sufficiently demonstrated and continuing the drill will provide no additional benefit, the drill will be terminated. When the Drill is terminated, area critiques will be conducted.

47

SCENARIO NARRATIVE Exercise Timeline 1 Note: all times are approximate 0755 Exercise begins 0802 Forklift driver runs into the north side of Fuel Handling Building; SM/ED declares ALERT based on EP-001-001; HA6, EAL #5 0816 RCS Hot Leg Safety instrument, RC-ITl-102HB, fails low 0829 CEA #5 has dropped into the core. The Control Room should enter OP-901-102 and attempt to recover the dropped rod.

0904 The "A" Turbine Building Component Cooling Water (TCCW) Pump trips, and the "B" pump receives an auto start signal and pump starts.

0922 An instrument air leak occurs on the supply line to CS-125A.

0936 CEA #47 drops, trip signal is received. Reactor is shutdown due to reactor's failure to trip. Damage to fuel cladding and RCS samples 132 mR/hr lead to SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

0959 A 227 gpm tube leak develops on Steam Generator #2.

1014 Charging Pump "A" trips due to broken connecting rod 1030 Steam rupture in the MSIV area occurs. A General Emergency is declared on FG1 EALs: CNB4, RCB3 or RCB4 and FCB2 or FCB5. Leak determined to be insolable. Exercise terminated with release in progress.

48 I

I I

11 I

I I

I TIME 07:00 CC-1 08:00 CC-2 08:02 CC-3 TIMELINE EVENT Drill Controllers brief the Operations shift personnel in the Simulator_ Drill guidelines and initial conditions are discussed with the participants_

NOTE: The remaining Shift personnef {HP, Chemistry, and Security) are briefed at 07:15_

The Control Room participants are instructed to start the DrilL Drill continuation announcement Fuel Handling Building Damage 49 DRILL ACTIVITY Following the briefing, the NAOs and other shift personnel are instructed when to take their positions in the plant for the start of the drill_

The plant is operattng at 1. 00% near middle of core life.

Chemistry conditions indicate a small amount of fuel damage. DEi has been trending up for the last 3 days_ Chemistry is sampting the RCS for DEi every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The last sample was 12/05/2017 at 0600. The GMPO has been consulted.

The UA/B" electrical bus is aligned to the "B" side. The Protected Train is "B".

'Emergency Diesel Generator "A" is out of service.

The control room receives a report from mechanical maintenance technician operating a fork lift moving material in the vicinity of the Fuel Handling Buildrng (FHB)_ The report states that the fork lift driver ran into the north side of the FHB which resulted in a six foot section of the concrete structure on the side of the FHB being removed from the impact

TIME CC-4 CC-5 CC-6 08:"16 CC-7 08:29 CC-8 CC-9 09:04 CC-10 CC-1 '1 EVENT Alert declaration RC-rTl-102HB fails CEA#S drops TCCW Pump trip.

so DRILL ACTIVITY The S ED declares an ALERT based on EP-001-001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Initiating Condition (IC) HA6 EAL #5, Vehicle crash resulting in VISIBLE DArvtAGE to Fuel Handling Building. EP-001-020, Alert is implemented. The emergency condition is announced to station personnel. The Onsite (TSC &

OSC), Nearsrte (EOF), and Offsite (JIC)

Emergency Organizations are mobilized.

State and local government agencies, Waterford 1 & 2 and the NRC are notified.

There are no Protective Action Recommendations {PARs) required at this time. There is no offsite radiological release at this time.

RCS Hot Leg Safety Instrument fails low.

The Control Room receives indication of a dropped rod. CEA #5 has dropped into the core. The Control Room should enter OP-901-102 and attempt to recover the dropped rod.

The UA" Turbine Building Component Cooling Water (TCCW) Pump trips. This will not cause a serious problem at this time. An NAO will be dispatched to investigate the problem. Electrical and/or echanical Maintenance may be requested to investigate the pump trip problem.

When the NAO arrives at the breaker for the "A" Turbine Building Component Cooling Water Pump the overcurrent trip relay will be energized. The Control Room requests a repair team to investigate the problem.

I 1

I I

1 I

I I

I

I I

I TIME 09:22 CC-12 CC-13 CC-14 CC-15 09:36 CC-16 EVENT Instrument Air leak.

CEA #47 drops 51 DRILL ACTIVITY An instrument air leak occurs on the supply line to CS-125A. This was caused by a worker erecting scaffo1ding near the valve operator and a ptece of scaffolding fell breaking the line. CS-125A fails open.

The instrument air to station air cross connect should open, but does not due to a failed pneumatrc relay in the valve controller.

The Control Room enters OP-901-511,

Instrument Air Malfunction. Mechanical maintenance should be dispatched to repair the header leakage and l&C maintenance should be dispatched to repair the cross connect valve. When Both failures must be fixed to restore instrument air to normal operation.

Operations may elect to open the bypass (SA-127) to supply instrument air. When the NAO arrives he isolates the leak by closing IA-56341.

CEA #47 drops and the reactor does not trip, but a trip signal is received. The automatic Reactor Trip fails and a manual trip is unsuccessful. The Control Room de-energizes the 3A32 and 3B32 feeder breakers to shutdown the reactor. The Control Room implements OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

TIME CC-17 CC-18 CC-19 CC-20 EVENT Declaration of Site Area Emergency Assembly Area personnel return to plant 52 DRILL ACTIVITY A Site Area Emergency is declared based on EP--001-001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions, Initiating Condition (IC) SS3, Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken from the reactor control console are not successful in shutting down the reactor. The failure of the reactor automatic trip function results in damage to the fuel cladding and an increase in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) activity as indicated by radiation monitor alarms. The Control Room should request Chemistiy to draw an RCS sample. When Chemistiy p laces the primary sample panel on recirculation, radiation levels will indicate that fuel cladding damage has occurred.

NOTE: For the purposes of this drill the Protected Area will not be evacuated. A small group of pre-designated persons will be evacuated to the assembly area to demonstrate evacuation and assembly area activities.

State and local government agencies, Waterford 1 & 2 and the NRC are notified.

Waterford 1 & 2 is directed to evacuate non-essential personnel (for the purposes of this drill, evacuation of Waterford 1 & 2 will not occur).

After Assembly Area muster activities are performed, the evacuated personnel shourd be called back to the plant. This objective will have been completed and this portion of the Drill is also completed.

I I

I TIME I

09:59 CC-21 I

I 10:14 I

CC-22 CC-23 I

10:30 I

CC-24 CC-25 I

I CC-26 I

CC-27 I

I I

EVENT Steam Generator "B" tube rupture Charging Pump "A" failure Steam Leak in MSIV area "B" General Emergency 53 DRILL ACTIV ITY The Control Room receives indication of a 277 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Radiation monrtor a larms are rece ived on the Blowdown and Condenser vacuum exhaust The No. 2 Steam Generator Main Steam Radiation Monitor increases.

The Control Room may enter O P-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture instead.

Charging pump "A" trips due to broken connecting rod. A repair teams is d ispatched from the OSC to investigate the problems with the charging pump.

echanical maintenance finds a plunger disconnected from the connecting rod.

A steam leak in the MSIV UB " area and a rupture is experienced on #2 steam generator. Indications of SG tube leakage are identified in the Control Room. Due to the tube rupture and fuel failure, radioactivity is being released to the atmosphere. This will be indicated by higher readings of the main steam line radiation monitor and radiological monitoring fielld team surveys.

The Emergency Director declares a General Emergency based on EP-001-001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Cond itions, Initiating Condition

{IC}, A General Emergency is declared on FG1, EAL CNB4, RCB3 or RCB4 and FCB2 or FCB5, Loss of ANY two barriers AND loss or potential loss of the third barrier. Initial Protective Action Recommendations of evacuation of Protective Response Areas A1, B 1, C1,

D1 (2-mile radius) A2,C2 (5-mile radius downwind) and monitor and p repare for the remainder of the Protective Response A reas is recommended.

z 13:00 T:: +5:00 CC-28 EVENT Termination of drill DRILL ACTIVITY The leak is determined to be unisolable_

The Exercise will be terminated with a release in progress to formulate a scenario for the purposes of the Ingestion Pathway Exercise_

When in the opinion of the Lead Controller, the drill objectives have been sufficiently demonstrated and continuing the drill will provide no add itional' benefit, the drill will be terminated. When the drill is terminated, area criti.ques will begin.

METEOROLOGICAL SCENARIO OUTLINE AND DATA The meteorological scenario selected for the Waterford 3 SES Site Drill has been prepared to meet the overall objectives of the drill.

The meteorological scenario assumes the following:

o At 08:00, the wind is from the south (180 degrees) at 3.2 m/s and stable meteorological conditions with a Stability Class of D at -0.45 degrees for the remainder of t he exercise.

The choice of this meteorology provides for the desirable measurable levels of radiation downwind to meet offsite objectives.

The meteorological data presented in this section includes:

1. Simulated general forecasts from the National Weather Service

2. Simulated computer printouts from the plant's meteorological system SIMULATED WEATHER FORCAST PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2017 The extended forecast for the New Orleans area and southeast Louisiana is as follows:

For Tuesday, December 05, 2017, morning lows are in the middle to upper 60's; afternoon highs will be in the low to mid 80's. Chances for rain are 10%. Skies are partly cloudy with winds up to 5 m/s from the south.

54 I

I I

This page is intentionally blank.

I I

55 I

ML18078A333

Contents

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Reference:

References:

Navigation menu

ML18078A333

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Reference:

References:

Navigation menu

Search