ML18065A474
| ML18065A474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1996 |
| From: | Burdick T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18065A473 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-OL-96-01, 50-255-OL-96-1, NUDOCS 9602120182 | |
| Download: ML18065A474 (3) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II I Report No, 50-255/0L-96-0l!DRSl FACILITY Palisades Nu~lear Power Plant License No. DPR-20 LICENSEE Co1sumers Power Company 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530 DATE January 17, 1996 CHIEF EXAMINER J. Lennartz APPROVED BY
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T. Burdick, Chief Operator Licensing Branch Examination Summary
.)/<, /rr Date' Simulator retake examination was administered on January 17. 1996 (Report No. 50-255/0L-96-0l(DRSll to two Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants.
~lt.i: Both applicants were evaluated a~ satisfactor-y and issued SRO licer~es.
The ability to use formal,._;osed loop communications was considered a weakness (Section 3).
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REPORT DETAILS
- 1.
- Examiners J. lennartz, NRC, Chief Examiner F. Jagger, LITCO/INEL S. Johnson, LITCO/INEL
- 2.
Persons Contacted
.Licensee Representatives G. Strickland, Operations Training Supervisor R. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor P. Schmidt, Simulator Supervisor P. Rewa, Operations Training U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
M. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector P. Prescott, Resident Inspector
- 3.
Simulator Retake Examination The NRC examiners made the following observation during examination administration:
The communications between crew membLrs were frequently open ended and informal.
Communicated directives from the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) to the control board operators were frequently not repeated back nor did the CRS ensure that directives were received and understood. Additionally, communications between control board operators ~ere often informal with no assurance that communicated items were received and understood.
Open ended and informal communications could preclude completion of required operator actions or result in incorrect operator actions.
The NRC examiners did not identify any failure ~o complete required actions or any incorrect actions due to the informal communications demonstrated.
Additionally, the examiners noted that co~dunication formality improved slightly during emergency operating procedure implementation.
However, the examiners considered the ability to use formal, closed loop communications a weakness.
4~
Exit Meeting The NRC examiners conducted an exit meeting on January 17, 1996, to discuss the applicant's performanL~ noted in section 3 and the simulator fidelity issues discussed in Enclosure 2, "Simulation Facility-Fidelitj -
Report."
Licensee representatives identified in Section 2 attended the meeting.-
I ENCLOSURE 2 SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
Palisades Nuclear Power Plant r~cility Licensee Docket No.
50-25~
(
Operating Tests Administered On:
January 17, 1996 This form is to be used only to report observations.
These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
lhese observations do not affect NRC cer ficalion or approval of the simulation facility other than to provid~ Information that may be used in future evaluations.
No licensee action is required in response to these obser,ations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
- 1.
Primary Coolant Pump (PCPs)
- 2.
Containment
~~ray Actuation (CSAS)
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- 3.
Diesel Ready Light
- 4.
Process ~lant Computer (PPC)
DESCRIPTION The PCP shaft shear and shaft sei:ure malfunctions could only be applied to PCP*
"A" and PCP "B" respectively which limited scenario event development.
A designated malfunction did not exist that w l~ prevent automatic initiation of contal nt spray (CS) yet allow manual control.
This event had
~o be created using switch overrides and then removing the overrides when the operators manually started the CS pumps.
The emergency diesel generator (EOG) ready light was still lit after the EOG had been tripperl locally using the overspeed trip device due to an oil leak.
(The licensee wrote a simulator deficiency report).
Indicated core exit. thermoco~ple (CET) temperature on the PPC appeared to mom~ntarily fail during a faulted/ruptured steam generator scenario.
CET temper~ture trace was tracking with the decreasing loop temperatures and then "straight lined" whilP l~op temperatures continued to decrease.
After approximately five minutes the C£T temperature trace did a step decrease and then again trdcked loop temperature decreas~.