ML18059B114

Insp Rept 50-255/94-08 on 940510-0630.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Nrc Restart Team,Esfs,Onsite Event Followup,Current Matl Condition, Housekeeping & Plant Cleanliness & Radiological Controls

ML18059B114
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/14/1994
From:	Kropp W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18059B112	List: ML18059B111 ML18059B113 ML18059B114
References
50-255-94-08, 50-255-94-8, NUDOCS 9407260177
Download: ML18059B114 (19)

See also: IR 05000255/1994008

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. *.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

. * REGION. I II

Rep~rt No. *50...:255/94008(0.RP)

. Docket No*. * 50:..255 *

Licensee~ Consumers Power Company _

• 212. West ~ichigan*A~~nue.

• ** * Jackson, *MI

~9201 .

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License No$. DPR-20 .

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. ::*J* Faci_lH.Y _Nam~: : Pa:lisades Nucl~ar *Generating *Facility

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• • : Jnspec~ion At:* ***:Palisades Site~< Coverf;*Michigan *

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• Insp_ectfon c:~nducted*: --M~y 10 *through June *30, 1994

• Irispect~rs: *W.

J~ Kropp

M. "E *. Parker.

D.: G. eassehl :

• • ~ J .. H. Neisler

J. L. *Hansen ..

C. ~-I .Or.sT ""' * ..

. Approved By: _W_+1n_

• ~--11-,_ '--,....,...---

w. J.'l<ropp/thi_ef

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Reactor.Projects Section 2A

-Inspection Summ~r~

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Ihs.pection from May 10 through june 30~ 1994: Report No. 50-255/94008CDRPl

Areas Inspected:. Routine, unannounced. safety inspection by resident and .

• . _regional* inspect"ors of actions on previous inspection findings; operational

safety verification, NRC Restart .Team, engineered safety feature ~ystems~

onsite ev~nt follow-up, current material condition, hou_sekeeping and plant

cleanliness,_ radiol_ogital controls, safety assessment and quality. *

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.:verification~ maintenance, surveillance, engineering and technical~ support,*

dry. fuel. storage acti~ities,. and review 9f license~ reports.

• Results:. ~Within. the 13 areas insp~~t-ed, no *violation.s. or -deviations ~ere,

identified in 12 areas.* One violation *was ide.ntified in the *remaining area*

• (paragraph 6.a) .*. Two Unresolved. Items were identified that pertained -to

contain~ent closeout (paragra~h 3.f) -and* a ~oritrol: rod i~terlock surveillance

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• The following is a summary.of the'licensee's_performance during thi.s

• inspection. period:*

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• ~3R72*DOco177 940720 :-

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K 05000255

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Plant*Operations

As a res.ult of the. exten~ive a11Jount of time the plant was. shutdo\\t!n* and the .

. : , .... -concerns expressed by the' Diagnostic* Eva 1 uat ion. Team (OET) in .the area of

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operations,: the NRC assembled a r~start team to.assess.the readiness of the *.

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• operations department to restart the plant. Operators on several shifts were

• observed prior to and during p 1 ant startup. Over a 11 performance. was

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-satiSfactory; sonie spedfi c .concerns included. the 1 ack of an effective *' :-: * *

' cont a i nnient closeout program and the i_nforma 1 review of p_l ant Che,ckli st_s,* ....

• • • * following ~hanges.

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Safety As~ess~ent/Oua~ity Verific~iion

A management advisory group, consisting of four senior nuclear executj,ves*,.

performed an independent assessment of *pa 1 i sades during. the week of June 20, .

1994. *. Management oversight *was . a 1 so . provided dud ng the p 1 ant startu*p -for * . *-. *

critical evolutions and throu~hQut powe~ escalation.

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Maintenance and Surveillance ..

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• The lice~se~'s perf~rmanc~ in this are* ~as ade~tiate: A ~urveillance test:in

_hot shutdown required withdrawing a control rod less than two inches. This is

considered an unresolved .item pendi11g*further *review by the NRC into whether

or not the withdrawal of a control rod {less than two inches) constitutes a

mod~ change. .

_Troubleshooting of High Pressure Safety Injection {HPSI) *pump P-66A was

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• observed after the pump-failed to meet minimum flow-requirements.

Althoug~no *

definitive-root cause was identified, the licensee thoroughly e~pl~red the' "

. 'p_ossible causes and instituted frequent testing to verify operabil_i~y. -No:: -

problem~ have been observed to date.

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" Engineering and Technical Support .

The licensee's performance in this area was_ less than*adequate. A-violation

~as issued involving the failure to.test the spent fuel pool crarie using the

corre~t interlock bypass keys.

Post-modification testing failed .to deteC:t*

that -the.interlock bypass keys on. the* spent fue 1 *poo 1 crane con.tro r box were * *

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DETAILS . * .

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persons Contacted *

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. *Consumers Power Conipanv __ .

• . *R.- :A.* Fenech, Vice President, ~uclear Operations ..

• T.- J. Palmisano, Plant General Manager.

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• *J. W. Muffet, Nuclear*Engineeririg & C6nstruction Manager

• • w ~ F. Peabody,

N.E~O' Manager ( Interi~) *. :.

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-*R. * D. Orosz, Dir*ector, NOD Servfoes

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*R; M. Swanson, Director, NPAD

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. *D. *.D~. Hice, Nuclear Training.Manager ;, _*: .*

• S~ Y. Wawro; Acting Operations Manager* *. ** .*

-*b. W .. Rogers.; .Safety & Licensing Director -

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~*R~ B. Kas~er, Maintenance.Mana~er *

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-*R.

c~ Miller, System Engineering Manager* . -.

X. M. Haas, Radiological ~ervices Manager. :

• . *C. R.* Ritt, .Administrative M~nager

• *J. C. Griggs, Human Resource Di rector

• H. A. Heavin, Controller

• M. *A. Savage; Corporate Communications. *

D~ G. Malone, Shift Operations Superintendent

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• D. J. Malorie~ Radiological Servi~es Sup~r~isor -* ;

• J .. H.

Kuemin~ Licensfog Administrator.

Nuclear *Regulatory Commission CNRC>

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W~,J. Kropp~ Re~ctor Projecis ~ecticin Chief

• M. E. Parker, Se'nior Resident Inspector *.

• D. G. Passehl, Resident Inspector

• J ... H. Neisler, Reactor Inspector*.

J.* L. Hansen, Reactor Examinerflnspector

C. N. Orsini , Reactor Engineer

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. *Denotes those attending the exit interv~ew conducted on June 30, 1994 ..

The inspectors .al so had _di scussiOns. with other licensee.employees, .

• . inch1ding members of the technical and engineering .staffs, reactor .and**

• auxiliary J>perators, shift engineers and el ectri cal , mechanical and

instrument maintenante personneli and contract sectirity personnel ..

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. *Action on. Prevjoys* Inspection Findings. (92701)

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CClosedf Inspection FollowUo Item **C255/91019-19CDRS):

The battery .

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_charger rating exceeded the de-rated ampacity of the charger input

.. -... :.and output cables under_certain conditions.

The inspector

r~viewed the results of the licensee's ampacity study. -The cables

• were instrumented in the trays with the _greatest amount .of ca.ble

where the highest temperatures were.expected to occur.

Approximately full charger load was applied for nine hours until

_ _ cable tempera~ures reached equilibrium. Cable temperatures at

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f~11.*1 oad were well below the cable design tempera.tu~e of* 90° c. * *. *

Also, battery charger loads were well below the rated loads for

the chargers .. This i.tem is.closed~ _** * .*.

b. * * CClosedl *Inspection *Followup ItelTI l255/91019.;.23lDRSl .and.

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_ - f255/92015-02CDRP): *The EDSFI.team questioned the abilitj of the.

Emergency Diesel Gen~rator (EOG} room heatfng ventilation and:air

- conditioning (HVAC} system. to maintain room temperature below 104°:." **

F with* only one of two fans fed from cl ass IE power.

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inspector conf1rmed by review of completed 111odifiCation FC-*9-39 .and*.*.

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app_l i cable.* revised *el e~tri cal drawfrigS* that' the E.DG room *HVAC .had .. ~

. been modified so -that all four EOG room, fans were powered from* : . . ..

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Class IE sources.* This.item is-closed~..

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c. :, 'cclosed) Insoection ~Followup frem *c2ss191019-24coRS): Abfl ity of*

.- : eme~gency diesel g~nerator exhaust system*td functio~ after ~n ::

earthquake._ The EDSFl team .Questioned the 1 ack of a* documented _ *.

. anchoring design for .the exhaust system. incl udfrig the mufflers*

whose ~nchor bolts were found to be cut off .. The inspector .; :

reviewe.d licensee's* specificati.on change* SC-92-079 with stress**

package 07003, DG Exhaust Piping Support ModifiC:ation~ that . * .. *

. documents the piping, including muffler, -system stress analysis,_* ..

~nd seismic support ~esign .. _The inspector's* walkdowri of the

diesel exhau~t system confirmed that the.supports had been

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.installed according to drawings and thal; the mufflers' restraints ...

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• were h1 place. Th.is item. is* closed .. _ ... *

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No violations, deviations, .unresolved, <l'r inspeclion followup items *were *.:

identified in this area.

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. * 3 >.. Pl ant Operat inns (71707, _ 93702)

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The pl~nt was taken criti~al'. and synthronized to t~e *grid on _June 18,-

>1994, after an extensive forced ()utage that began on February 17,-1994.

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• Several significant issues ~ere identified ~uring the forced outage ~ith

most findings and issues raised during the Diagnostic Evaluation Team**

{DET) visits in March and April 1994.

DET and license identified issues *

that required resolution prior to_plant*restart were* properly addressed.

On June 20, 1994, the licensee commenced Dry F~el Storage activiti_es by .

loading spent fuel assemblies .into the multi-assembly .sealed basket

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. {MSB}~ The licensee_ currently anticipates loading 1l casks this year.**

• Two. casks were previously loaded in 1993.

Each cask can accommodate up

to 24 spent fuel assenibl ies'.

Dry Cask -lo~ding activities were. scheduled

. to be** accomp 1 i shed over the next five . months with completion schedu l et1 * * .

in _November: 1994. .. *

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Operational Safety Verification (71707).

The inspectors .verified that the facility.was being operated in

. conformance with the l.icense and regulatory requirements and that

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the. 1 icensee's* ma.nagemeni-*control sy~tem was ~ffecti've in ens~ring.

safe operation of the plant.

On a sa~pling basis, the inspectors * *

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ve~ified proper control room staffi~g ~nd coordination.of plant - ..

. act iv.it i es;** verified operator adherence with procedures and * * . _ * _ ... _

technical specifications; monitored control roprri indications for._**.-. _*.

abnormalities; verifjed t_hat electrical power~wasavailable;* and

• observed.the frequency of plant and control room visits by station

management. *The inspectors reviewed applicable logs and conducted

discussions with control. room'operators throughout the inspection.

• period.

The inspectors observed a . number of contra l_ room shift

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'* turnovers. * The turnovers were. conducte.d ~ in a profess i ona 1 *manner

..and included log r_eviews, panel.walkdowns,"_discussions of:*

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• mainteriance Arid surveillance ~~tiviti~s in progress or planned,

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and associated_ Leo time*restraints, as applicable.

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. . The insped:ors made:th~ f~llow.irig .obse;~*ation~ .with regard'-_to.

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. Personne 1 on ~evera 1 shifts -were observed with~ no actual *or

perceivedschedule pressure identified. Pre-job briefings .

• and shift turnover meetings were adequate-.. .

. Several p 1 ant evo l u*t ions wer~ observed having adequate

.**supervisory oversight. -Shift supervisors were obse.rved not

to be overburdened* with coll a_tera l duties ..

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• .. Operator logs *were_. checked for severa 1 .crews on. sever.al

d,ays .. -One ~oncerri was identified with the completeness of ..

.-_auxiliary operator log sh_eets.

Several items were ~ircled

as being out of the s*peci.fied range but were not expl aine_d

or discussed in the "comments ... section as required by a N_OTE *

on the.individual 16g.sheets. * *

A condensat~ pump recirculation.valve (FV-0730) did not open

. during the conaensate pump start due to the air to the valve

' * beirlg se*cured. ** The condensate system valve lineup checklist

• had been completed, but this valv& h~d b~en lef~ off of the *

checklist_.*

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. In response to the above items, the.licensee evaluated the *

~onditions and took appropriate action ..

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NRC Restart Team

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A.s a result of th_e exte!lsive amount of. time the pla~t was .s~utdown

and the concerns expressed by the Diagnostic Evaluation Team {DH)

in _the area of plant operat_ions, 'the NRC assembled a restart team.*

T~e purpose of the team was:to assess the readiness of the

operations department to restart the plant and to directly .observe

~estart acti~itie~. The team made extensive observations of

op~rations activities for a two week period pri_or~ to bringfog the

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plant on:.. line~* This inc.luded overviewing activiti~s performed ..

around the clock.*. Specific activities observed included:

valve* *. *

1 i neup checks~ pl ant wa l kdowns, startup surveillances,. ma i ritenante

activities, eqLi_ipment protective tagging,. operability* and

. * reportability .determinations, shift briefings, shift turna*vers,

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*pre~job briefings, rod.manipulations~ approach to critical, *

• • _criticality,, turbine generator _synchronizati_on;.and power ... *

.*. ".¢scalation. *

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• .Specific weaknesses or* areas.of concern identified by the. DET thaf --

were reviewed by _the team included the: foll ~wing: ... : *

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• ~ * * ** .. Poor' planning* and.- direction by *ap~rations:*departme.nt ;

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Poor C?nshift su~ervisor.Y ~versigt\\t .. * *

.. Low pe_rform~~ce ~xpettat i ans*.*

Repetitive protecii~e taggirig prob1e~s *

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e * *.Operations department poorly support~d 'by" licensing a*nd * * ..

engineerin~ *

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The inspectors generally_ found that the. licensee had-*taken a'ctio~*- * .. * -* ,,

. or initiate.d steps to address the. DET's concerns. *In the* area of~*_*-:*

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• operability determinations, the licensee had-implemented a.

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completely new pro.grain.

Extensiv.i:i'management *avers.ight was : . ** -.

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. prov_ided throughout the pl.ant startup. Specific areas of c*ancern * .. . * -

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. are addressed .in this inspection repo'rt. Qverall, the team*

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concluded that the licensee had a successful startu~.

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Engineered Safety Feat~re CESFl Systems {71707)

Durin~ the ins~ection peri~d, the inspector~ sele~ted accessible . * *

port i ans of several .ESF systems to verify status .. * _Consi de ration

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was given to .the plant mode, applicable Techniial Specifications,*

Limiting Condit-ions -for Operation requirements, :and -other

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. :applicable. requirements.*

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Various-observations, where ~pplicable, were made*ot hangers and

supports; housekeeping;* whether freeze protection, if required,*

• was installed and operational; valve positio~ and conditions; ..

potential ignition sources; major.component Jabel*in~, lubri~ation *

. cooling, *etc.; whether .instrumentation was properly installed. :and

functioning arid 'significant process parameter values were*

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. .. consistent with. expe'cted value~-;- whether instrumentation was

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. calibrated; whether necessary support system~* were ope rational;.

• and whether locally. and remotely indicated breaker an'd valve.**

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During.the .inspection~ the_ accessible portions **~f. the _followin.g .

• ~ystems were wa 1 ked down:*

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-containment*

. : .. - 2) * * *. Low Pre~sure Sa*f ety 'Injection:, .Tr~ i ~-. f\\ and . B

3) : *.High Pre~sure safety Jrijection,'Trai_n A ilnd s:

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Auxiliary Feedwater,. Train A and B

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5 )_ . . Emergency *oi ese 1 Generator' Train A and . B

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The following itenis ~ere.identified d~ring the.walkdowns:.

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• several bearing cooling water va 1 ves (MV-FW140, MV:..FW142, *

MV:-:FW144, and MV_;FW146) .for auxiliary feedwater pump P--88

were not included on CL No. 12.5, "Auxil ia*ry Feedwater *

System Checklist (Except K-.8 Ste.am Supply)." The licensee*

confirme*d that these valves were co_vered under_ CL No *. 12.6,

"P~8B Steam S~pply Checkl1st." *

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The inspector identified ~that t~e :chemical addition .tank*

• . T-35 to auxiliary feedwater pump P-8C discharge va 1 ve _ MV-

. FW249 should have been closed pet CL 12. 5 but was open .. *

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This deviation was approved by the shift* supervisor because

this valve needs to be open to add chemicals during start-

up.

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.The~e was ,a toncern regarding the :review of changes io ~he

plant ~hecklists;' The licensee ~equires the Plant Review

Committee to review all procedure changes,_--.but not ~hanges

made to-checklists .. *It appears that the thecklists, ~hich

. are an integral part of procedures, are not. subject to" the

• same contra 1 s as. procedures. * The 1 i censee has -agreed to

• eva 1 uate this concern.

Ons.tte Event Follow:..yp (937oi> .

During the -inspection period,_ the l i celisee experienced se\\lera 1 : .

. . events, SOllJe of wnich.r"equired prompt notificatio_n of the NRC

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pursuant* to 10 CFR 50.72w. The inspectors pursued the events

onsite with license~- and/or other NRC officials.* In each:case,

the inspectors verified that any required notification ~a~ correct

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and timely .. The i*~spectors also *v~rif.i.ed that the lic~nsee

initiated prompt and appropriate actions. ~ .. The* spesific eve_nts,.

were as follows:

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On May 23; 1994, while performing~ specia1.*test_on the* ** ..

• service water system,* the as-found flows *to the . .two control *

room heating, ventilation; and. ai.r conditioning* (~VAC} * *

coolers was less than the* minimum required flow. * Th~

• coolers* were designed to* provide cooling to control room *

• equipment and personnel during accident conditions~ ~*The. ,

_plant accident analyses requir~d 46-gallons pe~ minute. at . . ....

81. 5 degrees r. *to eaeh coo] er. . : . : '

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the measured flow for the two coolers'wa~ 45 gallons per *

minute. and 44 gallons per nii nute ... A J l *.other. fl ow * ._;.

requirements f()r the service water. system were .measl,l_red **

satisfactorily: Upon disassembly of:-the condenser, the * * * *

licensee .dis~overed that gas~et m~terial used to channel *.

• flow through the six-pass condenser had blocked some ~f the .

inlet *and outlet fl owpaths 1 n the conden.ser. .Pl ant workers .

removed the gaskets from both end bells of the condenser and.

installed new.gaskets and retested the system.

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water flows through the coolers increased appr6ximately 35

percerit, exceeding minimum design requirements .. The *

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assessed during* the review of t~e associated Licensee Ev.ent ....... : -. .

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on* May 30,- 1994; the licensee identified a* potential ~::.

containment sump blockage caused from.signs,:adhesive.

labels, and tap~. The inspectors will assess the ljcensee's

correcttve action during the review of Licensee Event Report* 94-014.

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• Curr.ent Material Con.dition (71707}

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.. The inspectors performed g~nera l pl ant as well.* as selected system

and component wa l kdowns. to assess the genera 1 and speci ft c

material condition of the plant, to veri.fy that work requests had*

. been initiat~d for identified equipment problenis, and to evaluate ...

housekeeping. * Walkdowns included an assessment of the buildings,*

components, and systems for proper: i dent if i cation and tagging,

accessibility, fire and security door integrity; sca_ffolding, .

.. radiological controls,*and any unusual conditions.~ Un~sual.

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• .conditions included but were* not limited to.water, oil, or.other:

• 'liquid~ on the floor or equipment; i~dications of leakage through

• ceiling; walls, or floors; loose insulation; corrosion; .excessive

.. noise; unusual temperatures; and abnormal ventilation and .. * * ..

. lighting.

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Soine minor material condition deficiencies:were identified by the

inspectors during plant to~rs:

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A*funn~l and bose routed to *a floor drain from l~i d~esel

• ~enerator jacket and lube oil.cooler ser~ice wat~r outlet

valves MV-SW-677 and MV-SW-676 had no work request_ tag and

did not appear* to be leaking. _..

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The inspector identified that pressurizer wide range*

pressure indicator PI"'.".1050 was ou_t of* calibration. _ **

- 3) * *.Several light b.ulbs for valve position *1ndication*on.the hot

shutdown panel w~re burned out. *

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. 4) ... Several oil bubblers. were dri.ppi_ng*o*if and. other oil _leak.s

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. existed on equipment in the safeguards .equipment rooms *. . : .. ..

. * Many of these 1 ea ks were rfot *identified with def i Ci ency

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5)

. S~rvice *water' l~aks *6n containment air coolers VHX~2 and . *- ..

.. *VHX:...3 were identified during a containment_ c 1 oseout tour. . . *:

In respons~ to the above items, the lic~n~ee evaluated th~.:

conditions and took appropriate,.action._ '

.

'

.f.

_ House~eepinq and Plant Cleanlineis (7170i)

The inspectors monito,red the status of housekeeping an.d plant

.

. .

cleanliness for fire protection and.protection of safety-re]ated ._-.:

equi~ment from fntrusion of foreign matt~r. The i~spe~tcirs *

. identified the .. fo 11 owing conc~rtis ~ .

.

1)

~The inspecto~ ~n~ an 6perations'd~partrilent super~isor

identified several housekeeping and platit.cleanljtiess*

deficiencies in containment during a ~l-0seout tour on -

• June 5, 1994.

The deficiencies.were.of concern as ... * *

mechanical*maintenance and ra~iation protection personnel

' had just informed operations* department personnel that the* -

containment was ready for c 1 oseo.ut inspection.

. *

• *

Among the items found in *containment were bags of tools~ ...

ladde,rs; .flashlights, plastic bags, .attachments for*var:ious *

hand power tools, and pieces of debris scattered about on

"different cotitairiment:~levations~.

-

Further diScussions found that. *sorile. 'of t_he tools were staged .

for motor-operated *valve *testing . that was to be performed ..

• with the unit.in Hot Shutd6wn.

This ~as *n apparent

.

.

miscommunication,_since the operations.supervisorbelieved ..

this-equipment would be removed from containment until _ .

. testing was se~ to star~.

The inspector found the 1 icensee' s pr6g.ram for performing -

containment closeout was not fully effecti-ve .. Although the

. licensee's checklist 1.3, "250# Heatup Checklist Containment

- Building," Rev.24, required removal of transient equipment

.*

9

.*

. '.":

and*other loose material from containment pri6r.to Plaht-:.

• ~tartu~, there was no mechanism, ~ther than verbal.

,notification to *a~erations department, that ~ther .pl~nt

_departments had the areas clean and. ready for conta~nment. *: .

..

. *..

. ~

closeout inspection.

The inspectors were concer_ned ~i th* the . - ...

lack of coordin.ation between station departments during_ the*

• .'

"'**

. containment close*out.

. . . ,,

• • ~:* ...

This matter is considered ari u*~resolved Item pending further_** .

review by the .licensee and .the NRC (50-,255/94008-0l(DRP. * ... * .To facilitate timely resolutio~ of thii item, the licensee:** * has agreed to* respond in w_riting within 60 days to descrjbe .* **

• . * what actions are* planned to ensu.re future con ta i nll'!!:!nt . *

, ... = .. - . closeouts w.i ll be ef feet i ve. .. . . . . . .. . . ... "

• 2)

. The *c1e*anli'ness of.-the ~'West",safeguards- rooni w_as no.t :' ' . . .. tommensurate with the. rest of.the.auxiliary building, -:.<'. . . . especially in the area of the Shutdown Cooling heat. : '.. . ..

• exchangers. :some ~xamples were ladders not ~ec~red properly**
• and personnel protective clothing being on the . fl oar . and not * * *

in the proper $torage bag.

, g.. Radiological control-s. (71707) -... . The inspectors verified.lhai pers~nriel were following health -~ .'physics procedures for.dosimetry, protective cloth.ing,. frisking,.* .. posting, etc.,_ and r~ndoml_y examined radi.ation prote~tion ~ " - * *

• --~

instrumentation for use, operability, and calibratio_n. . ' One unresolved item was iden-tifled.: No v*ialations, deviations, or *

• in~pection followup items were identified in this area.*

4. Safety Assessment/Oyality Verification (40500and 92700) The i nspect'or noted. that a management advisory group,_ .cons 1st ing of four senior nuclear executive$, was*scheduled to perform an independent outside assessment of Palisades' performance progress du.rfog the._wee.k of".* . * *

• June 20, 1994.
• *
• *

Through dtrect observations;*discussions with licensee personnel, and review pf records, the fo 11 owing Licensee Event Reports ( LER) were . reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective.action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevel"!t recurrence had been or would be accomplished .in** accordance wi~h Technical_ Specific~tions (TS): . . ctJosedl LER 255/94001: f~il~re to maintain minimum pressure in the_** . . * 'Contra l . room with the HVAC- system in the emergency mode because 'the . .

• intake plenum was plugged with. ice _and snow.

On January 21, 1994, while

the plant was at 100 ~ercent power, operations department personnel were

performing monthly surveillance test M0-_33, "Control Room Ventilati_on . :Emergency Operation," Rev.3, on the "B" train and observed that control* 10

• -

_ ... * .

• ,

-*.

• ..

' ... * ..

• , ..
  • .

i

.*: *.

• f*'

.. * . room pressut~ had dropped to 0.07 inc~es water'~~uge.{WG) pressure~** The procedure .requires that* control room* pressure be greater. than or equal to 0.125 WG. The licensee attempted to place- bo.th "A and B!'_ * ._. trains of .control room heating, ventilation,_ and air toliditioning {CR * HVAC) systems in the emergency mode .and was unable *to maint~in the 0.125 WG pressure. T.he licensee dee] ared both trains. of* CR HVAC. inoperable. * * . . . and entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. '.... .. . . -.. . . . . _,. . . . . ,*.

• *Subsequent i nvesi i gat ion found that . the :common i ntak~ :*pi en um was clogged . *.

with ice and snow~ Plant workers removed the ica and:snb~ from the .. ~ ~. *

• plenum intake screen :and control room pressure was*.restored .withiri *a few
• ..

.minutes and the licensee exited Technical Specification 3.0.3.* *.*

• . *

~ - . - . . . . . . rtie.*"1.nspect~r found *ihe lic.ensee: t..ook ap'p*ropriate J>'reventive. actions.*.

• *
• , Those ac.tiOns*included changing .M0-33 to rec*ord control.room pressure**

- ... from. once per ten .hours to once per hour .. ~ 'in* addjtfon,. the. Mce:nsee . * , changed the al arm response* procedure* to instruct operators to *inspect.-.*

• the plen~m int~ke for blockage.if control room pressure' is lo~. *Thi~ *

item is closed. . . . ". * .

, * *

• *

.. ... * . . '*: . CCJOsedl' LER 255/92029: Inadverte~t. act i vat iori of left channel" sequencer caused by _operator* error. On April 4, \\992, an oper-ator opened the output breaker of Diesel Generator (DG) 1-1 *without. first paralleling

• • the alternate power supp*ly to* bus

11lC 11 .as required by Standard Operating Procedure 22, Section 7~5.4. 1his resulted in d~-energization*of bus .. 11lC, II re~closing of the DG 1-1 ou_tput b~E!aker, .and activation of the>*

• [eft Channel Norma*l Shutdown Sequencer.-

The- lic~nsee's correcti.ve .. * . *

• actions for this incident wer~ to discuss tbe importance of procedural .~.

~ compliance with. all shifts and t.o discipline the operator wh.o made the** . * * ** * error.

• *

.. This incident was *one of. five examples included in*a viol at.ion iS$Ued in"* _ *Inspection Report* No: 50-255/92015 *for failure to follow procedures.

• . The generic . issue of :procedure compliance at Pa 1 i sades is a*ddressed in

the licensee's response to this ~iolation. :This item is closed~.

• *

CClosedl LER 2S5/92020: SIS* check valv*e leakage PCVs were not closed by

• each SIS channel as. assumed ln ~nalyses. On Ma~ch 3, 1992~ the l~censee
• . discovered .that four -safety injeetion header pressure control val yes .

. (PCVs), wf\\ich should have each .been closed by each safety injection* . . .. signal (SIS) channel, were arranged with ,two close~ by one SIS_ channel * and two closed by the .other. The four PCVs are *required to. ~lose on* an

• *_SIS to prevent diversion of high pressure ~afety injection.* (HPSI)._ flow .

. : Tbis condi~ion had'be~n previously ideritifi~d i~:1988. *Howeve~~:i~e resolution was to.use the.normal PCV pressure.controllers to assure valve closure rather than to modify* the $IS circuitry. These pressure contro 11 ers were non~saf ety /non-en vi ronnienta 11 y qu*a 1 if i ed, and therefore . cannot be relied upon to ~nsure that th~*PCVs re~ain closed.

.. ** . . . ' . - . . In April 1992 the PCV.control circuits .were modified such that both SIS channels provided a close signal to each PCV. This item is closed~ 11

• • ... **

.. :.

• • <:

. *- .. . . -. . . .

• • ...

~ ... - **-*

• ... - '-

. *.. . ~ . **.* No vfolations, *deviations, unresolved*, or inspect~on followu'p items were .. identified in this area.-*. - . . s .. *:Maintenarice/Surve_i*llance. (S2703 & 61726) . -... ' .

.

-::-* a. * Maintenance Activities (~2703}. *. . *. , . -~ Routinelyi station mainte~ance activiti~s ~er~ observed and/o~. * revi~wed to ascertain that they wer~ conducted- in accordance wi-th * ;. ~ *

• • .approved procedures*, reguJ atory guides and i11dustry codes or

. *. * * . . standards,_ and i!l conformance wit~ technical *specifications. "

• ..

- ' ,. . The following .items were: also *cons.idered .*dlJrfng -this. rev1ew*: .*

_, ..

. ":.: l imitin'g. conditions for. operation were met ~hi le' components or: . :- . . . systems were removed from service*; approv.als were .obtained_~pr1or .

• **

to initiating the work; functional testing *and/or calibrations .. . were performed prior to returning *components or systems. t_o: .. . *. . service; quality control *'records were maintained; and activities.*: .. *. wer:e accomp l i she_d by qualified personnel . * .

- * -.. * b. . " - -.-: .. f

• ,~

L ' .'* -. ~ .: * -.:

• .

• ,

Port ions of the fo 11 owi n9 maintenance act.i vi ti es ~ere observed and rev.f ewed: * _ "

• * *

-'i. J .. ! 1}' * Work Order. 24303995: * Perform yearly inspedion of spent .* fuel pool c_ran~:* . * . .. ~.- . ; . . . - : '... -: . .--*;* ' . . 2) * Work* Order 24410673: Perform miscellaneous mechanic.al *work.*. . ,. ...

• * as directed by Consumers-*Power Company. * This .work *.order was*"

. :* ** .. -* -the control ling docunient used 'to document various dry fuel ' .. * .. storage project preoperational activities *(see P.aragraph a**. '" . of th.is report) ~

• *

.* Surveillance Activitiei {61726) .

• ~During *the inspection period,* the inspectors obse*rved tech~ical

specification required surv'eillance test.ing'and v.erified that. . .. . " .* .. I " .. ; i . ,. '! - I

• testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that

test instrumentation was calibr~ted, that results confrir~ed*with: technical specification~ and procedure requirem~nts and*~ere * reviewed, and that any defici.encies ident.i.f.ied during the testing .. ** -c .

.. :

were properly resolved. *.

• .

.. . . . . . ~h~ i~s~ecto~s also witnesse~ or reviewed.portion~ of :the* fo 11 ~wing surveil 1 ances: * 00-6. "Co 1 d Shutdown Va 1 ve Test Procedyre Clncl ud*i nq Containment Isolation Valves>~" Rev.23 t ._. .* - 2) * ... * QO-i9* .. *rnservice Test Procedure "". HPSI "p~mp and 'E:ss Check' }alve Operability Test.* Rev.11

12 . ~- .. **-- '-.** .... . . . -i

• ......

j . i \\ .. j

• '

.. " \\ . I i 1 i .l j j

• ----~ ... ..,... .......

'.r

... * . r- ,. __ ..

". " .~

• The.inspector observed the.licensee's troubleshooting when

High Pressure Safety Injection {HPSI) pump P-66A failed to

• meet minimum flow requirements dufing testing.

The minimum * flow required ~as 30 gpm through the discharge orific~.-* The. flow rate during the test was approximately 12 gpm. The licensee ct'rained .-the fluid from the p~mp di sch'arge* to the orifice, *replaced the orifice, and retested the pump. The inspector- noted t_he . fo 11 owing: .. Step. 5.3.6;e instru_cted -the *op~rat.Qr to.record pump discharge temperature "~.~~n the pump-casing at the

• . location identified b.Y T or as identified by the'

.

• _*_ .. system engineer.".-*Neither of the two a*uxiliary

.

operators. knew what the "T" *meant~. indicating this**_ ~tep needed clarification .. The operators did:recei~e . instruction froin the system eng_ineer.* ' . .

. . . ' . . . . . . .. Step. 2 .. 4 of "Attachment -2 instructed th.e operator to . 'lightly tap miniflow check valve CK-ES3340 .. Tha*

• .

operators obtained a piping .and* instrument diagram to .* identify the valve. since -the valve was not l_abel_led. * Although the lack of proper labelling was a problem,

• . operafors *took** the proper action..

. . . . _.After replacing._the orifice, the licensee ran three tests* ..

• - and each had satisfactory re$Ult$ indicating the orifice w*as

. :*-_probably blocked. 'However, the licensee found no evidence . __ * of blockage of .the ori gi na l orifice. : The* licensee remqved* and ex*amined .the original orifice,' *and used a boroscope*to* inspect- accessible piping upstream and downstream from the*

• *remqved orifi~e and found no ~lockag~ or debris.

In order to assure adequate minimum flow, _the license~ -* .. performed additional daily testing of the pump *for *one week* and found nQ other significant performance pr_ob l ems..

13 . : ~ . -- . *.,

• ' ..

~- '. '. ~- . '*t .. ~ - . ._ ---~"<'- .

- During the performance of RI-47~. 'step 5.'12.4~ the. reactor .. operator was required to verify that a control rod could be** withdrawn while in *the manual individual *rod drive control * system mode. _At this time the operator-withdrew a si_ngle control rod less than 2inches to verify'that the control . rods could be withdrawn," .and then subsequently*il)serted the *.*. control rod back to "its.original position of fully inserted ... * . . . . ' . . . . " - ~ . . . . ,, Technical Specifications 1.0, Defin.itions, Hot Standby,** *

• .states:

"The reactor is cQnsidered to.be in a hot standby . condition** if. the average temperature of the prim(lry coolant (T.v.) is greater* than 525°F and . any* of the contra l rods. are*. -

• * .. withdrawn and the neutron flux power r.ange i n~trumentat ion .

. 'indicates less than 2% Qf rated power~ n . . . . ' .. .

• ~ .. *The inspectors had the fo 11 owing c.oncerns: ~<

' * ' . . Neither the SS or th'e CRS were aware that the . operator

• . * wfthdrew a control rod or that the pr~cedure, RI~47,

'. - r_equ ired a part i a 1 wi thdrawa 1 ** of a cont ro 1 rod to . verify no rod withdrawal prohibit (interlock) ex.hted.

• When the surveillance was authorized; neiiher th~ SS**

. or CRS were aware that at. the .cone 1 us ion of the J & .C * . surveillance the operator would be directed to ... ' * withdraw a control rod. lhe CRS was not ale~ted to .* the .required con~rol rod -movement when he .. authorized . performance .of RI-41, ~i Sections l~~ though 4.'0.did * not ac~howledge that a contrril rod ~ithdrawal_ or a *. mode change would be 'required. . . ' . . . . ' .

• The reactor operator did not notify the SS or* CRS when

he performed_ Step 5.12.4- of Rl-47 by withdrawing the

• .*

co.ntro 1 rod. ' In -reviewing plant conditions durfog t"he performance of this ' evolution, the inspectors noted that the high pressure *

safety injection pump, P~6A, was declared inoperable, due to .. *its inability to provide minimum flow through the . . recirculation line. Technical Specifications 3.0.4. ~tates that: "Entry into. a reactor _operating condition or ct.her specified condition shall ~ot be.made when the conditions for the Limiting Conditions for:operation are not met and

• the associated action* requires a shutdown if ~hey are not.*

met within a specified time interval." .lhus, plant

conditions were not appropriate under'the circumstances to go from Hot Shutdown to Hot Standby condit~ons. .

• ,
• .* *

ln addition, the inspectors noted* the following factors that** . ~ontributed to the concern: *

14

• -:-

..

.

. *-'*'*". \\"

-**

. ~ ... ' . . .. .. _.

• • .

• , ".,

~. . -

'* *. ,' . ,.

. Most notabl.Y, the failure of the reactOr operator to

• notify the sen tor reactor operator *of. the* cont ro 1 rod

. movement. :

• *
• *
• ** *

The lack of procedural guidance i°hat c.learly . .

• .

recognized the mode change or .controi.*rod withdrawal.

• * .. The failure to conduct a* prejob briefing to discuss

. * *.the requ i r~d procedtffe steps. *. *

Subsequent t~ the event /the l iCensee 'has* had .. extens"iv~ internal dial~gue to clearly define what ton~titutes control .* .

• rod withdrawal and to provide 'a basis for those assumptions ..... ~

Pendi~g revjew* by the NRC o(.the Hcensee's position. of what: * defines a rod withdraw,* the withdrawal of a control rod ... * *

• • .* (les*s *than two inches). on Jun~ 12,° 1994; .is *considered. an* .. *
• unresolved ._Item ."(so . ..:2ss/94008-02(D~P)) ~ *
• • .*One *unres~lVed item was ide.ntified. * No violattons, d*eviations, or*

inspection followup items were identified in thiS .area. . . . . . . . 6.. .* Jnqineerfng and Technical Sui>port (37700) a. * ** Spent* *Fuel* Pao 1 Crane Unexpectedly Stopped D~rirlg * Preoperat i otia 1 * .. Testing For Th~ Dry Fuel Storage Proj~ct ..

. * . * .. , .. o~. May 23, * 1994~ th*e i icensee i ifteci t.he Multi-Assembly Trans.fer < *.

• ** * * Cask (MTC) and the Multi~Assembly SeaJed Basket (MSB) out of the~

.cask washdown pit*with .the spent fuel.pool crane *cL~3) and . * * * .attempted to.mov~ the l~ad to it~ designated location in the SFP.': . During the 1 ift, L-3 unexpectedly stopped near the edge of the

• SFP:

The licensee returned.the load to the task ~ashdown ~it ~nd

• , commenced an investigation. The 1 i censee' s i nvest.i gat ion *

determined that the pro_blem was caused by operation of the two interlock override keys, designated as .Key Number 20.*and Key .. Number *21 an* .the L-3 control .. *box. The override keys allow certain. crane interlocks to be bypassed.so* that the crane can be. moved over the SFP. . . .

• The i rispectors revi e*wed this event and. d~termi ned that. the safety .
• .:significance was minor .. However, the.inspectors identified * . *

.* several problems associated with inadequate post-modification *

• ~- testing procedures, poor .. work: practices,* and lack of appropriate
• ' * . management i nvo 1 vement. * *

..

• *

, .

• -

' - - ._*The oper~tion of L-3 interlocks .. was*:designed.a~ folltiws:* ,, . -..

.~.:- * e :* * : When operated, .Key 20* *allows the main hook on L-3 to travel

.-. , *only over the cask foading area in the north end of the SFP. \\. '; . 15 ... _ .. " : -* ... *-..-..-........ -.... ~* .. '

- *' ... .'*.* . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . * .. :

. ) When operated, Key 21 a 11 ows no mov-ement of the main hook-- over any*part*of the SFP .. - When operated~ Keys 20. *and* 21 al lOw the.: main hook ori L-3 to . traverse th.e entire SF_P, includi.ng the ca$k .l.~adjng_area .. -- * The* licensee's *investigation found that the two override k~Y~* were electrically reversed~ such that Key 20. functioned. as Key 2f:a.nd *.*. ' vi~e-versa. Thus when the licensee attempted to move the m~in' .. hook on L-3 to the cask laydown area **with Key 20, the crane _* **.stopped.

• *.*

_ _ . ,_

• __ The i nspe¢tors :determfoed that the. fun.ct i.oris of Key 20 *:and* 21. were*~ * ": * .
  • . electrtcally reversed during an unapproved modific~tion_th~t

-involved rewiring of the L-3 control box in 1986. At that-time,

• • *

. :* .the _l icerisee replaced the 1'."'3 control. box with an updat~d analog

• * . "~on_trol Chief" transmitter/receiver.* Plant personnel involVed-
• with -testing the new transmitter/receiver found the two overricje *:

. . :*keys *were electrically reversed .as-received froin the" vendor~. ._ .

• . -: Pl ant personnel resolved the prob l eni by reversing . the wiring i l'I * *
• *

the L-3 control box. Althoug~- the keys operated properly after *

• the r~ver~al, no documentation was generated to record the change.

'No design change was 1mplemented arid no drawings were_. updatecj_ ..... Furthermore, had a design change been implemented, plant personnel ** .- ** * _would have.likely changed the panel wiring on the crane rather ... ,. *" than* in the control box.- Correcting the panel wiring would h"ave

- .

been the preferred method of repair sinc"e the .spare. control boxe's .* would not nee~ to be reconfigured .. * *

.*

• The undocumented wirin~ chan~e in i986 remained :in pl~c~ tintil the

recent modification_ of L-3 performed in 1994 under.Specifi.C:ation- Change (SC) 93-094. Part of SC-93~094 called for updating the. * * analog L-3 control bo~ to a ~ew digital model. Wheri the new

• *.
• control boxes wer~ ordered .under SC 93-094, the vendor configured

the control box identical to the earlier analog design. * * ... ~ Consequently, the keys on the new control boxes operated i.n the. incorrect fashion.

• * *

. . .

. . The in~pe~tor reviewed the licensee's investigation ~nd.jdentified *

• -the following root causes:

' .. . ' . . .

• * .
• The pl ant modi fi cation process *was not used." to_ document. the

wirin~ ~hanges made to the control box in 1986. Hence,.no do.cu_mentat ion existed to reflect the change in the plant drawings or the vendor files .. Further, th~ modi.fication *

• *process~ would likely _have identified the p~eferred method ,-of

repair beirig changes to the panel wirjrig* versus changes to the c~ntrol box wiring._

• *

The:~rocedure for testing the ~rarie following the rec~nt . modification in 1994 was inadequate since there were no * 16

c.

., .

-**

-.

..... ' . *,. instructions to test or.verify proper opera.t1on. of the SFP interlocks.

• *
• **

Work* instruction * WI-sc..:.93-094-01, "Sp.ent Fue*{ Pool Crane .Control Chief Modification," Rev.3, Step 8.4 .required . electrical maintenance personnel.to satisfactorily. perform* an operational check of the* crane. via a separate work **.

• *

instruction, WI-MSE.:.E-07, "Overhead Crane.Electrical -- *. * . Inspection," Rev.O .. However; WI-MSE-E-07 did not have ... explicit instructions to test .. the SFi> an.d. task l ~ydown areji ..

• interlock bypass*keys.: .. The only requirement was to verify__

that "contro.l station*switches" at Step 5.1.2, and "crane .. *.

• limit switches" .at StepS~l.3, operat¢dproperly .. The

.. instructions were a bare outline of what. was required~ with . no detaill or acceptance criteria to gui~e*maintenante '*

. personnel through the' various .. checks. that needed *to be :' . performed. . . . *

• ..
• ** * *

. Although they checked that both .. keys al.lowed .the. main *hook*.

• on L-3 to ,traverse the entire SFP, the crew that performed

the post-modification testing on May 6, 1994, onli

* * .. * *

arbitrarily checked one of the.keys for the north end of the

• SFP.

When one key did not a 11 ow movement of the ma lf'.l hook . , over th~ north end of the SFP, they tried the other,* without . *noting -which ke.Y they had used to allow the interlock to be ..

bypassed.

Th.ey *failed to verify that Key .Number 20 *operated.

• as inte.nded, and that Key*Nu111ber .. 21 operated a_s intended.' *

. : The inspectors. found* over.s i gilt . by. maintenance' and : . : << . erigi neer.i ng supervisors was -1 acki ng .. No supervisors w_ere present to observe the testing during the May 6, 1994, 'post- modification testing o~.L~3 crane.

• '

' .. ',\\. ..

....

The ~nspectors determined that th~ licensee rem~i~ed t~ compliance. : * * *

with the Tech~ical Spe~ifications (TS) during this e~ent. The * *. *: . applicable TS,* 3.2Lt.d, required that .heavy loads shall not be *" . * *

• ... moved over the 649 foot elevatio.n of the _auxili~ry building (SFP .. * .. *
• floor) unless no fuel h.andlfog**operations were in progress and, .

.

. . r .* .

• '.:_

Th.e L-3 interlocks* were* operable or . . . . ~ . '* ., . :** The L-3 interfocks were .bypass*ed and un~er the.* administrative control of a supervisor. . ..

• .

. . '* . . *- In this instanc*e~ no fuel handl.,ing was in :progre.ss .. 0 The L:..3* .

• • interlocks were. effectively bypassed with the fund ions* on the L'.73 .

. . . control* box reversed *. A *heavy load*s supervi.sor was. present and .in cont~ol during the. entire evolution.

• Safet~ ~ignificancewas.minor since .at no ti~e was a h~avy loa~

moved over or. in danger of moving over fuel. sto_red in the SFP. .17

• ~*-

-* -- -----

.... ... .~ .. *. . - ... ' ., . .* ~ ' .... i: ... :

• .

... .. . .

. . .. . .* . . .. *

• * .* All other prerequisites of c~ane operation had beeri ~u~filled- '

... prior to beginning the evol~tfon.. .

,

. *. , -The failure to thoroughly test the L-3 crane during a 1994 . * .. ~odificatiori,* including the control box override keys, to assure .*. the. interlock/override. keys functioned. as designed,. is considered' .- - . . .. a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control ,. (5.0-255/94008-03(DRP)):

• . .

.- .. _.

• . _

. _-- - . . . The licensee inip l emented appropriate corrective ~ct ions. as warrarite.d by this event:* The corrective actH>ns* included:* ... . . . . - . . . '- .. - 4t .* " C~rrect i ng the wi ~i ng prob le~ .*with .the keys . . . , .

Reviewing test d~c~mentat"ion to ensure:lhat other.aspects of crane operation were properly tested; and

• ,_
• * * *clarifying the scope. and.intent o(WI-MSE-E-07.* *
• .. One viOlation was- identified.' .No *deviation~, unresol~ed, .or* .-irispectio*n
• followup items we~e identified _in this *area. * **

- _ " . .* ..

• *** .: -1.*
• pry Fuet stor*aqe ActiV-ities (42ioo, *a670Q) *

~. . . "' . . . . . .. . . -" , . *' ,..,.

\\,',"

. The.i!lspector reviewed the lice~see's:inspecfion and m~inten.ance results,.:*

• ._*:for components involved in .heavy-load li.ft applications. for the dry fue1 < * **

storag~ project. Included in: the review were no*ndestructi.ve examination * .. *. (NOE) results of .critical components or highl}" stressed welds*, and * * preveritive maintenance results. on the *spent fuel pool crane (L-3). The 1nspector identified no significant problems.

• -
• The inspector r*evi ewed the licensee's. package of NOE reports documented*

in procedure CLP-M-6, "Inspection of Heavy Load Lift Devices," Rev.2.- .

• The licensee performed vi sua 1 exalili nations (VT), magnetic . part i cl_e * * .

testing' (MT), *and 1 iquid *dye penetrant *examinatiOns (PT) i.n acco.rdance

with_- the prOCE!dure; on the f() l lowi ".g compo_nents:.

.- . . .. ,,_.. Structur~J Li.d Hoist Rings (VT) -.. ** ~ulti-Assembly Sealed Basket Spread~r Bari (VT)* ~* Multi-Assembly Transfer* Cask Lif.tfngYoke (MT) -: :'* .

• • _ . -*.

.-:*

• • .

Muiti-Assembly Transfer.Cask (MT) . *.: .. -

Spent Fuel Pool _Crane Main H_ook (PTf: * . *

-~* . . . - .

Spent Fuel Pool Cr~ne Auxiliary Hook (PT)" 18 .-* . .. ~ ."

.*. . **,: ... ** ~~ . . ' . _*.

• ,:

.. These i terns were reviewed with records *for the spen~ fu*e l pocl'l

• crane as ~esc~ibed below.

In addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's preventive* , mainte_nance records for spent fuel pool crane L-3, last *performed in* .. --.. January 1994 .. The work was performed according to procedure.MSM-M-13,* .. . ** . "Overhead Meehan i cal Crane Inspection,-" Rev .17. . The documentation* showed that most components asso.ciated.with the bridge, trolley;

• auxiliary hofst, .and main hoist were inspected .with satisfactory

res~lts. S~~e. minor items were identified and.dispositioned with work* * ~ _ orders; _The work orders were completed prior to commencement* of dry fuel .: ... * *

• • loading.--

.:*

.. .. *:* ... -"N~ *v.i ~*i at ions, d~vi at'ions,. un.resol ved, *. o~ *inspect i.on *iol l owup .items were * ..

• **identified fo this area~
• .. . . .

,.

• _ .

.. -. . : ... ** 8. Report Rev*i ew *

• .*-*

' 9.' .* '* During. the in*spection .period, .the inspectors reviewed the licensee's monthly operating report for May .1994. The. inspectors confirmed that the information pro~ided met the repbrting requiremen~s of TS 6.9.1.t arid Regulatory Guide 1.16, "Reporting of Operating information." **." . . . . . . . . ' . ' ' . ~:N6 violations~ devi~tions, unte~olved, or,inspection.followup items *w~re*- identified in this area. .. . ., .

• ' ::_

Unresolved Items

..

• • Unresolved items are matters ab~ut whi~h m.ore jnforma~ion is requ}red in - *

order to ascertain whether they are acceptable item.s, viola:tions, or* deviations. Unresolved* items-disclosed during the inspection are. ~iscussed in paragraphs 3.f and 5.b.

' ' . 10. . Meetings and Other Activities (30703).

• .

'. '. Exit Interview (30703) ' . ' . . ' . . . . The inspector~: met with the li~ensee represeiltati~es*d~~oted in* paragrap~ 1 durfng the inspection period. and at the conclusion ~f the * inspection. on June 30, 1994 .. The inspector.s summariied the- scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of. this .. inspection report~ The licensee atknowledged:the information ~nd did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during.the inspection * . could . be considered proprietary_.. in nature~ . -* *

.. ,

• .**"

- 19

• ~

. .. _,. }}