ML18054B523
| ML18054B523 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1989 |
| From: | Johnson B CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9004060082 | |
| Download: ML18054B523 (35) | |
Text
- .
consumers Power*
POWERINli
/llllCHlliAN"S PROliRESS General. Offices: 1945 Wast ParnaU Road, Jackson, Ml 49201 * (517) 788-0550 March 29, 1990 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT
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1989 ANNUAL REPORT OF FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS Attached is Consumers Power Company's Annual. Report describing the Facility Changes (FC), Specification Changes (SC), tests and experiments declared operable in 1989, final closeout in 1989 or in the first quarter of 1990 in the first attachment and those initiated in 1989 but not declared operable or closed out in the second a*ttachment.
This report is submitted :Ln accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.59(b).
Brian D Johnson Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, NRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment
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ATTACHMENT Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 1989 ANNUAL.REPORT OF FACILITY. CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS
- *March 29, 1990 33 Pages
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,1 FACILITY CHANGES, SP~CIFICATION CHANGES, TESTS ANO EXPERIMENTS
- DECLARED OPERABLE IN 1989 FINAL CLOSEOUT IN 1989 OR*IN THE FIRST* QUARTER OF 1990 189 ~NNUAL REPORT OF MOOS/Ll02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Fac111ty Changes, Spec1f1cat1on Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 2
. FC-786 This mod1fication covered Phase 1 of the installation of Excore Nuclear Instru-ment Instrumentation at Palisades *.It involved removal of the Startup and Wide Range Detectors/Preamplifiers in Containment, replacing them with EEQ Detec-tors~ Detector Junction Boxes, Normal Service Environment Qualified Preamplifiers and Detector Interface cabling.
Safety Analysis Summary
- The replacement.Excore Neutron Detectors are qualified to meet LOCA and Seismic Specifications at Palisades. The detectors were designed to interface with a.
standard amplifier and existing NI drawers as.Phase I of the Wide Range Excore
- . System.
The replacement detectors and amplifiers are compatible with existing NI cabl1ng and drawers used in the RPS panels in the Control Room.
All RPS trips and interfaces are not affected by this modification.
No change.to any safety functions related to the E~core Neutron Monitoring System resulted from this modification.
The equipment reliability, quality and
_performance have been enhanced, assuring system availability and confidence.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a d1fferent type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR is not created.
The function of the Excore Monitoring System is not altered; therefore, the..
.. margin of safety, as defined in the basis _for any Technical Spec1f1cation, is not reduced. It does pro vi de greater assurance of Ex core operabi"l 1 ty, improv-ing LCO performance and neutron activity detection in the core.
. This Facility Ch~nge covered the ~dification to the 480V power so1Jrces and controls to allow Charging Pump P-55B to be fed from either safety BUS lC or
.lD, so that P-55B can be used as a backup.for P-55A or C.
This is done by.
adding a manual transfer switch for powering the P-55B pump from the P-55C power source.
Safety Analysis Sununary This -modification provides pump P-55B a backup source of power which increases
- the probab111ty of meet1ng Technical Specifications and LCO requirements, and the probab111ty of an accident previously evaluated 1n the FSAR 1s not
- increased.
The probability or the consequences of a malfun.ct1on of equipment important to safety is not increased. All changes were made to Charging Pumps P-55B and C only, and affect only the switching of power and controls between the two pumps.
No other equipment or system is affected.
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 3 FC-859-1 This Facility Change covers modifications to restore the Primary Coolant System
- cold leg drains on loops 2A and 2B to an operable configuration, replacement of drain valves with a new type valve, and added spectacle flanges downstream of the valves to serve as a positive isolation against Primary system leakage to the PCS Drain. Tank.
Safety Analysis;Summary
- The piping downstream of *the PCS drain valves had been capped off to 'prevent.
- leakage to the drain tank because of leakage through the PCS drain valves.
This modification restores the piping configuration to nonnal with the addition
. of _the spectacle flange. A stress analysis of the piping has been *performed.
Since_ the function of draining *the PCS through these lines is not required to*
mitigate any accident, the safe shutdown of the plant will not be affected.*
Because the PCS drain valves are shut during ~ower operations, this modifica-tion has no affect on normal operation. All design and procurement activities*
are consistent with the plant design basis, as described in the FSAR and the Palisade~ Administrative Procedures.
fC.;862 This-.modification covers the replacement of the-Pressuriz~r Quench Tank pres- -
sure t_r*ansmitter and indicator with new instruments that provide improved
.. reliability.
Safety Analysis Summary Because this modification provides for improved operational reliability, the replacement of the transmitter and indic-ator does n*ot increase the probability or consequences of an ac~ident ~reviously evaluated-in the FSAR.
Also, the probability or consequen~es of a malfunction of equipment important to safety i.s not increased by this modification.
The possibijjty *of. an. acc-ident or.malfunction of a different type than any
. previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
The new instruments provide *greater accuracy with improved reliability~
FC-866 This modification covered the installation of steam traps to the Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply Piping to the K-8 Turbine, and the K-8 Casing Drain Piping. These traps will drain condensate from the piping and equipment to prevent water damage to the turbine during startup.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
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Safety Analysis SU1Rmary The probability/or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased by this modification. The steam traps are intended to drain tlie condensate out of the steam supply piping and turbine casing during K-8 standby, warm-up, and operating conditions. This function reduces operator action during K-8 startup.
- The probab i1 ity of ma 1 function of equipment important to safety is not in-
_creased by this modification.
The new steam traps are designed and installed*
-in acc(lrdance with original plant design criteria and specifications. *The operating capacity of the Aux Feedwater Pump P.,.88 and the K:-8 turbine will not be changed.
It is possible that pump P-88 could be rendered inoperable due to
-.a failure of the new steam traps.
The traps could fail open or clo~ed due to sludge.buildup, high differential pressure, worn valve seat, clogged inlet strainer or collapsed float.
If a.trap fails closed, the undrained condensate could potentially damage the turbine internals during startup; however, it
_would not prevent start'up. Operating Procedures allow the K-8 turbine to be started without draining the condensate from the-turbine casing;* thus, a closed
_trap would be. no -different than prior condition *
. If a trap fails open (or loses it's prime), a small amount of steam could blow through the trap -to the drain. This would not significantly reduce the steam supp'ly to the K-8 turbine until many hours into the accident when the turbine is run on low steam pr'essure. Operator act ion to isolate the steam traps can be taken at any time after _turbine startup.
Steam discharging from a failed..:open trap to the drain could potentially damage the motor-driven Aux Feedwater Pump (P-8A).
This. potential problem has_ been
-minimized by designing the steam trap d!"ain line.-to limit the thermal (steam) discharge-into the room.to less _than that produced by the current operation of the P-8A motor.
These indirect effects-will be minimized through regular inspections and l'!_laintenance on the traps~ -..
The consequences of_a malfunction-of equipment important to safety is not
- increased by this modification.
The operation of the K-8 turbine will be enhanced by eliminating the requirement to manually open/close the turbine
- casing drain valves prior to startup.
- FC-880 This Facility Change covers the modification which installed redundant Contain-ment High Pressure (CHP) and Containment High Radiation (CHR) relay contacts to assure activation of the Control Room HVAC Emergency System in the event of an accident or loss:of. power to'the CHP/CHR protective relays, and to protect against a singie failure of the relays.
The circuitfunctions remain the same, with added reliability.
- '89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/ll02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes,, Tests and Experiments Page 5 Safety Analysis Summary
. The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not in~*
- creased since the added contacts. provide redundant functions to those in the preexisting relay circuits..
The consequences of an accident previously evalu_ated in the FSAR are not increased since no additional equipment or new functions are introduced by this modification.
- .The probability of malfunctions of equipment important to safety is decreased since redundant functions of existing equipment are added, preventing the possibility of a single failure o.r malfunction.
This modification increases the reliability for the activation of the Emergency HVAC System for the Control Room; therefore, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety are not increased.
- The probability* of an accident of a: different type than any previously evaluat-ed in the FSAR is not created.
The.possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR i's not created sinc_e the modification utilizes additional contacts.of existing-CHP/CHR relays to perform redundant functions which assure proper function of the required circuits for Emergency HVAC activation.*.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this modification. The modification* increases the margin of safety in the function required by the activation relays since redundant contacts will be used, preventing the possibility of a single failure of a CHP.
or CH R re 1 ay.
FC-886 This modification removed the open control seal-1.n feature from PORV Block Valves M0-1042A and M0-1043A to provide for reliable, positive control of.valve opening and allow for stoppage/closure.of'the valves prior to the full open
.position. -
Safety Analysis Summary.*
The only adverse effect of this modification is that it will require additional operator time to operate the valves in opening mode.
The close control seal-in will remain in place.
- The probability of an accident is not increased since the modification provides for more operator control and less likelihood.of PORV actuation. The probabil-ity of a LOCA has not been increased.
'89 ANNUAL RE PORT OF MODS/LI02
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- The consequences or an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not in-creased since this modification actually lessens the likelihood of inadvertent PORV actuation and any leakage through the PORV. if it popped open would be bounded by the small break LOCA analysis.
The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased.
The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. Should the PORV lift, the modification could isolate it more rapidly,because the open control.seal-in feature is removed.
The possibility of an accident, or the malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
- The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any !echnical Specification,
- is not reduced by this modificattori.
sc aa.:;194 This Specification Change allows the use of a 15 11 intP.eller filed back to 11/16" knife edge, or the 15!
11 impeller filed back to i" knife edge, on the Component Cooling Water Pumps *
. Safety Analysis Summary The original impeller on these pumps was a 15t" impeller backfiled to.*a 0.5 11 knife edge.
Pump performance testing, and EA-SC-88-184 show that.the 15 11 impeller ca!l meet FSAR Design Basis Accident (OBA) Post Recirculation Actuation s.ignal (RAS) flow requirement with no increased load on the pump motor.
The change of impe.ller diameter will riot-*increase the pr_obabilityof an acci-dent *as evaluated in the.FSAR (Section 14).
The Component Cooling Water (CCW)
System will sti 11 be capable of performing its. safety-related function as
- described in the FSAR.
The change in impeller diameter will not' increase the consequences of an accident pr~iously.,eva-luated.in FSAR.
One. CCW,pump with a 15 11 impeller can provide the required CCW Post RAS flow to the Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers,
. Engineering.Safeguard Pumps, and to the Charging* Pumps.
The probability of a malfunction of equipment impo!'tant to safety 'will not be
. increased since the CCW Pump equipped with a 15 11 impeller will not affect pump.
motor load.
Increased motor -load cou.ld. lead to the possibility of a pump trip*
due to overcurrent trip.
The consequences. of a malfunction of equipment important to safety wfll not be i'ncreased by this change.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MOOS/LI02
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 7 This modification ~ill not create an accident not previously evaluated by the FSAR since the CCW System will be capable of providing Post RAS required* flow.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical :specification, is not reduced by this modification since the.modification wi.11 not affect the operability of the CCW Pumps.
This Specification Change r~placed the sequencer reset push.buttons *with key~*
lock switches.
T~e new.switches were installed in the slots vacated by the push buttons.
The new switches will perform the exact function as the former swftch.
Safety Analysis Summary.
- The new switches perf arm the exact same fun*ct ion as the farmer switches..A key switch and a push button operate similarly and. are considered equivalent from
- the failure.standpoint.
. PriOr:to this modification, in each of the* four identical Station Battery Chargers (D-15,* D-16,*D-17 and 0-18) there was an AC, low voltage auxiliary relay which was used to provide annunciation to the Control Room.* The Control Room annunciator. was*c611111on for the four chargers, and read "Battery Charger Power Off".
Also, a DC low voltage auxiliary relay existed in each battery *
. charger. The relays were not wired into any circu'it. This mod1fication paralleled the contact from the existing AC low voltage annunciator input with the same type of contact from the existing DC low voltage auxiliary relay. *The annunciator window was changed to read "Battery Charger Trouble 11
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Safety Analysis Summary The addition of the contact.from the DC low voltage auxiliary relay does not.
. change the electrical characteristics of the existing circuit *.
J~ provides an additiona.l J.rtput for the annunciator.
The additior:t_of a parallel contact to the annunciator circuit does not increase.
the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The addition of this alarm contact does not increase the consequences of an.*
accident previously evaluated in th~ FSAR *.
The modification does not increase the probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety. The prior alarm*response for "Battery Charger Power Off" was to' send an operator to the battery chargers to determine which charger had a problem, and what the problem was.
The replacement alarm "Battery Charger Trouble" will have the same operator response.
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e CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Fac11 ity Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 8 SC-89;..037 and SC.,;89-262 This modification removed tubes from service in Steam Generators E-50A and E-508 using Westinghouse mechanical tube plugs. The tubes to be plugged were selected based upon the results of detailed analysis.
r Safety Analysis Summary Removing the de~ignated tubes from service decreased the possibility of a primary to secondary leak due to tube failure during operation.
Removing the tubes from service did not exceed the available plugging margin for E-50A or B.
EA-SC-89-037-01, Rev 1, defined that there is a *large margin
- of tubes which can still be plugged prior to requirfog further plant safety considerations.
The plugging was done using qualified plugs *and pro~edures.
Th.is modification removes suspect tubes from service and is a routine activity *.
Because of this modification, the probability nor the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated-in the FSAR is not_.. created.
The margfo of_ safety, as defined in the b*asis for any Technical Specification,*
is not reduced by this modification.. A Primary System flow measurement was *
. conducted i_n accordance -with the Technical Specifications to assure the Reactor coolant flow is consistent with the basis.for Specification 3.1.l(c).
SC-89-051-This Specification Change covered the replacement of TIA-0116 (Quench Tank Temperature)- to comply with additional requirements d*ue to Regulatory Guide.
1.97. The resultant loop has an increased temperature range (0"'-350°F versus*
0-300°F).
Safety Ana!Y!1s Summary This modifit~tion consisted of replacing TIA-0116, Quench Tank Temperature Loop Temperature lndkator. This indicator was given a human factors review to ensure compliance with accepted human factors criteria stated in NUREG 0700.
The loop* is nonsafety-related and is used for indication and alarm purposes only~
The range expansion covered by thfs modification is an enhancement, and the margin of safety is not reduced.
The possibility and consequences of an accident* are not increased.
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 9 The equipment is used only for indication/alarm purposes, and does not inter-face with equipment operation. Therefore, the probability and consequences of
.malfunction of equipment important to safety are not increased *..
The system configuration/function has not been changed.
Therefore~ no accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR has. been created.
SC-89-070 This modification installed.blank couplings downstream of the cold leg drain valves. This provides isolation of any leakage past the valves and becomes a primary system boundary.
Safety Analysis Summary The implementation of this modification establishes an internal "Blank" on the cold leg d.ra;-n lines downstream of the isolatfon valves. *Th.is moves the Primary Coolant System (PCS) Class I boundary downstream of the valves to the blank* coupling.
The new piping.and coupling meet all code requirements; therefore, the probability of a LOCA is not increased.
(The isolation valves will be left open during plant operations, eliminating any concerns regarding overpre~surization between the valves due to thermal expansion resulting in fncreas i ng i'nterna l pressures.)
Although the cold leg drains no *longer perfqrm as drain lines, the Primary System draining will still be accomplished by alternate means.
Since the function of draining the PCS through.these lines is not required to mitigate any accident, and the modification performs *as a pressure boundary for plant operation, the safe shutdown or operation of the plant.is not adversely affected *.
. SC-89-072 This modification installed a cap into th.e cold leg drain piping.on the Primary Coolant Sys-te~. The cap *was installed directly downstream of the isolation valves with the remaining drain piping butt welded to its back side. The isolation vi-1ves are left normally open and the cap will become the Primary System boundary.
- Safety Analysis Summary The implementation of this modification *establishes an internal "Blank" on the.
cold*leg drain lines downstream of the isolation valves. This moves the PCS Class 1 boundary downstream of the valves to the cap.
The new piping and cap meet all code requirements, and the probability of a LOCA is not increased.
Leaving the isolation valves open during plant operation eliminates any con-cerns regarding overpressurization between the valves due to thermal expansion 189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
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CONSUMERS *POWER COMPANY.:. PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 10 resulting in' increasing internal pressures. Butt welding the remaining cold leg d~ain piping to the back side of the cap keeps piping seismic design*
intact.
- Although the cold leg drains no longer perform as a drairi line,.Primary System draining is still accomplished by alternate means. Since the function of draining the PCS through these'lines is not required to mitigate any accident, and the modification will perform as a pressure boundary for plant operation, the safe shutdown or operation of the plant is not affected.
SC-89-087 This modification covers an upgrade of the Spent Fuel Handling. Machine Control System.
Safety Analysis Summary This modification consists of a variable setpoint to interrupt hoist* motion during an underload condition, and "Emergency Stop" control circuitry being expanded to include bridge, trolley, and hoist drive power 11 interrupt 11 when
. "Emergency Stop" is.manually activated.
The modification does not affect the operating envelope of this machine: -
- The *prob~~ilit~ or*consequences of a~accident previously evaluated in the fSAR are not.increased *. This.. modification assi.sts the operator in the ha11dling of fuel. It provides a hoist load* interrupt to assist operator visual observation *
- of a fuel bundle snag or hang-up* while operating.the hoist in the down.direc-tion. The modification-also ensures that 240VAC meto.r drive for the bridge,
- trolley, and hoist is interrupted *when the Emergency Stop" is activated.
~C-89-09~ ~nd.SC-~9-107
- This modification removed tubes from serviCe**in the 11A 11 and 118 11 St!!am Genera-tors. The tubes plugged exceeded the plugging criteria as spec*i~ied in the 1989 Steam Generator Eddy Current Test Outage Plan. Plugs used were Westing-
.. house -Mecha-Mcal or_-CPCo-*welded designs. Both. plugs are qualified and designed for use in Palisades Steam Generators *.
Safety Analysis Summary Removal of degraded tubes from servi~e decreased the probability of a Steam*
Generator Tube Rupture Event.
Plugging the tubes cannot affect any FSAR accident or the consequences of the accident except to decrease the probability by removing defectiye tubes from service.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 11 The probability ora malfunction to the Steam Generator, which is important to safety, will be decreased by plugging defective tubes.
This modification reinoved only defective tubes. from servke and has no affect on the con~equences of any Steam Generator failure, thus the consequences of a malfunction are not increased.
- Plugging only affects a Steam Generator tube rupture accident, and removal of defective tubes prevents that from happening in thos~ plugged; thus, the possibility of an.accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.
Plugging defectiv~ tubes is performed to prevent tube leakage.
No malfunctions*
of a. different type. are created.
Plugging *defective tubes prevents the defects in those tubes from falling below acceptable limits for this design. Thus, ~he margin of safety.is increased by fhis activity *.
SC-89-115 This modification covered splicing cables.in Cable Trays in Containment, and*
the installation of.a redesigned fire stop,.repairing damaged cables.
Safety Analysis Summary The Fire stop* had been installed to pr.event a fire originating in one tray system from traveling along a:n interconnecting tray and affecting the other tray system.* The probaMlity of a fire traveling* from one tray to another is decreased by installing the new fire stop.
The redesigned fire stop is similar tci the prior fire stop; thus, the con~e quences of a fire in the cable tray are not increased.
This modification does not increase the probability of a malfunction of equip-ment important to safety nor will it increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.
This modification does not increase the possibi Hty of an accident of a differ~
ent type thaa previously eva 1 uated in the FSAR s i nee the fire stop wi 11 prevent a fire traveling from one tray to another.
The replacement of the fire stop does not create.the possibility of a malfunc-tion of a different type than has been evaluated in the FSAR.
The Technical Specification margin of safety requires that the PCS not_be heated above 325°F unless pressurizer heater capacity is available. Since the splicing.of the pressurizer heater cables will take place when the plant is shut down, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 12 The Technical Speclfications also require fire barriers to be functional at all times or a fire watch established. A fire.watch will be established for the length of time that the fire stop is not functional; therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.
SC-89-124 This modification upgraded the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Discharge Pressure. Transmitter Loop as required to comply with Regulatory Guide L97.
The Pressure Transmitter and cable in the CCW,Room were replaced with environ-mentally qualified equipment.
The pressure indfcator/alann was replaced in ord~r to be compatible with the transmitter*outµut.
- Safety Analysis Summary The probability of.an accident previously>evaluated.in the FSAR is not in-creased since the. new equipment is functionally equivalent to the previous equipment.
The new transmitter and cable are enviror:mentally qualified and.
better able to perfo~m the intended function~.
The consequences of an.accident previously evaluated.in the FSAR are not*
increased because of the functional equivalenc~ and improved envirorvnental
-qualification of the new transmitter and*cable.
. The probabil.ity of malfunction of equipment. important to s_afety i_s not in-creased because *of the new equi pmerit.
The new equipment is functionally equivalent* to the previous equipment *. It
.~ill perform in the same manner and, therefore~ will not increase the conse-
_quences of.a malfunction of equipment important to safety.
No additional equipment was installed, and the replacement equipment is func-tionally equivalent; therefore, there is n0 possibility of.creating an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR *
. SC-89.,.182 This modification replaced the filter assembly for the Purification Oemineral-izer Pre-filters with a finer filter having greater capacity.
Safety Analysis Summary The probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident previously.
evaluated in the FSAR is not. increased by this modification.
The modification does not increase the probability of or the consequenc.es of malfunction of equipment important to safety.
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MOOS/LI02
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments The possibility of-an accident, or the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
Page 13 The filters are not addressed i~ the Technical Specifications;-t~erefore,.the margin of safety, as. defined in.the basis for any Te~hnical Specification, is not reduced.
- Th.is modification covers stuffing box 0-ring changes for High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI} and Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Punips. *This mod_ification increased the crossectional diameter, forcing the 0-ring to act like a gasket~
as opposed to active or dynamic sealing where internal fluid pressure causes the 0-ring to deform* and seal the gap between two surfaces.
Either mode of operation; passive or active, is acceptable for an 0-ring. A silicone based sea 1 ant is. used to fill sma 11 voi.ds in the surf aces of the components, thus aiding the 0-ring in sealing. in the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW}
Tank, Primary Coolant System.(PCS), or Auxiliary Feedwater pumps *.
Safety Analysis Summary The *a-ring replacement has no* impact on the probability of accident previously*.
. evaluated in the F.SAR.
The change does not affect the consequences of an accident previously eva l.uated '
in the FSAR.
The 1 ar.ger sized 0-ri ng will not induce any pressure stresses. The probability of malfunction, or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety ~ill not be increased **. *
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The possibility of an accident of a different type, or* malfunction of a differ-ent type,. than any previously evaluated in the FSA~ is not created *.
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The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is 11<>t reduced by this raod1fication because the performance of the pumps will not be aff~ctect by the change in 0-ring size_.
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
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-CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments SC-89-250.
This modification involved the injection of leak sealant in shield cooling system piping.
Safety Analysis Evaluation The probability of an accident previously evaluated in.the FSAR is ~ot in-creased by *this modification.
. The probability of a malfunction of equipment, or the consequences of a mal-
. funct1.on of equipment important to safety is nQt increased by this modifica.:.
- tion.
The sealant material* is chemically compatible with the pipe material, and the material adjacent to th9 defect. It can withstand accu~lated
- radiation doses in excess of 10
- betta/ga11111a and does not yield significant quantities of activation products under neutron.irradiation. The sealant does not pose any risk. of blocking the pipe under treatment, or.coating. the internal walls of the piping.
The plugs are. capable of withstanding several
- times the. operating pressure. of th~: cooling water system.
The modification d.oes not* create the possibility.of an.accident.of a different type, or a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. *.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Tech Specs i.s not.
reduced.
By plugging the leaks in the coll the modifi¢ation assures system operabi 1 i ty.
SC-89-279 This specification covers the redesigning and modificat_i.on of a*support on the
.steam supply line to meet code allowable requir.ements.
The hanger originally.. *
.. exceeded the code allowable design, well below the yield point of the hanger.
- SafetY Analysis Sununary The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been
. inc.reased by this.modification. The new hanger is designed.to meet th.e COcfe.
allowable requirements as described in the FSAR.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.have not been incre~sed as a result of this modification.
- 189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR-PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 15 The probability of-a malfunction, or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to sa~ety, has not been increased by this modification.
. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been created. The new hanger is a*
. conventional design which meets FSAR requirements.
The support was fabricated and installed on the piping while the piping was out of service.
The margin of safety *. as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this niodification.
Code requirements have been. met for this piping support, thus assuring the margin of safety.
SC-89-323 This modification was done to deenergize Reserve Transformer EX-9.
This reserve transformer is intended to allow inainteriance on Startup Transformer 1-2 during shutdown conditions *. Disconnecting this transformer from the breaker alleviates concern over transformer failure taking out all offsite power.
Safety Analysis Summary This modification has no.. effect on the probability or consequences of any accident or malfunction of equi.pment important to safety as previously de-*
scribed in the FSAR.
It does not affect the margin of safety as described fn.
t.he basis for any Technical Specifications. This transformer was.intended
- .solely as an alternate power feed and.has no safety significance.*
SC-89-327 This specification provid~s the option to change the length of.socket head setscrews on the Safety Injection Pumps and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.' The setscrews ar.e used as a means to circumvent a shift (axial) in the seventh stage impeller due to hydraulic or mechanically induced force.
Safety Analysis Summary
-This modifi-Eation dot:!S not affect the ability of *the High Pressure.Safety Injection (HPSI) or Auxiliary.Feedwater pumps to mitigate an accident as.
described iR-the FSAR.
The modifications will not increase the probability of such an accident.
Setscrew length does not affect the ability of setscrew locking the impeller to the pump shaft; therefore, the probability *of malfunction or* the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety 1~ not increased.
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
.e CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 16 Because this modification does not affect pump operability, the margjn of
. safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced.
SC-89-328 This modification. covers a reduction in time setting of Contr.ol Room Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) relays 62~3 and 62-4.
These relays.
delay the start of the Control HVAC. emergency mode upon a Containment High
- Pressure or Contaimmmt High Radiation signal-.
The loweri.ng of the time delay reduces dose levels.
Safety Analysis Summary The probability of an accident, or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in th~ FSAR are not increased because of this modification.
The probability of malfunction or the consequences of malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by this modification.
The possibility of an accident, or the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than *ahy previously evaluated in the FSA.R is not created.
- The margin.of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification,*
is no~ re*duced by this modification.
Special Test T-191
. The purpose of Special Test T-191 11Startup PhySi!=S Test.Program 11 is to obtain.
or verify certa.in reactor parameters and to compare these.values with Technical Specification requirements. and predicted values.
When mea.sured data agrees with predictions,. *confidence is gained that the urvneasured core properties would also agree with predictions used in the Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation supplied cycle specific safety analysis report.
This, 1n turn, provides confidence that the existing Technical Speci~
... fication liil-1ts and**assumedi!nvelopes of the FSAR continue to be applicable *
. T-191 began -Gn 11/26/88 with the commencenient of low power testing. T-191 testing was completed on 1/6/89 with the completion of the 90 to 100% r.eactor power testing. A copy of the Cycle 8 Startup Physics Test Report was forwarded to the NRC on 2/17/89 as required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.a.
Safety Analysis Summary The procedure obtains measured values for:
- 3) Control Rod Group Worths.
- 4) ARO Moderator Temperature Coefficient.
- 5) Flux Symmetry at +/-30% Power.
- 6)
Power Distributions at 40-50% and 90-100% Power..
- 7) ARO HFP Critical Boron 1 89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/.LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiinents Page 17 Concentration. Th-ese measured values are compared to predicted values and Technical Sp.ecification requirements *.
The scope of testing performed in T-191 is considered consistent with American National Standard ANS 19.6.1, 11 Reload Startup Physics Tests for Pressurized Water Reactors." T-191 scope is consistent with the description *in CPCo letter 11 DRR-20, Palisades Plant Physics Test Program 11 date.d 12/20/85 from James L Kuemin to Director NRR.
During performance of T-191, certain deviations from normal operating practice occur, as allowed by Technical Specifications 3.10 *and 3.1.3.
These deviations*
were only in effect for the time period required for the test to be performed.*
The procedure has estab 1 i shed necessary precautions and limitations to *ensure accura.te data collection and safe performance.
This special test did not increase the probability of an ~ccident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR were* not increased by this special test.
T-191 did not deviate from normal operating limits during testing which occurs *at greater than 2% reactor power; ttierefore, a-11 of the pertinent Chapter 14 FSAR events were bounded by analyses of.record.
For* the low power testing, T-191 allowed deviation from normal PCS temperature
. limit for criticality and froin' normal control rod operations limitations as allowed by the Technical Specifications *
. *For the low power testing,.it was determined that three FSAR *events potentially
- may not bound the allowed deviations from normal operating limits stated in*
Tec.hnical Specifications 3.10.7 and.3.1.3. There events are:
14.2 :.. Uncon-
_trolled Rod Withdrawal Event; 14.14 - Steam Line Rupture Incide'nt; 14.16 -
Control Rod Ejecti~n Incident~.
The potential for t~e FSAR 14.2~ 14.1~ and 14.16 ~vents not to bound the allowed deviations from normal operating limits as stated in Technical Specifi-cations 3.10.7 and 3.1.3 have not changed from the startup physics testing performed during previous cycles.
Parameters such as rod worth, moderator temperature coefficient, Doppler defect, delayed neutron fraction, and boron worth. have not changed to any degree which would question the validity of Technical Specifications-3.l.3.and 3.10.7 allowance to.deviate from normal operating limits ~uring low power physics testing.
The consequences of the 14.2, 14.14 and 14.16 FSAR events for T-191 testing which is done at less than 2% power may not be bounded ~Y the analysis of record.
However; the consequences of these events are not deemed to have increased from previous cycle startup physics testing and the evaluation and approval of this by the NRC is considered to.have been performed by Technical Specifications 3.1.3 and 3.10.7.
The probability and consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety has not increased due to this special test.
- ' 89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
CONSUMERS POWER CoMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes,* Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments.
. Page 18 The possibility*oran accident or a malfunction of a different type than those evaluated in the FSAR has not been created by this special test.
The margin of safety as defined in the Technical* Specifications has not been*
reduced.
While allowed deviations from normal control rod operating limits were increased, administrative controls were in place to* assure safe perfor-mance.*. The a 11 owed deviations from norma 1. control
- rod op er at tng 1 i mi ts were minimized and were only in effect for. the time* necessary to complete ttie less*
than 2% power testing.
Special.Test T~l95 The purpose* of this Special Test is to determine a PCS hot full power mass flow
. rate using t_he secondary calorimetric method.
- Safety.Analysis Summary The.calorimetric method for calculating PCS flowrequires the determination of bulk average temperatures in the cold and hot legs of the Reactor.
Because of incomplete mixing.in the Reactor upper p1enum and hot legs, temperature strati-
. fication may occur in the hot legs. Therefore, a correction factor is requtr.ed to adjust the indicated hot let temperatures to a bulk average temperature.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment *important 'to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR 1S not increased and the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type
- than any evaluated previously in the FSAR is not created.
The margin of safety, as defined the the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by the performance of this test.*
- Special Test T-201 This Special Test demonstrates performance capabilities of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C. It 1s a.high accuracy pump performance.measurement.
This test ts. intended-to.be used following maintenance that could affect*
- performance.
- Safety Analysis Summary The procedure demonstrates the performance of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, P-8C.
It was conducted within equipment design. Testing reduces ttie probabil-ity of a malfunction of equipment going undetected by demonstrating the pump* s performance.
Included in the test are optional measuring of bearing vibratiQn, optional measuring of bearing temperature, setting bearing coolant flow and taking pump discharge pressure data at a number of different flows.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of
- '89 ANNUAL R,EPORT OF MODS/LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments
- Page 19
- equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is-not increased by this test.
The testing does not introduce the possibiltty of an accident or malfunct~on of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.
- The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification i$ not reduced by thi$ Special Test.
Special Test T-203 This test demonstrates the performance* of the steam pressure controller -
-. (PCV-0521A) for the turbine drive_n Auxiliary Feed Pump (P-88) by measuring the
- steam pressure control stability.
Safety Analysis Summary _
The test.was conducted within equipment design and does not. affect the proba-bility or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
Testing reduces the probability of a malfunction of.equipment by demonstrating the equipment's performance, which includes measuring ste*am turbine in.let pressure during turbine start as a function of controller settings; measuring steani pressure as a function of CV-05228 valve position at minumum flow load; taking high accuracy pump discharge.pressure-data at *two different flows; and measurj ng the stability of the steam pressure control systen:is (PCV-0521 and *
- turbine governor).
- The_ possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previ-ously evaluated in ttie. FSAR is not created.
The* margin of safety, as defined in the basi.s for any Technical Spec_ification, is no*t reduced during this test.
Special Test T-285 This special test is run to demonstrate the flow conditions required for the onset of lo~ flow hydraulic instability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-BC. _This test. uses high accuracy flow and pressure measuring equipment..* It is performed for collect~9n of engineering design data only.
This special test was run when the Auxiliary Feedwater*system was required to be operable.*
Safety Analysis Summary
- A.
When the Condensate Storage Tank level is low (less than 100,000 gal inventory), performance is restricted to when the Primary System is below 325°F.
At that time, the Auxiliary Feedwater System is not required to be operable at this temperature.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MOOS/Ll02
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 20 B.
The other con~tion is when the Auxiliary Feedwater System is required to be op er ab le.
When run under these conditions, the pump operates at flows greater than or equal to 30 gpm with the system in manual and the recircu-lation line isolated. The test was run with the Primary System above 325°F and an LCO entered.
Special cautions and actions are provided should flow jnadvertantly go below the vendor prescribed 30 gpm minimum flow.
Technical Specifications permit operatfon with the p;.;ac pump out of service.
- The procedure does not operate the pump outside of its design; therefore, the probability or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not in.creased; the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased; and the possibility of an accident or
.malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FASR 1s not*created.
The margin.of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
e*
OPEN FACILITY CHANGES AND. SPECIFICATION CHANGES INITIATED IN 1989 NOT DECLARED OPERABLE OR CLOSED OUT
. REPORTABLE ON THE ANNUAL.~EPORT 189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT*
Facility Changes, Speci f1cat1on Changes, Tests and Exper1ments Page 22 FC-781 Th1s Facility Change covers the modification of the Refueling Machine Control System, consisting of upgrading with a computerized control console that will assist the operator in the safe movement of nuclear fuel.
Interlocks and controls presently on this machine will remain after the modification is complete.
Th1s modification includes the electronics for a digital load weighing system and electronics for a hoist position tracking system~ A semiautomatic posit1oner will be 1nstalled, along with a manual positioner, to control bridge and trolley movements to des1red locations over.the Reactor Core or Tilt Machine.
This modificat1on also removes the obsolete dry sipping equipment *.
- Safety Analysis Summary The possibility of an accident with signif1cant consequences during fuel handling evolutions is remote due to the many physical limitations imposed upon
, *fuel handling operations.
Admi ni stra~1 ve restriction, operator tra*ining and
- .equipment checklists provide additional margin for safety.
Acci~ents.previous.
.ly evaluated in the FSAR will remain unaffected by this modification. *This modification does not alter any mechanical limitations of the Refuel~ng Machine which could lead to increasing the probability of an *accident previously discussed in the FSAR.*
The possibility of a malfuncti~n with ~ignificant consequences involving equipment important to safety is also remote.
The new control system will more effectively-assist the operat6r in the safe handling of nuclear fuel.
Iri the
_event of the new control system failing, the operator still has manual op*erat-ing capabilities which allow him to place the fuel.bundle or cohtrol rod_ in a safe location until proper repairs can take place.
The maximum operating speeds of the drive motors will remain unchanged, preventing any increased probability of a fuel handling incident regarding.increased fuel ~ransfer speed.
The possibility of creating an accident or malfunction.of a different type yet to be analysed i.n the FSAR is insignificant.
The operating* envelope in all
- three areas.of the fuel handling Jllachine remains unchanged; therefore, any.
accident that can *happen -will still be within the confines of the. refueling
- cavity and under water.
This modification has no effect on any Technical Specifications or on any basis for any Technical Specifications; therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
1 89 ANN.UAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 23 FC-819 This Facility Change covers the modification of the Noncritical Service Water isolation valve control circuitry to close the valve for a left channel relay activation.
Safety Analysis Summary The intent of this modification is to modify the Safety' Injection System (SIS) to close the Noncritical Service Water isolation valve on SIS left channel relay activation. Presently, this.valve closes manually or.from SIS right channel activation only. A spare contact on the left channel SIS-1 relay will be used to de-energize the solenoid valve and to close the control valVe.
The existing annunciator on the sequencer display panel will be activated from the*
existing alarm relay. *Test circuitry will.operate in the same manner as the existing SIS right channel test circuitry to prevent stroking the control valve while tests a.re being conducted.
Failure of the SIS test blocking relays could cause the service water: isolation valve to close, but. such a relay failure has a very low.probability of occur-rence and, therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be*increased.
The modification provid~s redundancyto insure closure of the valve for a single failure that _would disable a single train of SIS relays.
The. single failure of a test.blocking relay could prevent closure of the valve, but would not prevent the Service Water System from performing its function, since three
-Service Water Pumps would be operating and provide adequate flow.
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.
The probability of failure of equipment ililportant to safety i.s increased slightly due to having four test blocking relays instead of two that could fail. This. is consistent with other SIS test blocking relays that are used to block the actuation of other equipment. Therefore, this design is not new.
However, the overall effect of this modification is a decrease in the probabil-ity of a malfunction of the valve, or an improvement in safety.
.. This* modification provides-additional redundancy between the pumps; therefore, the consequences of *a malfunction of equipment *important to safety will be decreased, ~t increased.
The modification does not create the _possibility of an accid.ent of a different type than any previousiy evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possi-bility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The modification does not affect the normal or accident operation of the Service Water isolation valve and, therefore, the margin of safety, as defined
. in the basis for any Technical Specification, will not be reduced.
1 89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Speci f1cation Changes, Tests. and Experiments Page 24 FC-834 This Facility Change covers the installation of Fire Protection standpipe and cross.tie connect ions to port ions of the underground Fi re Protect ion System which are V!Jlnerable to* a break that would render sections of the System inoperable.
Safety Analysis Summary The probability of ~n accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by this modification.
- The design, material,* and construction stan-dards are equivalent to* the original requirements.
The modification will enhance the operability of the Fi re Protection System should a line break occur.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the.FSAR wi.11 not be.
increased.,The modification will provide assurance that the Fire Protection System wi 11.perfonri the intended safety function if a fire main break were to
- occur.
The probability of malfunctions or the consequences of a malfunction of equip-ment important to safety will not be increased *.
Because the modifiCation will be consistent with original design requirements, the.possibilHy of a _different type of accident or the malfunction of a differ-ent type than previou.sly evaluated in the FSAR will riot be created.
. There are no. Technical Specifications impacted* by this modification; therefore, the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications, will not be reduced.
- FC-840 This modification covers the redesign of the steam pressu.re control for the hogging air ejector to control steam pressure at 42 psig.
Safety Analysis Summary_*
This modification will improve the control of steam pressure going to the hogger, removing the potential.for spurious operation due to a fire affecting
- the cable. Therefore, the probability of or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR wi 11 not be increased.
The probability of a malfunction of equipment, or the consequences of a mal-function of equipment important to safety will ~t be increased.
The possibility of an accident of a different type, or a malfunction of a different type than any previously reported in the FSAR will not be created by this modification.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02
CONSUMERS *POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specificatfon Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 25 The margin of safety, as* defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, will not be reduced by this modification.
FC-841 This Facility Change covers the Post Accident Sampl.ing Monitoring (PASM) Panel Pressure Indicator upgrade. It ~ncludes the replacement of pressure sensing diaphragms with new electronic type pressure transducers and replacing the mechanical pressure indicators with electronic type digital indicators, and
- .will.improv.e the reliabi,l_ity of the pressure indicators located on the PASM Panel.
Safety Analysis Summary.*
This. l)'IOdifi cation wi 11 not _increase the probability of or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
Because of this modification, the probabil.ity*of a malfunction of equipment important. to safety*will not.be incre_ased, nor -is the possibility of a malfunc-tion ofa different type than any previously analyzed in the FSAR.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis fbr any Technical Speci,fication,
- will not be reduced by this modification.
FC-844 This modification covers the replacement of the Tu~bine *control System with a Digital Electric Hydraulic (DEH) control system...
Safety Analysi.s Summary A.lthough the.control system is-,to be changed_, its function (controlling the
. Turbine speed/load) remains the same.
The system will still perform basic computations on reference signals and Turbine feedback signals and generate. an output to the actuators. *
- The DEH control system-is-more reliable and will improve availability. Because of this modification, the probability of an accident, or consequences of an
.accident preYiously eval1,Jated in the FSAR will not.be i*ncreased.
The probability of malfunction of equipment or the consequences of. a malfunc-tion of equipment iniportantto safety will not be increased by this modification.
The control system's function will remain the same; thus, the possibility of an
. accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA_R will not be created.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
.-1':*.:.J.::.-~ '
.- :1*:l :~~i~.';,.. :
"::~*i:~1;::~*... ;.
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Fac111ty Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 26 The new DEH Control system is more reliable and will be used to increase unit availability.
This will not create a possibility of a malfunction of a different* type than any previously evaluated in the *FSAR.
The 11)argiri of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, will not be reduced.
FC-852 This Facility Change covers the addition of a second Reactor water level indication circuit. *This indication will be used by operators during cold shutdown.
The componen:ts wi 11 be seismically mounted to prevent interact ion.
with other equipment in close proximity.
This modification is. in response to Generic Letter 88-17.
Safety Analysis Summary The new indicator will riot be used at operating* levels above cold shutdown.
The probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR w_i 11 not be increased.
,..The probability of malfu.nct1ori, or the consequences of a malfunction of equip-ment important to safety will not be increased by this modification.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created by this modification.
The margin of safety,-as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification;
. will not be.reduced.
FC-855 This modification covers the addition of nine (9) new dual probe assemblies be.ing installed at each bearing for monitoring vibration on the Turbine Genera-
. tor. These probes, coiitb1ned with the existing probes for vibration, will make the system a dual probe/dual plane system. Differential expans1on rotor sp~ed, casing exp~s1ons-and rotor eccentricity monitors* wil 1 also be. added to the Control Panel~
Safety Analysis Summary The supervisories monitor Turbine performance, and have no controlling func-tion.
The probability of an accident or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased because of this modification~
- No safety related equipment will be affected by this niodification.
The proba-bility of malfunction of equipment*or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the modification.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MOOS/LI02
.~. -....,.
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT FacilitY Changes, Specificatio~ Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 27 Since the modification is for equipment that is for monitoring purposes ~nly, the possibility of an accident or the malfunctiOn of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR will *not be created.
This modification does not affect any safety related equipment.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, wi 11 not be reduced.
.. This Facility Change covers modifications to restore the Primary Coolant System cold leg drains on loops lA and lB to an operable configuration, and to replace drain valves with a new type valve, and adding spectacle flanges downstream of the *valves to serve as a positive isolation against Primary System leakage to the PCS Drain Tank.
Safety Analysis Summary
- The piping downstream of.the PCS drain valves is capped off. to prevent leakage to the drain tank because of leakag~ through the PCS drain valves. This*
modification wi 11 restore the piping configuration to normal with the addition of the spectacle flange.
A stress analysis of the piping has* been performed *.
Since the function of draining the PCS through these lines is not required to
- mitigate any.accident, the safe. shutdown of the plant will not be affected.
Because the PCS drain valves are shut during.power operation, this modification will have no effect on normal operation. *All design and procurement activities are consistent with the plant *design basis as described in the FSAR and the Palisades Administrative Procedures.
Because of th~ above, the probability or consequences of an accident.previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by this modification.
This modification will not increase the probability or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.
The valves and drain piping are not covered in the basis for any Technical Spec1ficati-en; therefore,.. the_*margin of safety is not. reduce~.
FC-868 This Facility Change will replace several Swagelok connections on the Primary Coolant System (P.CS) sample line with socket weld connections to alleviate leakage, and add a permanent hydrotest connection to the PCS sample line. Test connections will have a root valve, a Swagelok plug and will* be installed on the NSSS panel.
1 89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/ll02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 28
. Safety Analysis Summary The*implementation of this modification will.prevent leakage problems which.
have been experienced with Swagelok fittings associated with the PASM panel and located on the sample line upstream of the cooler. A stress analysis of the tubing will be p'erformed.
The modification will allow access to the tubing system w_1thout disconnecting or removing any portion of the tubing system.
The
- root valve and Swagelok plug will be closed during plant operations.
The probability of'an accident previously e*valuated in the* FSAR wili not be
- increased. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, as the replacement'will be functionally equivalent to the equipment installed.
. The probabil 1ty of malfunction of equipment important to safety will. not be
- increased, and the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased.~
Since the safety~related tubing is equivalent to that which is presently*
- installed, the possibility of an accident, or a malfunctfon of a _different. type
. than any previously evaluated in the FSAR, will not 'be created.
The margin of.safety, as defined in the basis fo-r any Technical Specification, will not be reduced by this modification.
. FC-872.
This modification covers. the Fuel Transfer Control System upgrade with a
. *computerized control system that wi 11 assist the operator in the safe transfer of nuclear fuel between the Containment Building and the Auxiliary Building.
Interlocks and controls presently in the system will remain after completion of this modification. with the,exception of the transfer winch dynamic braking.
Safety Analysis Summary The possibility of an acc1de~t with significant consequences during fuel handling evolutions ls remote due to the many physical limitations imposed upon *
.fuel -handl~operations~, --Administrative restrictions. oper~tor training and equipment checklists provide additional margin of safety.
Accidents previously evaluated in-the FSAR remain unaffected by this modification.
The modification does not alter any mechanical l imitat1ons of the fuel transfer system which could lead to increasing the probability of an accident previously discussed in the FSAR.
The possibility of a malfunction with significant consequences involving.
equipment important to safety is also remote.*
The new control system will.more effectively assist the operator in the safe handling of nuclear fuel *.
The operator also has the capability of manual fuel handling operations.
Operating speeds of the fuel transfer system will not be changed by this modification, 189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MOOS/LI02
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 29 preventing any increased probability of a fuel handling.incident regarding increased fuel transfer speed.
The possibility of creating an accident or malfunction of a different type yet to be analyzed in the FSAR is. insignificant. The operating envelope. in all three axis of the fuel transfer system. will remain unchanged; therefore. any accident that can happen will still be within the confines of the fuel transfer
- cana 1 and under water.
FC-877 This modification covers the installation of vestibules at Control Room doors 108. and 115 to provide assurance that the Control Room Heating. Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System will perform the.intended safety function if an accident were to occur.
The purpose of the vestibules is to prevent ~ir.
- inleakage.
Safety Analysis Summary The addition of t'he vestibules will not i.ncrease the.probability of an accident previously evaluated in.the FSAR *.
To ensure the doors are functional. a Periodic Activity li:lspection (PAC) will be performed with subsequent.maintenance as necessary.
The vestibules will provide an additional. barrier between the Control Room HVAC and adjacent HVAC areas. The design will be seismically analyzed to ensure the addition will not have detr.imenta 1 effects on other equipment in the area, and provides assurance that the Control Room HVAC System will function as intended should an accident occur.
Therefore, the probability of malfunction of equip-ment important to safety will not be increased.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any.Technical Specification~*
will not.be...i:educed as a. result of adding vestibules at these doors, since the doors prevent air.inleakage.*
SC-89.,.130 This modification covers the replacement of 3 11 manifolds and li 11 headers on existing Contairvnent Air Cooler VHX-4.
The replacement parts are constructed similar to the existing coils; however, they will have thicker walls to provide better braie joint than the original. The improved joint design is intended to eliminate the cooling water leaking problems.*
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 30 Safety Anal;ys is Sulnmary
.The probabiltty of an accident pr~viously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by this modification.
The Containnent Air Cooling System is designed.
to remove heat and vapor from the Containment atmosphere during normal plant operations, limit the Containment Building pressure rise, and reduce airborne radioactivity leakage in the event of a Design Basis Accident. (OBA).
The*
system is sized such that 3 of the 4 cooling units will limit Containment pressure to less.than design following a OBA as discussed in the FSAR.
This modification will. not increase the probability of this accident.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR *will not be increased by this modification.
Installation of replacement headers and manifolds on VHX:..4 is intended to eliminate cooling water leaks in the braze joints of the existing cooling coils.
The probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by this modification. *The replacement headers and manffolds will be*.
designed and installed in accordance with original plant design criteria and specifications.
The operability and performance of VHX-4 will not be affected by this modification; :therefore, the probability of a malfunction is not increased.
The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be
- increased by this modification since the operation of the Containment Air.
Cooling System will be enhanced by eliminating cooling water leakage from the
. cooling coils of VHX-4.
- The possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluat:..
ed in the FSAR wi 11 not be created by this modification.
The f.unction of the VHX-4 will not be. changed and no new accident scenario wi.11 be created~
The possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR wi 11 not be created.
VHX-4 is a passive piece of* equip-ment, the performance of which is*dependen.t upon adequate cooling water.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Techr:iical Specification, will_ not be reduced by this modification.
SC-89-136 This modification involves the removal of 6 hydraulic snubbers and repl.acing them with equivalent capacity struts. The snubbers are located on the Engi-neering Safeguards System and the Safety Injection System piping.
Safety Analysis Summary The modification will not increase the possibility of previously evaluated accidents as tontained in the FSAR.
'89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MOOS/LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 31 The consequences or an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased because this modification meets the design and analysis criteria of the FSAR.
The probability of malfunctions of equipment important to safety will not be increased because o.f this modification.
The piping supports and piping systems.
_will sti.ll meet the design and analysis criteria contained in the FSAR.
The possibility of a* different type of accident will not be created, since the
. installation of the struts will be consistent with original design requirements as contained in the FSAR.
The Technical Specification.inspection and testing requirements are based on a percentage of.the number of $afety-related snubbers installed.
Replacement of snubbers ~1th struts using FSAR design and analysis criteri~ does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications because the same percentage of safety.:.related snubbers will be inspected and tested.
SC-89-199 This *modification cover*s the installation of Force, Sensors on a 11 L imitorque M_otor Operated Gate and Globe Valves.* *The.sensors will be used.. to assist in setting torque switches an~* diagnostically testing Motor Operated Valves (MOVs).
Safety Analysis Summary This modification will not affect the design, function or opera~iltty of any system, structure or component in the FSAR or Technical Specifications.
The modification will allow the additfon of a *very small st.rain gage sensor to*.each
- valve yoke arm to measure the stem loading on the valve for testing purposes.*
The addition of* these sensors will not affect the valve's operability because *.
the system is a*nonintrusive valve/actuator diagnostic testing system used for measuring valve/actuator thrust output, switch settings, trending, problem/
- trouble shooting, and ver1fication of operation as required by USNRC Generic Letter 89-10, -"Safety Related Motor Operated Valve Testing and Survei'llance".
The i nsta 11 at-1on of these sensors wi 11 be contra l led vi a approved work orders
- and mai ntena.ace procedures.
- This modification will not affect the possibility or consequences of an acci-dent previously evaluated in the FSAR.
It w.ill not increase the potential or.
consequences of a malfunction of equipment previously evaluated in the FSAR.
It will not affect the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type as described in the FSAR. *This modification will not affect the margin of safety defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
- The sensors *are seismically insignificant and will be non_intrusive to the
- valve/actuator's operability.
They will be used only for testing purposes, using approved p 1 ant procedures and _work orders.
1 89 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/LI02
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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Fac111ty Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 32 SC-89-259
. This modification will reroute the hydrogen gas vent pipe on each of the
- charging pump* s suction line accumulators from the header to the Volume Control Tank, to the individual pump's seal leakage well.
Gas fn the leakage well leaves by a*n existing t" vent line to the Plant's atmospheric stack *
. Safety Analysis Summary The vent pipe rerouting will have no affect on the initiation of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The vented gas path from the charging pumps
- to the atmospheric* stack wi 11 be less* compl 1cated ~ have less surface. and less equipment.to pass through. Thus, the new vent path should be safer and de-crease the probability of this "vented gas" escaping.
- venting hydrogen gas from pump suction line accumulators should reduce pump cavitation and improve pump_ life and _reliability; thus the probability of malfunc.tion of equipment important to safety will not be increased.
The charging pumps will be used in the same manner as they were before the modification, and consequences of a malfunction will not be changed.
The only variable in the rerouting of the accumulator's vent piping will be the gas pressure differential and flow rates. Neither of these create a new or different type of. *accident probability than any.Previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification, may be increased by reducing the possib.11 ity of charging pump damage caused by cavitation or collapse of hydrogen bubbles.
SC-89-344 This modification covers the set point change to PCV-1903 and RV-1903 on the Post Accident Sampling Monitoring (PASM) Panel. This pressure_ control.valve is
- used to reduce th.e pressure on the PASM P.anel nitrogen header allowing purging of sample lines at reduced pressures.
The relief valve provides relief protec-t ion for tM+ same ~i trogen header.
Safety Analy.sis Summary
- _The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be
- .increased *. The modification will not modify the PCS or other components whose failure would initiate an accident situation *.
This modification will help make the PASM System more accurate by reducing apparent mi nor dilution of samples from demineral ized flush water. Consequenc-es of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will*not be increased.
189 ANNUAL REPORT-OF MODS/LI02
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Facility Changes, Specification Changes, Tests and Experiments Page 33
. This modification will not increase the probability of malfunction or the*
consequences of malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously
- described ih the* FSAR.
The possibility of an accident or the possibility of a malfunction of a differ-ent type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created.
The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, wi.11 not be reduced by this modification~* The modification will help ensure continued capability to obtain and analyze Reactor coolant during accident conditions.*
189 ANNUAL REPORT OF MODS/Ll02 r,"'
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