ML18052B299
| ML18052B299 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8709170243 | |
| Download: ML18052B299 (12) | |
Text
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Charles E.. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects THRU:
W. G. Guldemond, Chief, Projects Branch 2 FROM:
B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A
SUBJECT:
PALISADES STATUS REPORT -
Enclosed is the Palisades bi-weekly status report covering the period.
- August 17 thru 28, 1987.
During this period, one Resident Inspector monitored onsite activities. This report is intended to fulfill the requirements of the August 7, 1987 memorandum from T. E. Murley directing implementation of periodic status reports on facilities where there is significant regulatory concern and active interest by the. public, government officfals, or the Congress.
Please contact me if ybu have any questions regarding this report.
Attachment:
Palisades Status Report See Attached Distribution
~C!J'J' JJ!Ji Burges sis 9//t/87 l'/;r RIIV Guldemond 9//(/87 8709170243 870911 PDR ADOCK 05000255 R
PDR Original signed by W~ G. Guldemond B. L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A JC-CJ/
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Charles E. Norelius Distribution cc w/attachment:
Kenneth W.. Berry, Di rector Nuclear*Licensing David P. Hoffman, General Manager Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Michigan Department of Pub 1 i c Hea 1th T. E. Murley, NRR F. J. Miraglia, NRR R. W. Starostecki,. NRR S. A. Varga, NRR D. M. Crutchfield, NRR L. C. Shao, NRR c~ E. Rossi, NRR J. G. Partlow, NRR F. Cange 1, NRR J. Roe, NRR J. M. Taylor, EDO G. Holahan, NRR M. Virgilio, NRR J. Stefano, NRR H. J. Miller, RIII J. A. Hind, Rl!I A. B. Davis, RI II C. J. Paperiello, RIII Regional Administrators, RI, RI!, RIV, RV SEP 1 ~:
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY co*.~*.~1SSION RECIO!\\- Ill SEP C ~ 1327 MEMORANDU1' FOR:
Charles E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects THRU:
'i). G. Guldemond, Chief, Projects Branch 2
-FROM:
B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A
SUBJECT:
PALISADES STATUS REPORT Enclosed is the Palisades bi-weekly status repo~t covering the period August 17 thru 28, 1987.
During this period, o~E Resident Inspector monit6red onsite activities. This report is intended to fulfill the requirements of the August 7, 1987 memorandum from T. E. Murley di-rec ting implementation of periodic s:atus reports on facilities where there is signifi~ant regulatory concern a~~ active interest by the_ public, government officials, or the Congress.
Please co~tact me if you have any questions reg~rding this ~eport.
Attachmert:
Palisades Status Report cc w/attachment:
Kenneth -~. Berry, Di rector Nuclear Licensing David P. hoffman, General Manager DCS/RSB (R:os)
Licensin£ Fee Management Branch Resident ~r.spector, RIII Ronald Cal~en, Michigan.
Public Service Cormiission Michigan uepartment of Public hEalth
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B. L. B~rg~ Chief Reactor Projects Sectio~ 2A
ENCLOSURE PALISADES STATUS REPO~T FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 17 - 28, 1987
- 1.
Pl ant Status As of 8:00 a.m. on Au~ust 28, 1987, Palisades was operating at 93 of fuJl power {limited by the #4 turbine governor valve being closed at nonnaJ operating temperature and pressure (560 F, 2014 psig).
- 2.
Facility Operations SulTITlary The facility operated for 10 days during this 12 day period.
Maximum power generation was 1imitec to 93% due to isolation of the #4 turbine governor valve.
Power red~ctions include a forced outage to add ci1 to a primary coolant pump (PCP) rr~tor and repair the leaks (the reactor remained critical at 2% po~er), a manual reactor trip in anticip2tion of loss of the main turbine due to an electro-hydraulic control (EHC) syitem leak, and an anticipatory automatic reactor trip caused by loss cf the main generator field voltage.
Other situations of interest are identified below.
- 3.
Items of Special Interest
....... Primary Coolant Pump Motor Oil Leak
- On August 14, 1987, the licensee reduced power from 100 percent to approximately 2 percent power to allow troubleshooting of the ns~ primary coolant pump*motor.
The mc:or had a minor oil leak on the upper cil
. reservior which required a containment entry to add oil and deten;:ine.the location of the leak.
The plant shutdown was necessary to reduce radiation levels to minimize personnel exposure.
1nvestigation cf the P-50B pump motor identified lubrication oil leaking from a sight glass on the upper oil reservoir anc a leak around a manway.
The licensee repaired the leaks and insp.ected the other primary coolant pumps* for
- leakage prior to *re.start at 6:24 a~m. on August 15~ 1987.
Turbine Centro 1 Fluid Leak While returning to full power on August 17, 1987, at 4:04 a.m., c;~rato*rs were alerted to a turbine e1ectro-hydraulic control (EHC) syste~ leak when the standby EHC pump s~erted and the governor valves starte~
c16sing. The reactor was m~rually tripped.
Operators noted no e~~ipment operating problems during the trip. The plant was operating at 6E percent power while perfonr.ing a primary coolant system leak rate.
The NRC was notified of the tri~ at 4:57 a.m. on the same day.
The EHC fluid leak was idertified on the supply line to the #4 gcvernor valve at a midpoint of the f1exible coupling.
The flexible hose ~~s recently installed on all g:Yernor valve EHC lines as a corrective measure to eliminate cracki~; that had been experienced with thE ~ard piping due to vibration~ The EHC fluid leak idehtified on the su~ply
.y
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line to t~~ #4 governor valve was determined tc be a result of iffi~roper installaticr and/or application of the flexible hcse.
Since time consuming engineering and procurement would be required to replace the flexible hcse, it was decided to reinstall hard piping on the EHC lines until the planned EHC line modification can be installed during the October 19E7 maintenance outage.
It was later decided to isolate the #4 turbine governor valve to preclude another failure until additional action can t-e taken to resolve the vibration pher.omena.
This action limits power to 93% until the October outage.
After vario~s equipment repairs, the reactor was r~de critical at 5:37 p.m. on Aug~st 18, 1987.
The generator *was connected to the grid at 4:33 a.m. on August 19~ 1987, after a delay caused by generator voltage cor:rol problems.
The voltage regulator ~~uld not allow the matching of the machine and bus voltages so the ~cltage control was switched tc an alternate supply~
Containment Airlock Seal Failure Following *a satisfactory between-the-door test of the personnel air lock, a door seal test was performed on the inner door and was declared a failure at l:45 p.m. on August 20, 1987.
A four h~ur non-emergency report was ~3de and corrective maintenance was pe~formed. Both doors of the airlock open into containment so that presSLirE seals the doors*
closed.
D~ring the airlock integrity test, press~~e is applied between the doors.
To prevent the inner door from unseatir:g, strongbacks are installed tc hold the door closed.
the inner sea1s had been compressed by the strorgbacks, and after cleaning and adjustroent a satisfactcry seal test was performed on the inner door at 3:15 a.~. on August 21, 1987.
Additional Lesting was also required on the esca~~ lo~k, which was used to enter cortainment to perform the work on the ir~er door seal. During preparatiors for the escape.lock test, the inner seal of the escape airlock was also found to be leaking air. This c:~dition was ide~tified*
by personne~ inside the airlock when air was whis~1ing through the inner seals. This conditiori was in violation of the li:ensee's Technical Specificaticns for containment integrity, and eris~ed for several brief periods whe~ entries were made through this airlc:~ to make repairs to the personn~1 airlock~ As corrective action, the licensee closed the outer door, repaired the inner seals and satisfac:.:.rily reteste.d the airlock.
The licenseE was planning to enter through the ou:er personnel aitlock door to mak: repairs on the failed inner door sec1 of the same airlock.
When the irspector was notified of their plans, thEy were encouraged not to willfull~ violate containment integrity.
Plars were then made to enter throu;~ the escape airlock.
Followup with ihe licensee on containment airlock testing and repair methods ar~ Technical Specificatic~ interpretation is planned.
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3 Loss Of Generator Voltaae Control On August 23, 1987 at 6:28 a.m., operators re~eived a spurious generate~
alarm and seconds later a turbine trip and reactor trip on loss of loat.
The plant was operating at a steady state of 93 percent power.
Probleres startup on August 18, 1987, but had been resolv~d by switching to the alternate Trinistat power.supply.
On August 25, 1987 at 2:22 a.m., operators took the reactor critical.
The turbine was placed on line after steam generator chemistry hold points were satisified at 3:15 p.~. Investigation of the cause determined that the Trinistat ge~erator voltage regulator power amplifie~
had a failed potentiometer which caused a loss of the generator field.
The Trinistat drawer has been repaired, load tested for several hours, and determined to be operating sa:isfactorily.
Other conditions which were note~ after the trip and resolved include:
the correct alarm setpoint associated with an alarm operators expected :c rec~ive was verified; the +/-B' mair feed pump seal leakage was evaluate:
as acceptable; and the auxitiary feed pump control valve CV-0727A pack~r; was ~dju~ted, the stem lubricated, and stroke.teited satisfactorily.
Operation Below The Minimum Tempercture For Criticality On August 25, 1987, at 1:15 p.m; **hen the reactor was critical at abou:
2% power, the average coolant te~~erature (Tave) dropped from the desir~~
533 F to below the Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3(a) limit of 525
~
for less than a minute.
This trarsient condition was a result of the*
combined effects of a rapid xenor bu~nout rate, boration to maintain criticality, low control rod wort~ due to rod height, turbine/generatcr voltage regulator testing and feed pump startup. This condition is nc:
.considered safety significant.
Jr this regard, Standard Technical...
Specifications (STS) permit this ccr.ditionto exist for 15 minutes as c
- Limiting Condition for Opcratior, (LCO).
However, of the two similar events which preceded this, one "*:s nearly identical in root cause, i.e.,
operator error.
Correctjve acticrs planned to prevent recurrence incl~=~
revision of the TS to reflect the LCO of the STS.
Management Meeting On August 25, 1987, in the Regier !II offices, reresentatives of Consumers Power Co., led by Dr. F. W. Buckman, presented a status of plant activiiies on various actio~ items including the development of t~~
Configuration Management Progra~ tc Mr. C. E. Norelius and certain NRR and Region III staff.
l Changes to Period of Status Repor:~ng This is the first of the bi-weekl~* status reports for Palisades, made ir response to the directions of the T. E. Murley memorandum dated August 2, 1987.
iv
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e 4
- 5.
NRC Staff Activities Durina the Period One NRC resident inspector monitored plant operating activities between August 17 and 28, 1987 including startup, corrective actions for equipment problems and followup on other fssues.
These d~tails of these activities can be found in inspection report 255/87022(C?P).
A Fitness for Duty Inspec.tio~ was conducted by a four man team fr~ NRR and Region Ill.
The inspection staff at Palisades during the report period consisted of the fellowing:
Eric R. Swanson N*. J. Timmer Senior Resident Inspector Resident Clerical Aide
- A UNIHO SlA'TE~
NuMAR REGULATORY COM*.~1ss10~
REGION Ill 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD CLEN ELLYN. ILLIN015
'Ol:i~
SEP O 9 1327 MEMORANDUI". FOR:
Charles E. Noreliu.s, Director, 01vision of Reactor Projects THRU:
'{). G. Guldemond, Chief, Projects Branch 2 FRO~:
B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A
SUBJECT:
PALISADES STATUS REPORT Enclosed is the Palisades bi-weekly status report covering the period August 17 t~ru 28, 1987.
During this period, one Resident Inspector monitored onsite acti~ities. This report is intended to fulfill the requirements of the August 7, 1~57 memorandum from T. E. Murley directing implementation of periodic stctus reports on facilities where there is significant regulatory concern anC:: active interest by the public~ governrr.entqfficials, or the Congress.
. Please conta:t me if you have any questions regarding this report.
Attachment:
Palisades Status Report c.c w/attach.~nt:
. Kenneth \\\\.
~rry, Di rector Nuclear Li:ensing.
David P~ Ho~fman, General Manager DCS/RSB ( RI:*S)
Licensing Fe~ Management Branch Resident Ins~ector, RIII Ronald Ca11e~, Michigan
- Public Se:n'ice Cormlission Michigan De;crtment of Public HHith
~~
B. L. Burg~ Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A
~.,
e t~CLOSURE PALISADES STATUS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 17 - 28, 1987
- 1.
Plant Status As of 8:00 a.m. on August 28, 1987, Palisades was operating at 93~ cf full power {limited by the 14 turbine governor valve being closed) a:
normal operating temperature ard pressure {560 F, 2014 psig).
- 2.
Facility Operations Surrrnary The facility operated for 10.days during this 12 day period..
MaximJr power generation was limited tc 93% due to isolation of the #4 turt-~r.::
governor valve.
Power reductions include a forced outage to add oi1 to a primary coolant pump {PCP) motor and repair the leaks {the reactor remained critical at 2~. power:, a manual reactor trip in anticipatic' of loss of the main turbine due tc an electro-hydraulic control (EHC) Sfstem leak, and an anticipatory autor.atic reactor trip caused by loss of tr.e main generator field voltage.
Other situations of interest are identified below.
3; Items of Special Interest.
Primary Coolant Pump Motor OP Leak On August 14, 1987, the licensee reduced power ftom 100 percent to approximately 2 percent power to allow troubleshooting of the "B" pr;r:-.ary coolant pump motor.
The motor had a minor oil leak on the upper oi~
reservior which required a cor.~ainment entry to add oil and determir.: the location of the leak.
The plart shutdown was necessary to reduce radiation levels to minimize ~rsonnel exposure.
Investigation of t~*e P-508 pump motor identified lubrication oil leaking from a sight g1eEs on the upper oil reservoir and a leak around a manway.
The licensee repaired the leaks and inspected the other primary coOlant. pumps fo,.
leakage prior to restart at ~:24 a.m. bn August 15, 1987.
Turbine Control Fluid Leak While returning to full powEr on August 17, 1987, at 4:04 a.m., ope~c.:ors were alerted to a turbine elec:ro-hydraulic control (EHC) system le~*
when the standby EHC pump started and the governor valves started closing. The reactor was manuc.:ly tripped.
Operators noted no equip:-.:nt operating problems during the. trip.
The plant was operating at 68 percent po...,*er while performin£ c primary coolant system leak rate.
":'r.e NRC was notified of the trip at 4:57 a.m. on the same day.
The EHC fluid leak was identi~ied on the supply line to the #4 gove-*:r valve at a midpoint of the flexible coupling.
The flexible hose we:
recently installed on all governor valve EHC lines as a corrective measure to eliminate crackins that had been experienced with the h2~:
piping due to vibration.
The EHC fluid leak identified on the supp1~*
-1
2 line to the f! governor valve was determined to be a result of improper installation and/or application of the flexible hose.
Since time consuming engineering and procurement would be required to replace the flexible hose, it was decided to reinstall hard piping on the EHC lines until the planned EHC line modification can be instclled during the October 1987 ir.aintenance outage.
It was later decided to isolate the #4 turbine governor valve to preclude another failure until additional action can be taken to resolve the vibration phenomena.
This action limits power to 93% until the October outage.
After various equipment repairs, the reactor was made critical at 5:37 p.m. on August 18, 1987.
The generator was connected to the grid at 4:33 a.m. on August 19, 1987, ~fter a delay caused by generator voltage contrcl problems.
The voltage regulator wc~ld not allow the matching of the machine and bus voltages so the volt.age control was switched to ar alternate supply.
Containment ~irlo~k Seal Failure Following a sctisfactory between-the-door test of He personnel air lock, a door sea 1 test was performed on the inner door anc was dee 1 a red a
. failure at 4:!5 p.m. on August 20, 1987.
A four ho~r non-emergency report was mcde and corrective maintenance was perf c nned.
Both doors* of the airlock c~-en into containment so that pressure seals the doors closed.
Duri~g the airlock integrity test, pressure is applied between the doors.
Tt prevent the inner door from unseatin~. strongbacks are installed to h~ld the door.closed.
The inner seals had been compressed by the strong:.acks, and after cleaning and adjustmer:: a satisfactory seal test was perfc:rned on the inner door at 3:15 a.m. or August 21, 1987.
Additional testing was also required on the escape lock, which was used to enter contcinment to perfonn the work on the inr,e'" door *seal. During preparations for the escape lock test, the inner sec1 of the escape airlock was also found to be leaking air. This con~ition was identified by personnel inside the airlock when air was whistling thrdugh the inner seals. This condition was in violation of the licers~e's Technical Specificatior.s for containment integrity, and existed for several brief periods when entries were made through this airloc~ to make repairs to the personnel ~irlock. As corrective action, the licensee closed the outer door, re~aired the inner seals and satisfact0r~ly retested th~
airlock.
The licensee *~S* planning to enter through the outer personnel airlock door to make repairs on the failed inner door seal cz the same airlock.
When the insp~::tor was notified of their plans*,
the~* were encouraged not to willfully \\iolate containment integrity.
Plans *~re then made to enter throug~ the escape airlock.
Followup with th~ licensee on containment airlock testing and repair methods and Technical Specificatior interpretation is planned.
-,i'*
3 Loss Of Generator Voltage-Control On August 23, 1987 at 6:28 a.m., operators received a spurious generator alarm and seconds later a turbine trip and reactor trip on loss of load.
Th~ plant.was operating at a steady state of 93 percent power.
Problems startup on August 18, 1987, but had been resolved by switching to the alternate Trinistat power supply.
On August 25, 1987 at 2:22 a.m., operators took the reactor critical.
The turbine was placed on line after steam generator chemistry hold points were satisified at 3:15 p.m.
Investigation of the cause determined that the Trinistat generator voltage regulator power amplifier had a failed potentiometer which caused a loss of the generator field.
The Trinistat drawer has been repaired, load tested for several hours, and determined to be operating satis~cctoril,Y.
Other conditions which were noted after the trip and resolved include:
the correct alarm setpoint associate~ with an alarm operators expected tc receive was verified; the +/-B' main feed pump seal leakage was evaluated as ~cceptable; and the.auxiliary fee~ pump control valve CV-0727A packing was adjusted,. the stem lubricated, arc stroke tested satisfactorily.
Operation Below The Minimum T~mperatJre For Critic~lity
- On August 25, 1987, at 1:15 p.m. wher the reactor was critical at about 2% power, the average coolant temperature (Tave) dropped from the desirec 533 F to below the Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3(a) limit of 525 F for less than a mintite.
This transi~nt condition was a result of the combined effects of a rapid xenon bu~nout rate, boration to maintain criticality~ low control rod worth d~e to rod height, turbine/generator voltage regulator testing and feed pr:p startup.
This condition is not considered safety significant~ In t~is reg~rd, Standard Techriical Specifications (STS) pennit this ccrcition to exist for 15 minutes as a Limiting Condition for Operation iLCC).
However, of the two similar events which preceded this, one was ree:rly identical in root cause, Le.,'
operator error.
Corrective actions ~lanned to prevent recurrence include revision of the TS to reflect the LCC of.the STS.
Management Meeting Ori August 25, 1987, in the Region II: offices, reresentatives of Consumers Power Co;, led by Dr. F.
~. Buckman, presented a status of plant activities on various action i:c~s including the development of the Configuration Management Program torr. C. E. Norelius and certain NRR and Region III staff.
4~
Changes to Period of Stat~s Reportin~
This is the first of the bi-weekly sutus reports for Palisades, made in response to the directions of the T. E. Murley memorandum dated August 3, 1987.
1'
..c...l_
- \\;.L 4
- 5.
NRC Steff Activities Durina the Period One NRC resident inspector monitored plant operating activities between August 17 and 28, 1987 including startup, corrective actions for equipment problems and follow~p ~n other issues.
These details of these activiti~s can be found in inspection report 255/87022(DRP)~ A Fitness for Duty Inspection was conducted by a four man team from NRF and Region III. The inspection staff at Palisades during the report period consisted of the following:
Eric R. *Swanson N
- J. Ti rrrne r s~~ior Resident Inspector R~sident Clerical Aide
- ~