ML18047A389

Proposed Tech Spec Changes,Reducing Primary Coolant Sys Boron Concentration & Permitting Dilution W/O Containment Integrity Being Maintained

ML18047A389
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	06/25/1982
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18047A387	List: ML18047A386 ML18047A388 ML18047A389
References
NUDOCS 8206290391
Download: ML18047A389 (3)

Text

.

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST PALISADES PLANT

..*-1

(-8206290:391 820625

~ PDR ADOCK 05000255

.P ,PDR r<1

3.1. 2 Heatup and Cooldown Rates (Contd)

References (Contd)

(5) FSAR, Section 4.2.4.

(6) US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1. 99, "Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials," July 1975.

(7) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Appendix G, "Protection Against Non-Ductile Failure," 1974, Edition.

(8) US Atomic Energy Commission Standard Review Plan, Directorate of Licensing, Section 5. 3. 2, *"Pressure-Temperature Limits."

(9) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Requirements,"

August 31, 1973.

3.1. 3 Minimum Conditions for Criticality a) Except during low-power physics test, the reactor shall not be 0

made critical if the primary coolant temperature is below 525 F.

b) In no case shall the reactor be made critical if the primary coolant temperature is below 286°F.

c) When the primary coolant temperature is below the minimum temperature specified in "a" above, the reactor shall be subcritical by an amount equal to or greater than the potential reactivity insertion due to depressurization.

d) No more than one control rod at a time shall be exercised or with-drawn until after a steam bubble and normal water level are estab-lished in the pressurizer.

e) :Primary coolant boron concentration .shall not be reduced below cold shutdown boron concentration until after a steam bubble and normal water level are established in the pressurizer.

Basis At the beginning of life of the initial fuel cycle, the moderator temperature coefficient is expected to be slightly negative at operating temperatures with all control rods withdrawn. (l). However, the unce~tainty of the calculation is such that it is possible that a slightly positive coefficient could exist.

PROPOSED 3-12

coNT.AINMENT*sYST]Me

• . Apt>lic.ability Appl1esto the reactor contairimentbuilding.

Objective TO assure tbe integrity ot the reactor containment building .

. Specifications 3.6.1 Containment Integrity

• a; Containment integrity shall be maintained unless the reactor is.

in the cold shutdow'n condition. During the refueling mode of operation, containment shall be maintained as specified by Specification 3.8.

b. Containment integrity shall be maintained when the reactor vessel head is removed unless the boron concentration is greater than refueling concentration.

c. Except for testing one rod at a time, positive reactivity changes shall not be made by control rod motion, or boron dilution to less than cold shutdown boron concentration unless containment integrity is maintained.

3.6.2 Tbe internal pressure shall not exceed 3 psig (except for containment leak rate tests).

3.6.3 Prior to the reactor going critical after a refueling outage, an ad-ministrative check will be made to confirm that all "locked-closed" manual containment isolation valves are closed and loCked~

. Basis

.. The primary coolant system conditions of' cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and, hence, there would be no pressure buildup in the containment if the primary coolant system ruptures

• The shutdown

. margins are selected based on the type of' activities that are being

• . carried out. The refueling boron concentration provides shutd~ mar-gin which precludes criticality under any circumstances.

Regarding internal pressure limitations, the containment design pres-sure of 55 psig would not be exceeded if' the internal pressure before a major loss-of-coolant accident were as much as 4 psig.(l) .

The containment integrity will be protected if the visual check of all

. "locked-closed"* manual isolation valves to verify _them closed is made prior to plant start-up after an extended outage where one or more valves could inadvertently be left open.

References (1) FSAR, section 14.18.

3-4o PRO?O:::-ED